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Abstract 
This thesis examines the impact of disease and mortality on the Royal Navy in the West 
Indies from 1770 to 1806.  It also investigates the navy’s medical branch which was 
established to manage the care of sick seamen.  Using an interdisciplinary approach, this 
thesis produces a cohesive understanding of how disease and mortality affected the navy’s 
presence in the West Indies and the ways in which the navy attempted to mitigate their 
impact.  This thesis explores various aspects of naval medicine including the history of the 
Sick and Hurt Board, the diseases which distressed seamen, the medicines distributed by 
the navy, the key personnel who were integral in generating changes to the medical system 
and the development of hospital facilities. 
Largely based on Admiralty records including correspondence and minutes from the Sick 
and Hurt Board, ships’ muster books and surgeons’ journals, this thesis investigates the 
most prevalent diseases in the West Indies and the prescribed treatments advocated by the 
navy.  It then examines how these diseases and treatments affected seamen on board ships 
in that region through a quantitative analysis; then focuses on a number of the integral 
naval personnel who ushered in sweeping changes to naval medicine; and explores the 
navy’s increasing desire to transition from hired sick quarters to purpose-built naval 
hospitals on various West Indies islands.  It concludes with a case study of the 
development of Antigua naval hospital which demonstrates the effectiveness of these 
facilities in convalescing sick seamen. 
Through a quantitative analysis of ships’ muster books, this thesis argues that the levels of 
sickness and mortality in the navy in the West Indies during the late eighteenth century are 
largely exaggerated in historical studies while also discrediting the myth that those islands 
were the ‘white man’s graveyard’ for many naval personnel.  By surveying over 100,000 
seamen on board ships in that region, sickness and mortality figures emerge which indicate 
that, on average, less than 4 per cent of seamen were on the sick list at any given time and 
only a small percentage died, meaning that the majority remained on active duty.  This 
thesis then argues that many of the changes to the navy’s medical system that facilitated 
such low percentages were primarily instigated by surgeons, physicians and captains who 
identified beneficial medicines and championed their general distribution among the entire 
fleet.  By looking at these aspects of naval medicine through a multidisciplinary lens rather 
than a purely administrative one, it is possible to understand the true state of health of 
British seamen in the West Indies during the last quarter of the eighteenth century.  
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Introduction 
When England expanded its empire to the West Indies in the seventeenth century, it 
required the Royal Navy’s presence in order to protect its lucrative trade network.  Their 
attendance in that tropical region meant that seamen were frequently exposed to endemic 
diseases.  Due to high levels of sickness and mortality in the early eighteenth century, the 
region quickly gained a reputation for being particularly unhealthy.  In order to suppress 
the perilous conditions, the navy ordered their dedicated medical branch oversee the care 
of seamen both on board ships and ashore in convalescing facilities.  This thesis will 
explore the health of the British seamen in the West Indies during the period 1770 to 1806 
and will incorporate various facets of naval medicine in order to ascertain the true impact 
of disease and mortality at that time. 
In 1623, a party of Englishmen established a permanent colony on the island of St Kitts 
(also known as St Christopher) followed by a settlement at Barbados a year later.  These 
islands were England’s first footholds in the West Indies, a region which in due course 
produced considerable wealth for those who chose to invest in local agriculture and export 
their goods to Europe and North America.  Colonisation of additional islands such as 
Jamaica and Antigua led to a sizeable migration of Englishmen to the Caribbean in the 
seventeenth century.1  For the maritime historian, this growth of English overseas markets 
in the West Indies is important because it created an extensive system of trade routes 
vulnerable to piracy and enemy attacks during wartime.2  These merchant trade routes 
required a system of protection for their ships carrying valuable commodities back to 
England.  Royal naval ships were ordered to the West Indies to undertake this 
responsibility serving on two individual naval stations: Jamaica and the Leeward Islands.  
The number of ships the navy ordered to these two stations was ever-increasing, thereby 
ensuring a vigilant presence and watchful eye on English settlers and merchant shipping. 
Geographically, the West Indies is a chain of islands, varying in size from Cuba with its 
44,000 square miles, to small islets of only a few acres each in area, and extends in the 
shape of a sickle blade from Florida to the northern coast of South America (Figure 0.1).  
The huge section of ocean lying between the chain and the American continent is called the 
Caribbean Sea, named after the Charaibes or Caribs, the warlike race which peopled the 
                                                                 
1 William Lux, Historical Dictionary of  the British Caribbean, Latin American Historical Dictionaries, no.12 
(Metuchen: The Scarecrow Press, 1975), p. 24. 
2 R.P. Crowhurst, ‘The Admiralty and the Convoy System in the Seven Years War’  in Mariner’s Mirror, vol 57 
(1971), p. 165. 
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smaller islands at the time of their discovery. 3  The islands were also referred to as the 
‘Antilles’ a name based on Antilla or Antiglia, the mythical land, which was for centuries 
believed to exist in the far west.  Jamaica, Cuba, Hispaniola and Puerto Rico, the large 
islands to the north, are still referred to as the Greater Antilles, while the smaller islands to 
the east, beginning with St Thomas, are styled the Lesser Antilles. 4 
 
Figure 0.1 – Islands of the Caribbean 17795 
St Kitts was selected as the first English settlement because of its favourable geographic 
position, friendly natives, fertile soil and its abundant supply of fresh water.  Colonization 
began on the island in 1623 with the arrival of Sir Thomas Warner, his family, and fourteen 
others. English settlers were joined in 1625 by a group of French settlers led by Pierre 
Belain d'Esnambue.  The two parties wiped out the local Carib Indians in a massacre in 
1626 and then turned their attention to colonising islands around them.  A year after the 
settling of St Kitts, John Powell was returning home from Brazil when he landed at 
Barbados, which was all but uninhabited, and claimed the noticeably fertile land in the 
name of King James.  The next significant island claimed by England was Antigua which 
was occupied and settled in 1632 by Warner, the same man who settled St Kitts.  English 
control of Antigua was nearly short-lived for in 1666 a French force from Martinique, 
                                                                 
3 Allister MacMillan (ed.), The Red Book of  the West Indies: Historical and Descriptive Commercial and Industrial Facts, 
Figures and Resources (London: W.H. and L. Collingridge, 1922), p. 11. 
4 Ibid. 
5 David Barry Gaspar and David Patrick Geggus (eds.), A Turbulent Time: The French Revolution and the Greater 
Caribbean (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), p. 77. 
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joined by a number of Carib Indians, invaded the island and ravaged the country.  By the 
Treaty of Breda in 1667, Antigua was restored to Great Britain, and in 1689 General 
Christopher Codrington became Governor and laid the foundations of the island’s future 
prosperity.6  Jamaica was under Spanish control for almost 150 years until 1655 when 
Oliver Cromwell dispatched a fleet carrying 8,000 troops commanded by Admiral Penn to 
the West Indies under orders to conquer Hispaniola (also under Spanish control).  
Hispaniola turned out to be too strongly defended so Penn took his fleet to Jamaica.  The 
Spanish fortifications at the latter island were weak and the garrison outnumbered.  Penn 
issued the settlers an ultimatum and the inhabitants left the island for Cuba.  The English 
marched into the deserted capital, Spanish Town, and took control of Jamaica although 
their claim was not formally acknowledged until the Treaty of Madrid in 1670. 7  Aside from 
these long-term English settlements, a number of other West Indian islands fell in and out 
of their control during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  Some of the more 
economically significant islands which England laid claim to at one time or another were St 
Lucia and Martinique, both of whose histories entail English and French occupation. 
For most of the seventeenth century, countries in Europe frequently went to war, funded 
in large part by imports from the West Indies.  Despite the islands proving advantageous 
for financial reasons, physically, the West Indies did not feature as a strategic theatre of 
war.  That all changed with the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714).  The treasure fleets 
of Spain and Portugal, which originated from the West Indies, were targeted for attack as 
were crucial West Indian ports which endured severe raids and plundering.  Naval presence 
in that region swelled rapidly in order to protect European interests.  Most notable for the 
English was the service of Admiral John Benbow who was ordered to the West Indies to 
suppress piracy and subsequently died of wounds received in an engagement with the 
French fleet led by Jean du Casse.  By the conclusion of the war, the West Indies evolved 
strategically, both in an economical and physical sense.  The increased significance of the 
region is best demonstrated by the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 which gave 
Britain, a superior force in the war, a thirty-year asiento to supply slaves and goods to the 
Spanish West Indian colonies.8  This gave British traders crucial inroads into the 
                                                                 
6 MacMillan (ed.), The Red Book of  the West Indies, p. 325.  The Treaty of Breda also restored Montserrat and St 
Kitts to the English. 
7 Admiral Penn’s arrival in Jamaica also saw the beginning of the naval practice of daily rum rations.  The 
alcohol was allocated to the men instead of beer or fortified wine because neither was available in the West 
Indies.  Rum became the natural alternative to beer for ships serving in that part of the world.  See Eugene L. 
Rasor, Reform in the Royal Navy: A Social History of  the Lower Deck 1850-1880 (Hamden: Archon Books, 1976), p. 
82. 
8 John Horace Parry, The Spanish Seaborne Empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 269-271. 
12 
traditionally closed markets of Spanish America and provided unparalleled economic 
advantages over other European countries. 
The West Indies continued to grow in importance for European powers following the 
conclusion of the war, although the asiento eventually fuelled the outbreak of the War of 
Jenkins’ Ear fifteen years later between the Spanish and the English in 1739.  When Robert 
Jenkins, captain of an English merchant ship, was returning home from the West Indies, he 
was stopped and searched by a Spanish coast guard vessel under the pretext of ensuring the 
terms of the asiento were adhered to.  The Spanish captain tied Jenkins to the mast and cut 
off his right ear.  As the story goes, Jenkins returned to London and produced the severed 
ear to Parliament.9  This incident, along with some other dubious conduct executed by the 
Spanish caused a stir amongst the English public.  They demanded Walpole seek 
compensation from Spain and when reparation was not forthcoming, a squadron of 
English warships was dispatched to the West Indies under the command of Admiral  
Vernon in order to molest Spanish shipping.  One of his first actions was the capture of 
Spanish-held Porto Bello, a silver-exporting town on the coast of Panama, in an attempt to 
damage Spain's finances and weaken its naval capabilities.  Vernon’s tactics were so 
effective, they led the Spanish to change their trading practices; rather than trading at 
centralised ports with large treasure fleets, they began using a larger number of smaller 
convoys trading at a wider variety of ports. 
With the War of Jenkins’ Ear raging in the West Indies, the War of Austrian Succession 
broke out in Europe in 1742 and soon engulfed a number of other European powers; most 
unfavourable for England was the entry of France into the war in 1744.  The rivalry 
between England and France was predominately centred round their West Indian sugar 
colonies and trade with North America and Europe.10  A number of battles between the 
two countries ensued predominantly in North America, India and Europe.  With the war 
over in 1748, the English were initially given an extension of the asiento by the Treaty of 
Aix-la-Chapelle, although the Spanish opposed a number of the clauses.  In 1750, by the 
Treaty of Madrid, England agreed to surrender the asiento for the cash sum of £100,000, 
but was permitted to continue trading with Spanish holdings in the Americas.11 
                                                                 
9 There is no official record of Jenkins’ hearing at Parliament meaning there is no definitive proof that he 
actually produced the severed ear. 
10 Lux, Historical Dictionary of  the British Caribbean , pp. 34-35. 
11 John Fisher, ‘Imperial Rivalries and Reforms’ in Thomas H. Holloway (ed.), A Companion to Latin American 
History (Chichester: Blackwell, 2011), p. 181. 
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Between 1700 and 1760, West Indian sugar production tripled, with Jamaica the chief 
beneficiary of that prosperity.12  From the conclusion of the War of Jenkins’ Ear until 1756, 
England’s holdings in the West Indies generated great wealth.  Sugar prices were high.  
They averaged 33s-8d or 50 per cent higher than before the War of Jenkins’ Ear which 
gave efficient planters a net return of 7 to 10 per cent.  When the Seven Years’ War began 
in 1756, the price of sugar plummeted.13  The lucrative trade in the West Indies forced 
France and England into war citing overlapping interests in their colonial and trade 
empires.  Boundary disputes in North America and the West Indies also fuelled the desire 
to declare war.  Most significant was France’s failure to evacuate the four neutral islands of 
St Vincent, St Lucia, Dominica and Tobago as they had been ordered to do by Treaty of 
Aix La Chapelle.14  One of England’s primary objectives during the conflict was to raid 
France’s sugar-rich islands in the West Indies, a goal that was realised with the capture of 
the lucrative islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe.  At the conclusion of the war in 1763, 
the Treaty of Paris extended a choice to France; they were either allowed control of the 
large French territory in North America or they had the opportunity to regain control of 
those two West Indian islands, the unselected option given to England.  Appreciating the 
profitableness of the islands, France opted to regain control of them rather than the 
territory in North America.  According to the terms of the treaty, Spain also lost control of 
Florida to England, meaning the latter gained control of all North American territory east 
of the Mississippi River.  This arrangement suited England well as they maintained control 
of a number of sugar-producing islands in the West Indies and did not require Martinique 
and Guadeloupe for financial gain. 
Following the war, the islands of the British West Indies continued their profitable trade to 
North America and Europe.  In 1775, the value of British property or stock invested in the 
West Indies was estimated at £30 million, and by 1788, despite the ravages of the American 
War, the value was said to be £70 million.15  Figures from Mitchell’s British Historical 
Statistics give an indication of the continued financial success of the West Indies colonies 
recorded from the onset of the Seven Years’ War in 1756 to the end of the survey period 
(1806) while also providing a comparison to the amount exported to that same region 
(Table 0.1). 
 
                                                                 
12 Lux, Historical Dictionary of  the British Caribbean , p. 159. 
13 Ibid., p. 159. 
14 Ibid., pp. 20-21. 
15 Alan G. Jamieson ‘War in the Leeward Islands: 1775-1783’ (PhD dissertation, University of Oxford, 1981), 
p. 3. 
14 
Year Imports from West Indies & South 
America 
Exports to West Indies & South 
America 
1755 --- --- 
1756 £4 --- 
1757 £4 --- 
1758 £1 --- 
1759 £93 £61 
1760 £424 £120 
1761 £491 £140 
1762 £827 £460 
1763 £1,036 £32 
1764 £62 £7 
1765 £85 £5 
1766 £28 £5 
1767 £34 £10 
1768 £54 £12 
1769 £103 £14 
1770 £112 £11 
1771 £47 £6 
1772 £92 £9 
1773 £65 £18 
1774 £35 £14 
1775 £59 £25 
1776 £53 £20 
1777 £49 £3 
1778 £53 £7 
1779 £16 £18 
1780 £34 £127 
1781 £33 £31 
1782 £100 £229 
1783 £29 £61 
1784 £136 £31 
1785 £61 £1 
1786 £113 £45 
1787 £71 £14 
1788 £315 £28 
1789 £251 £31 
1790 £229 £39 
1791 £198 £56 
1792 £280 £107 
1793 £308 £21 
1794 £272 £54 
1795 £385 £206 
1796 £877 £1,041 
1797 £1,078 £665 
1798 £1,159 £1,264 
1799 £1,390 £1,048 
1800 £1,497 £479 
1801 £2,577 £589 
1802 £1,658 £285 
1803 £355 £193 
1804 £346 £312 
1805 £736 £319 
1806 £1,227 £1,796 
Table 0.1 - £ in Thousands16 
                                                                 
16 B.R. Mitchell, British Historical Statistics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
15 
At the commencement of the American War of Independence, exportation of goods from 
the West Indies was not immediately disturbed as that region did not feature prominently 
in the hostility.  Once France formally entered the war on the side of the rebelling colonies, 
England realised their colonies were vulnerable to attack.  Striking swiftly, England 
attacked and captured St Lucia from the French early in the war, although France’s navy 
quickly responded by capturing Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St Kitts, St Vincent and 
Tobago.  If it were not for Admiral Rodney’s victory at the Battles of the Saintes in 1782, 
the French were poised to take the strategic island of Jamaica from the English as well.  At 
the conclusion of the American War of Independence, the Treaty of Paris signed away a 
number of England’s possessions including their hold on east Florida.  France opted to 
take control of Newfoundland, while they restored a number of their West Indian 
conquests back to England.  The latter recovered Dominica, Grenada, the Grenadines, St 
Vincent, St Kitts, Nevis and Montserrat. 
Both during and after conflicts, some trade was maintained between the West Indies, 
North America and Europe.  Tobacco, rice and cotton were exported from the former 
colonies, but sugar remained the principal export.  In order to protect these valuable 
commodities plying the Atlantic waters, a system of convoys was organised by the 
Admiralty.  The dates of the sailings were agreed between the Admiralty and the most 
influential London merchants and planters with an interest in the West India trade  who 
knew how to maximise profits.  To maximise the trade opportunities, convoys sailed from 
England in December or January, with a second in April.  The first sailing was arranged ‘so 
that merchants could reach the Leeward Islands and Jamaica in time to purchase the crop 
of sugar as soon as it was ready for shipment, and the second was for ships which were not 
ready in time to sail with the first.’ 17  To support the convoy efforts, the British maintained 
two island bases at Jamaica and Antigua.  At each location, the navy constructed dockyards 
to ensure a reasonable degree of logistical support for visiting warships.  Ships on the 
Jamaica station cruised between that island and the western Caribbean Sea as far south as 
Trinidad and as far north as Pensacola and the Mississippi River.  Antigua was the seat of 
the Leeward Islands station.  Ships on that station routinely cruised as far north as the 
Virgin Islands while also patrolling Barbados, St Lucia, Martinique and as far south as 
Grenada. 
War in the West Indies from the beginning of the eighteenth century demanded naval 
activity and ‘permanently introduced into naval life all the medical and other problems of 
                                                                 
17 Crowhurst, ‘The Admiralty and the Convoy System ’, pp. 165-166. 
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the tropics.’18  The overwhelming difficulty for visiting squadrons was their inability to 
prevent sickness.  Ships were unhealthy in themselves; ideas of sanitation and cleanliness  
were rudimentary, sometimes non-existent, and victuals consisted mainly of salted meat 
and infested biscuits.  ‘Add to this a debilitating foreign climate with a variety of unpleasant 
fevers, and it is easy to understand why sickness was the main enemy ’ in the tropics.19  
Fevers were not alone in causing the ill health of men in that climate.  Sailors suffered from 
a number of other illnesses, mainly digestive ailments including dysentery and diarrhoea, as 
well as scurvy, ulcers, consumption, dropsy, rheumatism and ruptures.  In a number of 
contemporary sources, the West Indies is prescribed a notorious reputation for being the 
eighteenth century seamen’s graveyard.  Allison asserts that ‘crews of ships stationed in the 
Mediterranean and in tropical waters...suffered from fevers and fluxes ’ so that ‘the West 
Indies had a particularly unenviable reputation in this respect.’20  Disease was more 
prevalent in the West Indies; however it was not quite as dire as some historians suggest.  
Aside from unsystematically-gathered sickness data gathered on both the Jamaica and the 
Leeward Islands station, as yet no researcher has carried out a meticulous and methodical 
survey in order to quantify sickness and mortality figures in the West Indies. 
To tackle issues of sickness in the fleet, the Commissioners for Taking Care of Sick and 
Wounded Seamen, more commonly known as the Sick and Hurt Board, were established in 
1664 as a branch of the Admiralty.  They were charged with the supervision and 
development of medical services both at home and abroad as well as, up until 1796, the 
care and exchange of prisoners-of-war.21  Initially the Board was not a permanent fixture; 
they were only convened during wartime with outstanding duties falling on the Navy Board 
during peacetime.  Duties of the office grew significantly.  In 1740 the Sick and Hurt Board 
was once again reassembled but this time they remained in Admiralty service for the 
remainder of the century even during peacetime. 
The commissioners’ main responsibilities were the overseeing of sick quarters both at 
home and abroad, the management of agents at all major ports, the development and 
dissemination of surgeons’ regulations, liaising with independent medical bodies to 
ascertain the efficacy of certain medications and treatments, designing and implementing 
trials of medications and all other sundry duties directed by the Admiralty.  When the sick 
quarters system fell out of favour with the Admiralty, the Sick and Hurt Board was integral 
                                                                 
18 J.J. Keevil, Medicine and the Navy 1200-1900, vol 2 (Edinburgh: E&S Livingstone, 1958), p. 5. 
19 A.J. Pack, Nelson’s Blood – The Story of  Naval Rum (Havant: Kenneth Mason Publications Ltd, 1982), p. 20. 
20 R.S. Allison, Sea Diseases: The Story of  a Great Natural Experiment in Preventive Medicine in the Royal Navy  
(London: John Bale Medical Publications Limited, 1943), pp. 93-94. 
21 They handled the care and exchange of prisoners-of-war for both the navy and the army. 
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to developing hospitals, most famously the revolutionary Haslar hospital in Portsmouth 
and the equally innovatively-designed Stonehouse hospital in Plymouth.  Through the 
Board’s dedication and initiative, these institutions were transformed from places where 
invalids were sent until their discharge from service into facilities where men went to be 
healed and returned to active service. 
At the beginning of the period of this survey, medicine and medical practices were 
rudimentary.  Medicine had hardly advanced over the centuries, and it is ‘easy to forget 
how small a proportion of Europe’s adult population would have been healthy at any one 
time.’22  Stomach disorders were prevalent amongst the general population as was 
tuberculosis, suppurating ulcers and eczema.  For naval sailors, these ailments were a 
concern; however they were commonly exposed to a number of other diseases.  Sick and 
Hurt Board commissioners were not typically trained in medicine nor had they served on 
board His Majesty’s ships.  This meant the Board relied heavily on independent bodies for 
advice and guidance for all medical matters.  These independent bodies, such as the Royal 
College of Physicians and the Society of Apothecaries, were only as good as the medical 
understanding of the day.  Eighteenth century physicians were taught a number of beliefs 
and philosophies rooted in a traditional concept that the body and its illnesses were the 
result of the four humours, a belief which dated back to the Hippocratic corpus.  The corpus, 
a collection of roughly sixty medical works, is credited to Hippocrates (c460-377 BC), 
although they were not necessarily penned by him. 23  Essentially, the corpus broadly 
explained health and illness in terms of the four humours.  These humours consisted of 
blood, choler (yellow bile), phlegm and black bile and it was believed that each of these 
humours were responsible for their own individual life functions.  Blood was the source of 
vitality, choler was the gastric juice which aided in digestion, phlegm constituted all 
colourless excretions from the body including sweat and tears and lastly black bile 
represented ‘melancholy’ and was responsible for tainting the other humours at times when 
illness struck.  Each humour represented a visible and tangible occurrence of physical 
existence: temperature, colour and skin texture.  ‘Blood made the body hot and wet, choler 
hot and dry, phlegm cold and wet, and black bile produced cold and dry sensations.’ 24  
Each fluid also had a distinctive colour, ‘blood being red, choler yellow, phlegm pale and 
melancholy dark.’  If a person was in good health, it was believed the four humours existed 
in a harmonious balance with illness resulting from one of the humours building up or 
                                                                 
22 Fiammetta Rocco, The Miraculous Fever-Tree: The Cure that Changed the World (London: HarperCollins, 2004), 
p. 31. 
23 Roy Porter, Blood and Guts: A Short History of  Medicine (London: Penguin Books, 2002), p. 25. 
24 Ibid., p. 26. 
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diminishing.  For example, if the body produced too much blood it resulted in sanguineous 
disorders and fevers.  A deficiency of blood, by contrast, meant reduced vitality and 
potentially resulted in fainting, coma or even death. 25 
During the mid to late eighteenth century, there was a  clear divergence away from 
Hippocratic teaching.  This revolutionary period saw a growing preference for scientific 
experimentation and observation among a certain number of surgeons and physicians.  The 
‘contagionist’ theory gained momentum and offered a more accurate model of disease 
transmission, replacing, to some degree, the idea of miasmas or ‘bad airs’ which had 
coevolved with the humoral theory.  According to miasmatic theory, decaying matter, such 
as dying plants or the fetid air in the hold of a ship, released harmful vapours that carried 
disease.  Marsh and mangrove areas were considered particularly unhealthy in the West 
Indies ‘because stagnant water and rotting vegetation gave rise to noxious miasma.’ 26  The 
contangionist theory gradually replaced the idea of miasma, but not all at once and not 
where all diseases were concerned.27  The medical revolution, also known as the 
Enlightenment, saw the waning of the humoral theory as well.  Those surgeons and 
physicians who rejected Hippocratic teachings instead relied heavily on their own 
experiences with diseases and treatments.  Variation in opinion on medical ideas and values 
among these men resulted in several diagnoses, treatments and remedies for a number of 
naval diseases in the eighteenth century.  Clearly matters of the medical revolution are more 
complicated than is expressed here; this is a generalisation of the medical concepts at play 
covered by this thesis.  It is merely intended to underline the complicated nature of 
medicine at the turn of the century and the evolution from theory and speculation to 
experimentation and observation. 
Armed with such heterogeneous theories about how diseases were caused and how they 
affected seamen, the navy was always going to be at the mercy of tropical diseases.  The 
Board was in the habit of altering their medical practices in an attempt to improve the level 
of care in order to preserve precious manpower.  Regulations were modified to raise levels 
of cleanliness on board ships, medicines, which at one point were paid for by surgeons, 
were freely distributed in order to ensure they were reaching the seamen in need and by the 
end of the eighteenth century even the commissioners changed for the better.  They 
                                                                 
25 Ibid., p. 27. 
26 Mark Harrison, Disease and the Modern World: 1500 to the Present Day  (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), pp. 54-
55. 
27 In some medical circles, the belief in miasmatic influences gained strength; the theory appealed more 
favourably to physicians and surgeons who were familiar with the distribution of yellow fever and malaria .  
Refer to discussion of both diseases in Chapter 2. 
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progressed from a largely administrative body into a more self-reliant organisation 
governed by medically-trained individuals who had served on board naval ships. 
From the time of their permanent status as a unit within the Admiralty, the Sick and Hurt 
Board proved a dedicated and conscientious organisation which strove to improve the lives 
of seamen.  The tasks of the office were numerous, particularly as they included the 
management of prisoners-of-war from both the army and navy during war time.  Despite 
the Board continually achieving better standards of health, including the appointment of 
medically-trained men as commissioners, they suffered severely from inadequate 
accounting and operated in arrears for a number of years.  To remedy the arrears, the 
Admiralty transferred responsibility for prisoners-of-war to the Transport Board in 1796.  
The transfer came a little too late and the Sick and Hurt Board was unable to clear their 
debt sufficiently to justify their continuation.  The responsibility for caring for sick and 
wounded seamen was transferred to the more fiscally-responsible Transport Board and the 
Sick and Hurt Board was wound up in 1806. 
Objectives and Structure 
Despite a number of sources referring to the health of seamen in the West Indies, to date 
there has not been a comprehensive, systematic enquiry into the actuality of their situation.  
This is an oversight this thesis attempts to rectify.  It aims to examine the degree to which 
naval seamen suffered from sickness in the West Indies and what was done improve their 
situation in the period 1770 to 1806.  The dates were selected to encompass a time when 
the Sick and Hurt Board was operating on a permanent basis during both peace and war 
time.  By 1770, the Board had enough experience at managing sickness on a global scale to 
be effective in suppressing disease.  Over the next 36 years, they conducted the business of 
that office during major wars such as the War of American Independence and the French 
Revolutionary War.  They also had benefit of a few years of peace during which time they 
focused on developing on shore facilities and the trial of experimental treatments.  The end 
of the survey period coincides with the ceding of all Sick and Hurt Board duties to the 
Transport Board in 1806.  Naval medicine continued to be a crucial aspect of English naval 
superiority, but the Admiralty no longer considered a dedicated branch a necessity. 
This thesis aims to assemble the most accurate representation of seamen’s health in the 
West Indies in the late eighteenth century through an investigation of the naval 
administration, diseases, medicines, hospital development and key personnel who 
influenced medical practices.  Sickness and mortality figures are normally exaggerated in 
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contemporary sources.  The most notorious sources ascribe high sickness and mortality 
figures to the dreaded scurvy.  While scurvy did affect seamen, it was by no means the killer 
it is customarily portrayed as.  The disease, rather than killing, ‘effectively limited the time a 
squadron could stay at sea, and thus directly affected the efficiency of the service.’ 28  Armed 
with that understanding, this thesis reveals which illnesses were most prevalent and the 
percentage of men who succumbed to disease.  It demonstrates that only a small 
percentage of naval seamen were affected and that the majority of ships were generally 
healthy in the West Indies. 
Certain subjects are omitted from the study.  First, although the Board was responsible for 
the management of prisoners-of-war, that subject is not covered by this thesis.  The sheer 
volume of letters and minute books concerning that branch of service is far too large to 
analyse properly in a study of this length.  In any case that responsibility did not influence 
the health of seamen in the West Indies.  Also absent from this study are remarks on 
victualling and the seamen’s diet.  Within the last year, two published works on Royal 
Naval victualling have been produced which examine the navy’s system of procuring and 
distributing provisions.29  Other works investigate the seamen’s diet and the impact on 
health.30  There is, therefore, no need to expound on that subject in this thesis.  
The structure of the thesis is as follows: the Introduction surveys the history of the British 
West Indies and the profitableness of the colonies while also reviewing the methodology, 
sources and literature concerning the health of seamen in naval service.   Chapter One gives 
the history of the Sick and Hurt Board in greater detail to identify how it was organised and 
how its responsibilities varied over time.  Chapter Two focuses on the most common 
diseases suffered by seamen in tropical regions.  In particular, the chapter discusses in detail 
the historical perspective on the causes and symptoms of the diseases.  Chapter Three 
turns attention to a number of medicines and treatments, both successful and unsuccessful, 
which the navy utilised during the late eighteenth century.31  The chapter explores each 
treatment individually specifying how the most successful treatments were achieved at the 
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insistence of observant surgeons and physicians serving in the tropics.   Chapter Four 
contains original statistics collected through the systematic sampling of data from ships’ 
muster books to produce an accurate representation of disease and mortality amongst 
seamen in the West Indies.  Samples were taken in 1773, 1778, 1783, 1788, 1790, 1793, 
1798 and 1803 meaning statistics were gathered every five years (with the exception being 
1790)32.  Choosing these dates ensured an equal number of samples were taken during both 
war and peace years in order to be able to draw comparisons between them.  Chapter Five 
examines the handful of men who influenced naval medicine in this period.  These notable 
men include James Lind, Admiral Sir George Rodney, Gilbert Blane, Leonard Gillespie and 
Thomas Trotter.  It also contains case studies taken from naval surgeons’ journals which 
provide a unique perspective into their role on board ships in the West Indies.  Chapter Six 
reviews hospital development in the West Indies and the navy’s growing reliance on them 
to serve as convalescing facilities for the sick of the squadron.  The chapter uses 
correspondence from commanders-in-chief describing the precarious nature of the sick 
quarters system to house men on shore in order to convince the Admiralty that hospitals 
were the preferred method for lodging men.  Chapter Seven is a case study focusing on the 
erection of the naval hospital at English Harbour, Antigua.   This hospital was selected as 
the case study due to it being designed, built and operated within the survey period.  
Opting for this particular layout allows the thesis to explore a number of historical 
disciplines.  The basis of the study is maritime history; however medical and social history 
feature prominently in the study.  All of these are underpinned by continuing military, 
political and economic themes crucial to the navy’s presence in the West Indies.   
Understanding the relationship between the disciplines creates a more thorough and 
comprehensive study, one which has been generally overlooked by historians. 
Sources 
Aside from a study of the navy’s medical administration, there has been no study of the 
health of British seamen in the eighteenth century.  Historians cite the lack of primary 
material generated by members of the lower decks, which include the lack of surgeons ’ 
journals for the period.  While these are valid points and the subject may appear difficult to 
research, there are, in fact, a multitude of superb sources available.  In particular the 
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primary material relating to operations of the Sick and Hurt Board is abundant.  The 
Board’s papers include bound volumes of correspondence with the Board of Admiralty 
which are held at the National Maritime Museum (NMM).  The volumes exist from 1740 
until 1806.  The Sick and Hurt Board in-letters from the Admiralty and are seemingly 
complete from 1740 to 1806.  Sick and Hurt Board out-letters to the Admiralty suffer from 
a gap in sequence between 1765 and 1794 when the records are supplemented by 
incomplete folders of loose letters.33  This correspondence relates to the operations of the 
Sick and Hurt Board and contains frequent debates about its responsibilities in the West 
Indies.  Another advantage to this particular resource is that the original third-party letters 
alluded to in the text of the correspondence are often still enclosed, therefore providing an 
additional primary source.  Also located at the NMM are Navy Board letters which contain 
instructions from the Admiralty concerning the erection of naval hospitals, a collection of 
personal papers belonging to Sir Gilbert Blane, a commissioner on the Sick and Hurt 
Board between 1795 and 1802 and personal papers belonging to captains and admirals who 
served in the West Indies during the survey period. 
The majority of Admiralty papers are located at The National Archives (TNA) including 
correspondence from commanders-in-chief on all stations; for the purposes of this study 
that involves letters sent from both the Jamaica and the Leeward Islands stations (ADM 1).  
At TNA, too, are duplicate records of the Sick and Hurt Board in and out correspondence 
(ADM 97 and ADM 98) as well as the Board’s minutes which exist for the entire survey 
period (ADM 99).  Late in the eighteenth century, naval surgeons began to submit journals 
with their observations to the Admiralty.  Only a handful still exist at TNA whose dates 
coincide with the survey period and whose surgeons spent time in the West Indies; in fact 
they number less than twenty (ADM 101).  As there was no organised way of recording the 
journals, each of them provides a distinct insight and explores diverse ideas on treating sick 
men.  In order to carry out the statistical survey on the health of British seamen in the West 
Indies, the use of ships’ muster books is integral (ADM 36).  These are also found at TNA 
and their survival rate is surprisingly good, therefore making them a valuable resource to 
complete the comprehensive survey.  A less numerous but equally useful source to assess 
sickness and mortality are hospital muster books held at TNA (ADM 102) although they 
are only available from the 1790s onward. 
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Records at the Royal Naval Museum Library (RNML) contain a number of items related to 
naval medicine.  These include the papers of Thomas Corbett, Secretary of the Admiralty, 
which outline the history, members and instructions for the Sick and Hurt Board from its 
inception and throughout his time in office (MSS 121).  There are four volumes of letter 
books kept by Admiral John Ford while at Jamaica which give the perspective of a 
commander-in-chief operating in the West Indies.  His correspondence contains letters to 
the Admiralty, Sick and Hurt Board, the victualling agent on the island and the hospital’s 
surgeon all of which demonstrate how thorough a commander had to be to ensure an 
acceptable standard of living for seamen. 
Primary medical records, aside from those expressly kept by the navy, are also valuable for 
contextualising the state of health and medical knowledge in the eighteenth century.  As the 
principal repository for medical material in the UK, the Wellcome Library (WL) contains 
an extensive collection of useful items.  The WL houses publications by a number of naval 
surgeons on topics such as the diagnosis of diseases and the production of efficacious 
medicines.  Most notably there are booklets by James Lind, Gilbert Blane, Thomas Trotter, 
Elliot Arthy, Leonard Gillespie and Robert Robertson all discussing the general care of 
naval seamen.  There are pamphlets by some lesser known naval surgeons such as James 
Litle who wrote about seamen suffering from ulcers, Malcolm Flemying who spoke highly 
of the effects of Dr James’s Fever Powder, and Frederick Thomson a naval surgeon who 
penned an essay on scurvy.  Publications were not only limited to disease and medicine.  
There are a number of publications that discuss the practice of surgery and analysis of 
injuries; for example, John Atkins, a naval surgeon, published his observations on surgery 
in order to promote the treatment of afflictions such as fractures and ruptures. 
Literature 
There are very few secondary sources which refer to naval medicine.  Those that are 
available are typically administrative in nature.  Most well-known is the four volume series 
of Medicine and the Navy published between 1957 and 1963 which is often cited but seldom 
updated.34  Following the publication of those volumes, focus on naval medicine seems to 
have receded.  Naval historians have referred to health and the Sick and Hurt Board in 
passing, but no in-depth study has replaced Medicine and the Navy.  Notable works which 
contain brief descriptions of naval medicine include the continuing series of naval history 
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books written by N.A.M. Rodger.  His The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy 
and The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649-1815 discuss life on board 
ships-of-the-line as well as investigating the administration of the Sick and Hurt Board.35  
Along the same lines is Daniel A. Baugh’s British Naval Administration in the Age of Walpole 
which devotes a section to the history and duties of the Sick and Hurt Board through their 
early years.  However he pays very little attention to the health of seamen.36  More specific 
to the West Indies region is Duncan Crewe’s published work based on his doctoral thesis 
entitled Yellow Jack and the Worm: British Naval Administration in the West Indies, 1739-1748.37  
As with the other volumes, Crewe’s work focuses mainly on administration and does little 
to describe the condition of the men themselves.  Michael Duffy has published a number 
of works on the navy in the eighteenth century, and even presents mortality figures in 
Soldiers, Sugar and Seapower: the British Expeditions to the West Indies and the War Against 
Revolutionary France.38  His figures are combined with the mortality of the army and it is 
therefore difficult to gauge the hardships suffered by the navy alone.  For making 
comparisons with the British army’s experiences in the West Indies, Roger Norman 
Buckley’s The British Army in the West Indies: Society and the Military in the Revolutionary Age  and 
Sir John William Fortescue’s multi-volume work entitled A History of the British Army are 
informative.  One of the only historians to focus solely on the Sick and Hurt Board is P.K. 
Crimmin who has published a number of articles dealing with its commissioners and duties 
of the office.  In her assessment of the Board during the second half of the eighteenth 
century she considers that, ‘through trial and error and only slowly, naval health 
improved.’39  Crimmin offers no statistics to validate her claim, instead relying heavily on 
figures quoted in the Board’s correspondence with the Admiralty and naval surgeons. 
Books published by the eminent social and medical historian, Roy Porter, help to 
contextualise the state of health amongst the general masses in England.  His unique blend 
of the two disciplines, including commentary on the Royal Navy, demonstrates that the 
organisation’s medical practices were on par with the rest of Europe.  In terms of this 
thesis, Porter’s more useful books include Disease, Medicine and Society in England, 1550-1860, 
Bodies Politic: Disease, Death and Doctors in Britain, 1650-1900 and Blood and Guts: A Short 
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History of Medicine.40  J.R. McNeill’s work, Mosquito Empires: Ecology and War in the Greater 
Caribbean, 1620-1914 demonstrates very well the changing ecology of the West Indies and 
the resulting surge in fever epidemics and how they distressed the local population and the 
islands’ new arrivals.  More recently, Mark Harrison has contributed a number of works on 
the history of medicine and the military.  His Disease and the Modern World: 1500 to the Present 
Day provides an excellent overview of the evolution of diseases and health, but it is his 
more detailed works on military health that have been more valuable for the purposes of 
this thesis.  Harrison’s War, Medicine and Modernity and to a greater extent his Medicine in an 
Age of Commerce and Empire: Britain and its Tropical Colonies, 1660 -1830 demonstrate how 
health varied from region to region and serves as the basis for comparison between the 
West Indies, India and Africa.41  Another medical work that has been integral to this thesis 
is The Cambridge Historical Dictionary of Disease which not only offers thorough descriptions of 
how society viewed diseases in pre-Victorian England, but also explores their causes and 
conventional cures.42 
During the period this thesis covers, there was significant reforms to medicine taking place 
in Britain (commonly referred to as the Enlightenment), therefore a number of medical 
histories were consulted in order to gauge the extent of the transformation.  Some of the 
more knowledgeable works include Pratik Chakrabarti’s Materials and Medicine: Trade, 
Conquest and Therapeutics in the Eighteenth Century which explores the use of local resources 
obtained within the British Empire that were efficacious in the treatment of diseases.  
Likewise, Christopher Lawrence’s work ‘Disciplining Disease: Scurvy, the Navy, and 
Imperial Expansion 1750-1825’ demonstrates the Royal Navy’s desire for reforms in order 
to treat diseases effectively during the development of the Britain’s overseas territories.  
For more concentrated studies on specific aspects of the Enlightenment, Irvine Loudon 
book Medical Care and the General Practitioner, 1750-1850 demonstrates how the role of 
surgeons was changing during this period.  Lisa Rosner’s work, Medical Education in the Age 
of Improvement: Edinburgh Students and Apprentices, 1760-1826 has a similar theme, although 
hers focuses on the emerging Scottish Enlightenment through its universities and hospitals.  
On a similar note, Susan Lawrence’s Charitable Knowledge: Hospital Pupils and Practitioners in 
Eighteenth Century London establishes London as a centre for medical reformation through its 
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various hospitals which served as ‘closed’ environments for experimentation and 
observation.  Ulrich Tröhler’s PhD thesis examines experimentation and observation in 
hospitals, however he casts a wider net to explore more ‘closed’ environments.  Specifically 
he targets the army and navy for his study since the groups of men remained generally 
consistent in both military branches, therefore their surgeons were able to carry out long-
term observations. 
Because Medicine and the Navy was published nearly 60 years ago, there have been recent 
attempts to provide a modern view of naval medicine with particular attention paid to the 
Enlightenment.  Multi-author works edited by Geoffrey L. Hudson and David Boyd 
Haycock and Sally Archer give a good indication that interest in the topic is rekindling.  
Hudson’s book, which focuses on naval and military history, includes essays on the British 
Army in both the West Indies during the Seven Years’ War and the American War of 
Independence as well as one focusing on naval medicine contributed by P.K. Crimmin.43  
The Haycock and Archer book, entitled Health & Medicine at Sea, 1700-1900, concentrates 
solely on naval medicine with the contributors concentrating on the role of naval surgeons, 
surgery in the navy, the development of the Sick and Hurt Board and the health of naval 
personnel in West Africa.44  While the recent works provide new and original material on 
naval medicine, they have only just begun to scratch the surface.  This thesis provides a 
much needed contribution to the subject matter.  It establishes not only the navy’s system 
of healthcare, but just how that system of healthcare affected thousands of men stationed 
in England’s lucrative tropical, and sometimes deadly, West Indies colonies. 
Notes on terms 
This study is based on a large amount of primary material written in the eighteenth century .  
Contemporary spelling, abbreviation, punctuation and capitalisation have been modernised.  
For example, it was typical in the eighteenth century to use ‘expence’ and ‘Barbadoes’.  
These are replaced in the text of the thesis with ‘expense’ and ‘Barbados’.  The only 
instances where spelling or abbreviation remain in their original format when they are 
specifically relevant in the context of the thesis.  When direct quotations have been used 
and words have been edited out, they are indicated with ‘...’; where words have been 
inserted to put the quote into context, they are indicated with ‘[...]’.  Only particularly 
obscure or outdated nautical and medical terms have been explained within this thesis. 
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Chapter 1 
Sick and Hurt Board: History and Responsibilities 
Sickness, job hazards and war-wounded created a serious drain on manpower in the Royal 
Navy.  The Admiralty knew firsthand the benefits of sustaining healthy crews, for those 
crews were far more valuable than fleets abounding with sick men operating at half-
strength.  Worse were dead men who were literally a ‘dead loss’ to the service and very 
difficult to replace.1  Once the navy was required to send ships to protect British interests 
outside European waters, it was inevitable that illness would be a by-product through 
exposure to new climates and diseases as well as the limited availability of fresh provisions.  
In order to better defend Britain’s foreign territories it was necessary for the navy to 
improve the system for maintaining seamen’s health on board their ships.  That was 
certainly no easy task and in fact it took the navy a great deal of time to achieve a 
favourable work environment for seamen.  In 1693, the ‘allied main fleet barely managed to 
remain at sea a fortnight.’2  A mere sixty-five years later, Admiral Hawke orchestrated the 
blockade of Brest, during which time he and his men were able to stay at sea continually 
for six months.  In order to facilitate this improvement in health, the Admiralty employed a 
dedicated medical branch named the ‘Commissioners for Taking Care of Sick and 
Wounded Seamen’, more commonly referred to as the ‘Sick and Hurt Board’.  Initially the 
commissioners were convened on a temporary basis.  However, when it became apparent 
that medical services were a full time concern, the Sick and Hurt Board became a 
permanent body in the 1740s. 
The chief function of the Sick and Hurt Board was the supervision of all things medical.  
Initially, this was not an unmanageable task, especially when the main fleet was based in 
and around European waters and seamen numbered less than 13,000. 3  When the 
Government established a strong foothold in foreign waters, the Admiralty and Sick and 
Hurt Board’s jobs became more complex.  Not only was it necessary to send men halfway 
around the world to protect trade interests, it also became essential to organise naval 
dockyards as well as contracting with individuals to provide food, medication and on shore 
accommodation for seamen.  In particular, the Sick and Hurt Board focused their attention 
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on North America and the West Indies.  Throughout the study period (1770 to 1806), it is 
clear that their responsibilities were generally consistent, although towards the end of the 
century the Board endured significant administrative changes which altered its operations.  
Initially the Board was largely made up of bureaucrats rather than men with medical 
training and early on they relied heavily on independent medical bodies to guide them in 
providing directions for naval surgeons.4  Once the Admiralty appreciated the Board would 
benefit greatly from commissioners being drawn from the medical service, the Board began 
to wean itself off those independent bodies and became practically self-reliant.  From that 
point forward, changes which enabled seamen to remain healthy over long periods of time, 
even in tropical climates, were championed by this new breed of commissioner.  
Unfortunately, just when the Board really began to gain momentum, long-standing issues 
with financial arrears proved excessive prompting the Admiralty to institute serious 
cutbacks.  In 1796 the Board lost their management of prisoners-of-war to the Transport 
Board and the Board itself was eventually absorbed into that same branch in 1806.5 
The permanency of the Sick and Hurt Board from the mid-eighteenth century was one 
facet of a larger awareness of naval medicine and seamen’s health.  In order to defend the 
growing British Empire, the navy was forced to stretch its resources further and further.  
Finding an adequate number of seamen to man the ships, particularly in war time, was 
often difficult.  The most critical period was during the initial mobilisation ‘because the 
enormous number of seamen required to launch a powerful wartime fleet could not be 
recruited quickly enough.’6  This was most evident during the first few months of the Seven 
Years’ War when a shortage of men was exacerbated by losses from disease and desertion.  
During that conflict, a large number of British sailors were ordered to the West Indies 
which led to an extraordinary loss of life from diseases such as yellow fever, malaria and 
dysentery, while other diseases such as ulcers and ruptures debilitated men so severely that 
they were unable to carry out their shipboard duties.7  In order to reduce the weakening in 
manpower from disease and desertion, the Admiralty and the Sick and Hurt Board devoted 
a great deal of attention to preserving lives; particularly with regards to enhancing medical 
care in the navy.  From the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War, the navy took the care of 
seamen more seriously and endeavoured to do what it could to reduce the effects diseases 
had on the fleet. 
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Sick and Hurt Board: Pre-1740 
In 1664, when the Second Anglo-Dutch war was on the verge of commencing, King 
Charles II created the Sick and Hurt Board and appointed four commissioners to serve 
under the direction of the Navy Board.  The most notable appointee as commissioner was 
John Evelyn, who later became a close friend of Samuel Pepys.8  The commissioners were 
responsible for all aspects of the care of sick and wounded seamen, each earning a salary of 
£300 per annum.  At that time, the commissioners’ duties included placing sick and 
wounded men into hospital and ensuring that they had the benefit of physicians or 
surgeons.  When no hospital was available, the commissioners found alternative 
accommodation on the cheapest terms.  They were also instructed to place a clerk or 
deputy in each principal British port to keep an account of sick put on shore and to 
provide them with all necessaries.  Following any military engagement, one commissioner 
was ordered down to the port where the wounded were landed in order to facilitate their 
care.  Lastly, they had the power to distribute charity money to widows, children and 
parents of those seamen slain in His Majesty’s service who were in need of relief.  To 
enable the commissioners to carry out their duties, they were allocated £150 per annum to 
pay for the services of a clerk, a doorkeeper, a messenger, firewood for their office, 
candles, pens, ink and paper.9  According to N.A.M. Rodger, the Board at that time ‘was 
devoted and efficient – Evelyn’s accounting system aroused the admiration even of so 
rigorous a judge as Pepys.’10 
When war concluded in 1667, warrants for the commissioners ceased and the Board was 
dissolved.  Their duties during peacetime were conducted by John Pearce, Surgeon General 
of the Fleet, who had been hired to serve with the main fleet and supervise surgeons and 
hospital ships the same year the Board was established.11  When the Third Anglo-Dutch 
war broke out in 1672, the Sick and Hurt Board was formed again.  Henceforward, the 
commissioners were required to transmit to the Navy Office a regular account of all 
seamen and soldiers set ashore, the date they entered care and how many days they spent in 
sick quarters.  By 1690 they were also ordered to send a weekly account to the Admiralty 
outlining the state of sick men for the two preceding weeks in all ports, ‘specifying in the 
most distinct manner their distempers, number, entries, discharges, whether belonging to 
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the King’s ships or his allies.’12  In pursuance of an order laid before the King in Council in 
1695, the management of the sick and wounded service and its commissioners transferred 
away from the Crown and became the Admiralty’s responsibility which was meant to 
afford a more efficient service.13  The temporary assemblage of commissioners continued 
for three more years until the Board was once again dissolved with their functions 
transferring to the Register Office.14 
When the war broke out in 1702, the Admiralty re-established the Sick and Hurt Board, 
appointing Henry Lee, Philip Herbert Esq, Doctor Richard Adams, Doctor William 
Sherard, and Doctor Charles Morley as commissioners.  In addition to the Board’s duties 
during the seventeenth century, they were also assigned the management of all prisoners-
of-war.  For their services, Mr Lee, the senior commissioner, was allocated a salary of £500 
per annum with the remainder of the commissioners paid £300.  Sherard served for 
roughly one year and following his departure, it was decided there was no need for a 
replacement.  Instead, Adams and Morley divided his salary between them.  This financial 
arrangement was reached largely ‘in consideration…of their great trouble in viewing the 
surgeons’ chests.’15  To further add to their numerous duties, one of the commissioners was 
appointed to regularly visit ports where they had officers and agents in order to inspect 
their accounts and muster books to probe for potential fraud and mismanagement. 
At the Peace of Utrecht in 1713 the number of commissioners was reduced to two: Mr 
Herbert and Dr Adams.  The Admiralty decided in 1715 that the management of that 
Board would be placed under the care of two commissioners at the Navy Board rather than 
retain Herbert and Adams.  The Sick and Hurt Board was once again dissolved.  Within a 
year, the two Navy Board commissioners indicated they were unable to manage the 
business themselves and an additional commissioner, Mr Edisbury, was added in order to 
assist with tasks in the office.  The number of Navy Board commissioners tending to the 
medical service was eventually reduced to one during the prolonged period of peace and 
this arrangement continued until 1740. 
Sick and Hurt Board: Post 1740 
In 1740, with the War of Jenkins’ Ear raging, a memorial was sent from the Admiralty to 
the Lords Justices setting forth that the business of tending to the medical needs of seamen 
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had increased tremendously and that the Navy Board commissioners were no longer able 
to cope with it.  The Sick and Hurt Board was reconstituted once again taking the current 
commissioner from the Navy Board and adding William Bell and Nathaniel Hills, followed 
by a fourth commissioner in 1745.16  From that point forward, the Board remained a 
permanent fixture in the organisation of the navy through to the end of the century, 
although the number of active commissioners would vary; customarily four or five during 
wartime reduced to two during peace time.  For example, on the eve of the Seven Years 
War in 1755, the Board was increased to four members while at its conclusion, the number 
was reduced to two.17  In 1779 that number was raised to five in order to cope with the 
American War of Independence.  At that point, there were only four clerks to tackle the 
numerous duties of the office as well as a number of employees who reported to the 
commissioners - who included the surgeons and agents, their messenger and the portable 
soup maker.18 
Given the small number of commissioners on the Sick and Hurt Board, it is not difficult to 
assume they were too few as to be able to visit ports around the British coastline.  It was 
necessary to employ agents, usually surgeons, to oversee the duties of the office at various 
ports.  Prior to 1740, agents were located at the following ports: Deal, Dover, Fareham, 
Gosport and Portsmouth, Plymouth, Rochester, Yarmouth, Guernsey, Jersey and Kinsale. 19  
Once the Board became permanent, the number of ports where their agents were stationed 
expanded, extending to Bristol, Berwick, Exeter, Falmouth, Glasgow, Hull, North Shields, 
Saltash and Weymouth within the British Isles; abroad agents were initially stationed at 
Gibraltar and Port Mahon but this grew to include a number of North American and 
Mediterranean ports.  These local agents were required to secure sick quarters for men sent 
ashore for the recovery of their health.  They were also expected to procure any necessary 
medicines and food.  Bills for the aforementioned work were verified and sent off to the 
Sick and Hurt office in London for payment. 
Aside from overseeing agents, the commissioners were expected to supply printed 
regulations to captains and surgeons of the fleet, the first of which appeared in 1731, 
outlining the daily care of sick men.20  By 1740 the list of regulations numbered over 30 
specific items and included directions for surgeons to have their medicine chests surveyed 
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at least once every twelve months, an order to inspect all recruits brought on board for 
infections and contagious diseases, and an order to draw up a list of all men who were sick 
or hurt who were entitled to relief from the Chatham Chest.  It was further outlined that it 
was the surgeons’ responsibility to ensure the lower decks were kept clean and dry, which 
meant the fumigation of bedding and clothes belonging to crew.  Surgeons were to regulate 
the diet of sick men which meant they had to have a very attentive relationship with 
pursers.  The commissioners also requested surgeons keep sick men on board rather than 
sending them to sick quarters or hospital, especially when in tropical climates, to encourage 
the recovery of the sick and to keep costs down.  This regulation was a double-edged 
sword in that by keeping the men on board, the Admiralty was able to reduce the sick 
quarters expenditure and reduce desertion, although keeping infectious men confined in 
close quarters on board their ships heightened the possibility of spreading disease.   
Surgeons’ instructions were particularly crucial during times of war when manpower was 
exceedingly scarce.  If the regulations were adhered to, ships stood a greater chance of 
retaining a sizeable portion of the crew.  As stated previously, the Admiralty as well as the 
Sick and Hurt Board focused on the wastage of manpower, which meant naval medicine 
and seamen’s health became much more vital. 
Towards the end of the century, the Board underwent a noteworthy transition that saw 
their focus shift slightly away from administrative duties and more towards medical duties.  
Historically, the commissioners had always been administrative men who had served on 
various other boards and had no knowledge or proficiency in medicine.  By the mid-1790s 
that all changed.  From 1793 the Board was made up of a mixture of lay men as well as 
trained naval doctors who used their personal experience and education to set in motion a 
variety of changes to the methods by which the sick and hurt were handled.  In 1796, the 
Board consisted of Dr John Johnstone, Dr Robert Blair, Sir William Gibbons, Dr John 
Weir and Sir Gilbert Blane.21  Lloyd and Coulter accurately described this transitional 
period and the introduction of medical men to the Board: 
For almost the first time in the long history of the Board important 
innovations were made at the instigation of the Board, and not, as 
hitherto, as a result of the advice of its subordinates...In 1796 new 
regulations were drawn up for the use of surgeons, which Blane took 
personal care to see properly implemented22 
                                                                 
21 Lloyd and Coulter, Medicine and the Navy, p. 4.  Blane was the former physician to Admiral Sir George 
Rodney’s squadron in the West Indies during the American War of Independence.  He and Rodney are both 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. 
22 Ibid., p. 5. 
33 
It was at this stage that the Board became proactive rather than reactive to requests for 
changes in standard naval medicine practices.  Blane, in particular, had served in the West 
Indies, an area of the world where the Royal Navy was hit hardest by disease.  In his view, 
it was better to practice preventative care rather than dealing with medical issues once they 
had taken hold on board.  He felt the Board’s history of reacting to epidemics was an 
incompetent way to keep men healthy.  Customarily, the Board decided whether or not 
certain medicines should be supplied to the ships as a reaction to epidemics amongst the 
fleet.  With the coming of this new Board, the commissioners were proactive in deciding 
what medicines should be standard issue on all ships or on single voyages to prevent 
disease rather than treat it.  This new Board was also responsible for the regulation of naval 
surgeons and the management of naval hospitals.  Stricter guidelines meant surgeons, 
physicians, mates and dispensers were held more accountable for the daily routine of caring 
for the sick. 
The Sick and Hurt Board reached a turning point in 1796, which was predominantly 
instigated by the removal of duties pertaining to prisoners-of-war in that year.  Once free 
of the duties attached to the care of prisoners-of-war, the commissioners were able to 
enhance their attention to caring for sick seamen for, which, at that particular time, they 
were fully qualified to do.  The Admiralty advised the Board that their duties were now 
limited to medical issues such as the care of sick on board all of His Majesty’s ships in 
commission, the care of those sent to hospital and sick quarters, the superintendence of 
those hospitals and sick quarters, the superintendence of medicines and necessaries 
supplied for the use of sick afloat and ashore, the examination of all surgeons for the navy 
and the appointment of surgeons and surgeon’s mates subject to the approval of the 
Admiralty.23  For the commissioners serving at the time, these duties were achievable as 
they were able to utilise their own understanding and experience.  This also meant the 
commissioners were not wholly reliant on the input of external bodies such as the Royal 
College of Physicians and physicians from Guys and St Thomas’s hospitals.  With their 
adjusted responsibilities, the Board set about a revision of regulations for surgeons afloat 
which was distributed to surgeons in 1796 and 1797.24  One of the most notable of these 
revisions was the standard issue of lemon juice for the treatment of scurvy, which had been 
approved for use in August 1795. 
Aside from revising the surgeons’ regulations, the Board re-outlined their objectives to the 
Admiralty.  In a letter they wrote to the Admiralty they indicated that they saw their 
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primary role as the prevention of disease, especially in new recruits.  They proposed 
examining, and if necessary, rejecting candidates who were not in reasonable health or 
posed a threat to the remainder of the fleet.  Also in their letter they asserted their desire to 
superintend ‘the preparation and issuing of the medical stores’ which would curtail the 
monopoly held by the Society of Apothecaries.  Thirdly, they proposed that both 
provisions and clothing on board all ships should be inspected by surgeons and not just by 
the pursers.  Finally, the Board requested they have the sole authority to examine all 
candidates who wished to be naval surgeons or surgeons’ mates, essentially because they 
had formerly served in a medical capacity on board ships and would be best qualified to 
judge the aptitude of candidates.  However, they conceded, that should there be an internal 
difference of opinion on any medical matter, they would refer to the Company of Surgeons 
and the Royal College of Physicians for a final decision.25 
Soon after their proposals reached their Admiralty, the Sick and Hurt Board was granted 
the authority to appoint to ‘all future vacancies of surgeons and surgeons mates, instead of 
the principal officers and commissioners of His Majesty’s Navy.’26  As a further testament 
to the commitment of the Board’s new style of carrying out the duties of their office, the 
five commissioners resolved to meet every day rather than continue meeting three days per 
week (which had been customary).  The basis for the change was due to the sheer volume 
of work they took on as well as the large arrears of accounts, the clearance of which ‘would 
tend much to the furtherance of the public service.’27 
Since early in the eighteenth century, the Board had been notoriously behind on their 
accounts.  According to N.A.M. Rodger, the Board’s finances were more precarious than 
those of the rest of the naval administration.  They had no course or bill system, but paid 
cash for everything, when they could get it.28  A decision was handed down in 1796 
ordering the care of prisoners-of-war away from the Sick and Hurt Board which was 
transferred to the Transport Board.  Although the move may have brought a certain degree 
of relief to the commissioners, it was not completely welcomed.  The arrears belonging to 
that branch were not forwarded to the Transport Board but the clerks who were employed 
to clear them were.29 
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The clerks remaining in the Sick and Hurt office attempted to catch up with the arrears, yet 
made little headway.  In 1799, the Board forwarded a complaint to the Admiralty about 
their predicament.  Not only were the commissioners displeased with the removal of some 
of their clerks, they wanted additional employees due to the rise in their responsibilities for 
the care of sick seamen.  They claimed: 
this new business alone is now of such extent as nearly to require the 
whole attention of the present establishment of the department (we view 
however with heartfelt satisfaction the benefits arising from the supplies 
issued by this office, and that general regulations adopted for the 
preservation of health in His Majesty’s ships which has created so much 
new business in this department)30 
Additionally, there were 329 accounts to be audited, amounting to £1,271,908-13s-5d, a 
great part of which were, they claimed, of a very intricate and complex nature.  They 
required the utmost care and circumspection in order to detect the various attempts made 
to introduce improper or exaggerated charges into public accounts and the current number 
of clerks would not suffice.31  If the Board was to come up to date with their accounts, they 
demanded financial encouragement for their clerks.  The salary paid to clerks in other 
departments far exceeded that paid to theirs and therefore provided little incentive to clear 
the arrears (Table 1.1).32  Moreover, the Board felt the Admiralty should have: 
readily perceive[d] that the clerks in the Sick and Wounded Office 
unfortunately both for the service and themselves, [had] not experienced 
encouragement proportionate with their neighbours, or calculated to 
meet the increased expenses of the times, or to induce those of superior 
abilities to remain in the service.33 
Ultimately the Board was denied both an increase in the number of staff and an increase in 
staff pay. 
When the 13th Report of the Commissioner of Naval Inquiry was submitted in 1806, it 
found abuses in the contracts drawn up by the Board.34  It was at that point the decision 
was made to place the care of sick and hurt men under the direction of the Transport 
Board, the same board who had taken over the management of the prisoners-of-war a 
decade earlier.  Charles Middleton, by 1806 Lord Barham, explained the reasons for the 
amalgamation of the two Boards.  He found ‘the deplorable state of the business in the 
department of the Board for Sick and Wounded Seamen ha[d] long been known’, and 
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considered it advisable to place its business in the hands of a Board ‘accustomed to the 
investigating of accounts.’  On the Sick and Hurt Board at the time of the amalgamation 
were two medical men and one civil commissioner.  Of these, he said, only one was 
resident in London, so that the Board met too infrequently to supervise current business, 
hence the ‘immense accumulation of arrears.’  35  One of the only persons to come to the 
Sick and Hurt Board’s defence was Dr Jonathan Harness who reminded Barham of the 
recognition due to them for the improvement in seamen’s health, most recently the 
mandatory issuance of lemon juice to prevent scurvy.  He also insisted that Dr Baird, the 
hospital inspector for the Board, who was a friend of St Vincent and ‘one of my personal 
enemies’, had influenced Barham against the Board.  Harness, who was senior 
commissioner, felt that blame was inaccurately attributed to him.  In spite of that, 
Harness’s twenty-nine years of service were taken into account, including his service as 
Physician to the Mediterranean Fleet, which persuaded Barham to appoint him the medical 
commissioner under the guidance of the Transport Board.36  Dr John Harness was the only 
commissioner to transfer to the Transport Board and he was the only one of the seven 
commissioners who was medically trained.  In January 1806 the Admiralty ordered the 
office books, papers and instructions sent to the Transport Office.37 
 Navy Office Victualling Office Sick and Wounded Office 
Principals £800 per annum £700 per annum £400 per annum 
1st Assistants £500 £400 £150 
2nd Assistants £300 £250 £120 
3rd Assistants £250 £250 £100 
4th Assistants £150 £150 £80 
5th Assistants £130 £120 £80 
6th Assistants £120 £100 £80 
7th Assistants £100 £90 £78/5s 
8th Assistants £90 £80 £78/5s 
9th Assistants £90 £80 £78/5s 
10th Assistants £80 £80 £78/5s 
Table 1.1 – Clerk Salaries in 1799 According to the Sick and Hurt Board38 
The termination of the Sick and Hurt Board came at a most inopportune time.  If they had 
been allowed to continue, at the very least, until the end of the Napoleonic War, there was 
a real possibility that a number of medical improvements would have been championed by 
the medically knowledgeable and dedicated commissioners.  One only needs to compare 
Commodore George Anson’s voyage in the early 1740s and Captain Matthew Flinders 
circumnavigation of Australia in 1801 to substantiate the Board’s noble efforts.  The 
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former returned from his epic voyage in 1744 with only 500 men out of nearly 1,900, a 
majority of them dying from disease, while in the latter’s case not a single person died due 
to disease.39  Certainly this comparison can only be a testament to the overwhelming 
commitment of the commissioners to the health of seamen.  During the last decade of its 
existence the Sick and Hurt Board engaged in a variety of duties which had, up until that 
time, not been customary for that department.  It ‘expressed opinions on medical matters 
and naval health in more forthright terms.  It was vigorous and active in proposing 
improvements in medical care, in suggestions for controlling costs, in improving the 
professional standing of surgeons, and trying, with some success, to achieve a better 
medical service at sea.’40 
Sick Quarters, Hospitals and Hospital Ships 
A major difficulty which faced the Sick and Hurt Board abroad was the securing of suitable 
on shore accommodation for sick men.  It was routine during the early to mid eighteenth 
century to hire private houses temporarily as required.  These sick quarters were rented at 
the cheapest possible price and only on short term contracts.  Once the number of sick 
men on shore was reduced, sick quarters were released immediately and thereby no longer 
incurred a charge.  Unfortunately, this system teemed with flaws.  As the quarters were 
procured on the cheapest terms, that meant they regularly hired rooms in public houses or 
accommodations near drinking establishments where convalescing men acquired alcohol, 
which in no way aided their recovery.  Another unfortunate consequence of using this 
system was the opportunity for men to desert the service.  Ships’ surgeons also found it 
very difficult to attend sick men while they were scattered amongst various lodgings.  This 
meant that seamen did not always receive necessary treatment.  Townspeople also found 
the system unfavourable.  When sick men were sent ashore, their contagious diseases 
quickly spread through towns subsequently infecting a number of the populace. 
The advantages for the navy in using this system were essentially financial in nature.  
Because the navy did not erect and maintain facilities in most ports at home or abroad, they 
saved a large amount of capital.  They hired accommodations in various ports and merely 
paid a landlady for use of the lodging when necessary without having to outlay a 
tremendous amount of money.  The price of lodging included the cost of food and some 
care until the men were well enough to return to work, thereby affording the navy financial 
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flexibility with a nominal amount of capital to raise.41  Once the accommodation was no 
longer required, the navy simply terminated the agreement and did not pay any further 
money to the landlady.  This system worked effectively enough to justify maintaining it  for 
some time, although the Admiralty realised the hired facilities were deplorable. 
In 1740, when the Sick and Hurt Board became a permanent fixture in the navy, they were 
immediately urged to evaluate the sick quarters system to determine what could be done to 
regulate that facet of service.  Eventually, the Board produced a set of regulations aimed at 
their port agents instructing them on how sick men were to be dealt with when sent ashore 
for their recovery.  The regulations were chiefly derived from several complaints of bad 
management with relation to the treatment of sick men ashore.  Sick quarters, according to 
their new policy, were to be kept clean and not crowded with too many cradles or beds and 
allow a foot and a half of space between each one.  The bedding was to be cleaned and 
aired often and, ‘especially when any man dies or recovers, the bedding in which he lay is to 
be aired very carefully before another man is put into it .’  Each sick man was to be issued 
with new sheets which were to be changed every three weeks.  Men with different illnesses 
were not to be placed in the same room, especially those with contagious diseases, nor were 
they to be put into a room with men who were nearly recovered.  Due to complaints of 
men sharing beds in sick quarters where one was found dead in bed alongside a living 
patient, a new regulation was added which required every man have his own bed or cradle.  
Public houses which sold strong liquors were no longer acceptable places to house sick 
men if private houses were available, and liquor was banned from sick quarters ‘it being a 
practice of pernicious consequence to the health of seamen.’  Surgeons were required to 
visit all men within their jurisdiction as often as their illness required, but no less than once 
a day.  And finally, to prevent the payments for sick quarters from falling into arrears, it 
was now required to send the accounts for sick quarters to the Board every three months.42  
That is not to suggest that the aforementioned written regulations were groundbreaking; on 
the contrary, many of them were already practiced in most ports.  Their importance lay in 
the fact that they were finally put down in printed form, creating a more legitimate 
appearance for the Board and setting out boundaries for agents as to what practices would 
be tolerated and which ones were injurious to the already sick men.  
By 1750, the navy had grown to be of the opinion that sick quarters were not beneficial in 
the men’s recovery nor were they practical for the service.  Hospitals, they alleged, were the 
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most appropriate facilities for men to regain their health.  According to the papers of 
Thomas Corbett, Secretary to the Admiralty from 1741 to 1751, the navy on the whole 
became disenchanted with sick quarters.  He said: 
...It is found by experience that hospitals contribute much more to the 
preservation and cures of sick and wounded men, than town quarters, in 
regard they are attended by such nurses &c in hospitals, as understand 
their circumstances, and are confined from town debauches, whereby 
relapses are prevented, and the cures hastened, but town quarters are 
attended with indigence, ignorance and carelessness, which neglects and 
hazards the patient, prolongs the cure, and excessively swells the public 
charge, it being observed that cures in hospital (in all acute diseases) are 
performed in much less time, and above all, do shorten (in a set number 
of men) the bill of mortality by one half, or more, and being within the 
walls of the hospital, prevents desertion, as is common in town 
quarters.43 
The navy’s idea of what constituted a hospital cannot be confused with the present-day 
concept.  According to the navy, hospitals did not have to be purpose-built, nor did they 
have to be very big and what they referred to as a hospital meant a variety of designs.  At 
some ports, the hospital was simply a rented house where men could be kept in one 
location to ease the surgeons’ burden and to control the influx of drink.  When the 
Admiralty began considering the use of hospitals, especially those in home ports, they 
appreciated no existing buildings were sufficient to contain the number of men sent on 
shore.  Thus, the idea of the navy constructing their own purpose-built facility near 
Portsmouth was devised.  Plans for Haslar hospital, as it would come to be known, were 
first sent to the Sick and Hurt Board in June 1745, although a Parliamentary vote had 
already been granted five months earlier.44  Haslar was completed in 1761, though once one 
wing of it was erected, it accepted a number of sick as early as 1754.  For many years, 
Haslar was the largest hospital in Europe and when fully completed it had a maximum 
capacity of 2,000 patients; ‘more than four times the size of Guy’s and St Thomas’s in 
London, the next biggest hospitals in Europe. ’45  The cost of building such a landmark 
facility exceeded £100,000 which was nearly double the price of the Admiralty building in 
London or the equivalent of constructing three battleships.46  The design of Haslar was not 
revolutionary, nor was the plan for utilising particular wards to segregate infectious patients 
from those who were already on the mend.  This was rarely possible in other facilities due 
to space, but with the sheer amount of room at Haslar, it became entirely feasible.  And 
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under the watchful eye of James Lind, Haslar’s first Physician, the quality of treatment the 
men received was of the highest class. 
When George II approved the construction of Haslar at Portsmouth, he also agreed for a 
naval hospital to be erected at Plymouth, although its progress was much slower.  Land was 
purchased by the Sick and Hurt Board in 1758 and its first patients were admitted as early 
as 1760.  The design of Stonehouse hospital, as it was called, varied slightly from Haslar as 
it was built on the ‘pavilion’ system which meant that , rather than existing as one large 
building with a central courtyard, it was an arrangement of separate blocks.  Its design 
ensured a further division between the contagious and the convalescents.  This innovative 
hospital model proved rather successful and was copied to some extent in other European 
countries.47 
Despite the navy erecting the two large domestic hospitals, they were not readily prepared 
to lay out money to establish something quite so substantial abroad.  They preferred, on 
the whole, to rent entire buildings and lodge sick men in them.  There were, however, 
hospitals in existence abroad and had been since 1711 when the navy erected their first 
purpose-built hospital at Port Mahon, albeit a meagre facility.48  Additionally the Admiralty 
invested money to erect a hospital at Jamaica in the 1740s.  The latter proved to be a 
disastrous undertaking with a sizeable number of seamen succumbing to fevers 
unnecessarily.49 
Hospitals abroad were run by contract, and in some instances, contractors provided their 
own premises rather than the navy procuring one themselves.  These contractors were 
responsible for furnishing non-medical staff, food and drink with their remuneration 
contingent upon the number of patients treated.50  The contract system was far from ideal.  
Similar financial benefits of using the former sick quarters system appealed to the 
Admiralty in that they were not required to surrender capital to procure the lease of a 
building or to negotiate the purchase of large quantities of food.  Gradually, the system of 
civilian contracts was rejected due to numerous complaints from both contractors and 
commander-in-chiefs who felt adequate care and attention for sick men was not provided.  
Contractors also lost money chiefly due to the unpredictability of the number of men sent 
ashore.  If contractors purchased a sizeable amount of perishable food and a limited 
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number of men were sent ashore, the contractors lost out on their investments.  
Conversely, if contractors had not ordered sufficient amounts, sick men suffered from the 
lack of food and necessaries.  When contractors were not able to procure goods at an 
economic price, they were forced to purchase an adequate supply locally at an inflated rate.  
Either way, it resulted in a loss.  When the contractor system proved deficient, contractors 
were replaced with medically trained men appointed by the navy while the navy also 
assumed financial responsibility for hiring hospitals and supplying them with provisions 
and necessaries.51 
It is useful to present statistics on the number of men sent ashore to receive medical 
attention during the last quarter of the eighteenth century during war time.  It is evident by 
Table 1.2 that a sizeable proportion of men serving in the Royal Navy were sent to hospital 
in order to receive care for an illness or wound.  This does not take into account the 
number of men remaining on board their ships who received treatment from their 
surgeons.  The significant drop in the percentage of men sent onshore in 1796 coincided 
with the compulsory issuance of lemon juice to seamen on foreign voyages as a prevention 
and cure for scurvy. 
Year 
Total number voted by Parliament in 
Royal Navy and Marines 
Number 
Sent Sick 
Number sent sick as a 
percentage of total number voted 
(%) 
1778 60,000 15,978 26.6 
1779 70,000 24,226 34.6 
1780 85,000 32,121 37.8 
1781 90,000 23,812 26.5 
1782 100,000 22,909 22.9 
1783 110,000 13,577 12.3 
1793 45,000 17,280 38.4 
1794 85,000 19,248 22.6 
1795 100,000 20,579 20.6 
1796 110,000 16,860 15.3 
1797 120,000 20,544 17.1 
1798 120,000 15,713 13.1 
1799 120,000 14,608 12.2 
1800 111,538 17,747 15.9 
1801 131,538 15,082 11.5 
1804 100,000 7,650 7.7 
1805 120,000 8,083 6.7 
1806 120,000 7,662 6.4 
Table 1.2 – Proportion of Men Sent Sick to Hospital from Ships, 1778-180652 
Closer to home, it was the responsibility of the Sick and Hurt Board to monitor the 
business of hospitals to ensure men received the best possible treatment.  Hospital 
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surgeons’ instructions were under constant revision.  From these regulations, it was evident 
the Board demanded a very high standard of care.  Each man, they determined, deserved 
600 cubic feet of space in a ward with windows and a large airing ground for recovering 
patients to walk around.  During times of war, however, when small hospitals were hired or 
built, such a distribution of space was not required.  The Board advised that particular 
attention be given to the location of hired hospitals as to be near a ‘plentiful supply of good 
water, and that the soil and filth should never stagnate, but be carried off easily and 
expeditiously.’  The cleanliness of the men was also considered.  When sick men arrived at 
the hospital with a suspected infectious disorder or were just overall unkempt, surgeons 
were instructed to remove their clothing instantly and to wash them before they made 
contact with other patients.  Hospital dress was issued and their personal belongings and 
bedding fumigated.  Wards were instructed to be emptied occasionally in order to be 
cleaned, fumigated, white-washed and windows opened to oust any remaining infections.53 
****** 
An alternative to sending sick men ashore were hospital ships.  They were first introduced 
in the seventeenth century, and during the following two hundred years several were kept 
in commission during wartime ready to attend the fleet.  Their function was ‘to take the 
surplus sick from other ships, and to treat them until such time as they could be placed in 
sick quarters ashore, or sent back to duty.’  As a rule they were hired merchantmen or old 
frigates, sixth raters from 300 to 500 tons, which were converted by removing their guns, 
cutting extra ventilating holes in their sides, and clearing the gun-decks of all partitions and 
bulkheads so as to give a clear space fore and aft in which to house the sick  men.54  
Hospital ships were instructed to be kept ‘perfectly sweet and clean’ and Hales’s Ventilators 
‘worked in...[ships] incessantly either by hand or by means of a windlass.’55 
A hospital ship of two decks was equivalent to a one-ward hospital and therefore its size 
rendered it impossible to segregate men according to their diseases.  A three-decked ship 
created a hospital with two wards, although, if scuttles were cut in the orlop deck, it may be 
said to have three wards.   The use of the orlop deck in the three deckers had its 
disadvantages which stemmed from its location.  Since it was situated below the waterline, 
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the amount of natural light and the amount of fresh air that reached the deck was very 
limited.  Another disadvantage resulted from the height of the deck, which never exceeded 
six feet.  The Board proposed that convalescent ships should be moored near hospital 
ships as a way to remove the contagious threat from the recovering men.  Whenever a man 
was recovering, he would be sent on board her.56  While there were overall advantages of 
using hospital ships and convalescent ships such as preventing men from deserting and 
thwarting drunkenness and debauchery, the use of hospital ships never gained widespread 
use in the eighteenth century. 
Surgeons 
Surgeons who served in the Royal Navy held a very unusual position on board ship.  For a 
majority of the eighteenth century, they received their warrants from the Navy Board, not 
the Admiralty, and therefore were not executive officers.  And ‘while their names appeared 
in the ship’s books with those of the boatswain, the gunner and the carpenter, they drew 
less pay than these worthies and received infinitely less thanks .’57  Typically surgeons were 
also looked down upon by their fellow shipmates because unlike the officers, surgeons 
wore no special uniform.  Once surgeons entered service, they became the responsibility of 
the Sick and Hurt Board.  Before they were appointed to a naval ship, it was requisite they 
passed a medical examination at Surgeons’ Hall at the Company of Barber-Surgeons (later 
the Company of Surgeons).  Officers of the Company were only able to examine men in 
their competence at surgery and not in physic, although naval surgeons were required to act 
in both capacities.  The right to examine would-be naval surgeons remained the 
responsibility of the Company until 1796 at which time the commissioners of the Sick and 
Hurt Board took over the examinations.58  Before candidates attended an examination at 
Surgeons’ Hall, they served an apprenticeship to learn their skill, and although many did 
not hold a university degree, many attended lectures without graduating.  To appreciate 
what the viva voce involved, it is useful to quote Peter Cullen who described his examination 
in the third person for the post of naval surgeon by the Company of Surgeons in 1789. 
[T]he examiners were seated at a semi circular table...Mr Cullen having 
walked up to the table and made his bow was asked his name, from 
whence he came, for what purpose...On answering it was for the naval 
service, one of the examiners rose and taking Mr Cullen to the side of 
the room, enquired his age, his apprenticeship, studies, and practice in 
the profession...the examiner proceeded to question him in anatomy, 
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physiology, and surgery...and asked how he would treat certain surgical 
cases...This gentleman was quite satisfied...and taking him to the centre 
of the table where the president was sitting said, ‘I find this young 
gentleman fully qualified  as an assistant surgeon for His Majesty’s navy.’  
The president bowed to Mr Cullen and desired him to pay one guinea as 
a fee, and asked him to call the next day at the Navy Office where he 
would find his certificate.59 
2 amputating knives 
1 amputating saw with spare blade 
1 metacarpal saw with spare blade 
2 catlins (double-edges amputating knives) 
Pair of artery forceps 
2 dozen curved needles 
2 tenaculums (hooks for holding parts) 
6 Pettit’s screw tourniquets 
Pair of bone nippers and turnscrew 
3 trephines 
Saw for the head (Hey’s saw for enlarging cranial orifice made by trephines) 
Rugins (raspatories or files) 
Pair of forceps 
Elevator 
Brush 
2 trocars (tube for withdrawing fluid) 
2 silver catheters (tube for drawing off urine) 
2 gum elastic catheters 
6 scalpels 
1 small razor 
Key tooth instrument (for extracting teeth by torsion) 
Gum lancet (for lancing gum boils) 
2 pairs tooth forceps 
Punch 
2 Seton needles (for drawing silk through the skin to leave a tract for drainage) 
Pair of strong probe scissors 
Curved bistory with button (scalpel) 
Long probe 
Pair of bullet forceps 
Scoop for extracting balls 
2 Probangs (throat sponges) 
1lb ligature thread 
1 paper of needles 
Case, with lift-out 
Apparatus for restoring suspended animation 
Set of pocket instruments 
6 lancets in a case 
2 pint pewter clyster syringes (enema syringes) 
2 sets common splints 
Set of Japanned iron splints for legs 
12 flannel or linen rollers 
2 18-tailed bandages 
20 yards of cloth for tourniquets 
60 yards of tape 
Cupping apparatus, consisting of 1 scarificator and 6 glasses 
Table 1.3 – List of Instruments in a Surgeon’s Chest, 181260 
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After passing their examination, it was the surgeons’ job to assemble their own medical 
chests with instruments and medicines before receiving their warrant.  The cost of the 
chest was paid wholly by the surgeons who had also just paid to appear at Surgeons’ Hall. 61  
Table 1.3 catalogues the vast array of instruments surgeons were required to have in their 
chests in 1812: the list in the eighteenth century was not markedly different.  According to 
P.K. Crimmin, to help offset initial and ongoing costs, naval surgeons were paid six 
shillings and eight pence per man per cure.62 
Various Sick and Hurt Board members criticised the Admiralty’s lack of attention to the 
status of naval surgeons and as early as 1781 Dr Robert Robertson, later senior Physician at 
Greenwich Hospital, argued there was a need to improve the status of naval surgeons to 
maintain parity with those in the army.  This point was also raised by Thomas Trotter in 
1797, himself a naval physician and a champion for medical changes.63  Despite these and 
other protests made by commissioners, surgeons, physicians and captains, the surgeons’ 
status on board ships changed very little.  To add insult to injury, in 1802 all officers except 
surgeons and chaplains received a pay raise.  Surgeons were aggravated that they were 
overlooked and it was ‘not surprising that on the renewal of hostilities [in 1803] many 
surgeons refused to sign on again’ for service.64 
Eventually, and mainly due to the serious threat posed by Napoleon, the Admiralty 
considered raising pay for surgeons.  In 1804, the Admiralty solicited the Sick and Hurt 
Board to draw up a memorandum based on the current practice in the army’s medical 
department ‘to induce well-qualified and respectable persons to enter [naval] service’ to 
which the Board supplied a plan of what needed ‘to be done for the relief and 
encouragement of surgeons and surgeons [sic] mates in the Royal Navy.’65  The first issue 
tackled by the Board in their plan was the matter of pay for not only surgeons, but also for 
hospital mates, dispensers and surgeons’ assistants (as they would now be called rather than 
surgeons’ mates).  This last group now received six shillings and six pence per day aside 
from the benefit of ships’ provisions.  They also received two shillings per day half pay 
when naval service was reduced provided they had served two years subsequent to the 
confirmation of the regulations or three shillings per day if they had served three years. 66  
Ships’ surgeons were now paid on a gradient based on their years of service.  For instance, 
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surgeons in active service who worked six years, of which not more than three years were 
spent as a hospital mate or assistant surgeon, were allowed eleven shillings per day and six 
shillings per day on half pay.  Surgeons who served ten years, allowing not more than three 
years as a hospital mate or assistant surgeon, received fourteen shillings per day, although 
their half pay remained at six shillings.  Another enticement for surgeons to enter navy 
service was the increase of gratuitous medicines which were now provided for all ships and 
vessels at the expense of Government, although surgeons were still responsible for 
procuring their own surgical instruments.67 
It was also decided that, in order to improve the surgeons’ status on board, they should be 
issued with a standard uniform to enable them ‘to have a similar rank with the officers of 
the same class in His Majesty’s Land Service.’68  When surgeons were in full dress, their 
uniform consisted of a blue cloth coat with blue cloth lapels, cuffs and collar, with three 
buttons on the pockets and cuffs.  The coat was to be worn with a white cloth waistcoat 
and breeches and a plain hat.  Surgeons’ mates also wore a blue cloth coat with plain cuffs 
without lapels.  Their waistcoat and breeches were allowed to be white or blue cloth.  All 
medical men were to wear the sword established for the officers of the navy, and surgeons 
serving afloat were to wear a button with a plain anchor in an oval, while those serving in 
hospitals would wear a similar button with the addition of ‘H.S.’ for hospital staff. 69  The 
estimated cost of the necessary reforms – increased pay, free medicines and a uniform – 
was £41,726-9s-2d.  Ultimately, these long overdue recommendations were put into effect 
by an Order in Council in January 1805.70  Although these reforms did further respect for 
naval surgeons, it was nearly 40 years until they were granted commissions rather than 
warrants.71 
Arguments made by surgeons and physicians for improvements to naval service were part 
of a larger medical reform movement in the late eighteenth century known as the 
Enlightenment.  Buckley maintains that ‘this era...produced a prodigious list of discoveries 
and leading lights in clinical medicine.’72  These discoveries and advancements were not 
necessarily the innovation of classically-educated medical men; noteworthy developments 
stemmed from surgeons, particularly those working in the colonies or those associated with 
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military forces.  Isolated locations, such as the islands of the West Indies, gave surgeons 
autonomy to implement their own systems of experimentation and observation in a ‘closed’ 
population.  The same is true for military surgeons.  Wartime meant that large numbers of 
men were overseas in a controlled environment such as an army camp or on board a naval 
ship and therefore able to be observed on a consistent basis.  As will be shown in 
subsequent chapters, the contributions of naval surgeons during this period improved their 
professional status.73 
****** 
The life of a surgeon on board a ship was not an easy one.  Aside from seniority struggles, 
he was required to live and work in dreadful surroundings.  On board ship, he was not 
allocated any permanent space to attend the sick or wounded.  Generally sick men 
remained in their own hammocks while he attended them at least once a day to record their 
progress, change dressings, alter their diets and examine their overall level of cleanliness.  
Dr Thomas Trotter, who was an advocate of sweeping changes for the medical 
department, described the lack of a ‘commodious spot being set apart for the sick’ on 
board for the surgeon’s use.  He divulged the experience on his first ship as a surgeon’s 
mate where the sick-berth was ‘half-enclosed with hammocks, being fixed near the galley; 
more with a view to stifle contagion with the smoke from the fire than to keep the patient 
comfortable.’74  He was not the only naval surgeon to complain about the conditions in 
which the sick were kept.  Dr James Lind, recognised for his efforts towards eliminating 
scurvy, described the place allotted for the sick generally to be in ‘either the fore part of the 
gun deck, called the bay, which is the most damp and unwholesome part of a ship; or, what 
is nearly as bad, and very incommodious, the fore part of the hold.’  Both these confined 
places, he asserted, ‘have too often proved a seminary of infection to the whole company .’75 
Generally surgeons themselves were berthed on the orlop deck (along with the purser) 
which is the lowest part of a ship aside from the hold.  It was located below the waterline 
and therefore admitted no natural light and required the use of lanterns for light.  The aft 
area of the orlop was referred to as the cockpit.  When ships readied for battle, surgeons 
requested an area from the captain to use for the treatment of the wounded men and 
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typically they were allocated the cockpit.  Once that was determined, the carpenters either 
laid down a platform with seamen’s bedding placed on top or midshipmen’s sea chests 
were shoved together to make an operating table.  The floor was strewn with sand or 
sawdust to prevent everyone, including the injured, from sliding around in blood.  As soon 
as seamen arrived in the cockpit, surgeons prioritised the men according to their injuries; 
the most serious were urgently treated first.76  James Lowry, who was an assistant surgeon 
on board the Foudroyant, briefly described his experience working in the cockpit during an 
encounter with the French vessel La Hoche.  He recounted that the English: 
had not many men killed or wounded.  I was busy, employed in the 
cockpit stopping the haemorrhages and dressing the wounded.  The 
surgeon and all his assistant surgeons are stationed below (which is out 
of danger of the balls in the time of battle) where they have a platform 
made with beds laid on for the convenience of the wounded, all their 
surgical instruments, bandages, etc etc in readiness, and where the 
officers and sailors are brought to be dressed of their wounds.77 
Developments in ship design from the 1790s impacted the way the sick and wounded were 
treated by surgeons on board.  One of the most vital advancements was the introduction of 
the purpose-built sick berth on board.  Developed by Captain Markham of the Centuar, the 
berth was located below the forecastle in an area that was formerly used as a pig sty. 78  
There were numerous benefits to relocating the sick berth to a permanent area, rather than 
continuing with ad hoc arrangements in the cockpit.  The new location gave sick men the 
benefit of natural light and fresher air as well as containing a round house (toilet).  Dr 
Trotter spoke highly of the ‘improved sick-berth [which] the navy is indebted to Captain 
Markham...and is much beyond any ward in our Royal Hospitals. ’79  Markham’s design 
included a large sleeping area where the sick and wounded men could sling up their 
hammocks and an adjoining dispensary where the surgeon had his own desk.  In frigates, 
the entire berth covered an area 15 feet long by 11 feet wide.80 
Trotter described the new layout: 
The Markham sick-berth takes in the two foremost guns under the 
forecastle, all that space from the ship’s side to the fore-mast, so that it 
includes the round-house and head-door, and also the midships, which 
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was formerly occupied by a pig-stye.  The head-door is converted into a 
sash-window, and occasionally into venetian blinds.  Over the midships 
is a large sky-light, which give a cheerful appearance to the whole, and in 
warm weather is thrown open, so as to cause a fresh current of air to 
pass through the ports and head-window.  The walls of the sick-berth are 
either panels of deal, or strong canvas, so closely put together as to 
exclude the smoke of the galley fire, and nicely whitewashed once a 
month.  The furniture consists of commodious benches and a settee for 
the weakly people to recline upon.  Tubs and pails for washing, cooking 
vessels, with towels and clean canvas tablecloths, dishes, spoons, knives 
and forks, etc., complete the utensils, all of which are kept in fine order 
in concealed lockers within the sick berth.  A canvas cot or two, with 
hospital bedding, neatly surrounded with clean white calico curtains, are 
kept for fractures or particular surgical cases.  The utmost attention is 
paid to cleanliness and purity, which is easily done, as the round-house is 
often washed.  In cold or damp weather a hanging-stove with clear 
embers is brought in and also when the deck is scrubbed...The space 
between the head-doors and under the sky-light is used as a dispensary 
and elegantly fitted with a desk; and along the head are ranged the 
drawers and bottles for present use, in a style of neatness that would do 
credit to the first apothecary’s shop in London.81 
The layout for Markham’s sick berth is seen in Figure 1.1.  Totter found this new 
arrangement beneficial to surgeons because: 
...the practice of seeing and examining every [sick] person in the list in 
daylight...makes it more convenient...In surgical cases, such as wounds 
and sores, it is also of the first importance to view them in a clear 
manner, for the treatment so much depends on the appearance and 
colour of the matter and surface of the ulcer.  All of these advantages are 
now obtained in the highest degree; and I trust service will never again 
relapse into the slovenly habit of dressing or examining the sick in a 
cockpit...A sick berth of these dimensions, in the larger class of seventy-
fours, gives room sufficient for twenty-two people to hang up their beds, 
with full advantage to attendance and purification.  It can seldom happen 
in a ship duly regulated that more space can be wanted, as a convalescent 
temporary berth can be easily erected on the opposite side. 82 
It was not till the very end of the Napoleonic War that the Admiralty gave orders for 
Markham’s sick berths to be fitted agreeable to the new form by the dockyard joiners.83 
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Figure 1.1 – The Layout of the Markham Sick Berth84 
Naval surgeons in the eighteenth century were faced with a difficult role.  They were 
warrant officers, but were not executive officers.  They were expected to pay for all their 
instruments as well as medicines for the entire ships’ crew.  They wore no naval uniform 
and secured little respect from senior officers.  Army surgeons were held in higher esteem 
and because of this, were better compensated financially for their services.  Combined 
efforts to change the surgeons’ status by the Sick and Hurt Board, admirals, captains, 
physicians and the surgeons themselves paid off.  The surgeons’ role underwent significant 
changes such as an increase in pay, the distribution of gratuitous medicines, the alteration 
of the sick berth from a temporary configuration to a purpose-built spacious area, the 
allocation of uniforms and the issuing of a sword.  The dedication shown by the 
aforementioned people afforded the surgeon a better opportunity in the navy and therefore 
provided an enhanced system of treating sick seamen. 
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Physician 
While the surgeon was the simple warrant officer on board a ship, his sophisticated 
gentlemanly counterpart was certainly the physician.  These two men differed on many 
levels.  The physician underwent a prolonged university education, typically in Scotland, to 
render him expert in the liberal arts and sciences.  They were indoctrinated in theoretical 
foundations of medicine promoted by such revolutionary men as the Dutch anatomist 
Herman Boerhaave (1668-1738) while surgeons traditionally practiced the art of surgery.  
Medical historian Roy Porter declared the physician to be ‘upright, trustworthy and God-
fearing, grave, sober and devoted to learning not lucre .’85  Eighteenth century physicians 
were expected to diagnose complaints, make a prognosis, prescribe treatments and 
medicines and provide attendance and advice.86  The Hippocratic Oath taken by the 
physicians forbade them to do any knifework and Porter asserts that while recognising the 
surgeon’s skills, ‘this bred an enduring medical division of labour in which surgery was 
viewed as inferior, the work of hand not head.’87 
In the Royal Navy, physicians were appointed to act chiefly as medical officers.  As they 
possessed a ‘medical degree rather than the merely nominal qualifications required for a  
naval surgeon, the physician was a more honoured and better-paid officer.’88  There were 
only a handful of physicians serving in the navy, one to each of the larger squadrons.89  
While on board, they were under the orders of the admiral or commander-in-chief and 
resided either in the flagship or the hospital ship.  Once they were appointed, their 
responsibilities were numerous although their main focus was the supervision of surgeons 
belonging to the squadron.  Aside from that, physicians acted as consultants by examining 
the sick and decided which men were invalided, they reviewed sick returns and surveyed 
stores for the fleet.90 
One of the most notable physicians stationed in the West Indies during this time was 
Gilbert Blane, who was appointed Physician of the Leeward Islands fleet in April 1780 by 
Admiral Sir George Brydges Rodney.  Rodney, himself a believer in maintaining the health 
of seamen by practicing preventative medicine rather than reactive treatment, felt Blane 
was the perfect candidate to take on the responsibilities of a physician owing to ‘his skill 
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and application.’  Rodney praised Blane for his work in fostering ‘the recovery of many sick 
as well as wounded, both among those on board as well as those sent to Gros Islet, St 
Lucia’ following an engagement with the French fleet.91  Since Blane had not been given his 
commission from the Admiralty, it was unclear to both he and Rodney what financial 
benefits he was entitled to and where he fell within the hierarchy amongst the officers.  He 
regularly dined with Rodney and the men of the upper deck, something a surgeon was 
rarely invited to do.  Once Blane was no longer serving in the West Indies, but before he 
was appointed a commissioner of the Sick and Hurt Board in 1795, he continued to 
campaign for the advancement of rights for naval physicians and to provide them with 
pensions following their departure from service.  In December 1790, he petitioned His 
Majesty’s Council for an increase in pension pay as he felt their ten shillings a day, after 
taxes, ‘amount[ed] in reality to little more than two thirds of that sum.’  Additionally, he 
recognized their financial encouragement was ‘inferior to what is allowed to physicians to 
the Army.’  Naval physicians, he believed, deserved ‘equal encouragement [for] the talents 
and exertions of the medical profession.’92  A raise in pay for physicians did not come until 
1804 at the same time surgeons’ benefits were adjusted. 
Company of Surgeons/College of Physicians 
The Royal Company of Surgeons has a long and distinguished history beginning with their 
partnership with barbers.  Under the rule of King Henry VIII, the union between the 
Fellowship of Surgeons and the Company of Barbers was effected in 1540 in order to form 
the Company of Barber-Surgeons.   In fact it was Thomas Vicary, surgeon to Henry VIII, 
who urged the King to introduce sufficient regulations for surgeons practicing in the city of 
London.  The sixteenth century viewpoint saw barbers and surgeons almost in unison as 
both were trained in the art of using knives; also the barbers were in the habit of practicing 
minor surgery such as bleeding, cupping, tooth extraction and lancing of abscesses while 
surgeons performed a similar role.93  This newly formed Company was rather unsettled 
with a certain amount of internal quarrelling amongst its members.  Lloyd and Coulter 
keenly point out that the ‘internecine quarrels of a Company, in which the barbers provided 
most of the cash and the surgeons resented their condescending attitude, presaged its 
collapse in 1745.’94  A petition for the separation of the two bodies was laid before 
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Parliament which was then obliged to dissolve the ancient union between barbers and 
surgeons by an Act dated June 25, 1745.95  Prior to the split, the Company of Barber-
Surgeons did very little to advance the understanding of the practice of surgery.  Moreover, 
the surgeons’ association with barbers did nothing to advance their social status.  The 
surgeons then formed their own Livery Company known as the Company of Surgeons.  
What the split determined, according to Porter, was that surgery was indeed its own craft; 
‘a cut above mere hairdressing.’96 
As mentioned, prior to the split, the Company of Barber-Surgeons undertook the 
responsibility for examining would-be naval surgeons.  The practice began in 1697 and 
lasted until 1796 when the Sick and Hurt Board took over the surgeons’ examinations.  The 
system did not work properly while it was under the supervision of the Company.  
Candidates were examined by men who understood various forms of surgery ; however 
examiners had no formal training in combating diseases (typically a physician’s role) which 
was something that naval surgeons most certainly had to attend to once they received their 
warrants.  Despite these shortcomings, the Company did play a useful role in naval 
medicine through their inspection of instruments and their opinions on various medicines 
and cures for the relief of seamen.  During the Enlightenment, the Company changed their 
practices very little.  They did not require attendance at medical lectures to issue licenses or 
memberships.  While they did offer some education in anatomy, it only involved short 
demonstrations and not extended courses.  Due to these very basic offerings for surgeons, 
Lawrence maintains that the Company’s ‘instruction was increasingly treated as inadequate 
or ancillary.’97  Hospitals, as centres of experimentation and observation, emerged during 
this period as the hub for surgeons’ development and instruction.  The Company’s 
influence weakened, particularly where the navy was concerned.  When the Sick and Hurt 
Board became more self-reliant in the 1790s, their dependence on the Company waned 
while their attention turned to hospitals for advice when required. 
****** 
Aside from the navy’s relationship with the Company of Surgeons, it also sought advice 
regarding internal medicine which the Company could not always provide.  For those 
queries, the Sick and Hurt Board turned to the Royal College of Physicians.  The College 
consisted of members who were university educated in various subjects covering liberal arts 
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and sciences.  Candidates for Fellowship in the College underwent an oral examination to 
demonstrate that they were ‘groundedly learned’ (classically educated) in addition to their 
medical knowledge.98 
The College had begun, as did the Company of Barber-Surgeons, in the sixteenth century 
under the direction of Henry VIII.  A group of Oxbridge-educated physicians in London, 
led by Thomas Linacre, petitioned the King to establish the College in 1518.  It was 
Linacre’s desire to found an academic body for physicians rather than a trade guild of the 
kind which regulated surgeons and apothecaries.  From the physicians’ standpoint, they 
sought to regulate the service provided by physicians in London.  They requested the right 
to examine those men who desired to work in London as well as the ability to reprimand 
those who were unqualified and/or those engaged in malpractice.  As the founding charter 
decreed, the College ‘curb[ed] the audacity of those wicked men who shall profess medicine 
more for the sake of their avarice than from the assurance of any good conscience, 
whereby many inconveniences may ensue to the rude and credulous populace.’99   By 1523, 
an Act of Parliament extended the College's licensing powers from London to the whole of 
England and in 1551 it gained its ‘royal’ tag.100 
From its inception, the College was involved in battles with other medical bodies to control 
medical licensing in London.  Early in the eighteenth century, the College suffered some 
setbacks, falling out of royal favour, and (after the House of Lords’ judgement in the Rose 
Case, 1704) losing its monopoly to prescribe medicines in London. 101  The Lords ruled that 
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apothecaries could also prescribe medicine provided that they charged only for their 
medicines, not for their advice, something still reserved for physicians.102  Later in the 
century, in 1767, a bitter dispute with its own licentiates was brought on by the College’s 
refusal to admit candidates from non-Oxbridge universities.  The situation resulted in angry 
licentiates storming the College during a committee meeting, but it was not until 1835 that 
candidates from other universities were finally admitted.103 
For the Royal Navy’s purposes, the College was an essential ally whilst members of the Sick 
and Hurt Board remained administrative and not medical.  Given the choice between the 
College and the Company of Surgeons, the Admiralty on the whole preferred to solicit the 
advice of physicians based on the social and educational distinctions between the two 
groups.104  Although, as N.A.M. Rodger points out, the ‘College of Physicians in London 
were of little assistance in the field of naval medicine’ simply because physicians during that 
period predominantly trained in ‘a strictly theoretical school which placed a high value on a 
priori reasoning and regarded empirical observation as the mark of a charlatan.’105  While 
Rodger’s view is largely accurate, it is essential to mention that there were physicians who 
championed experimentation and nosological classifications. 106  Just like the Company of 
Surgeons during this period, the College also became less involved in medical reform partly 
due to internal quarrelling and debates with the Society of Collegiate Physicians.107 
The navy’s reliance on the College of Physicians began to diminish once commissioners 
were appointed to the Sick and Hurt Board who had served as naval physicians since the 
latter was able to handle the majority of medical queries internally. 108  It was only when the 
Board could not reach a consensus amongst themselves that it was germane to contact the 
College for their opinion, which was ultimately the final word on any concern, although 
this happened rarely toward the close of the eighteenth century. 
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Society of Apothecaries 
The last institution of medical men that was of service to the Royal Navy was the Society 
of Apothecaries who were in the business of supplying all required medicines to naval 
surgeons.  An eighteenth century apothecary was ‘nothing if not versatile; he was the 
physician’s cook, the community’s general practitioner and the local pharmacist whose 
shop was a storehouse of pungent powders, fragrant herbs and contorted roots.’109  Their 
history is something of an interesting one.  Founded nearly a century after the College of 
Physicians, the apothecaries broke away from the Grocers’ Company which led to the ir 
organisation as the Society of Apothecaries in 1617.  For the remainder of the century, the 
Society busied themselves with the establishment of Apothecaries Hall in Blackfriars  which 
was destroyed by the Great Fire of London in 1666.  They also founded the Chelsea Physic  
Garden in 1673, then known as Apothecaries’ Garden, for the purpose of training men to 
identify various types of plants.  Similar to the other two organisations, a core function of 
the Society was to inspect apothecaries’ shops to prevent the distribution of inferior 
medicines and address accusations of malpractice.  Additionally they monitored apprentices 
to ensure they learned the required subjects of chemistry and botany, although the Society 
was not given examination authority until the early nineteenth century.   Unfortunately for 
apothecaries, they were viewed as the ‘physician’s underling: what the latter prescribed, the 
former dispensed.’110  This, as has been noted in the Rose Case, caused a great deal of 
tension between the Society and the Royal College of Physicians. 
A very tight relationship formed between the Royal Navy and the Society in 1703 when the 
latter was granted the monopoly of supplying drugs to their surgeons.  They even opened a 
special shop where surgeons, on obtaining their warrants, might purchase their medical 
stores.111  Initially surgeons were required to provide a chest containing instruments and 
medicines at their own cost, however they were given a meagre allowance of gratuitous 
medicine which was not enough to cover the amount expended.  Until 1779, senior 
surgeons received an allowance for the initial purchase of medicines valued at £33-9s; that 
amount was increased to £62-0s in 1781.112  Once medications were purchased by naval 
surgeons and examined, chests were sealed up until surgeons arrived at their ships, thereby, 
in theory, ensuring they did not sell off medicines to recoup part of their costs.  
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A more unfortunate situation belonged to those surgeons whose ships were ordered on 
foreign service where, if they ran out of medicines (which happened very frequently in 
tropical climates), they were forced to purchase additional supplies at inflated rates.  When 
that situation befell surgeons in the West Indies, they petitioned the Sick and Hurt Board 
for reimbursement provided the Board received receipts of the expenditures and felt the 
charges justified.  Eventually, following an abundance of complaints made to the Board 
regarding the outlay of monies for medicines and necessaries, it was finally agreed in 1796 
that some principal medicines would be provided gratuitously to surgeons while the Society 
of Apothecaries advised them what to select.  The Society maintained the arrangement to 
supply surgeons with medicines not furnished gratuitously by the Admiralty.  This did little 
to ease the financial strain on surgeons serving in tropical climates.  When supplies of 
gratuitous medicines ran out, surgeons were required to purchase enough locally to serve 
their ships.  In 1804, it was agreed the Admiralty would supply all medicines gratuitously to 
surgeons.  Thus, the monopoly held by the Society of Apothecaries for providing naval 
surgeons with all medicines came to an end.  It was now the job of the Admiralty to supply 
drugs at the public expense, and in doing so, according to the historian Allison, ‘removed a 
burden which should never have been placed upon the surgeons. ’113 
Conclusion 
When the navy’s resources and manpower began to spread out around the globe due to the 
expansion of the British Empire, the Admiralty was faced with a host of setbacks.  Not 
only were seamen tempted by the prospect of desertion from service, they were also 
subjected to several diseases which at times proved fatal.  This became a greater issue 
during times of war.  At the commencement of the Seven Years’ War, the first few months 
were tremendously difficult for the navy.  They were unable to mobilise quickly due to a 
shortage of manpower, and a portion of those they did recruit either deserted or 
succumbed to disease.  In order to curtail these substantial losses, the Admiralty and Sick 
and Hurt Board began a naval medical reform movement.  The Board, with independent 
assistance, served a fundamental role in the betterment of health amongst seafarers.  From 
their establishment as a permanent department in 1740, the Board undertook innumerable 
measures to enhance medical policies and practices in the navy.  They progressed from a 
largely administrative body who utilised the medical training of independent institutions to 
dictate the Board’s policy into a largely self-sufficient and competent organisation.  
Through their impetus, the navy ceased relying on the ineffective sick quarters system both 
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at home and abroad and replaced it initially with the contractor system and then with 
permanent naval hospitals and hospital ships.  Baugh correctly surmised by doing this ‘the 
navy was moving away from a system designed mainly just to get the sick men out of ships 
where they might infect others and could not be adequately nursed, to a system designed 
mainly to preserve their lives and restore their health’ and restore them to active service.114 
Aside from securing healthier and more effective housing for the sick and wounded, the 
Board also effected changes to the perceived role of surgeons.  Despite being issued a 
warrant, surgeons were classed little above common seamen and well below commissioned 
officers.  Through changes advocated by the Sick and Hurt Board, surgeons found 
themselves better placed amongst senior members of the crew and found their physical 
shipboard locale moved from the orlop deck to a purpose-built sick berth below the 
forecastle with a built-in dispensary.  In this new setup, sick men were placed in a central 
and controlled environment meaning surgeons could better attend them. 
Surgeons were not the only ones who underwent a role alteration.  Naval physicians gained 
more prominence both on board ships and within the administration.  While afloat, 
physicians were able to act as intermediary between surgeons who learned their trade by 
apprenticeship and senior officers who preferred carrying on a dialogue with classically 
educated men.  Having physicians on board meant that captains were no longer required to 
monitor surgeons or to monitor onshore sick arrangements on a regular basis.   Those 
physicians who joined the naval administration were equally as useful.  As had been 
customary for most of the century, the navy secured the advice of independent medical 
institutions such as the College of Physicians before dictating new policies.  With 
physicians on staff, the need to consult external institutions dwindled considerably.  
Guidelines and procedures were now fully accomplished in-house and produced by 
educated men who were experienced in the practice of naval surgery. 
The dependence on separate medical institutions, which the Sick and Hurt Board relied on 
for the majority of its existence, began to wane toward the end of the eighteenth century.  
For the College of Physicians and the Company of Surgeons, the financial implications 
were slight as they rarely charged for their services apart from examining would-be naval 
surgeons.  The Society of Apothecaries stood to lose the most.  Once the Admiralty agreed 
to furnish surgeons with a number of gratuitous medicines, the requirement for surgeons 
to procure supplies from the Society was lifted.  The Sick and Hurt Board contracted with 
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London agents for the gratuitous medicines, meaning the Society lost a considerable 
portion of their revenue. 
The Sick and Hurt Board’s history is unlike any other naval department.  Originally a 
temporary fixture during war time, the need for a permanent Board arose at the outbreak 
of the War of Jenkins’ Ear.  Once assembled, the Board’s functions changed little in 
roughly half a century.  Eventually, physicians and medically trained men were selected as 
commissioners and the Board’s dynamics changed extensively.  Their training meant they 
were able to be more hands-on with care regulations, they examined naval surgeons in-
house and determined which medicines were distributed to the fleets.  Unfortunately their 
extensive accounting arrears proved too much and eventually the duties of the Sick and 
Hurt Board were transferred to the Transport Board.  But, fortunately, before it was 
dismantled, the Board enjoyed a decade of success in implementing ‘practical measures of 
cleanliness, improved diet and better hospital care’ which ‘made headway against much 
sickness.’115 
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Chapter 2 
Naval Diseases in the West Indies 
In a return to the House of Commons in 1762 it stated that of the 184,899 enlistments in 
the Seven Years’ War thus far, 1,512 had been killed in action while 133,708 were lost to 
the naval service by other causes, predominantly from sickness and desertion.1  Michael 
Duffy cites a similar set of figures for the American War of Independence.  Of the 175,900 
enlistments from 1774 to 1780, 1,243 were killed in action, 18,545 died of disease and 
42,069 deserted.2  As exact figures are available for the latter war, it is simple to calculate 
the total percentage of men who succumbed to disease.  During that time, less than 1 per 
cent of men died as a result of combat while 10.5 per cent of men died as a result of illness.  
Death from disease, and not as a direct result of combat with the enemy, was in fact one of 
the navy’s biggest adversaries. 
Life on board a sailing ship was gruelling and unhealthy.  Ships teemed with refuse, rotting 
provisions, rats, insects, dirt and unclean drinking water.  It is not surprising that these 
conditions resulted in diseases becoming widespread.  Provisions for seamen to clean 
themselves and launder their belongings were not supplied by the navy meaning the men 
usually slept in filthy hammocks and wore the same dirty clothing for months at a time.  
Elsewhere on board, unhygienic conditions prevailed.  The bilge, for example, was the 
most fetid area as it was filled with noxious gases and the stench of rot emanating from 
refuse and stagnant water. 
Overcrowding was a major problem.  Seamen worked closely alongside one another and 
enjoyed very little individual space.  Ships carried a large number of seamen which 
encouraged the rapid spread of disease among the crew and resulted in a considerable loss 
of life.  Ships generally left England carrying more seamen than were needed to operate the 
sails and guns because the navy calculated that a percentage of them would succumb to 
disease and wounds.  If their estimations were correct and a certain percentage of seamen 
died, there were still enough seamen to man the ship.  By doing this, the Admiralty created 
a vicious circle.  Initially, by placing an excess number of seamen on board, they made 
ships extremely overcrowded and promoted the spread of disease.   To compensate for the 
loss of men due to disease (which was partly due to overcrowding), the Admiralty 
considered it essential to order an excess number of men on board each ship.  Problems 
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with overcrowding were especially true in larger ships-of-the-line.  In those larger ships, the 
calculated amount of space per seaman was significantly less than the allocated space in 
smaller frigates and schooners.  As a rule of thumb, seamen in smaller ships were generally 
healthier because of the extra personal space and because those ships generally spent more 
time cruising which kept them offshore and away from disease-carrying insects. 
Naval surgeons utilised both a traditional system of treating patients – that being the belief 
in the Hippocratic and Galen principal of the ‘four humours’ – as well as the more 
contemporary views of the Enlightenment.3  While the former depended heavily on the 
assumption that keeping the four humours in balance resulted in a healthy person, the 
latter relied on observation and experiment.  Thrown into this complex mix was the idea of 
‘climatorial’ or ‘miasmatic’ influences versus the ‘contagion’ theory.  Miasma theory had 
existed since ancient times and was most closely related to the principle of the four 
humours.  The belief in the humoural theory began to wane among surgeons and 
physicians in the eighteenth century, while at the same time the belief in miasmatic 
influences gained strength; the latter theory appealed more favourably to physicians and 
surgeons who were familiar with the distribution of yellow fever and malaria.4  Despite the 
increase in popularity, the Enlightenment brought the miasmatic theory into question, 
dividing the medical community between it and the ‘contagion’ theory.   Interest in 
contagion, also referred to as ‘germ’ theory, appears to have proliferated from scientific 
research carried out in the eighteenth century and carried on well into the following 
century.5  This varying opinion on medical ideas and values by European surgeons and 
physicians resulted in various diagnoses, treatments and remedies for a number of naval 
diseases in the eighteenth century.  While this is an oversimplification of the various 
medical concepts at play during the period covered by this thesis, it is meant to emphasise 
the complicated nature of medicine at the turn of the century and the shift from theory and 
speculation to experimentation and observation. 
No matter which theory medical men subscribed to, they were chiefly limited to practicing 
curative medicine: very little medicine at that time was preventative.  Since the symptoms 
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of the diseases themselves were often unclear and inconsistent, treatment was varied and 
contradictory among naval surgeons.  An illness described by one surgeon as an ‘ague’ 
could be described by another as a ‘quartan fever’, while still another could refer to it as a 
‘bilious intermitting fever’.  These three surgeons could potentially treat the disease in as 
many methods.  While there was some consistency in treatment in the navy, diseases were 
typically identified by individual surgeons who then attempted to provide a cure according 
to their own knowledge and experience.  As difficult as it was for naval surgeons to 
consistently identify and record diseases, it is equally as difficult for historians to perform 
retrospective diagnoses using eighteenth century documents: yellow fever is a notable 
exception due to its conspicuous symptoms.6  Diseases were recorded in those documents 
without any exactitude.  It will be demonstrated in this chapter that the terms, perceptions, 
symptoms and treatments of the most common naval disorders frequently varied from 
surgeon to surgeon, making modern-day analysis complicated. 
***** 
Seasickness was the only true naval disease.  All other ailments endured by seamen were 
also found among the population-at-large.  Seamen were more prone to experiencing 
certain diseases in the West Indies including yellow fever and malaria.  The men ordered to 
that region of the world, belonging to both the navy and army, were considered to be at 
high risk of exposure to these particular diseases.  As will be demonstrated in a subsequent 
chapter, seamen ordered to the West Indies remained generally healthy, although there 
were specific periods when outbreaks precipitated slightly higher-than-normal morbidity 
and mortality rates.7  One such outbreak occurred in the West Indies during the wars with 
France at the turn of the century.  According to figures quoted by David Geggus, for the 
period between 1793 and 1815, some 70,000 British troops died in the West Indies.8  He 
maintains that ‘the turbulent years of the great military expeditions, 1793 -1798, claimed just 
over half this number [35,000 troops].’  Geggus also claims that for the period 1793-1801, 
the Royal Navy lost more than 30,000 men in the West Indies, which included figures from 
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the documented yellow fever epidemic.9  According to Duffy’s calculations, the number of 
battle casualties during the 1790s was relatively low meaning that mortality figures quoted 
by Geggus are in large part due to disease.10  There were a number of factors that brought 
about these high mortality figures.  First, and most importantly, was the sheer volume of 
seamen and troops sent to the West Indies as expeditionary forces from 1793 to 1798.  At 
no point before had such considerable forces descended upon the islands which were 
essentially composed of newly-recruited men who were ‘unseasoned’ to tropical service.  
As it will soon be demonstrated, the influx of unseasoned military forces from Britain and 
France accelerated the yellow fever epidemic.  Second, the British expeditions’ arrivals were 
ill-timed and coincided with the sickly season in the West Indies (August to December) as 
well as with the epidemic of yellow fever.11 
While both the navy and army were hit hard during the period 1793-1798 and then again to 
a lesser extent in 1802-1803, the sickness and mortality figures do not represent the 
eighteenth century as a whole.  Yellow fever and malaria were the prevailing diseases; 
however seamen were troubled by several other afflictions which hindered their ability to 
contribute to naval operations.  Of these other afflictions, the most prevalent were scurvy, 
dysentery, ulcers, rheumatism, ruptures and venereal diseases.  Medical knowledge and 
understanding led surgeons and physicians to misinterpret the basis of most disorders and 
therefore many of them continued to beleaguer squadrons stationed in the West Indies.   
This chapter will explore these specific diseases in greater detail to demonstrate how they 
adversely affected naval operations. 
Yellow Fever 
Yellow fever was one of the greatest scourges of seamen in the West Indies.  The disease 
was referred to by a variety of names including malignant fever, vomito negro because of the 
black vomit discharged by the sufferer, ‘Barbados distemper’, ‘bleeding fever’ and ‘yellow 
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jack’, a name taken from the colour of a ship’s quarantine flag.12  Its progression through a 
squadron stationed in the tropics was rapid, and it was not unusual for a large portion of a 
ship’s company to fall ill upon arrival.  Men who exhibited symptoms of the disease often 
died in a short period of time.  Most preventative measures were misdirected making them 
practically useless.13 
The origins of the disease are unknown, but it is generally accepted that it spread from the 
west coast of Africa to the New World via the old slave trading routes.  Most likely 
imported on Dutch vessels carrying slaves, the mosquito responsible for the fever’s 
transmission could have survived the Atlantic crossing in water casks.  Prior to the arrival 
of the Europeans, the West Indies were not the ideal breeding ground for yellow fever.  
Despite the warm temperatures and frequent rainfall, the islands lacked certain qualities 
which mosquitoes needed to thrive: namely not enough clean water storage containers, not 
enough vectors and most importantly not enough people for them to bite.14  Through the 
increase of sugarcane cultivation in the islands, mosquitoes were given their foothold in the 
West Indies.  Large scale deforestation which paved the way for sugarcane plantations 
caused the eradication of a number of native birds who would otherwise have preyed on 
the mosquito population.  McNeill maintains that ‘whatever the effects of the sugar 
revolutions on mosquito predators, sugar plantations did wonders for [mosquito] breeding 
and feeding.  Plantations and the ports that sent sugar to Europe made ideal incubators and 
larders’ for the insects.15  The expansion of plantations meant there was also significant 
human population growth which the mosquitoes could thrive upon.  As a result of this 
escalating economic development, port cities in the West Indies were forced to expand 
making the presence of additional government agents and military personnel necessary.   
The influx of non-immune people to populate the plantations and ports intensified the 
disease in that region, causing it to become more prevalent. 
Yellow fever’s first documented appearance was in Barbados in 1647 at which time 5,000 
people died from a ‘new distemper’ characterised by black vomit.16  Once the disease 
reached the West Indies, its mosquito vector increased and it became endemic to that 
region.  It spread to Guadeloupe and Yucatan in 1648, St Kitts in 1649, and Cuba in 1649-
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50.17  Not all West Indian islands suffered continually from yellow fever, particularly if the 
local population remained consistent with very few newcomers.  In Cuba, for example, 
yellow fever flourished from 1649-55 and then disappeared until the 1760s.18  In fact, 
following the initial outbreaks in the mid-seventeenth century, yellow fever disappeared for 
nearly forty years.  McNeill asserts that this came about because the disease had ‘worked its 
way through the susceptible hosts, leaving behind a higher proportion of immune people.  
It could not flourish again without a sufficient proportion of non-immune people.’19 Aside 
from the consistent population, sugar production also played a role in determining whether 
or not the disease was endemic on specific islands. 20  The particular mosquito which 
transmits yellow fever, Aedes aegypti (or Stegomyia fasciata as it was formerly known) has the 
ability to live on sucrose as well as on human blood.  Sugar production in the West Indies 
grew in significance from the 1640s; islands whose livelihoods were centred around 
sugarcane typically suffered from yellow fever epidemics: Guadeloupe, Barbados, Saint 
Domingue, Martinique, Cuba and Antigua to name a select few. 
It was not until the 1890s that the mosquito vector was identified, although there was some 
speculation that mosquitoes were carriers of the disease a decade earlier.  In the eighteenth 
century, a number of lesser-believed theories existed as to the cause of yellow fever 
including sudden exposure to the sun, eating too great a quantity of animal products, 
drinking fermented liquors to excess, sleeping outdoors in ‘night damps’ and at one point, 
Rear Admiral Cochrane suggested that yellow fever was the result of seamen drinking rum 
of a very young age.21  However, the most common belief was that exposure to ‘unhealthy 
airs’ or ‘noxious land breezes’ triggered yellow fever.  This ‘miasmatic’ idea was the 
prevailing theory in the West Indies throughout the 1700s and well into the 1800s.  In 
order to prevent the disease from spreading to crews, naval captains considered it essential 
to keep their ships as far offshore as possible in order to avoid ‘land air’, as it was deemed 
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especially unhealthy.  Keeping the ships offshore produced the desired effect, but not for 
the reasons they supposed.  Putting a fair distance between the ships and stagnant bodies 
of water such as swamps and marshes, the favoured breeding ground of mosquitoes, 
seamen had virtually no chance of coming into direct contact with them unless they were 
ordered ashore.  Since mosquitoes were not considered the communicators at the time, 
neither the army nor the navy attempted to eradicate them by filling in swamps or 
mangrove areas.  They remained unimpeded and continued to flourish in marshy areas. 
Symptoms of yellow fever and malaria are very similar in that sufferers of both diseases 
experience fevers, headaches and vomiting.22  Yellow fever differs as it is a very quick killer, 
but for those who recover, they become immune to the disease for the rest of their lives.  
One of the crucial ways in which malaria differs is that it is a recurring disease which flares 
up periodically for the remainder of the infected persons’ lives although they generally have 
a good chance of survival if treated properly.23  Since victims of yellow fever became 
immune to the disease after suffering once, there is a good deal of truth behind the navy’s 
claim that ‘seasoned’ sailors who had previously served in the West Indies once or who had 
been on station for long periods of time were less likely to fall ill.  Essentially it was 
newcomers who were afflicted with yellow fever in the greatest numbers.  In his An Essay 
on Diseases Incidental to Europeans in Hot Climates , Lind noted that ‘the constitution of 
Europeans, by length of time, becomes seasoned to the East and West Indian climates, if it 
is not injured by the repeated attacks of sickness upon their first arrival.’24  This was 
sometimes referred to by surgeons as a ‘seasoning fever’, after which time, the sufferer 
became accustomed to the tropical climate of the West Indies.  
Once yellow fever was contracted, symptoms commenced with lassitude and weariness, 
shivering, an inclination to vomit, faintness and giddiness, flushing of the face and extreme 
pain in the lower part of the forehead and eyeballs.  Sufferers were also prone to constant 
wakefulness, pain in the back and stomach and their tongues were covered with a dark 
fur.25  In William Turnbull’s The Naval Surgeon, he described his experience with the first 
stage of yellow fever during which time he witnessed the ‘sudden giddiness and loss of 
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sight, to such a degree as to make the person fall down insensible.’26  He maintained that by 
the third day the skin and the eyes took on a yellow hue (where the disease’s name 
originated from) and vomiting became unremitting and the bowels costive.  Sufferers 
nearing the end of their lives experienced, ‘foam issue from the mouth, the eyes roll 
dreadfully, and the extremities are convulsed, being thrown out and pulled back in violent 
and quick alternate succession.’  Livid spots became visible on the skin, the pulse nearly 
disappeared and the whole body went cold.  At the final stage, haemorrhages were frequent 
and occurred from almost every part of the body: ‘the gums, the nose [and] the corners of 
the eyes...sometimes bloody exudations from the forehead,  the armpits, from cicatrized 
wounds, large black spots, and foetid cadaverous excretions of every kind confirm the 
general state of putrefaction.’27  Finally the body produced a strong corpselike smell 
followed by the patients being carried off to death. 
Frederick Marryat’s fictitious novel Peter Simple centres round a young British midshipman 
during the Napoleonic Wars.  In the book his character described the ship’s arrival at 
Kingston, Jamaica during a yellow fever epidemic after which time the quartermaster 
detailed the symptoms of the disease to the midshipman: 
With regard to Yellow Jack, as we calls the yellow fever, it’s a devil 
incarnate, that’s sartain – you’re well and able to take your allowance in 
the morning, and dead as a herring ‘fore night.  First comes a bit of a 
headache – you goes to the doctor, who bleeds you like a pig – then you 
go out of your senses – then up comes the black vomit, and then it’s all 
over with you and you go to the land crabs, who pick your bones as 
clean and as white as a sea elephant’s tooth.  But there be one thing to be 
said in favour of Yellow Jack, a’ter all.  You dies straight, like a gentleman 
– not cribbed up like a snow-fish, chucked out on the ice of the river St 
Lawrence, with your knees up to your nose, or your toes stuck into your 
arm-pits, as does take place in some of your foreign complaints; but 
straight, quite straight, and limber, like a gentleman. 28 
The disease killed large numbers of men and influenced the outcome of various campaigns 
in the West Indies.  Most recognised was Admiral Vernon’s 1741 expedition to conquer 
Cartagena.  He left England with 186 ships carrying some 26,600 men and almost instantly 
upon his arrival, yellow fever seized the squadron.  Between his and the American forces 
who besieged Cartagena, some 70 to 80 per cent succumbed to the disease and the entire 
mission was labelled a disaster.29  Twenty-one years later, the British siege and capture of 
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Havana suffered similarly from yellow fever.  Between 7 June and 9 October nearly eight 
hundred seamen and five hundred marines died, of whom only eighty-six had been killed 
by the enemy.  The army suffered considerably more than the navy.  Between 7 June and 
18 October, it lost 5,366 men, of whom 4,708 had died from disease.  These figures do not 
represent the total losses for both the navy and the army.  At the conclusion of the 
campaign, a number of seamen and soldiers who had been sent to hospital no doubt died 
at a later time or were incapacitated for months.30  The losses suffered during the siege of 
Havana are estimated to be roughly 40 per cent of the troops which was largely due to 
yellow fever.31 
In fact, during the time of Vernon’s expedition and the siege of Havana, periodic yellow 
fever outbreaks were common.  Between 1690 and 1770, epidemics appeared in the West 
Indies when the largest proportion of the local population was not immune as most had 
recently arrived from Europe in order to take advantage of the rising price of sugar which 
peaked in the 1760s.  Geggus claims that epidemics tended to appear in areas of most rapid 
development – ‘at first in Barbados, then Martinique, Saint Domingue, in the 1730s and 
1740s, the Guianas and Windward Isles in the 1760s, Cuba somewhat later. ’32  By the 
1770s, the influx of non-immune white Europeans began to level off.  It was at that point 
that epidemics became less frequent and less severe.  According to Geggus, yellow fever 
had become less virulent while ‘local inhabitants must have acquired immunity in 
childhood or shortly after arrival in the Caribbean.’  Once the bulk of the population had 
been exposed to the disease and become immune, the Aedes aegypti mosquito was unable to 
transmit the disease to newly-arrived individuals as they were not appearing in such 
elevated numbers.  ‘By postulating a low level of endemicity, one may thus account for 
both the decreased incidence of yellow fever epidemics and the immune status of the 
resident population during the 1770s and 1780s. ’33 
Epidemics of yellow fever escalated again in the West Indies around the turn of the 
century.34  Michael Duffy estimated that between 1793 and 1801 the navy lost 
approximately 19,000 to 24,000 men predominantly due to the outbreak of the disease. 35  
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The great influx of soldiers and seamen during the joint-forces expeditions (1794 and 
1795), prisoners of war, military contractors and their clerks doubled the white population 
of many West Indian ports in a short period of time, most of whom had never been 
exposed to yellow fever.36  Almost immediately soldiers and sailors were attacked with the 
disease which decimated their numbers.  All treatments to combat the disease were deemed 
ineffectual which therefore meant yellow fever persisted largely unimpeded and periodically 
hampered the navy’s West Indies squadrons well into the nineteenth century. 
Ague or Intermitting Fever (Malaria) 
Fevers were endemic in the tropics and aside from yellow fever, the next big killer was 
malaria.  Symptoms of malaria were similar to yellow fever, although with the former, 
depending on the strain suffers contracted, recovery could be quite rapid.  Vomiting was a 
symptom of malaria, and it too had a distinctive colour, making it difficult for surgeons to 
distinguish between it and yellow fever.37  Malaria sufferers undergo three stages of the 
disease: a cold stage, a hot stage and a sweating stage.  During the cold stage patients feel 
extremely cold and shivery and experience a fever, headache and vomiting.  This is 
followed by the hot stage which causes a burning sensation which often makes patients feel 
delirious.  Lastly, throughout the sweating stage, patients emit a large quantity of 
perspiration until the fever drops and the sufferers gradually begin to feel a sense of relief 
and enjoy sleep.38  Common symptoms throughout the three stages are an elevated heart 
rate, a mild jaundice (which can confuse it with yellow fever) and an enlarged spleen or 
liver. 
Malaria is transmitted by the same method as yellow fever, however the parasite’s carrier is 
the Anopheles mosquito.  One significant difference in the transmittal of malaria is that the 
disease’s life cycle is much more complex and spends time in both the mosquitoes and 
humans.  There are five varieties of malaria (plasmodium parasite), which all differ in their 
level of severity: Plasmodium falciparum is the most serious and often fatal form, Plasmodium 
vivax, Plasmodium ovale and Plasmodium malariae cause milder symptoms and are not often 
fatal while Plasmodium knowlesi typically infects monkeys and rarely infects humans.  Once a 
person is bitten, the parasites move through the bloodstream to the liver where they breed 
during an incubation period lasting a couple of weeks.  Returning to the blood, the 
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parasites then attack the red blood cells, whose weakening is responsible for the recurrent 
violent chills and high fever.39  Since malarial strains differed significantly in their severity 
and as well as the duration, surgeons have historically referred to the disease by a variety of 
names including ‘ague’, ‘marsh fever’, ‘double tertian fever’, ‘quartan fever’ and 
‘intermittent fever’. 
For the same ecological reasons that yellow fever began to flourish, malaria was able thrive 
in much the same way in the West Indies.  The large-scale deforestation undertaken in 
order to clear land for plantations meant that many of the mosquitos’ natural predators 
were eradicated.  McNeill points out that ‘deforestation and soil erosion created new 
lowland freshwater (or brackish) swamps... inaccessible to fish and other predators of 
mosquito larvae.’40  Changes to the landscape on sugar plantations, particularly to irrigation 
systems, meant there were more ditches and canals with standing water, a favourite 
mosquito breeding ground.  Moreover, the use of livestock on plantations further amplified 
the spread of malaria because the Anopheles mosquito feeds off of both human and 
livestock blood.  As with yellow fever, the spread of malaria was also dependent upon 
population density and the ability for the parasites to reach non-infected people. 
The prevailing medical understanding of the day attributed the disease to unhealthy airs (as 
mentioned previously, mal aria literally translates from Italian as ‘bad air’).  Drawing upon 
Hippocratic teachings in miasmatic environmentalism, it was believed that the heat of the 
tropics produced putrescence from rotting vegetation, polluted water, sewage and animal 
ordure which emitted bad airs (miasmata) ultimately generating these terrible fevers.41  The 
only way to dispel the noxious vapours was to expose them to free currents of fresh air and 
fast-flowing water.  This theory was not truly contested until the mid-1800s. 
Unlike yellow fever which specifically affected tropical areas, variations of malaria were 
known in Europe.  Documentation of malaria exists in writings dating from Roman times 
indicating the disease was fairly widespread in southerly regions.  Malaria was not unknown 
in parts of England; reports reveal that it existed in a mild form at Sheerness and other 
south-east areas of the country.42  One only needs to refer to the Walcheren Campaign to 
observe the effects of malaria in Europe.  In 1809 English troops were sent to Holland to 
attack Napoleon’s forces and capture a number of his newly-built ships.  When the 
expedition set off, the allotment of medical provisions and medical men to attend the 
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troops was severely inadequate.  According to a report written by John Webb, a physician 
who accompanied the Walcheren expedition, the troops sailed ‘with barely a day’s dose of 
Peruvian Bark [a proven preventative and cure]...some ships carried no bark at all.’43  The 
troops arrived in August, and upon hearing this, Napoleon ordered the sea dyke breached 
causing ditches to flood in an area where the English forces were erecting gun and mortar 
platforms.  The troops were soaked through and fever took hold of them at once.  Scores 
of men were afflicted with fever and by 17 September, it had been contracted by 8,200 
soldiers with 250 men dying every week.44  The high mortality rate indicates that the men 
were suffering from either the falciparum strain of malaria, although some historians argue 
that malaria alone would not account for the severe and fatal nature of the disease over 
such a brief period of time.  They suggest the disease may have been a hybrid of malaria 
along with typhus fever, typhoid fever and dysentery. 45 
For some of the British troops, relief came in the form of Sir James McGrigor, Chief of 
Medical Staff (who later became Surgeon General to Viscount Wellington), who noted the 
insufficient availability of bark and demanded a large quantity be procured as soon as 
possible.  He also observed that the men were in desperate need of a hospital.  No hospital 
ships had been sent out with the forces, meaning that the sick required transportation back 
to England for treatment.  Once the majority of troops had been removed at the end of the 
Walcheren Campaign, it transpired that a total of 4,000 men had died, while another 12,000 
still remained ill in February the following year.46  The cartoon in Figure 2.1 depicts the 
public’s interpretation of the calamity of Walcheren and the English forces’ inability to 
properly prepare for sickness. 
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Figure 2.1 – Cartoon Depicting the Debacle of the Walcheren Expedition47 
Although malaria had a bad reputation for killing seamen in the West Indies, there were 
periods when it did not affect the squadrons too severely.  McNeill asserts that long-term 
temperature fluctuations in the eighteenth century directly affected the number of malaria 
epidemics.  When drier, cooler temperatures prevailed, the reproduction of the Anopheles 
mosquito was stunted, thereby reducing malarial cases in the West Indies.  During the two 
decades when yellow fever epidemics were non-existent (1770s and 1780s), malaria 
outbreaks were practically unheard of.  The low rate of malaria-related deaths did not 
continue for long.  A decade later when the yellow fever epidemic was raging, incidents of 
malaria also increased.  A cure was in hand the entire time, but its sporadic availability and 
underrated effectiveness meant it was often underutilised, ultimately resulting in 
unnecessary mortalities among the seamen. 
Typhus 
‘Ship fever’ (also called ‘gaol fever’, ‘jail fever’ and ‘hospital fever’) is the last type of fever 
the navy’s men were exposed to that will be covered in this thesis.  The disease is now 
more commonly referred to as typhus.  Unlike yellow fever and malaria, ship fever spread 
far beyond tropical regions since the source of the disease was not based on mosquito 
vectors.  Aside from appearing in all climates, typhus also differed from other fevers in that 
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it was contagious from person to person whereas yellow fever and malaria were not.  It was 
spread by vermin, in particular by the body louse, and therefore the disease was associated 
with the filthy, cramped living conditions in such locations as jails and camps, hence the 
fever’s many names.  Lice and fleas thrived in soiled clothing and bedding and were easily 
transported between goals and ships when men were pressed for naval service.  It was 
believed, as with the other fevers, that it was spread through noxious air, more specifically 
the stench rising from dirty persons and clothing. 
Characteristically, typhus is identified by a sudden onset of several symptoms, followed by 
a high feverish period lasting roughly two weeks and terminates either by crisis (sudden 
improvement or decline) or rapid lysis (a more gradual abatement of symptoms).48  Typical 
symptoms include prostration, aches and a widespread rash which covers a person’s trunk 
and limbs.  In severe cases, the prostration becomes more progressive with increased 
neurological symptoms including deafness, stupor and delirium eventually resulting in a 
coma prior to death.49  One of the best observations on ‘ship fever’ was provided by Dr 
Robert Robertson, physician to Greenwich Hospital, in his book Observations on Jail, Hospital 
or Ship Fever, from the 4 th April 1776 until the 30 th April 1789  made in various parts of Europe and 
America and on the Intermediate Seas.  In his study, Robertson described typhus as ‘an evil 
confined to no particular country or climate, but extend[ed] its fatal effects as far as we 
have either society or commerce.’50  With numerous outbreaks of typhus occurring 
throughout the eighteenth century, N.A.M. Rodger asserts that it was the real killer at sea in 
cold weather.  An epidemic during the hard winters of 1739-1741 ‘wrecked the navy’s 
mobilisation, with men falling sick faster than they could be recruited.’51  Typhus proved 
deadly again in 1755-1756 with over 2,000 men succumbing to the disease.  During the 
course of his study, Robertson recorded notable outbreaks of typhus and specifically the 
one which distressed Admiral Byron’s squadron.  Seamen in his fleet began exhibiting 
symptoms of the fever in 1778 while they were in North America and once they reached St 
Lucia in January 1779, Byron was forced to land a portion of the 1,223 sick men suffering 
predominantly from typhus and scurvy.52  By April, the number of men suffering from 
scurvy had significantly reduced due to supplies of fresh provisions, although the number 
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of fevers had increased because the men brought their filthy bedding and clothing on shore 
and no efforts had been made to launder them.53 
An outbreak on board the Pompee also offers a superb example of how a contagious fever 
could wreak havoc on a ship’s crew.  According to her surgeon, the first sign of the disease 
appeared when it attacked two men ‘who were in the habit of frequent intoxication.’54  
Their symptoms consisted of vomiting, a foul tongue, quick pulse and pain in the head, 
back and loins.  One of the men died the following day, while the other, in the interest of 
the remainder of the crew, was sent to sick quarters at Dartmouth.  Within a week, several 
other seamen from the ship were taken ill with typhus and numbers increased on a daily 
basis.  The ship was fumigated in order to purify the air and the crew continued to use 
‘windsails of large dimensions’ down the hatchways.  In spite of the efforts made to impede 
its circulation, it appeared as though nothing could stop it.  James Wilkes, the surgeon, 
deduced that the fever originated in the men’s filthy bedding which was ultimately 
destroyed.55  Measures such as destroying soiled slops and bedding once the men 
contracted typhus was no solution for the problem. 
James Lind noted the disease seemed to be most prevalent amongst impressed men.  
Typically, pressed men were immediately put into a guardship at the Nore in close 
proximity with other pressed men.  If one of them was carrying the disease, as was often 
the case, he conveyed the infection on board transmitting it to the remainder of the men.  
To combat the spread of typhus, Lind proposed the use of ‘receiving ships’ to accept 
impressed men prior to their being sent to the guardship.  These receiving ships would be 
furnished with slops, shirts, bedding and all necessary seamen’s apparel  as well as soap, 
tubs and any other tools for bathing the men and a room for fumigating their clothing.56  If 
the Admiralty denied the request for receiving ships, Lind suggested an alternative measure 
to keep the guardship more hygienic.  He felt that burning tobacco quickly followed by 
lighting charcoal fires strewed with brimstone would reduce infectious diseases on board.  
Lind knew ‘and experienced efficacy of these processes’ and it appeared to him ‘that fire 
and smoke are the most powerful agents for annihilating infection.’57  Gilbert Blane 
concurred with Lind’s proposals especially with regard to raising the levels of cleanliness of 
the seamen’s clothing.  ‘As clothing is not the gift of nature, being left to man’s own 
reason,’ he said ‘it is subject to caprice, and thereby productive of inconvenience and 
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disease.’58  The navy agreed with both Lind and Blane and took up the use of receiving 
ships (also referred to as ‘slop ships’) in 1781 and used them to clean and clothe impressed 
men prior to their joining the fleet. 
Diarrhoea, Flux and Dysentery 
Food preservation and storage practices on board sailing ships in the eighteenth century 
were rudimentary.  Meat was typically salted and packed into large casks for distribution to 
ships.  Once on board, these casks were susceptible to both heat and vermin infestation 
and often served to the seamen in that condition.  The storage of provisions was far from 
ideal, but there was little in the way of an alternative.  Water supplies were stowed in a 
similar way and equally prone to spoiling.  Fresh vegetables were not customarily available 
during long voyages and were generally limited to the seamen’s time in port.  Taking all of 
these factors into consideration, it is not surprising that the seafarer’s diet lacked vitamins 
and nutrients essential to regulate their digestive systems and bowels.59  As a result of 
consuming this standard of provisions, seamen often suffered from diarrhoea, fluxes and 
dysentery. 
Of the three complaints, diarrhoea was the most common and straightforward bowel 
complaint to treat on board ship.  Seamen were considered to be suffering from diarrhoea 
if they had three or more loose stools in a single day.  Simple diarrhoea resulted from an 
intestinal infection from either a viral, bacterial or parasitic enteropathogen.  Generally, 
infection circulated through the fleet mainly due to improper handling of food and/or 
contamination of water.  The biggest threat to the sufferers was the risk of severe 
dehydration.  No legitimate cure for diarrhoea existed and the sick were placed on a 
restricted diet and given medicines to settle the intestinal spasms.  Often it was the case 
that diarrhoea eventually became more troublesome by evolving into flux or dysentery. 
Fluxes were also a frequent bowel complaint and often appeared alongside fevers.  Writing 
in 1790, a naval surgeon by the name of Frederick Thomson reckoned the flux was chiefly 
caused by the ‘coarse, indigestible food [seamen] live  on and the warm, humid air they 
breathe in betwixt decks.’60  In reality, fluxes were caused by a strain of bacteria invading 
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the mucosa of the large intestine resulting in mucus secretion, oedema, superficial 
ulceration and bleeding.61  Men who were diagnosed with simple fluxes experienced: 
a frequent and plentiful discharge of thin, watery, frothy, greasy or 
blackish stool, sometimes mixed with the excrements, and sometimes 
not, but without blood, and without any inflammation or ulcers in the 
bowels...it is frequently attended with gripings, but not always...The 
patient is weak, makes but little water, has a poor appetite and is 
sometimes feverish.62 
It is highly probable that severe outbreaks of flux were the bacillary type, suggesting men 
were exposed to contaminated or impure water.63  More serious was the ‘bloody flux’, or 
dysentery, which differed slightly from the simple flux as there was a discharge of blood in 
the stool.  Other symptoms of dysentery were: 
frequent purging, preceded by severe griping pains in the lower part of 
the belly; constant inclination to go to stool, without a natural discharge; 
and is distinguished from diarrhoea by a straining and uneasy feel, as if 
the bowels were not emptied, and by the slimy and sometimes bloody 
stools.  In severe cases the patient feels a bearing down, as if the bowels 
were falling out, and sometimes a part of the intestines does actually 
protrude.  The stools consist of mucus or slime, often streaked with 
blood; when large quantities of blood are lost, it is a dangerous 
symptom.  Seamen often suffer severely from this complaint, which is 
much more prevalent in hot climates than in cold ones, especially in the 
rainy seasons.64 
Typically these symptoms were also occasioned with inflammation of the intestines and a 
hard, strong pulse.  Captain Cook’s voyages, which are noted for the meticulous attention 
paid to cleanliness and crew health, lost twenty-three men to the bloody flux during the 
first voyage.65  His ships made a brief stop at Prince’s Island to take on fresh water and 
food and within weeks of departing the crews were dangerously ill with dysentery being 
‘poisoned by the bacteria that infested those supplies .’66  As G.J. Milton-Thompson 
pointed out, dysentery ‘was more likely contracted ashore, for the ship’s company would 
undoubtedly have built up a degree of immunity to the micro-organisms that flourished in 
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their own food supplies.’67  So when men arrived in the West Indies after a long voyage and 
were exposed to fresh fruits (especially coconuts) and generous supplies of new alcohol 
they became far more vulnerable to dysentery, fluxes and diarrhoea. 
All three diseases had the potential to be fatal.  Dysentery was the most likely to kill seamen 
because of the severe nature of the symptoms.  Prevailing medical theory of the day 
typically accused ‘putrid blood’ as the cause of dysentery.  Although John Coakley Lettsom, 
a naval surgeon who spent time in the West Indies during the middle of the eighteenth 
century, blamed, ‘fear and other passions of the mind’ as the catalyst for bowel complaints 
and also claimed that thunder and lightning frightened some men into experiencing 
diarrhoea.68 
Seafarers’ diets hardly changed until food preservation methods advanced.  Storing fresh, 
clean water remained problematic for some time especially when it was gathered from 
unsanitary sources which ensured that fluxes and dysentery remained a plague on naval 
service well into the nineteenth century and beyond.  So difficult was it to provide armies 
and navies with provisions free from bacteria, that diarrhoea and dysenteries remained 
problematic up to and including World War I.  When medical understanding in the 
twentieth century could scarcely control outbreaks among large groups of men, it 
demonstrates just how challenging diarrhoea and dysentery were to control in the 
eighteenth century.69 
Scurvy 
Scurvy was an accepted inevitability on board ships which spent long periods of time at sea 
in the eighteenth century.  In centuries past, when ships were limited to local waters and 
short voyages, scurvy was not an issue.  Once British colonies were established in most of 
the world’s oceans, ships were obliged to make lengthier sea voyages.  Although expansion 
occurred at a rapid pace, the same could not be said for food preservation technology.  
Seamen on long voyages were principally supplied with salted meats, casked cheese, biscuit 
and casked water, all of which frequently spoiled.  Consuming a diet mainly consisting of 
these foodstuffs triggered outbreaks of scurvy because the provisions were deficient in a 
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number of essential vitamins and nutrients.  There has been a great deal of work done 
recently on the history of scurvy in the Royal Navy and, although they prove popular, they 
consistently overestimate the problem and attribute a greater number of dead to the 
ravages of scurvy when this simply was not true.70  N.A.M. Rodger maintains that a number 
of sources put the total number of British seamen dead from scurvy in the eighteenth 
century around one million – ‘a figure which implies that every man who ever served in the 
navy died of scurvy approximately twice.’71  Real killers in the navy were fevers, fluxes and 
dysenteries, although it is not unknown for scurvy to be the cause of death.  Scurvy 
debilitated ships’ crews and weakened their immune systems sufficiently for the men to 
become susceptible to other diseases that ultimately proved their demise.  In his Treatise of 
the Scurvy, Lind brought this last point home when he confirmed scurvy’s potential to 
produce ‘putrid fevers, pleurisies, the jaundice and violent rheumatic pains ...and sometimes 
it occasioned an obstinate costiveness, which was generally attended with a difficulty of 
breathing.’72 
Symptoms of scurvy first made their appearance roughly six to eight weeks after fresh 
provisions were expended (assuming the men were healthy when they boarded their ship) 
and were easily identifiable to the ships’ surgeons.  If the seamen were already of a weak 
constitution, the scurvy could take hold much sooner.  First the seamen suffered from 
swollen and bleeding gums which began to deteriorate until their teeth eventually fell out.  
While their condition worsened, their limbs and joints stiffened and ached, they 
haemorrhaged around their hair follicles and blood trickled from their eye sockets and 
nostrils while their vomit also contained blood.  Because vitamin C is necessary for the 
body to produce collagen which continually glues scar tissue together, seamen with wounds 
which had been healed for years found they reopened (usually referred to as scorbutic 
ulcers), while fractured bones that previously mended broke apart.73  A particular case was 
recorded by Lind: 
...there was a remarkable instance on one of the invalids on board the 
Centurion, who had been wounded above fifty years before [at] the Battle 
of the Boyne; for though he was cured soon after, and had continued 
well for a great number of years past, yet on his being attacked by the 
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scurvy his wounds, in the progress of his disease, broke out afresh, and 
appeared as if they had never been healed.74 
William Hutchinson, a privateer captain, described his own experience with scurvy : 
...after being about four months in our passage...after eating a hearty 
breakfast of salt beef, I found myself taken with a pain under my left 
breast, where I had formerly received a dangerous blow.  From this time 
the sea scurvy increased upon me, as it had done upon many 
others...[who] became black in their armpits and hams, their limbs being 
stiff and swelled, with red specks...I pined away to a weak, helpless 
condition, with my teeth all loose, and my upper and lower gums swelled 
and clotted together like a jelly, and [that] bled to that degree, that I was 
obliged to lie with my mouth hanging over the side of my hammock, to 
let the blood run out, and to keep it from clotting so as to choke me. 75 
Although older, more seasoned sailors did not understand the nutritional particulars of 
what caused scurvy to appear, they knew it was a result of their salted meat diet.  When 
ships reached land after a long voyage, the purser typically procured and issued fresh meat 
and vegetables as ‘costly and troublesome though it was’, which essentially eliminated 
scurvy in the ships who were lucky enough to receive it. 76  In the West Indies, the Jamaica 
squadron regularly received fresh meat while the ships on the Leeward Islands station were 
obliged to keep to their salted meat by Admiralty orders.  Thomas Pye, writing from 
Antigua in 1766, expressed his displeasure with the lack of fresh food declaring that some 
men of his squadron who had served there for more than three years ‘have never tasted a 
bit of fresh provisions’ and were suffering from scurvy as a result.  As he was ‘credibly 
informed they are allowed it at Jamaica’ he desired his men be given ‘the same 
indulgence.’77  Although the Admiralty realised that supplying fresh meat in the Leeward 
Islands would come at a high price since it was not readily available on the island, they 
eventually agreed for its provision.  Robert Grant, the victualling contractor for that 
squadron, suggested that rather than procuring fresh beef or mutton at a high cost, he 
could provide pork and turtle meat at a more reasonable rate.78  Admiral Rodney sang the 
praises of turtle meat saying ‘nothing would so effectually eradicate that inveterate disorder 
[scurvy].’79  He also felt that the seamen would be thankful for any fresh provisions, so if 
turtle and pork were cheaper, then the Admiralty would do well to accept Grant’s offer.  
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While fresh meat helped to replenish nutrients deficient in sailors, it was certainly not 
enough to ward off scurvy completely.  Fresh fruit and vegetables were distributed to crews 
sporadically making it difficult to provide consistent relief from the disease.  The navy 
continued to suffer from scurvy until the 1790s when they agreed to distribute citrus juices  
to squadrons, especially those ordered on foreign service and ships at sea for extended 
periods of time.  Until then, scurvy periodically hindered operations and weakened the 
seamen’s immune systems enough to allow other diseases to strike. 
Ulcers 
Debilitating to such a degree as to render men incapable of standing, ulcers were likely to 
trouble seamen at any point during their service with the navy.  The eighteenth century 
term ‘ulcers’ constituted a number of complaints with one inherent quality; an opening in 
the skin which frequently oozed puss or a similar discharge.  There were several varieties 
including scorbutic, venereal and general ulcers which typically appeared on areas of skin 
that had been cut or wounded.  They ordinarily developed on the seamen’s lower 
extremities and took a great deal of time to heal.  The most common and troublesome 
ulcers were sores which formed on the legs after seamen suffered wounds or bruises, or 
over swollen veins.  Thomas Spencer Wells observed that it was fairly routine for ulcers to 
heal and break out again ‘especially in those [seamen] who drink freely and in persons 
enfeebled by improper food.’80 
Aside from venereal ulcers, the main cause of the ailment was the seamen’s diet.  Without 
adequate nutrition, their skin did not heal properly and resulted in the long-term 
debilitation of men in the navy.  Non-venereal ulcers were not fully understood by naval 
surgeons; most assumed they were very local diseases on the body and did not necessarily 
recognise they represented a larger problem.  Seamen wore wet, salty clothes which stuck 
to their skin and were under constant friction, and once their immune system had broken 
down sufficiently through the lack of fresh food, their skin became even more susceptible 
to eruptions.  Ulcers were extremely painful and were generally surrounded by redness and 
swelling which kept seamen on the sick list for extended periods of time.   In his proposal 
for a cure, Dr Vance described what men with ulcers experienced: 
...when a wound on a lower extremity is inflicted or when the skin is 
eroded or destroyed by any other cause some degree of inflammation 
soon takes place...The sore at this time exposes a greater surface, from 
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the general enlargement of the limb, and a thin discharge oozes from it 
which in the beginning is mild but as the disease advances becomes so 
acrid as to [erode] the surrounding parts.  The [seaman] now begins to 
suffer from...increased frequency of pulse, rigor, thirst and lassitude...The 
surface of the sore at the commencement of these symptoms loses every 
appearance of health becomes flaccid and gangrene very often ensues.  
When this disease does not terminate in extensive mortification about 
the fourth day, a degree of inflammation takes place round the edges of 
the sore and in two or three days more puss is formed the gangrenous 
parts separate from the sound and the muscles of the limb appear 
uninjured.  The pulse returns to its natural frequency, thirst and nausea 
disappear and trifling degree of debility only remains... Everything goes 
on well until the part begins to cicatrize when the same symptoms often 
return with increased violence...tendons and muscles destroyed which 
ultimately escape the loss of the limb and not unfrequently have loss of 
life.81 
Writing in 1809, James Litle, a naval surgeon, deemed ulcers the most dangerous disease to 
seamen since they killed more men in the service compared to all others.  He observed that 
once ulcers took ‘deep root among a ship’s company, it is, of all the diseases...the most 
difficult to eradicate.’82  On board the Caurageux, Captain Hardy described a contagious 
ulcer that spread amongst the crew during their time spent in the West Indies.  At first, two 
men fell ill with them, but that quickly increased to fifty-eight.  Twenty-three of the men 
were in such an abysmal condition, they had to be left at Barbados when Hardy sailed.  
Charles Carr, the ship’s surgeon also reported on the state of the men, whom he 
immediately separated away from the healthy crew in order to curb the outbreak’s 
intensification.  Carr claimed that in three of the cases, amputation was necessary, and 
according to his letter, a further one or two might have been essential among the men left 
at Barbados. 
Medicines to treat ulcers were scarce and fairly non-effective.  Surgeons attended the 
ulcered men, but they ‘could not be of any considerable utility either in alleviating or 
removing their complaints.’83  All that could be done for those suffering with ulcers was to 
apply a dressing to the affected areas to keep them as clean as possible.  Surgeons 
recommended keeping the men in their hammocks for at least a few days and to cover the 
sore with wet lint and a dry outer covering.84  They also believed that the longer the limb 
could be rested, the sooner ulcers healed.  As most ulcers remained on the skin for long 
periods of time the men were typically ‘rendered useless to the public service, to themselves 
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and their families.’85  Unlike most diseases that were either treatable or that killed men in a 
relatively short time, ulcers continued ‘for many weeks and several [seamen were] ultimately 
turned out as incurable or suffer[ed] the no less afflicting alternative of having the limb 
amputated.’86 
Consumption 
Consumption, to call it by its historical name, has afflicted the human population from 
time immemorial.  Its name was derived from the observation that the disease seemed to 
consume people from within, beginning with a bloody cough, a fever and pallor.  Today, 
the disease is more commonly known as tuberculosis.  So little was known about 
consumption that medical men were unable to make the link between it and phthisis, 
phthisis pulmonial and scrofula, which were all variants of the same disease.  Lloyd and 
Coulter declined to include any of these diseases in their Medicine and the Navy since ‘the 
diagnosis...was so confused, and the treatment so elementary...that worthwhile comment is 
impossible.’87  Despite their refusal to comment on the disease, too many seamen were 
troubled by the disorder to ignore it in this study. 
Consumption was easily identifiable in seamen as they habitually coughed up blood and 
experienced difficulty in breathing.88  Surgeons believed that the disease resulted from an 
ulcer of the lungs ‘of which an old stubborn neglected cough [was] generally the cause.’ 89  
Patients normally complained of pains in their sides and breasts which were sometimes 
accompanied by a hectic fever.  In addition to consumption’s typical symptoms of coughs, 
aches and pains, the patients radiated more body heat, their faces turned a red or florid 
colour and the sufferer experienced hot and restless nights.  The cures employed to treat 
consumption were elementary and not much was offered in the way of relief. 
Tuberculosis is a contagious disease and with the deplorable conditions on board sailing 
ships it became common among seamen.  Roddis acknowledged that ‘frequent 
overcrowding [and] the lack of careful physical examination...permitted tuberculosis cases 
and carriers to be present in the [ships’] crews.  Exposure to cold and wet; and the 
hardships endured, made this disease all too common in both the navy and the merchant 
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marine.’90  While close quarters accelerated the spread of the disease, the surgeons’ theory 
behind its contraction was off the mark.  Gilbert Blane believed it was the result of 
exposure to cold air at night and said ‘many pulmonic [afflictions] are caught by men falling 
asleep in the open air, on their watch.’91  Dr Trotter experienced salutary effects from 
placing men suffering from consumption in the lower hold of a ship where he reckoned 
the air was less oxygenated than common air and much warmer.  He also noted distinct 
characteristics of men prone to contracting the disease: ‘persons with narrow conformation 
of the chest, high shoulders, long neck, smooth skin, etc.’92  These attributes could not 
have predisposed anyone to consumption, and Trotter’s observations further demonstrate 
the confusing nature of the disease. 
So bad was the spread of consumption amongst seamen that Dr Finlayson reported in his 
Essay...on the Means of Preserving the Health of Their Crews that once the sea scurvy had been 
relegated to a minor illness, the diseases that continued to ‘thin our ranks’ were of an 
inflammatory nature including ‘inflammations of the lungs and their membranes [and] 
consumptions.’93  Despite the efforts of both Finlayson and a number of other doctors, the 
bacillae (Mycobacterium tuberculosis) responsible for tuberculosis was not identified until 1882 
by Robert Koch, meaning seamen continued to suffer from the disease for some time. 
Dropsy 
One of the diseases seamen were less frequently prone to during service was dropsy.  
Mainly affecting men serving in hot climates, dropsy (better known by its modern-day 
name of oedema) developed on various areas on the body, but primarily the disease was 
focused in the abdominal region and closely resembled an obese belly.  Dropsy is the result 
of an abnormal amassing of fluid which produced the ‘swollen’ and ‘bloated’ look usually 
caused by either congestive heart failure, liver failure, kidney failure or malnutrition (Figure 
2.2).  More specifically, when a patient suffers from dropsy, they experience an 
accumulation of fluid in their tissues when intracapillary pressure increases or when the 
blood’s ability to remove water from tissues decreases. 94 
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Until the late eighteenth century, dropsy was treated predominantly with ineffective drugs.  
In the West Indies, physicians rejected the use of Peruvian Bark as a cure for they believed 
the medicament caused both jaundice and continued dropsy among the patients.  Dr Lind 
chided some physicians’ practices because they preferred Dr James’s Fever Powder as a 
treatment which he deemed useless.95  Other surgeons used the Sweet Spirit of Nitre or 
Cream of Tartar both of which were mild saline purgatives. 96 
Figure 2.2 – Person Suffering from Dropsy97 
According to statistics compiled from hospitals in the West Indies at the end of the 
eighteenth century, dropsy was not the most prominent disease by far and only troubled a 
handful of seamen at any given time.  Of all the cases documented in hospital, 28 per cent 
of men were discharged and sent back to work on their ships, 25 per cent were invalided 
back to England, 25 per cent died from the disease while 22 per cent remained in hospital 
for further treatment and their ultimate fate is not recorded. 98  It is probable that those who 
died were suffering from congestive heart failure (pulmonary oedema).  Although dropsy 
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was not a leading disorder in the navy, it still caused a considerable number of men to leave 
the service when they were in short supply and difficult to replace.  The best and most 
effective treatment available for seamen afflicted with dropsy was for the surgeons to 
provide fresh provisions and a restful place and where they could recuperate in the hope 
that swelling would reduce. 
Gravel and Other Urinary Complaints 
Urinary complaints were to be expected on board sailing ships.  The combination of salted 
meats, stale water, laborious duties and liberal quantities of beer, wine and rum doomed the 
men’s urinary tracts to a number of disorders.  A frequent complaint was ‘gravel’.  Now 
referred to as kidney stones, gravel was diagnosed by the surgeon when a thick sediment 
settled from the patients’ urine or when they passed small stones during urination.  Seamen 
suffering from gravel experienced severe pain in their loins extending to the testicles and 
down the inside of the thighs, accompanied by feelings of sickness. 99  Thomas Spencer 
Wells, who served as a naval surgeon at Malta, considered gravel to be caused by over-
eating and drinking with too little exercise and further maintained that anyone suffering 
from the more-serious red gravel should become a ‘teetotaller, eat moderately, keep the 
skin clean and warm, the bowels open and take sufficient exercise.’100 
Men sent to hospital in the West Indies were given a routine treatment of poultices, warm 
baths, the application of hot flannels, cupping, blistering and bleeding which were 
administered until all the stones were passed and men no longer complained of abdominal 
pain.  The most difficult and least frequent treatment for gravel was lithotomy, an invasive 
and dangerous surgery employed when stones were too large to pass naturally through the 
urinary tract.101  Surgeons were not overly keen to perform the operation as there was no 
anaesthesia for pain and it involved the participation of four men, rope to tie the patient 
down and the cutting of a very delicate area of the groin.   One of the most famous 
sufferers of gravel was Samuel Pepys, who had experienced symptoms, often very painful, 
from a young age.  In 1658, Pepys elected to undergo the risky surgical procedure to 
alleviate his agony.  The stones were successfully removed and he resolved to hold a 
celebration every anniversary of the operation. 
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To a lesser extent, men suffered from stricture (narrowing of the urethra) which was most 
likely the result of a viral or bacterial infection of the urinary tract and was considered by 
naval surgeons to be a venereal disease.  Standard practice in the navy was to impose a 
charge on seamen diagnosed with venereals.  They were ordered to pay 15s per cure or be 
mulct two weeks’ pay.102  As men were reluctant to dispense with their money, they did not 
attend the surgeon for treatment of stricture straight away, they waited until the pain was 
unbearable, and by that time, stricture would have become much more severe.  Medically 
speaking, stricture is instigated by a build up of scar tissue in the urethra as part of the 
body’s natural defence, and the continual build up resulted in the narrowing or even 
closure of the passage.  For those seamen who refused medical treatment when their 
symptoms first appeared on the grounds they were ordered to pay the surgeon, they were 
allowing their urinary problem to worsen. 
Rheumatism 
Laborious work on board sailing ships took its toll on sailors’ bodies and resulted in a 
variety of complaints.  Most prevalent were rheumatism and rheumatic disorders.  Sailors 
were diagnosed with rheumatism when they complained of a long-term, chronic, 
debilitating ache affecting multiple joints.  The most common joints where seamen 
experienced pain were the interphalangeal joints of the fingers brought on by 
hyperextention deformity.103  Affected joints in the hands underwent increased pain over 
time and became red and swollen, making it uncomfortable for the sufferers to use them.  
The severe joint pain and swelling was sometimes, but not always, accompanied by a fever 
(rheumatic fever).  Although surgeons recognised the effects arduous work had on seamen, 
they typically attributed rheumatism to exposure to cold, wet air followed by exposure to 
warmer temperatures.  According to Spencer Thomas Wells, men serving ‘in hot climates 
exercise under a powerful sun, followed by repose in the shade or some damp place’ and in 
his estimation these conditions were ‘very apt to produce rheumatism.’104 
Curing rheumatism was unachievable; the most surgeons could do was make patients 
comfortable by decreasing the swelling in their joints and reducing any accompanying 
fever.  Surgeons attempted to treat the men with Dr James’s Fever Powder, failing that, 
surgeons issued purgative powders.  Seamen were ordered to remain in bed with the ir 
painful joints covered with flannel to ease the swelling and pain.  Of the 525 cases of 
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rheumatism reported at West Indies naval hospitals during the time period of this thesis, 31 
per cent were discharged back to work, 28 per cent were invalided, 6 per cent deserted 
from hospital, while only 3 per cent succumbed to the disease.105  The remaining 32 per 
cent of sufferers continued in hospital until it could be determined whether or not they 
were able to return to duty.  Until naval service was less physically demanding, seamen 
were always subjected to bouts of rheumatism and rheumatic fevers. 
Ruptures 
Similar to rheumatism, another ailment affecting seamen due to arduous service on board 
ships were ruptures (hernias).  There was enormous physical strain in lifting a whole host 
of casks together with the exertion required to haul lines, therefore ruptures were an 
inevitability.  A rupture was brought about in response to a flawed movement made by 
seamen which resulted in a portion of the bowels protruding from the lower abdomen or 
groin.  Some pain was felt at the time of the accident with immediate swelling which 
increased in size while standing and reduced when patients laid down and placed pressure 
on the protruded area.  Ruptures were liable to recur in men that had a history of them.  
There was very little chance of men dying from the disorder; the worst case scenario was 
they were sent back to England as invalids incapable of future naval service. 
As with rheumatism, little could be done to reduce the rupture.  In the first instance, 
patients were stabilised with diet and relaxation and kept in a flat position to determine 
whether or not the bowel would go back in place naturally.  Should that have failed to 
work, patients were purged and bled and once the body became limp enough from the loss 
of blood, the rupture was returned to the abdominal cavity by digital manipulation. 106  If 
bleeding did not work on the patient, the distinguished physician William Hunter suggested 
that ‘making the patient stand on his head and throw his legs over the shoulders of a strong 
man who may give him a shake or two sometimes answers the [problem].’ 107  Once 
ruptures were reduced, surgeons applied a truss to the affected area.  These instruments 
were designed to press the distended area back into the body core until the men could 
return to duty.  Once the patients were fitted with a truss, the Sick and Hurt Board advised 
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that those men ‘should not be obliged to hand or reef because the pressure they must meet 
with in that service would be very apt to force the intestines into the scrotum’ again.108 
Admiral Rodney, in particular, found ruptures a nuisance to the men of his fleet.  Writing 
to the Admiralty while back in London for the recovery of his own health, he expressed 
dissatisfaction with the system of treating ruptured men.  Seamen, according to him, were 
‘extremely liable from the various exertions of their duty to the disorder called ruptures’ 
and as care was inadequate ‘these men [were] discharged...because the trusses now sent on 
board ships hardly ever prove[d] of the smallest benefit.’109  Rodney was not the only man 
who disapproved of the trusses.  Enclosed with his correspondence was a letter from Mr 
Hossack and Mr Taylor of the infirmary at Greenwich Hospital in which the two men 
criticised the current naval trusses used to treat ruptures claiming they were ‘little better 
than an iron hoop.’  As little could be done aside from manipulating the intestines back 
inside the body followed by the application of a truss, it appeared to surgeons that it was 
futile to send ruptured men to hospital when those spaces were better utilised by sick men 
who could be treated with medicine and a proper diet.  Despite surgeons’ best efforts for 
relief, ruptures continued to plague the navy for as long as heavy lifting and strenuous 
exertion were part of their daily life. 
Wounds 
Although not strictly speaking a disease, wounds were an inherent danger on board an 
eighteenth century ship.  Wound types can be broken down into two categories: those 
received during battle and those received during everyday duties.  Battles are generally 
referred to more often in historical narratives, however the majority of sailors never 
experienced combat firsthand.  This, therefore, made the likelihood of receiv ing battle 
wounds highly improbable.  Most open wounds, fractures, broken bones and lost limbs 
resulted from the daily hazards on board. 
Wounds received during battle were typically caused by gunshots, flying debris and sword 
lesions.  Less commonly considered as a hazard of battle was the accidental explosion of 
gunpowder.  Seamen involved in such an explosion generally bled to death before 
assistance was obtained largely due to the location of the surgeon and his mates in the 
cockpit area of the orlop deck during battle (one of the lowest parts of the ship).  Gilbert 
Blane was an advocate of more stringent regulations for the carriage, storage and use of 
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gunpowder to avoid these unnecessary mishaps during battle.  According to him, during 
the battles of 1780 and 1781 in the West Indies ‘one-fourth part of the whole killed and 
wounded was from this sort of accident.’110  However once stricter regulations were 
implemented in the Leeward Islands’ squadron, Blane reported that during the Battle of the 
Saintes ‘only two accidental explosions of gunpowder happened in the whole fleet, by one 
of which one life was lost, by the other, two. ’111  He attributed the stricter regulations to 
both experience and ‘habits of caution acquired in the course of war’  and partially to 
‘improved methods in working the artillery introduced by Sir Charles Douglas.’  As Blane 
kept meticulous records, it is worth briefly quoting the total of his wounded and mortality 
figures from the Battle of the Saintes.  According to him, the total number of men on 
board the thirty-six ships that made up the line of battle was 21,608.  Of those men 243 
were killed and 816 were wounded in battle.  This equates to roughly 1 per cent of men 
killed and a little less than 4 per cent of men wounded, although some of those eventually 
healed and returned to duty. 
Not all wounds were the result of enemy action.  The very nature of the seamen’s 
occupation precipitated a risk to their safety.  Aside from abrasions or cuts, fractures were 
the next most frequently occurring complaint.  According to Thomas Woodall, author of 
The Surgeon’s Mate and noteworthy seventeenth century naval surgeon, the first course of 
action for fractures was to restore ‘the bone disjoyned’, and to keep the divided ends 
together until the fracture healed.112  Once the bone had been put back into its original 
position, the limb was immobilised with makeshift splints and bandages.  Aboard the US 
packet Dreadnought, fractures were dealt with in the same fashion as their British 
counterparts.  The captain described his own injury which included an open fracture of his 
leg just below the knee and his near-amputation.  According to his account, he and some of 
his crew: 
...tried to force the bone back into place while the leg was extended; but 
did not know that bending the knee would relax the muscles so that the 
strength of a child would have sufficed...I became so exhausted  from 
the pulling that they desired...it was necessary for me to perform the 
operation [amputation] as no one else would undertake it...I gave my 
instructions for the taking up the arteries in case I became too weak...At 
                                                                 
110 Blane, Observations on the Diseases of  Seamen , unpaginated. 
111 Ibid. 
112 John Woodall, The Surgions Mate: A complete facsimile of  the book published in 1617 (Bath: Kingsmead Press, 
1978), unpaginated. 
90 
this juncture the second officer in whom I had much 
confidence...begged me not to amputate.113 
The decision was made not to amputate the captain’s fractured leg and he was eventually 
treated upon their arrival in the Azores where ‘the exposed bone was positioned and held 
by wire passed through drill holes in the bone and lashed.’  Amazingly the leg never 
became infected nor did it turn gangrene.  This was unusual for men who endured similar 
injuries and subsequent treatments since the limbs typically became one or the other.  
Unless limbs became gangrenous, amputation was not encouraged especially above the 
knee since it more often than not resulted in death from excessive blood loss.  When 
surgeons resorted to amputation of an appendage, it was customary practice to remove 
more of the bone and reserve flesh in order to make a ‘flap’.  The excess skin mended to 
itself and created a stump where a wooden peg could be fitted if need be.  Cauterising the 
wound with a hot iron or boiling oil kept the haemorrhaging to a minimum, although as 
the eighteenth century progressed it was more common to use a ligature to control the 
bleeding.  It is also worth bearing in mind that during this period, anaesthesia was not used 
and amputations, as well as all other surgeries, were performed without it.114 
Other types of wounds from accidents resulted from seamen falling from the rigging while 
working aloft, when shifting cargo or less-frequently when men aboard the same ship 
became involved in fights with one another.  Wounds commonly experienced in warmer 
climates such as the West Indies included serious cases of sunburn and the all-too-common 
occurrence of men being struck by lightning.  The latter proved to be fatal on board a 
number of ships including the Topaze stationed in the West Indies as reported by Rear 
Admiral Duckworth.  According to his letter, the ship’s mizzen mast was ‘shivered by 
lightning’ which ‘extended itself to two of the powder horns in the captain’s cabin whereby 
Mr Scott became so serious a [sufferer]...from the splinters to lose two of his teeth and his 
hearing, and to be otherwise much disfigured.’115  Apart from Scott’s wounds, a marine was 
killed and another three men wounded.  Even James Lind recognised the danger from 
lightning strikes claiming ‘accidents from lightning are frequent on ship board owing to the 
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height of the masts.’116  In order to keep men safe during dangerous squalls, Lind advised 
that men should be assigned duties which did not expose them to the stormy weather. 
Whether confronted with battle wounds or routine shipboard wounds, surgeons were 
expected to be prepared to manage the men with a three-stage treatment process.  The 
initial stage was ‘first-aid’ which consisted of cleaning the wound, the removal of any 
foreign bodies including shrapnel and the arrest of haemorrhages.  Secondly, it was 
expected that within a few days the laceration would invariably produce a discharge mainly 
composed of ‘laudable pus’ which indicated the evacuation of any remaining harmful 
material.  Finally the wound progressed into its final stage of healing where it mended 
sufficiently enough for the men to return to work assuming their open wound had not 
become infected.117  Whether caused by battle or by accident, wounds were difficult to treat 
and recuperation was difficult as the lack of sterile environments encouraged infection. 
Less Frequent Complaints 
Aside from the abovementioned complaints which were the most frequent ly occurring, 
there were other diseases which affected sailors in the eighteenth century.  Most notable 
were the ever-present venereal diseases that plagued men particularly immediately after 
their ships left port.  Fraternising with prostitutes before a voyage or while on shore-leave 
resulted in a considerable number of seamen suffering from both syphilis and gonorrhoea.  
This study refrains from a thorough investigation into venereal diseases as they have been 
reported on in most medical histories and cannot be added to in any great detail.118  It is 
enough in terms of this study to speak only of the most common types affecting sailors of 
the day.  Syphilis was by far the most dreaded and widespread.  The disease worked in 
three stages, the first of which was the appearance of lesions (chancres) around the 
genitalia following an incubation period of a few weeks.  Left alone, the lesions healed by 
themselves in two to six weeks.  That stage was followed by a brief latent period and 
afterward the second stage began, characterised by the appearance of disseminated lesions 
on the skin and in the internal organs.  The final stage, which did not appear in all cases, 
was typified by a small, rubbery, benign tumour which developed anywhere in the body.  
Alternative names for this type of disease used in contemporary publications included lues 
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venerea (‘venereal infection’) and morbus gallicus, though the latter was less frequently used as 
the century progressed.  Closely related to syphilis was yaws, although yaws were not 
necessarily a venereal disease.  Yaws are endemic in tropical areas and generate the 
appearance of lesions on the body just like syphilis.  It differs from the venereal disease in 
that it does not normally attack the internal organs and is contagious in more ways than just 
through sexual contact; skin-to-skin contact with someone having an infected lesion is 
enough to transfer the disease.  The last form of venereal disease affecting sailors was 
gonorrhoea which was characterised by a milky pus discharge issued from the penile 
opening and discomfort during urination.  All of these venereal diseases were treated by 
ships’ surgeons with a standard charge for cure.  As mentioned, because cures cost 15s, 
many men opted for quack cures or disregarded symptoms until they became chronic, 
prompting abolition of the charge in 1795.119 
Other non-venereal diseases that seamen suffered from included hepatitis (an inflammation 
of the liver resulting from a variety of causes), ophthalmia (an inflammation of the eye, 
especially of the conjunctiva, but also encompassing blindness), asthma, debility (general 
loss of strength or a feeling of being feeble), epilepsy (repeated seizures), scrofula (an 
obsolete word describing a form of tuberculosis), pleurisy (inflammation of the pleura 
cavity surrounding the lungs), cholera, nephritis (inflammation of the kidney), dyspepsia 
(difficulties in digestion), palsy (paralysis of a body part and accompanied by shaking), 
catarrh (inflammation of the mucous membranes, especially in air passages), lumbago 
(historical name for osteoarthritis) and apoplexy (historical term for a stroke).  All of these 
diseases, among others, affected sailors occasionally, but none of them as frequently as 
fevers, bowel afflictions and ulcers.  Nevertheless, these ailments managed to debilitate a 
reasonable number of men who were more useful to the service if they were healthy. 
Conclusion 
With such a great number of diseases debilitating seamen during the eighteenth century, it 
is a marvel the navy proved so effective in opposing its enemies.  Fortunately for the 
British, their opponents suffered from the same diseases, and often, the latter were more 
severely afflicted.  Even when surgeons were able to ascertain the causes of certain 
diseases, their remedies were not successful and therefore very little could be done to 
alleviate suffering aside from ineffectual medicaments and bed rest.  Some of the more 
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dangerous diseases in the West Indies were yellow fever and malaria which, at times, forced 
a considerable number of men onto the sick list.  Some of those men suffered so severely 
that they swiftly succumbed to the fevers.  Figures from Chapter 4 in this thesis 
demonstrate the average number of sick men on board ships in the West Indies during 
selected years while Chapters 6 and 7 provide statistics regarding the disease types as well 
as sickness and mortality rates for seamen sent to hospital for treatment.  The number of 
sick men in that region prompted both the Admiralty and the Sick and Hurt Board to order 
alterations to the navy’s system of care.  Because such a considerable number of men were 
diagnosed with fevers in the tropics, the Board considered the enhancement of hospital 
facilities of the utmost importance.  Even commanders and surgeons on station took a 
vested interest in bettering the medical service by procuring additional medicines and fresh 
provisions when necessary, ensuring sick men rarely went without. 
By the end of the eighteenth and into the early nineteenth century a number of diseases 
had been reined in to such an extent that they were no longer distressing the fleet mainly 
due to the efforts of the navy’s administration and surgeons.  With the introduction of 
‘slop ships’ in 1781 and the issue of lemon juice in 1795, the navy suppressed two of the 
foremost ailments: typhus and scurvy.  Gilbert Blane confirmed the good effects of 
suppressing so many diseases.  He claimed that the total number of deaths as a ratio of 
numbers borne on warships fell from 1 in 15.4 between 1776-1780 to 1 in 29.58 between 
1810-1812.120  The savings in manpower unquestionably made improved capacity for future 
naval operations during the remainder of the Napoleonic Wars. 
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Chapter 3 
Medicines, Cures and Trials 
Disease was the ultimate adversary for the Royal Navy in the eighteenth century.  The Sick 
and Hurt Board was established by the Admiralty to operate as the navy’s medical branch 
and to oversee a multitude of medical duties which included disease prevention and 
control.  This was no easy task for the Board because before 1793, the commissioners had 
no formal medical training; they were typically bureaucrats with experience serving in other 
government departments and were appointed solely to handle the finances of the office.1  
Although they possessed no medical education, the commissioners remained accountable 
for the medical decisions of that office.  External assistance was available in the form of the 
Royal College of Physicians, the Company of Surgeons, the Society of Apothecaries and 
the Royal Naval Hospital at Greenwich which had an infirmary and physician. 
The Sick and Hurt Board were expected to, as part of their duties,  decide which medicines 
were suitable for use on board ships.  They also were responsible for considering proposals 
for new medicines and remedies generated by surgeons and physicians.  With their lack of 
medical training, they relied heavily on the Society of Apothecaries to guide them on what 
treatments seemed more reliable before exhausting funds on costly medicinal trials.  When 
the Society felt there was merit in any of the proposals, the Board designed guidelines for a 
trial at either one of their naval hospitals or on board a select number of ships.  They also 
arranged the procurement of a sufficient amount of medicine with instructions for its 
intended use from the proposer.  Naval surgeons selected to undertake the trials were 
required to document its distribution to patients in a journal and report their findings to 
the Board.  If particular medicinal trials were deemed a success, the Board and Society of 
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Apothecaries altered the list of mandatory remedies carried in the surgeons’ chests to 
include the beneficial remedy.2 
Naval surgeons were required to carry a fixed supply of medicaments which were 
considered effective in the treatment of a variety of diseases.  One of the first major 
overhauls to the surgeons’ chests inventory came in 1741.  At that time a select group of 
physicians belonging to the Royal College of Physicians and Dr Cockburn from Greenwich 
Hospital met to decide which medicines were efficacious and which were superfluous to 
the navy’s needs.  They collaborated to update the universal list for the chests while also 
designing one ‘peculiarly adapted to voyages to Africa and the West Indies .’3  Once they 
had settled on the official list, it remained largely unchanged until the 1790s.  A number of 
the more well-known medicines and cures included in the surgeons’ chests at that time as 
well as a few of the more notable remedies trialled by the navy are discussed in this chapter. 
There are some conspicuous absences from this study, most notable is mercury.  For 
reasons cited in the previous chapter, this study refrains from a thorough investigation into 
venereal diseases and therefore mercury, the principal treatment, as they have both been 
reported on in most medical histories and cannot be added to in any great detail. 4  Aside 
from a number of medical histories referencing mercury, documents from the Sick and 
Hurt Board hardly mention it except to say that it was mandatory to include in the 
surgeons’ chest.5 
Before delving into specific medicines and treatments, it is essential to briefly highlight the 
changes to medicine and medical practices at the end of the eighteenth century.  Not only 
did the Enlightenment influence the ways in which surgeons and physicians viewed the 
source of diseases, it also impacted recommended remedies and treatments.  During the 
Enlightenment in Britain, there was a gradual organisation of medical facilities through the 
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establishment of a whole host of new non-university medical institutions, hospitals and 
dispensaries.  Tröhler maintains that the dramatic rise in these facilities was due to ‘the 
insistent demand of energetic physicians...who sought a field for clinical work...The use of 
these new facilities...offered early opportunity for controlled mass observation.’ 6  New 
facilities were not the only conduits through which eighteenth century medical reform 
occurred.  Both the army and navy contributed to this new approach to medicine relying 
heavily on observation, experience and some experimentation.   In particular, the navy’s 
growing inclination toward erecting hospitals which included facilities for clinical research 
greatly enhanced their understanding and treatment of a number of diseases. 7  Aside from 
hospitals, surgeons recognised the potential for observation and experimentation in a 
controlled environment, or the ‘closed populations’ that existed on board ships. 
The concepts of observation and experimentation were not only limited to forward-
thinking surgeons and physicians.  During this period, the Sick and Hurt Board also began 
to subscribe to these concepts which will be explored in more detail in this chapter mainly 
through their insistence on medicinal trials and subsequent reports.  While the navy did 
have a standardised medicine chest for surgeons, it was frequently looking to revise its 
contents in order to provide the most appropriate relief for seamen’s illnesses.  Proposals 
for non-naval approved medicines frequently arrived at the Sick and Hurt Board office, and 
as previously mentioned, the commissioners made the decision whether or not to trial 
them in either their hospitals or on board ships.  By using these methods, the navy was at 
the forefront of medical development in the eighteenth century. 8  A number of the 
medications which the navy utilised and/or experimented with during that period are 
investigated in more detail below. 
Portable Soup 
One of the most utilised treatments in the mid-eighteenth century was the portable soup 
tablet.  Portable soup was, in the simplest terms, a gelatinous form of the bouillon cube 
that was prepared by boiling bones and offal of oxen (the cartilage and tissue were required 
in the process since the end product was held together by a form of gelatine) which 
eventually turned into a beef broth.  A number of vegetables were added to the broth on 
the day of preparation which was then allowed to simmer for hours until it reduced to a 
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syrupy consistency and the vegetables were virtually dissolved into the mixture.  The soup 
was then poured out into shallow trays and allowed to dry and harden until it could be 
carved into small tablets designed for easy storage. (Figure 3.1)  Each of the tablets had the 
potential be stored for a number of years and still retain their full virtue.  Once the tablets 
had been transferred on board naval ships, they were reconstituted by dissolving them in 
hot water and served to sick men as a sort of instant soup.9 
Figure 3.1 – Tablet of Portable Soup with Admiralty Stamp10 
Commander S. Moxly claimed that portable soup was first trialled in the navy on board 
HMS Dolphin in 1767.  However, it was in fact first proposed by the Sick and Hurt Board 
in August 1756 for the use of convalescent seamen and marines of the fleet.11  The Board 
supposed it would be particularly useful in scorbutic cases, although they recognised the 
potential for it to relieve other illnesses.  There is some doubt as to the original inventor of 
portable soup, but it was most certainly not the creation of the Royal Navy.  According to 
the Board, they had been introduced to the soup by Mrs Dubois who had been selling it in 
London for many years.12  In order to produce large quantities of portable soup, enough 
for general distribution to all squadrons, they recommended using the offal of oxen 
                                                                 
9 See Charlotte Mason, The Ladies’ Assistant for Regulating and Supplying the Table; being a Complete System of  Cookery 
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11 Commander S.H.S. Moxly, ‘Scurvy’ answer in Mariner’s Mirror, vol 39 (1953), pp. 69-70. 
12 NMM, ADM/F/13, Sick and Hurt to Admiralty, 24 August 1756. 
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slaughtered by the Victualling Board and mixing it with mutton in order to make it ‘more 
light and nourishing to the sick.’13  Within a week, the Admiralty eagerly responded praising 
the Board for their suggestion and agreed that all beef not salted for use in the navy was 
approved for this purpose.  They required the Board to submit a plan to execute the 
scheme which needed to include the hire or purchase of a soup house because the 
Victualling Board’s facilities did not provide enough room for production.14  Following a 
discussion with the Victualling Board and Dubois, the Sick and Hurt Board estimated that 
they would be able to procure 7,600 pounds weight of beef per week during the 
slaughtering season and, with the addition of mutton to the recipe, that would bring the 
total to 10,133 1/3 pounds weight.  That amount would theoretically produce 1,031 1/3 
pounds weight of portable soup per week, and an overall total of 26,376 2/3 pounds 
weight during the killing season.15  Next, the Board was obliged to find a suitable location 
to produce the portable soup.  Dubois offered to oversee the entire operation and the use 
of her employees to manufacture the soup for no less than £80 per annum so long as the 
fat rendered from the process would be hers to sell elsewhere.  Since she was already in the 
business of manufacturing portable soup, she only required the Board to rent a building 
with a large kitchen and an airing room to dry the soup cakes.  The rest of the materials she 
intended to use from her personal business.16 
The first batch of portable broth was ready for trial by February 1757.  Only 100 pounds 
weight had been prepared, meaning it was enough for a single ship.  It was proposed either 
to put it on board a ship bound for Nova Scotia or the West Indies.17  Rather than 
receiving only one testimony from the trial on an individual ship, the Admiralty required 
the quantity split between the Devonshire and Somerset.  Within a fortnight, another quantity 
of soup was prepared, and by the end of March, a further batch was ready to be stowed on 
board a number of His Majesty’s vessels.  Observing the rapid rate of output, the 
Admiralty requested the Board determine what quantity of soup should be allowed for 
every 100 men in each ship for a four-month period so a bigger trial could be carried out.  
The Board estimated that 50 pounds weight of soup sufficed for that number of men 
which would provide a ‘pint and a half each to ten men in a hundred for every day of the 
                                                                 
13 Ibid. 
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16 NMM, ADM/E/17, Admiralty to Sick and Hurt, 15 October 1756. 
17 NMM, ADM/F/14, Sick and Hurt to Admiralty, 22 February 1757. 
99 
said four months.’18  The Board intended to gauge the feedback provided by surgeons and 
would adjust the quantity as required in time for the next slaughtering season. 
By January 1758, feedback from trials of the broth began to trickle into the Sick and Hurt 
Board’s office.  Mr Carruthers, surgeon of the Burford, asserted his overwhelming approval 
in an enthusiastic manner: 
...under God the portable broth preserved many of the weakly and 
scorbutic patients, until our sickness obliged the ship to make for 
Portsmouth, where they were sent to their respective hospitals, 59 
soldiers to Forton and 35 sailors to Haslar.  Every British seafaring man 
in His Majesty’s navy ought to be thankful for this great refreshing 
benefit, so wisely calculated for a palatable diluting nourishment as well 
as to have a tender regard for the inventor and proposer of a thing so 
likely to support and revive the feeble...The intention is certainly noble, 
and I hope success will crown the design.19 
Aside from the anti-scorbutic effects the Board hoped portable soup would have on sick 
seamen, they were also eager to know if it was efficacious against various other ailments.  
In 1759, Mr Poole, surgeon of the Barfleur, described a serious malignant fever that had 
taken hold of a large portion of the crew.  According to Poole, ‘many of the men were 
reduced to the lowest ebb’, and were they not given the soup they ‘must have perished 
through a marasmus’ as most were refusing to eat every other food offered to them.  He 
further praised the soup saying, ‘there is nothing in the navy instituted for the use of the 
sick equal [in] utility with the portable broth.’20 
As additional quantities of portable soup were produced and more feedback from trials was 
received, it was determined that proper instructions for its storage, distribution and 
accountability should be printed and circulated throughout the fleet. 21  To further fortify 
the soup before serving it to the sick, it was suggested that surgeons could add, if necessary, 
rice, oatmeal, pearl barley or pease.22 
By 1763 the Board had sufficient soup in store, roughly twelve ton weight, and they 
proposed to distribute enough to each ship for use as a preventative measure in fending off 
the dreaded scurvy.  According to their new plan, the soup could be served on days that 
meat was not.23  The Admiralty was happy to agree to the trial of the portable soup as a 
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preventative measure, designating the Tartar, bound for the West Indies, to be given a large 
quantity of the desiccated tablets to see whether it would suppress the predictable 
appearance of scurvy on such a long voyage.24  No results of that particular trial exist.  It 
can be assumed that it was met with good results as the Admiralty insisted on conducting 
further trials on ships ordered to the Leeward Islands station.  They claimed that ‘great 
advantages...have arisen from the issuing of [it] to the well men of His Ma jesty’s ships on 
long voyages.’25  Fresh meat was not available to the men on that particular station, 
(although it was available on the Jamaica station) and the Admiralty was convinced that 
providing portable soup would have similar effects as consuming fresh meat.26  Once the 
soup arrived on station and circulated amongst the ships, Vice Admiral Pye, Commander-
in-Chief on the station, reported to the Admiralty that he ‘made the strictest scrutiny in the 
effects of the portable soup’ and found it ‘much liked by the people and very conducive to 
their healths in the preventing of the scurvy raging so much as it too often does in this 
country for want of fresh provisions.’27  Due to Pye’s extremely positive review, 
arrangements were made to send out further supplies for use by both healthy and sick 
seamen. 
Portable soup took on a vitally important role during the American War of Independence 
when fresh provisions were difficult to obtain.  Writing in February 1776, Mr Arbuthnot, 
the Commissioner of the navy at Halifax, observed the ‘constant drain’ on supplies of fresh 
meat by the healthy troops at Boston.  Since the price of those goods had risen exorbitantly 
since the start of hostilities, he recommended using the portable soup in lieu of paying high 
prices for meat.  He surmised that 1,000 pounds weight at Halifax and 2,000 pounds 
weight at Boston would be adequate enough to sustain the troops until fresh provisions 
could be procured.28  Even Lord Barrington, Secretary of War, requested that sufficient 
quantities be supplied to hospitals in North America. 29  Throughout the remainder of the 
war, large amounts of soup continued to be shipped overseas to answer part of the 
shortage of fresh victuals. 
Perhaps one of the more crucial voyages on which portable soup was trialled was that of 
Captain Cook while he was in command of the Discovery and Resolution from 1776 to 1780.  
It has been recognised in various academic sources that the health of Cook’s crews during 
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26 Ibid. 
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29 NMM, ADM/E/42, Admiralty to Sick and Hurt, 29 July 1775. 
101 
his voyages was quite impressive given the medical knowledge of the time and his attention 
to cleanliness, hygiene and proper diet contributed to their overall good health.30  Cook 
found the portable soup was a valuable provision when fresh foods were not available and 
was well-liked by his crews.  When the Resolution returned to London after the five year 
expedition, the leftover portable soup tablets were forwarded to the Sick and Hurt Board 
so they could test how serviceable they were after such a lengthy voyage.  They were 
pleased to report to the Admiralty that although those soup tablets had been stored in a 
box without a cover and in canisters which ‘appeared to have been opened and some 
remained loose in the box’, that those tested were found to still make, even in their 
unsuitably stored condition, good quality soup which retained much of its original virtue.31  
Such resounding results further emphasised the importance of manufacturing the tablets as 
they were capable of remaining in storage until needed which could potentially be a 
number of years in the future. 
The recipe for the soup remained the same for nearly ten years.  Dr Nathaniel Hulme (a 
regular letter-writer to the Board who frequently proposed changes to medicines)  
recommended they enhance its effectiveness by adding potherbs of various kinds and 
plenty of onions.  This addition, he surmised, would fully bring together ‘the nourishing 
power of the animal-food and the healing virtues of the vegetable kingdom, which will be 
thus strongly combined together and prove a most sovereign food for all convalescents at 
sea.’32  The Board considered the original method of preparation most effective and 
therefore dismissed Hulme’s proposal.33  As far as they were concerned, the encouraging 
feedback they received from surgeons on all stations was reason enough to believe there 
was no need to alter a formula that ostensibly succeeded. 
The only other real challenge to the portable soup came in 1781 from John Grafer and 
John Bessell when they proposed preparing a vegetable called borecole (otherwise known 
as kale) which could be dried, packed, sent on board ships and then made into a soup.  
They intended their concoction to be used in the same way as the portable soup to treat 
convalescing men and could also ‘keep the sailor healthy and free from scurvy at a trifling 
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expense.’34  Unfortunately, due to the large amount of water necessary to prepare the dried 
borecole, it was not deemed a practical provision for the navy to employ because the 
distillation of seawater had not been perfected and such large quantities of casked water 
could not be expended for that purpose.  However, as scurvy persisted in the navy and, 
with war raging with America, the decision was made to trial the borecole’s effectiveness.  
The results were unsatisfactory as the Sick and Hurt Board assumed since the amount of 
water required to prepare the dried vegetable proved too great and it was not adopted for 
general naval use. 
Portable soup continued to be crucial to naval service well into the 1790s, even after the 
order to distribute lemon juice to prevent and cure scurvy was given.  Writing his Essay on the 
Scurvy: Shewing Effectual and Practicable Means for its Prevention at Sea  published in 1790, 
Frederick Thomson, a naval surgeon, considered the portable soup as advantageous as any 
other anti-scorbutic available.  If it was ‘seasoned with onions, eschalots, or garlic; rice with 
currants and sugar; sago, or salop [a thickening powder made from orchid roots], with 
sugar and wine; with the addition of lemon, orange, or lime juice, sowins or oatmeal 
slummery, with sugar and wine’ he said, it produced ‘the happiest effects.’35  Production of 
the soup was still high in the mid-1790s and it was considered necessary to rent a larger 
house near the Victualling Office in Deptford where the soup could be prepared which 
would also double as warehouse to store lemon juice.36  In 1797, Dr Gilbert Blane, at that 
time a Commissioner of the Sick and Hurt Board, recommended the re-issuance of rules 
relating to the soup to ensure its distribution alongside lemon juice demonstrating its 
continued significance to the health of the fleet.  Towards the end of 1796 the Board 
requested the transfer of the entire operation to the Victualling Board ‘as the principal 
ingredients used in making it were brought from their stores at Deptford’ and now that it 
was stored with lemon juice (the responsibility of the Victualling Board) it made more 
sense for the Victualling Board to oversee its distribution. 37  In December 1803, the Board 
again requested the Admiralty re-assign management of the portable soup’s preparation.  
For a second time, their request was denied as the Admiralty felt the current arrangement 
worked well.  Its manufacturing was only handed over to the Victualling Board once the 
Sick and Hurt Board’s duties were absorbed by the Transport Board in 1806.  The soup 
itself remained exceedingly popular in the navy for the remainder of the Napoleonic Wars.  
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It also continued to be recommended for sick men well into the nineteenth century, 
although the introduction of canned meats slowly reduced the demand for the soup. 
Elixir of Vitriol 
One of the more favoured and well-supplied naval medicines was Elixir of Vitriol.  The 
medicine was a combination of sulphuric acid and alcohol which was regularly 
administered to men suffering from scurvy.  According to the Edinburgh and London 
Pharmacopoeias of 1770, the official breakdown of the additives aside from sulphuric acid 
was: 
Cinnamon, 3 drachms 
Ginger, 3 drachms 
Cloves, 3 drachms 
Calamus, 1 troyounce 
Galanga, 1 1/2 troyounce 
Sage, 1/2 troyounce 
Peppermint, 1/2 troyounce 
Cubebs, 2 drachms 
Nutmeg, 2 drachms 
Aloes, 1 drachm 
Citron peel, 1 drachm 
 
Reduce these ingredients to a powder, to which add of 
 
Sugar candy, 3 troyounces 
Alcohol, 1 1/2 pints 
Oil of vitriol, 1 pint 
 
Digest them together for twenty days, and filter the tincture for use 38 
Over time, the actual formula altered considerably and it is possible to find other 
ingredients listed elsewhere. 
Elixir of vitriol was first recommended for naval use in January 1740 and had been 
endorsed by the Royal College of Physicians in London.  On that basis, the Admiralty 
agreed to include the medicine in the surgeons’ chests. 39  The College estimated that two 
pounds weight per every hundred men would answer the scurvy problem on ships bound 
for foreign service.  Quantities of the elixir were sent out to Jamaica, Gibraltar and Port 
Mahon for general distribution for ships under the commands of Vice Admiral Vernon and 
                                                                 
38 London Pharmacopoeia (1770), item 265 ‘Mynficht's Elixir of Vitriol’. 
39 At the time, the Board was made up of administrative men who lacked medical training.  It was common 
during that period that they would take recommendations from the Royal College of Physicians in London 
and the Society of Apothecaries as to which medicines would be included in the surgeons’ chests.  The Board 
rarely questioned the recommendation and simply required the medicine to be carried by the navy’s surgeons.  
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Rear Admiral Haddock respectively.40  Once quantities of the medicine reached Jamaica, 
Vernon conveyed satisfactory feedback, speaking of the elixir’s great benefit to scorbutic 
seamen and those weakened by fevers and fluxes.  Next to rhubarb, he believed, it was the 
best general medicine for use in that region.41 
In little less than a decade, Dr James Lind, often considered the surgeon responsible for 
determining the cure for scurvy (although subsequently ignored for decades), used elixir of 
vitriol for one of his test groups on board the Salisbury in 1747.42  Lind concluded that the 
elixir was not effective against scurvy, although his findings were largely ignored because 
reports from various medical men, including the Royal College of Physicians, continued to 
believe it was beneficial.  For now, elixir of vitriol remained in the surgeons’ chest and 
some believed that it was extremely effective against other diseases aside from scurvy.  A 
letter from J. Martin, surgeon of the Shoreham stationed in the Lisbon River, acknowledged 
the good effects it had in treating ardent and intermitting fevers and fluxes and considered 
it to ‘greatly contribute towards preventing those diseases.’43  Not everyone was an admirer 
of the elixir.  Aside from Lind, Admiral Rodney disapproved of it and wrote to the Sick 
and Hurt Board from the West Indies in 1781.  He felt that: 
...every man has his favourite anti-scorbutic, which he presses upon the 
public with great earnestness, and extols with exaggerated praise.  In the 
beginning the cure of this disease was not sought for from food but 
from medicine and elixir of vitriol was to be the infallible cure; it was 
introduced into the navy and is now universally known to be of no 
manner of service in the cure of the scurvy.44 
Further realisations of the elixir’s failings were presented by the prominent naval physician, 
Dr Thomas Trotter.  In his Observations on the Scurvy, published in 1792, Trotter described 
the elixir as a medicine which surgeons still demanded; however, it was neither ‘capable of 
preventing or curing the scurvy.’  He continued by saying that ‘when diluted powerfully 
with water it is commonly used as a gargle to the gums and mouth’ but aside from that ‘it 
[was] a mere placebo.’45  Trotter’s derogatory verdict was not incorrect. 
Claims from other surgeons and physicians referring to the elixir’s ineffectiveness 
continued to reach the Sick and Hurt Board until finally they were forced to re-examine its 
value to naval service.  Lloyd and Coulter maintain that the elixir remained in general use 
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until 1794 when the Board concluded that they now preferred acidum vitriolicum as its effects 
were more favourable.46  The elixir of vitriol, along with a number of other medicines, 
spent over half a century in the naval surgeons’ chests but provided no genuine medicinal 
value to combat scurvy. 
Dr James’s Fever Powder 
Another widely popular medicine available to surgeons was Dr James’s Fever Powder.  Its 
origins are somewhat disputed, but it is known to have been sold by John Newbury, the 
publisher of children’s books and after which the Newbury Medal was  named.47  As 
purveyor of the popular fever powder, Newbury amassed a moderate fortune.  Evidence of 
him as the purveyor is seen in Figure 3.2.  Believed to have the capacity to cure more than 
just fevers, the powder was also touted to cure gout, rheumatism and even scurvy.  
According to the recipe deposited in Chancery patent records, the fever powder consisted 
of antimony calcined with a quantity of animal oil and salt. 
Not long after its patenting, the navy evaluated the possibility of including Dr James’s 
Fever Powder in the surgeons’ chest.  During the eighteenth century, medicines featuring 
antimony in powder form were highly popular as a remedy for various diseases including 
fevers and the navy was interested in arming its surgeons with it.  In September 1752 the 
Sick and Hurt Board suggested to the Admiralty that surgeons should not be obliged to pay 
for the powder until they could ensure a proper trial was made in order to test its 
effectiveness.  At that point the fever powder was distributed to a number of naval 
hospitals to ascertain what benefit, if any, was to be had by using it to treat fevers .48  The 
medicine must have proved effective at the hospitals because the Sick and Hurt Board 
agreed to distribute it to the entire fleet at no cost to surgeons with a greater quantity put 
on board ships bound for the coast of Africa and the West Indies.   Some West Indian army 
and navy surgeons considered the powder the best remedy for bilious fevers.  Moreover, a 
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number of army surgeons also used antimonials as purgatives including James’s Fever 
Powder and tartar emetic.49 
Figure 3.2- Packet of Dr James’s Fever Powder50 
Not all surgeons found James’s medicine advantageous; some claimed that it was found to 
be of little use in fever cases.  The medicine quickly earned a number of adversaries.  One 
of the most vocal opposers of his fever powder was Dr Garlick, surgeon of the Princess 
Caroline hospital ship.  According to Garlick, he found the medicine extremely ineffective 
when treating his fever patients and requested to be supplied with an alternative.  The 
Admiralty condemned his view of the powder and had ‘a very bad opinion of his 
judgement.’51  The Admiralty refused to supply Garlick with an alternative medicine and 
instructed him to make use of the powder for all fever complaints.  Garlick was not the 
only challenger of the fever powder’s efficacy.  In an anonymous pamphlet entitled A New 
Method of Treating the Common Continual Fever...With Some Observations on...Dr James’s Fever 
Powder its author also questioned the utility of the medicine.  He felt slightly more 
convinced than Garlick about the powder’s effectiveness, although he recommended using 
it in conjunction with other cures to make it truly useful. 52  James Lind was also against the 
use of the powder, saying it had no real healing capabilities as well as criticising the secrecy 
surrounding its recipe.  Speculation as to the makeup of the medicine was a topic of more 
than one pamphlet.  Dr Malcolm Flemying penned an entire dissertation focusing 
exclusively on the powder and spent a great deal of time analyzing its composition and 
suggested ‘that the fever powder consists of an antimonial and mercurial preparation 
                                                                 
49 Mark Harrison, Medicine in an Age of  Commerce and Empire: Britain and its Tropical Colonies, 1660-1830 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 144. 
50 Dr James’s Fever Powder c.1770.  Museum of the History of Science, Oxford.  Reference 42170.  
51 NMM, ADM/E/16, Admiralty to Sick and Hurt, 23 June 1756. 
52 Anonymous, A New Method of  Treating the Common Continual Fever, and Some Other Distempers: With Some 
Observations on a Treatise, called the Febricula, and Dr James’s Fever Powder (London, 1757), pp. 21-22. 
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united.’53  Unlike a number of his contemporaries, Flemying believed the powder had some 
curative properties.  This particular mixture in the powder, according to Flemying, was not 
only useful in fever cases, it was also a ‘powerful remedy against chronical rheumatism’ 
which was used ‘in our navy...with great success [against] that distemper.’54 
Whatever effects the medicine did or did not have, the navy continued to use it for as long 
they supplied elixir of vitriol.  In 1796, the Sick and Hurt Board was still recommending 
James’s powder, although, according to their own letter, they were unsure why they 
continued advocating its use for so long when ‘no more than three editions of the London 
Pharmacopoeia [had] been published during the present century and...no notice whatever 
[was] taken of James’ powder in any of them.’55  It seems that the navy was one of a limited 
number of supporters for the medicine; however, by the end of that year, they no longer 
distributed it.  By this time a number of the administrative commissioners on the Sick and 
Hurt Board had been replaced by trained medical practitioners who had experience 
employing the powder while serving on board ships.  Most notable was Gilbert Blane who 
had witnessed firsthand the devastation of fever in the West Indies as well as the 
ineffectiveness of James’s powder.  On his advice, the Board discontinued the distribution 
of the antiquated remedy and instead trialled the pulvis antimonialis which they believed was 
potentially better suited for saving the lives of many men.56  Despite the navy’s decision to 
withdraw the medicine from general distribution, James’s powder and other antimonials 
remained popular in the West Indies well into the nineteenth century. 
Peruvian Bark 
What Dr James’s Fever Powder lacked in healing ability, the Peruvian Bark atoned for.  
This medicine, sometimes referred to as Jesuit’s Bark or cinchona, was first brought to 
Europe from South America in 1631.57  Its European name derives from both its 
indigenous growing region and the group of men who first carried it back from South 
America.  Originally gathered from the cinchona trees native to Peru, the bark was shown to 
Jesuit missionaries as a cure for the ‘ague’ or ‘intermittent fever’ (malaria).58  As malaria was 
                                                                 
53 Malcolm Flemying, Dissertation on Dr James’s Fever Powder in which the dif f erent circumstances, wherein that remedy 
may prove benef icial or hurtful, are considered and distinguished, according to observation and reason  (London, 1760), p. 9. 
54 Ibid., p. 39. 
55 NMM, ADM/F/26, Sick and Hurt to Admiralty, 2 February 1796. 
56 NMM, ADM/E/45, Admiralty to Sick and Hurt, 6 February 1796. 
57 Fiammetta Rocco, The Miraculous Fever-Tree: The Cure That Changed the World (London: HarperCollins, 2003), 
p. xviii. 
58 There is some speculation that the naming of the cinchona tree was done to honour the Countess of 
Chinchón.  According to various sources the wife of the Viceroy had fallen ill with a tertian fever while in 
Peru and word spread into rural areas as far as present-day Ecuador.  The Prefect of Loja was said to have 
written to the Viceroy saying he had a cure for the Countess comprised of the bark from a local tree.  When 
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not common in the cool mountains of the Andes, the Indians of northern Peru only used 
the bark from the cinchona tree as a cure for shivering.  The missionaries thought the bark 
could be useful in treating ‘marsh fever’ which the residents in and around Rome suffered 
from during the hot, rainy months as shivering was one of the principal symptoms.  The 
Jesuits considered it imperative they bring a quantity of bark with them when they returned 
to Europe to determine whether or not it could treat fevers.59  Its effectiveness was 
immediately felt and there was a sudden interest in its procurement from South America.  
Large sums of money were put up by a number of European interests and sizeable 
quantities of bark began to arrive in Europe.  So well received was the bark throughout 
Europe that it soon became the focus of esteemed botanists who requested that seeds from 
the tree be brought back in order to attempt cultivation.  Not long after, the Netherlands 
East India Company successfully established plantations of cinchona succiruba on the islands 
of the South China Sea; the first place cinchona was grown outside of its native land.60  The 
Peruvian Bark also spread to England and was first advertised for sale in 1658 by James 
Thompson, and twenty years later it was included in the London Pharmacopoeia. 61 
Unlike other naval treatments which were originally recommended either by the Admiralty, 
the Sick and Hurt Board or the College of Physicians, the Peruvian Bark came to the navy’s 
attention by way of one of its captains.  Captain Thomas Collingwood of the Rainbow was 
ordered to the west coast of Africa in 1773.  He was fortunate enough to be accompanied 
by the surgeon Robert Robertson, who saw fit to carry out his own trial of the bark which 
‘was attended with great success.’62  Since it was his duty to ‘use every prudent method to 
obviate fevers amongst [the men] who are employed on...shore duty this voyage ’, he 
distributed a tincture of bark prior to sending men ashore on wooding and watering duties.  
He believed the bark would prevent or at least partially alleviate the threat of the 
intermittent fever.  Robertson revealed that on the voyage he successfully administered the 
treatment on shore at St Thomas (an island off Sierra Leone, West Africa).  He recounted 
what occurred: 
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when at St Thomas’s...our officers and men, about fifty in number on 
duty were obliged to stay ashore all night from a great tornado, I sent a 
dose of tincture of bark for each of them in the morning after, to be 
taken in a glass of wine...few of them were afterwards [taken] with fevers 
to what were expected, and in all probability would have been had they 
not got that medicine.63 
Following that, Robertson continued to administer a quarter pint of his vinous tincture of 
bark to each crew member every morning before they went ashore at Sierra Leone, St 
Thomas or Cape Coast.  Robertson reported that during that time only two men had been 
seized with fever at Sierra Leone (one while cutting wood ashore), three at St Thomas (one 
while fishing and two while watering) and not one seaman at Cape Coast was taken ill.  
Seeing as these results were atypical for ships stationed in that area, Collingwood strongly 
recommended that the Admiralty provide the bark with a glass a wine for all future 
operations on that coast.64  At the conclusion of his naval service at sea, Robertson took to 
writing about his experimentation with Peruvian Bark.  According to him, the bark was the 
most advantageous remedy in treating fevers.  He backed up his findings with analytical 
tables illustrating his success rate with bark on board a number of naval ships, particularly 
those he served on during the American War of Independence.65 
After his naval service afloat ended, Robertson was employed privately in Hampshire 
before rejoining the navy as Physician of Greenwich Hospital (1790-1807).  As will be 
shown, the surgeon’s advice for administering Peruvian Bark on voyages to the African 
coast was heeded by the Admiralty.  Although Robertson’s influence over the alteration in 
naval procedure was a noteworthy achievement, he did not stop there.  He remained 
dedicated to the study of fevers and their treatments.  In 1790, Robertson published An 
Essay on Fevers which advocated the use of bark not only beyond the African coast, but to 
extend its distribution to the army and to ‘civil service at large’. 66  So convinced of the 
efficacy of the bark, a further publication came in 1799 titled Directions for Administering 
Peruvian Bark...In Fever and other Diseases in which Robertson offered recipes for several 
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concoctions containing bark in order to make more palatable and easier on the stomach (a 
common complaint).67 
Collingwood and Robertson’s correspondence from their experience with the medicine in 
1773 initiated the Admiralty’s approval of the distribution of Peruvian Bark to all ships 
bound for the coast of Africa.68  The bark was ordered to be administered to men before 
they went on shore ‘in the quantity of a drachm morning and evening in half a gill of wine 
and each man to have afterwards the like quantity of pure wine which will contribute to 
promote the success of the bark.’69  The Pallas was one of the first ships to receive 
instructions to distribute bark in this fashion when it was ordered to Africa in 1775.  
According to her captain, Captain Cornwallis, the ship’s men were employed wooding on 
shore both morning and evening and very few of them were taken sick.  He claimed they 
were generally healthy and he could not recall a time when the surgeon reported a single 
man in danger, nor did they have a man die.  During their middle passage to the West 
Indies, the scurvy made an appearance, but those men recovered upon their arrival at 
Jamaica due to the availability of fresh provisions.70 
Another advocate for administering bark to seamen in tropical climates was James Lind 
who referred to the medicine in his Treatise of the Scurvy.  He found the bark’s circulation 
amongst those suffering from both intermittent and remittent fevers ‘proved the most 
certain means of cure’ and ‘the bark [was]...the best remedy.’71  Even more innovative was 
his view that, since bark appeared to curtail relapses, then conceivably it could also be used 
to prevent fevers from taking hold of individuals coming in contact with the ‘bad airs’.   His 
advice appears to have been overlooked for some time as the bark’s issuance continued 
sporadically and was administered only once fevers set in.  Gilbert Blane agreed with Lind’s 
endorsement of the Peruvian Bark, and in his Observations on the Diseases of Seamen, he 
reiterated the success of the medicine on board the Rainbow off the coast of Africa and 
went as far as recommending government to issue the bark not only for ships destined to 
serve in that region, but also to those stationed in the West Indies.72  Blane claimed to have 
befriended an eminent physician in the West Indies who enjoyed ‘uninterrupted health’ 
which the latter attributed to his taking an ounce of bark ‘every change and full of the 
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moon.’  Blane was not convinced the phases of the moon influenced the onset of fevers; 
however, it appeared to him that the use of bark certainly kept the disease at bay. 
Seamen frequently complained about the harsh taste of bark, causing reluctance among 
patients to take the medicine.  Lind suggested that it could be made palatable by infusing it 
in spirits (particularly wine) especially if some orange peel was added to conceal the bark’s 
bitter nature.  According to his estimations, if eight ounces of bark was blended with four 
ounces of dried orange peel and then combined with a gallon of spirits, he conceived it 
would produce an effective and satisfactory remedy.  If two ounces of that mixture were 
administered daily to men who were stationed in areas where fevers were known to persist, 
he believed it would be a sufficient amount to ward off the disease.  As previously stated, 
Robertson also offered ‘alternative’ recipes for taking the bark  in order to make it more 
palatable.  His suggestion was to serve the bark in a fermenting state to reduce patients’ 
nausea.  In a series of experiments carried out at Greenwich Hospital in Autumn 1796, 
Robertson dissolved bark into a variety of substances including treacle, brown sugar, honey 
and sweet wort to which was always added a pint of barm to activate the fermentation 
process.73 
Despite this medical innovation and the ongoing experimentation by a number of naval 
surgeons, the navy’s distribution of Peruvian Bark was limited by the Admiralty to the coast 
of Africa only and was not widely provided for use in other tropical climates.  The Sick and 
Hurt Board believed that although the bark worked in Africa’s tropical climate, it did not 
necessarily mean it would work in other tropical regions.  Their logic was partly based on 
the lack of medical understanding and their assumption that fevers differed by location.  It 
was also partly based on the difference in landscape.  When seamen were sent ashore to 
wood and water in Africa, it was supposed they were exposed to ‘dews and noxious damps’ 
trapped in the forested coastal areas and, upon their return to their ships, many were seized 
with fevers.  Issuing the bark mixed with wine succeeded in warding off fevers along that 
coast.  Providing it in the West Indies on islands which were ‘well cleared from those 
forests impervious to the sun and which have a perpetual damp hovering about them’  
would simply not work.74  Additionally the Board was informed that men sent on shore in 
the West Indies were not at such a high risk of contracting fevers as they were in Africa.  
They weighed their options whether or not to trial bark in the West Indies and surmised 
the experiment would prove very expensive and potentially useless.  They also knew it 
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would be difficult to persuade seamen to take the drug ‘unless they saw almost a certainty 
of their being sick’ and that was only the case on the coast of Africa.75 
Once again it was down to admirals, captains and surgeons on both the Leeward Islands 
and Jamaica stations to request the medicine rather than the Board agreeing to convey it 
there.  In 1780, Sir Peter Parker wrote from Jamaica relating that several complaints had 
been made by captains citing the lack of bark and alleged ‘several men [had] died from the 
want of a proper quantity of [it].’76  In Parker’s opinion, naval surgeons should be supplied 
‘at the expense of government with Peruvian Bark...especially in the West Indies.’  Echoing 
Parker’s initiative, Admiral Rodney also insisted he be supplied with a quantity of the bark 
before sailing for the Leeward Islands.  Citing the ‘landscape logic’, the Board believed that 
with the existing hospitals and hospital ships in place in the West Indies, sick seamen could 
be properly attended to and relieved of any sickness without the issuance of bark.77  
Rodney was not convinced by this and nor was his newly-appointed physician of the fleet, 
Gilbert Blane.  Rather than allow seamen to suffer from fevers, both Rodney and Blane 
took their own initiative and purchased 500 pounds weight of Peruvian Bark and divided it 
amongst the ships in his squadron.  According to Rodney’s letter to the Sick and Hurt 
Board justifying the expenditure, the number of sick men at Jamaica numbered far too 
many for the hospital to accommodate and it appeared to him that the only way to combat 
the fever was to procure the bark themselves.  Once the medicine was in hand, he claimed 
the fever patients recovered more rapidly while they were tended to on board ships rather 
than those in hospital.78 
Throughout 1795, and even the early part of 1796, ships intended for the West Indies were 
still not mandatorily furnished with bark.  A desperate plea was delivered by Captain 
Countess, commander of the Daedalus at Port Royal, Jamaica.  Daedalus’s surgeon, Mr 
Winter, administered bark in the prescribed manner while the ship was off the coast of 
Africa before sailing for the West Indies.  Its circulation subsequently resulted in only two 
deaths (one alleged to be caused by an apoplectic fit, the other from an old internal 
complaint).  With such an outstanding track record, Winter thought to continue its usage 
upon arrival at Jamaica as the men would mainly be employed on shore on watering duties 
at Rock Fort.  Much to the captain’s satisfaction, the bark and wine resulted in ‘not one 
person so employed having been taken ill.’79  With such agreeable results found on both 
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sides of the Atlantic where malaria raged, Countess strongly advocated the distribution of 
bark to ships destined for either location as, according to him, he ‘[had] so high an opinion 
of its good effects, it should be administered to a much greater extent: to preserve the 
men’s health at this dreadful time of sickness and death being in my opinion of the greatest 
consideration.’80  When Countess’s testimonial arrived at the Sick and Hurt Board, Gilbert 
Blane, by that time, had been appointed to serve as a commissioner on that Board.  As he 
recognised the utility of the medicine from his time spent in the West Indies as well as 
being acquainted with Robertson’s experiments with bark at Greenwich Hospital , Blane 
was all too pleased to unequivocally recommend its general distribution to ships serving in 
that region.  Within ten days, Countess, and several other admirals, captains, physicians and 
surgeons had their wish: the Admiralty authorised the distribution of bark to vessels bound 
for the West Indies to answer the devastating nature of fevers. 
Ulcer Cures 
Ulcers were one of the main maladies of the eighteenth century seamen, and, like so many 
other diseases, there was no apparent cure or alleviation for their suffering.  Initially most 
ulcers, especially the scorbutic ulcers on the legs, were treated with simple stockings to 
cover the open sores.  Surgeons believed that by covering the sore, it would eventually heal 
itself over time.  Mr Allen, surgeon of the Solebay hospital ship, maintained that healing 
time sped up when stockings were employed and also prevented the sores from returning.  
While patients were on the sick list, they were fed a more nutritious diet that was of more 
use in curing the ulcer than stockings were.  Once seamen left the sick list and returned to 
standard victualling, their sores soon reopened. 
Some of the more observant surgeons noticed that the seamen’s diet influenced the 
outbreak and cure of ulcers.  Vice Admiral Pye’s surgeon remarked that the distribution of 
portable soup ‘greatly assist[ed] in the cure of obstinate ulcers .’81  While this probably did 
have salutatory effects since the broth was prepared with vegetables and would have 
provided nominal nutritional value, it was not enough to alleviate ulcers completely.  By the 
1780s, citrus juice was used sporadically throughout the fleet to attend to various illnesses,  
and it was noticed that those ships who employed lemons and lemon juice, found that they 
helped to heal ulcers.  In 1782, Captain Curtis claimed the Porcupine’s men were suffering 
considerably from scurvy, obstinate fluxes, boils and ulcers, all of which were cured on 
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board through the ‘liberal use of lemons.’82  Writing a decade later (but still prior to the 
general issuance of lemon juice) Thomas Trotter remarked on the use of lemon juice and 
its advantageous effects on ulcers.  He observed: 
The livid complexion of the sore itself, with the black cloat [sic] of blood 
on their surface, disappears, oftentimes in less then twenty-four hours.  
The ulcer becomes florid, the cloat [sic] of blood is not regenerated, and 
a smaller quantity of pus than is usually found in other sores of equal 
size, is the consequence.83 
When lemon juice began to be distributed to sick seamen in 1795, the occurrences of ulcers 
lessened.  And when, in 1797, the Channel Fleet was suffering from an attack of scurvy and 
ulcers, the Sick and Hurt Board realised that the lack of lemon juice and fresh vegetables 
was to blame.84  As long as those items could be procured and sent out directly from 
Plymouth to the ships, the Board anticipated scurvy and ulcers would significantly subside. 
Mr Magennis received the attention of both the Sick and Hurt Board and the Admiralty 
when he proposed an additional treatment for ulcers in 1798.  Magennis was the surgeon to 
prisoners-of-war at Norman Cross, although he had previously served as a naval surgeon 
on board a number of ships.  During his stint afloat he ‘observed with unavailing regret a 
great number of brave and able seamen annually rendered useless to the public service to 
themselves and their families owing to the dreadful ravages made by old and what was then 
deemed incurable ulcers.’85  He rejected various contemporary methods to cure ulcers not 
specifically employed by the navy which included the application of ointments, Peruvian 
Bark, calomel, antimony, elixir of vitriol and opium claiming that not much ground was 
gained by those remedies.  In his capacity at Norman Cross, Magennis treated the vast 
number of prisoners who were afflicted with old ulcers using a variety of remedies to no 
avail.  He eventually encountered a pamphlet written by Mr Baynton suggesting an 
alternative treatment which in theory was ‘in direct opposition to common reason and 
common observation.’  Baynton’s method consisted of applying a strip or strips of plaster 
agreeable to the size and extent of the ulcer and then supporting the entire limb with a 
spiral roller.  Once the dressing had been applied, Baynton advised keeping it continually 
moist with cold water to prevent inflammation and enable a small cicatrix when healed.   
The plaster itself was to be fabricated from a mixture of diachylon and yellow resin melted 
together and then separated into useable pieces when it dried.  Magennis commented on 
his success using this natural product citing: 
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It may be remarked as an extraordinary circumstance that the simplicity 
of the process had not led to a more early discovery, a proof of how 
frequently we wander in search of abstruse and complex remedies for the 
cure of simple diseases.  Nature is generally plain, uniform and consistent 
in her movements.86 
So impressed was the Sick and Hurt Board with the comprehensive experimentation and 
report sent in by the surgeon that it was immediately decided not only to trial Magennis’s 
cure, but to also put instructions directly into print in order to distribute them to all 
surgeons in the Royal Navy.  This extraordinary action, which was immediately approved 
by the Admiralty, was certainly unusual and was not replicated again with any other 
medication or treatment.87  Typically the Board conducted thorough investigations into the 
effectiveness of treatments and once they were considered successful, only then did the 
Board print instructions for use.  This process had the potential to last for a few years, so it 
is particularly extraordinary that they approved Magennis’s cure so quickly.  Following the 
distribution of the printed instructions, naval surgeons commented that they were grateful 
for being introduced to this new method of treating ulcers.  One of those men was Mr 
Vance, surgeon of the Agincourt.  He referred to Magennis’s method as an ‘excellent plan’ 
and found that before he tried the method on board the ship ‘he had [previously] been in 
the habit of putting one or two men on shore every week [into hospital]’ and using this 
treatment meant that ‘many small ulcers on the lower extremities were healed in five or six 
dressings which had [normally] rendered many men incapable of doing their duty for many 
months.’88  The only negative drawback to the treatment was that it was only curative and 
could not be used as a preventative. 
In spite of the distribution of lemon juice and Magennis’s plasters, letters arrived at the Sick 
and Hurt Board indicating seamen continued to suffer from outbreaks of ulcers.  Despite 
these recurrences, Captain Hardy of the Courageux and Admiral Cochrane wrote in 1803 
and 1805 respectively, both noting that when there were cases of ulcers, their surgeons and 
physicians were able to treat them efficiently, enabling the seamen to return to work in a 
short time.89  Until a nourishing and wholesome seamen’s diet was completely understood 
and provided, ulcers remained a persistent problem for the Royal Navy.  Owing to medical 
innovations (however simple) throughout the eighteenth century, ulcers became 
manageable and no longer an ailment which forced invalids home. 
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Rupture (Hernia) Cures 
Ruptures were frequently-occurring ailments which were caused by the physical working 
conditions on board ships.  They were part of everyday life and as with other disorders of 
the late eighteenth century, there was little which could be done to prevent them.  Once a 
seaman suffered a rupture it was tended to with a rudimentary apparatus called a truss.  
Essentially a truss was a belt-like instrument worn round the waist which applied pressure 
to the lowest section of the abdomen where ruptures frequently occurred.  The belt was 
wrapped behind the back with an additional strap that fed from the backside, underneath 
the groin and attached to the belt in the abdominal area (Figures 3.3 and Figure 3.4).  
Before the truss could be applied, the injured seaman laid down and the rupture was 
manipulated back up into the abdomen by the surgeon.  The long movable pad was then 
placed over the spot where the distended bowel re-entered the belly while the strap passed 
around the opposite hip.90 
Figure 3.3 – Truss for Treating Ruptures91 
From the mid-eighteenth century, trusses were the only real treatment for ruptures.  Their 
issuance in the navy began in 1744 when captains appointed to regulate pressed seamen in 
port towns forwarded a request to the Navy Board.  Pressed men were prone to 
experiencing ruptures since they were generally recruited from other manual labour trades.  
The decision was made to not only allow a supply to those captains, but to also distribute 
them to surgeons on board all His Majesty’s ships so they could be ‘ready to apply when 
sailors meet with accidents which occasion ruptures.’92  Steel trusses were distributed to the 
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fleet at a rate of five per every hundred men (one was a double truss, two were for the right 
side and two for the left side). 
Figure 3.4 – Truss Shown on the Body93 
Between 1745 and 1747 a total of 1,366 trusses - both single and double - were delivered by 
the navy’s supplier, Mrs Ann Johnson, at a cost of £308-8s which equated to 4s-5d per 
truss.  When compared with the typical rate of ‘20s that some truss-makers charged for 
their product...there can be little doubt that military and naval trusses were of dubious 
quality.’94  Furthermore, the navy’s trusses were constructed for a general fit and proved 
inadequate for most ruptures.  In 1751, Dr Lee, the rupture doctor at Greenwich Hospital, 
wrote to the Admiralty alleging to have produced his own special bandage which he 
claimed was effective in the treatment of the ailment.  The Sick and Hurt Board called a 
meeting with Lee as well as the physician of that hospital to discuss his invention and its 
effectiveness on patients.  According to Lloyd and Coulter, it was at that point that Lee was 
revealed as a quack whose special bandages were confirmed to be futile in rupture cases.  
The only explanation for his unsuccessfulness in curing his patients was because Lee 
suspected ‘there was a distinction between marine and land ruptures’ , something which the 
Board did not believe.95 
When the Sick and Hurt Board were revising their ‘General Instructions’ for surgeons in 
1763, they acknowledged the naval trusses’ shortcomings and recommended that rather 
than use them in all rupture cases, surgeons could make their own bandages specific to 
each patient.96  These bandages would serve temporarily until the ruptured men were put 
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on shore where they would be fitted with proper trusses at a hospital or sick quarters.  This 
idea proved unpopular because the bandages were not supportive enough, therefore trusses 
remained the standard. 
William Blakey, a member of the College of Surgeons in Paris, claimed to have invented a 
more beneficial type of truss which he proposed for use in the navy.  He alleged that his 
‘elastic bandages’ were far superior to any other kind and were successfully administered in 
hospitals at Brest and Rochefort.  Moreover, he claimed the most eminent surgeons in 
France had been using these particular bandages for upwards of thirty years with 
efficacious results.  On the Board’s insistence, Blakey’s trusses were forwarded to a number 
of distinguished surgeons in London for their advice.  Following their trials, those men 
concluded his bandages were of no greater advantage then those presently supplied for 
naval service or hospitals in town.97  No record exists as to the precise outcome of the 
meeting held with Blakey after these independent trials, but it can be safely assumed that, 
since the navy continued distributing steel trusses, they deemed his proposal lacking in 
merit. 
Fifteen years passed without scrutiny into the effectiveness of steel trusses.  It was not until 
Admiral Rodney submitted a lengthy letter regarding ruptures and his proposal to treat 
them that their distribution was re-evaluated.  Writing in December 1781 whilst back in 
London for the recovery of his own health, Rodney acknowledged that numerous seamen 
were prone to ruptures and conceded that many of these men were invalided due to the 
lack of suitable treatment.  He applauded Dr Brand, the rupture surgeon at Greenwich 
Hospital, for taking the initiative to treat his rupture patients with elastic trusses similar to 
those proposed by Blakey.  As far as Rodney was concerned, the navy would benefit from 
using Brand’s trusses rather than the steel ones.  Dr Hunter, an eminent surgeon in 
London, praised Brand’s treatment, and recognised the ‘great pain’ the latter took to adapt 
his trusses to the ailment.  Hunter maintained that Brand’s revolutionary truss could not 
have been made ‘if he [Brand] had not taken all the means in his power to understand the 
disease a circumstance (I believe) no truss maker has ever attempted.’98  In order to 
                                                                 
97 NMM, ADM/FP/8, Sick and Hurt to Admiralty, 5 August 1763.  ADM/E/40, Blakey to Admiralty, 17 
July 1765. 
98 TNA, ADM 1/314, Dr John Hunter to Admiral Rodney, 7 December 1781.  Dr John Hunter was born in 
Scotland in 1728 and received very little in the way of formal education, his medical education being  mainly 
self-taught.  In 1748, he moved to London to join his brother William (a prominent anatomist and 
obstetrician) where they both taught anatomy.  He later served in London at Chelsea Hospital, St 
Bartholomew’s Hospital and St George’s Hospital until 1761 when he was sent to France and Portugal to 
work as an army surgeon.  Eventually returning to London, he established his own anatomy school and was 
elected a Fellow of the Royal Society.  In 1786 he was appointed deputy surgeon to the army and in 1789 he 
119 
ascertain which truss was superior, the Sick and Hurt Board forwarded a steel naval truss 
and Dr Brand’s elastic truss to surgeons at all major London hospitals for their opinions.  
Those surgeons unanimously concluded that the current naval trusses were the ‘most 
proper and serviceable.’99  Therefore these relatively useless steel trusses remained in naval 
service until the nineteenth century and continued to have a marginal effect on most 
ruptures. 
Aside from the issuance of trusses, there was little else that could be done to contend with 
these common work hazards.  Other treatments recommended by surgeons typically 
involved a change in the patients’ diets.  According to Dr John Atkins’ The Navy Surgeon: Or, 
A Practical System of Surgery Illustrated with observations on such remarkable Cases as have occurred to 
the Author’s practice in the Service of the Royal Navy the best method for treating ruptures was to 
prescribe a warm diet of good nourishment.  He suggested the diet consist of mutton, veal, 
lamb or pullet while many activities, including walking, running, leaping, riding, coughing, 
sneezing and inordinate laughter ‘must be forbid.’  In order to reposition the distended 
abdomen, he recommended ‘laying the patient on his back with his buttocks raised; and 
then...gently repressing [the rupture] with your hands.’100  Another method that was used to 
treat ruptured patients was a warm bath and a grain of opium every eight hours, coupled 
with an attempt to reduce abdominal distensions manually.101  No matter what the 
suggestion, the navy was years away from providing adequate treatment while ruptures 
continued to occur for as long as seamen endured intense physical labour on board ships. 
Venesection (Bleeding and Bloodletting) 
Venesection, also known as bleeding or bloodletting, was a common medical practice 
which dated back to Hippocratic and Galenic times that was used to treat a variety of 
diseases, although mainly fevers.  Eighteenth and nineteenth century medicine was still 
influenced by this practice, particularly when it came to ridding the body of harmful 
substances.  Venesection was part of a trinity of treatments: bleeding, emetics and 
cathartics which were intended to cleanse the body functions in areas such as the lungs, 
kidneys and the gastrointestinal tract to permit natural recovery.102  Even before the coming 
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of the Enlightenment in the final decades of the eighteenth century, a number of surgeons 
began to question the rationale behind the practice.  In William Cockburn’s Sea Diseases, the 
author acknowledged the uncertainty behind the practice of bleeding:  ‘We [surgeons] 
cannot determine when it will prove useful and when fatal, it being every evident that it 
sometimes does great good, and at other times great mischief.  In some epidemical diseases 
all die that are bleeded; in other seasons, bleeding has been very useful. ’103  Over a century 
later, the same argument over whether or not bleeding was an acceptable practice was 
made by Thomas Spencer Wells: 
Great caution must therefore be exercised before bleeding anyone, or 
adopting any other measure which can permanently lower the powers of 
[the patient’s] system.  Temporary good may be done at the expense of 
great future evil.  A medical man often finds it difficult to determine if 
bleeding to relieve some urgent symptom is advisable, or if it may not do 
more harm than good, by weakening the patient, and prolonging the 
disease.  A person not medically educated, therefore, should not run any 
risk, but rather be sure at least to do no harm.  If he have any doubt, let him 
wait.104 
Bleeding was particularly employed in fever cases, meaning that a number of surgeons in 
the West Indies practiced it regularly.  Between 1760 and 1790, the uncertainty surrounding 
venesection’s efficacy against fevers came to a head in that region.  Harrison maintains that 
by the American War of Independence, it seems as if there had been a marked shift away 
from bleeding.105  The naval surgeon Robert Robertson spent time in the West Indies 
during the 1760s and 1770s, during which time he made numerous observations on fevers 
and the several treatments employed.  His examinations caused him to dismiss bleeding as 
a viable remedy since ‘from upwards of thirty years experience and observation, I have 
never in one instance seen its good effects; nor a case in which, upon a serious revision of 
it, it would not have been better omitted. ’106  Robertson claimed that venesection 
diminished ‘the already debilitated energy upon which the equilibrium or healthful state 
depends’ and increased ‘the cause of the fever; which certainly is not a philosophical way to 
cure it.’107  He also noted that most surgeons assumed that all fevers were caused by 
inflammation; therefore bleeding a fever patient would assuage that particular symptom.  
Initially, he preferred to induce vomiting in fever cases with an emetic such as ipecacuanha 
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followed by a dose of Peruvian Bark.  Robertson believed bark, rather than bleeding, was 
the most imperative element in treating fevers, for ‘without bark there was no cure’.108 
Robertson was not the only West Indies surgeon who found bleeding ineffective when 
treating fevers.  Leonard Gillespie, surgeon at the Martinique naval hospital, also described 
his experience with venesection during an outbreak of fever.  Prior to becoming the 
hospital’s surgeon, Gillespie was assigned to the Majestic which was stationed in the West 
Indies.  From the 27th November until the 8 th of December 1794, the ship was anchored in 
Fort Royal Bay, during which period Gillespie recorded considerably heavy rains.  The ship 
removed to St Pierre, where she was positioned until the 5th February, at which time the 
‘epidemic yellow fever’ had set in among the crew on board.  According to the surgeon, the 
ship lost nine men by the fever out of about twenty; several men were bled though it was 
‘not attended with good effects...and all of them died.’109  Dissatisfaction with the practice 
was not only limited to naval surgeons.  Harrison maintains that ‘there is evidence to 
suggest that travellers to the West Indies were beginning to place more faith in various 
chemical and botanical preparations by the end of the century ’, thereby suggesting the 
navy’s reliance on such a harmful practice was considerably influenced by the 
Enlightenment.110 
Fluxes, Dysentery and Diarrhoea Cures 
Nutritional deficiencies and foul drinking water resulted in a considerable number of 
seamen experiencing digestion and intestinal problems.  The most common of these 
diseases were diarrhoea, fluxes and dysentery (also known as the ‘bloody’ flux).111  At the 
time, there was little in the way of effective medicines to alleviate the symptoms and there 
was even less that could be done to prevent them from occurring.  So long as seamen were 
fed salted meats and had no regular supply of fresh provisions, the navy facilitated the 
likelihood that seamen would experience difficulties with digestion.  The lack of clean water 
was also to blame for triggering these illnesses.  All the Sick and Hurt Board could do was 
ensure that the surgeons’ chests included approved medicines to treat seamen’s irritated 
bowels. 
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A remedy to treat fluxes was developed by Dr Cockburn, a Fellow of the Royal Society and 
the College of Physicians.  Previously he had served on board the Sandwich under the 
direction of Captain Meese (later Rear Admiral) where he experimented with various 
medicaments.  He eventually designed a cure for fluxes that was seemingly effective and, 
according to one of Cockburn’s followers, ‘the fame of the medicine spread everywhere 
with[in] our fleets.’112  His follower, Mr Latouche, also claimed that in 1731 Pope Clement 
XII was cured by Cockburn’s medicine which was brought to him by a Roman Abbot from 
the fleet stationed at Leghorn.  The medicine eventually became known as Dr Cockburn’s 
Anti-Dysentery Electuary and became widely used throughout the navy.  Prior to his death, 
Cockburn passed the recipe for the medicine to Latouche in the hopes that the latter would 
carry on its manufacture and distribution.  By 1757, the navy felt that Cockburn’s electuary 
was ineffectual as they had never seen any proof of its efficacy.  The decision was therefore 
taken to discontinue its use. 
Having no real combatant for fluxes, dysentery or diarrhoea, the navy was on the lookout 
for medicines that could cure the considerable number of men suffering from those 
complaints.  It is not surprising that when Edward Hogben submitted his proposal for a 
cure in 1758, the Sick and Hurt Board were happy to allow for a trial of it.  Hogben was 
authorised to carry out his trial at Haslar and Stonehouse naval hospitals where he was 
allocated twelve patients between the two locations and ordered to administer the 
medication in the dosage he deemed appropriate.  The Board required him to record his 
progress and forward the results once the trial period expired.  Hogben’s results were less 
than promising.  According to his report, four of the men died and one was removed from 
the ward due to him becoming comsumptive (tuberculosis).  Of the remaining men, only 
two were cured and one of those, it was suspected, would have been cured of the flux 
anyway by ordinary means.  Hogben argued that the men provided to him for the trial were 
ill with other disorders that could not be treated with his medicine.  His argument did not 
convince the Sick and Hurt Board to alter their view that his medicine was inefficacious 
and would not be generally distributed in the navy.113 
Additional remedies were offered to the Board prior to the War of American 
Independence, but still none seemed to be of any substance.  Richard Dunn claimed his 
powder, a family secret, was infallible although he was unable to produce vouchers 
attesting to any cures.  Monsieur Pinto, who at one time served with the fleet under the 
command of Sir George Byng (then Lord Torrington) as clerk to the British Consul at 
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Naples, asserted he had an external medicine which could ‘expel the venom, comfort the 
bowels and restore the patient his health.’114  Even Edward Hogben submitted another 
proposal to cure the flux, although he too could not produce certificates attesting to its 
effectiveness.115  The Admiralty, recalling his prior submission and failed trial, decided it 
was best to not waste their time on him.  An additional method proposed to cure the 
disorders included bleeding the patient, relieving him of some six to eight ounces of blood, 
followed by an induced vomiting.116  Another involved using a mucillaginous clyster of 
common starch or cassava so ‘the intestines are hereby cleared of hardened faeces and the 
mucilaginous matter.’117  The same surgeon suggested that if fluxes or diarrhoea occurred in 
the West Indies, surgeons were better off using local medicines.  These local medicines 
included rinds of pomegranate, the bark and gum of the Acason (anacardium), the guava 
bark and jelly, the seeds of the sea side grape, logwood, bastard locus and the mistletoe of 
the lemon tree either boiled or made into tea which could prove advantageous.  Aside from 
the local remedies, naval surgeons carried a number of medicines used to treat bowel 
complaints, particularly dysentery.  Among these were calomel and ipecacuanha, both 
emetics intended to purge the sufferer’s stomach.  While taking any of these medicines, the 
men needed to be placed on a proper diet.  Food needed to be light, nutritive and easy to 
digest.118  Whatever treatments were suggested, seamen continued to be susceptible to 
fluxes, dysentery and diarrhoea until supplies of fresh, clean water were readily available 
coupled with the provision of a balanced diet. 
Fever Cures 
The complex nature of fevers and the lack of understanding as to their causes made 
diagnosing them incredible difficult.  Varying symptoms and disparate surgeons’ reports 
also make retrospective diagnosis tremendously challenging.  Although the Sick and Hurt 
Board realised Peruvian Bark was effective against malaria on the coast of Africa (and later 
the West Indies), it was not the only variety of fever they contended with.  For most of the 
eighteenth century, no remedy for yellow fever or jail fever existed.  It was assumed that a 
certain number of seamen would succumb to the diseases and there was simply little that 
could be done.  Fevers were widely believed to be caused by ‘bad airs’, therefore most cures 
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were based on ways in which air could be purified.  A favoured method was to ‘sweeten’ 
the air in spaces on board overcrowded vessels.  Once diseases like jail fever appeared 
amongst ships’ companies, cleaning and purifying both the air and the ship were valuable 
operations in dampening the outbreaks especially when their clothing and bedding were 
fumigated.  One of the earliest recommendations for fumigation came from Dr Maxwell , a 
naval surgeon.  He was instructed to attend the Cambridge after it had been infected with a 
contagious fever and 130 seamen were ordered on shore for treatment; out of those, thirty-
two died.  To eradicate fevers like the one that took hold of the Cambridge, Maxwell 
proposed that all ships should undergo periodic treatments of smoking their hammocks 
and bedding using charcoal and brimstone for a period of ten or twelve hours.  After 
smoking, he suggested all bedding and clothing be washed to ensure the illness had been 
eradicated.119 
Ventilation on board was of the utmost importance as any fresh-flowing air had the 
potential to dispel the bad vapours.  The most notable name associated with the shipboard 
ventilator was Stephen Hales.  As a clergyman and natural philosopher, Hales was an 
accomplished writer of books on those particular subjects, although he personally felt his 
best contribution was the ventilator named after him.  He had originally designed the 
instrument for use on the roof of Newgate prison in London and when the same ventilator 
was adapted for shipboard operation, it was immediately found to be clumsy and difficult 
to use.  Hales improved on his idea and produced the ‘Ship’s Lungs’ which was essentially a 
bellows in a huge box with hinged sides which could be opened and shut by means of rods 
and worked by hand.120  He first proposed his ‘easy and cheap method’ to the Admiralty in 
1756 initially for use in naval hospitals and sick quarters around Gosport.121  Easy and 
cheap was language the Admiralty could support, especially when Hales had credible 
references from the army for his method.  The results of Hales’ Ventilators were so 
successful that the Admiralty immediately set forth in organising their distribution to all 
naval hospitals and throughout the ships of the fleet. 
Shipboard cleanliness levels were also vital in quashing contagious fevers.  Cleanliness was 
always considered important, but it was not persistently required on some ships since the 
Sick and Hurt Board distributed very few written regulations on that matter for the 
majority of the eighteenth century.  That is not to suggest that because there was a lack of 
written regulation concerning cleanliness, each vessel was a floating pigsty; the state of each 
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vessel was down to its captain and his particular shipboard rules.  Later in the century, 
people like James Lind, Gilbert Blane and Thomas Trotter specifically addressed the lack of 
attention toward naval hygiene and cleanliness in their individual publications.  Blane in 
particular described the importance of scrubbing decks, keeping the ports open to admit 
fresh air below deck (especially in the West Indies), to fumigate frequently with wood fires 
sprinkled with pitch or rosin and to utilise ventilators and wind sails to air the lower decks.  
The last item was especially crucial in larger ships ‘where the mass of foul air is so great, 
and so remote from the access of the external air, that it [could not] be thoroughly swept 
off but by such contrivances.’122  By 1795, the Sick and Hurt Board (with Blane as one of 
its commissioners) agreed that contagion was best regulated by ‘cleanliness, fresh air and 
dryness.’123  Making these items a requirement in the printed regulations at that time 
demonstrated the Board’s growing willingness to ensure all captains and surgeons were 
maintaining strict levels of cleanliness and hygiene.  The consequence of following such 
hygienic measures was that ships and hospitals experienced an unprecedented freedom 
from infectious fevers and it was thought best to maintain their encouragement.   Toward 
the end of the century, the navy’s growing attention to cleanliness meant that the seamen 
regularly suffering from fevers were new recruits ‘not yet clothed and washed by the 
navy.’124  Bedding and clothing were now cleaned weekly and aired on deck if a ship’s crew 
was generally healthy, with the process occurring immediately if seamen were taken ill.  In 
particular, decks were cleansed with vinegar and walls were whitewashed.  The separation 
of contagious men from healthy ones further enhanced the overall healthiness of ships’ 
crews from typhus.  Although the connection between body lice and typhus fever would 
not be made until the nineteenth century, it was apparent to captains and surgeons that 
dirty clothing and living space were in some way responsible. 
To treat some of the tropical fevers, the essence of spruce was considered to be more 
efficacious than some other remedies.  The essence received praise from Rear Admiral 
Parker who testified to its good effects on patients in the West Indies.  Not only had Rear 
Admiral seen his men suffer from yellow fever, he also became a victim of the disease 
while at Cape Nichola Mole, St Domingo.  As it was assumed his fever was caused by 
putrid airs, the fleet physician suggested that Parker relocate to either the cool mountains 
of Jamaica or back to England for the recovery of his health.  Parker opted to return to 
England and it was during that voyage that the master of one of the transports 
                                                                 
122 Gilbert Blane, A Short Account of  the Most Ef f ectual Means of  Preserving the Health of  Seamen, Particularly in the 
Royal Navy (Antigua, 1780), unpaginated. 
123 NMM, ADM/FP/38, Sick and Hurt to Admiralty, 13 November 1795. 
124 N.A.M. Rodger, The Command of  the Ocean: A Naval History of  Britain 1649-1815 (London: Penguin, 2004), p. 
308. 
126 
administered the essence of spruce which he believed would cure the Rear Admiral.  Parker 
regained his health as did a great number of seamen suffering from yellow fever who were 
also making the same journey back to England for their health.  Because Parker and his 
officers attested to the spruce’s curative qualities, the Sick and Hurt Board immediately 
ordered a quantity of it sent to ships on both West Indies stations.125  However good the 
Board’s intentions were, the essence of spruce was only capable of easing some of the 
symptoms of yellow fever but was not a cure for the disease.  
Fevers continued to ravage the fleet on all stations for the remainder of the eighteenth 
century and for the duration of the Napoleonic Wars.  Jail fevers appeared to lessen a bit 
mainly due to captains, physicians and surgeons remaining vigilant about cleanliness on 
board ships and seamen’s personal hygiene as well as the institution of ‘slop ships’ in 
1781.126  As for the yellow fever, a cure was not forthcoming.  The Royal Navy’s seamen in 
the West Indies in the eighteenth century had neither any real hope of escaping the disease 
nor did they have any real hope of being able to treat it on a large scale. 
Scurvy Cures 
Depicted as one of the most serious threats to seamen’s health during the age of sail, 
scurvy has been studied and written about more than any other maritime disease.127  Scurvy 
was by no means the principal killer of seamen although it did routinely debilitate them and 
encourage the onset of other diseases.  Once scurvy had weakened the men’s immune 
systems, they became susceptible to other illnesses like fevers, ulcers, fluxes and 
dysenteries.  Contemporary narratives on the causes of and cures for scurvy essentially 
have a similar theme: James Lind ‘discovered’ the cure for it, but the Admiralty declined 
heeding his proposals.  This, some claim, resulted in seamen suffering unnecessarily from 
scurvy for an additional forty years until the navy recognised lemon juice warded off 
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scurvy.128  Although this is an oversimplification of what has been published, it is fairly 
representative of the overall perception of the cure for scurvy.  The true situation of the 
events was much more complex than studies conducted by Lloyd and Coulter.  Although 
the Admiralty had been presented with the curative properties of citrus juice during the 
time of Lind, one must bear in mind that a number of other cures also claimed to do the 
same thing.  It is easy to read the correspondence that passed between the Admiralty and 
Sick and Hurt Board and presume incompetent behaviour; however, it must be 
remembered that contemporary views are based on a modern-day understanding of 
nutrition.  At most, all the Admiralty and the medical men of the day knew was that scurvy 
was triggered by the quality of victuals and digestion difficulties and was not specifically 
inherent to seafarers.  When presented with so many alleged cures, it was difficult for them 
to establish which were potentially helpful and which were inadequate. 
In terms of this thesis, scurvy was intentionally left until last in this chapter because the 
story has been well covered; however it is nevertheless important to include evidence in 
showing the pattern of how the Board operated in response to proposed scurvy cures.  
Brian Vale in his ‘The Conquest of Scurvy in the Royal Navy 1793 -1800: A Challenge to 
Current Orthodoxy’ quite rightly challenges the views held by many historians that Lind 
should be credited with a cure.  In fact, treating scurvy with citrus fruit had been noted as 
far back as the sixteenth century.  Mariners knew it worked, but they could not explain 
why.129  When Lind carried out his well-documented trials on board the Salisbury, even he 
was not convinced of the lemon’s effectiveness.  If the Admiralty had heeded his advice to 
use a ‘rob’ of lemons and oranges, they would have found it  inadequate.  In order to make 
the rob, one was required to boil the fruits, allowing the juice to reduce into a syrup form.  
During the boiling process, the vitamin C property of the fruit is lost, making the rob 
highly ineffective against scurvy. 
It is worth briefly summarising some of the proposed cures trialled throughout the fleet to 
fully comprehend the challenging decisions the Admiralty had to make.   Elixir of vitriol 
was suggested around mid-century as an effective means for curing the scurvy and was 
perceived to be successful, although, as it was mentioned previously, in reality it provided 
no relief.  Next to reach the Admiralty was the proposal from James Lind.  By that time he 
had already carried out his systematic experiment on board the Salisbury in which men 
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suffering from scurvy were issued with separate cures to determine which worked best.130  
According to Lind, the men who were administered citrus fruits recovered from scurvy the 
quickest and were able to return to service before the others. 
Following his experiment, Lind published his Treatise on the Scurvy outlining his work and his 
findings.  Once it had been publically distributed, he wrote to the Admiralty drawing 
particular attention to the section obliging the navy to reduce the amount of salted meats in 
the sailors’ diet.  When the Sick and Hurt Board deliberated over Lind’s suggestions for the 
reduction of salted meats and the distribution of the rob of lemons and oranges, they wrote 
to three qualified medical men, Dr Isaac Schomberg, Dr James and Dr Hill requesting their 
opinions.  Schomberg, who was a Fellow of the Royal College, submitted a brief response 
saying only that Lind’s proposals were ‘ingeniously founded on reason and observation’ 
and they were ‘likely to be of public use whenever carried into execution. ’131  Dr James felt 
the rob of lemons would make the ‘most excellent preservative against ...scurvy proceeding 
from putrefactions which the sailors are subject to,’ while Hill, who was the surgeon at 
Woolwich dockyard, felt Lind’s method of treating scurvy was ‘not quite practicable’ and 
that if shipboard ventilators were kept in good order, they would ‘keep a ships company 
better in health than all the methods ever yet proposed’.   Hill believed that providing 
seamen with vinegar to eat with their salt provision would work best rather than any of 
Lind’s suggestions.  Hill also believed elixir of vitriol was more useful in suppressing scurvy 
until ships could be brought into port.132  It is abundantly clear why the medical system 
failed to realise citrus fruit could be effective in the prevention and cure of scurvy; with 
three experts consulted, they scarcely agreed with each other. 
Amongst some of the other cures put forth, it was proposed that cider could be effective if 
served on the outbreak of scurvy.  The same three doctors were consulted to gather their 
opinions, and they all agreed cider was preferable to beer and substituting the former for 
the latter might prove effective against scurvy.  Before a trial of the cider could be made, 
Dr John Fothergill, a London physician, recommended the use of dried apples procured 
from North America rather than distributing cider.133  These apples, he claimed, could keep 
in a dry cask for a number of years until they could be ‘put into crusts and baked with the 
liquor they are boiled in’ or perhaps ‘boiled in paste as a pudding.’134  Once the idea of 
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using dried apples was put to the Admiralty, they were pleased to sponsor the trial if an 
adequate supply could be procured for a reasonable price.  An agreeable price was reached 
with Fothergill for 100 bushels to be purchased for use on scorbutic patients.  No results 
of the trial exist; perhaps down to Fothergill’s ability to only procure a mere eight bushels 
rather than the intended 100. 
Sour Kraut was the next anti-scorbutic remedy presented to the Admiralty by Dr James.  
According to him, the kraut had been used with impressive results for relief of scurvy 
outside of the navy.  Sour kraut was easily procured and stored as it was merely cabbage cut 
small, pressed down and preserved.  James felt that the stowage of the kraut would take up 
less room than peas; moreover, he surmised ‘the more sour kraut a sailor eats, the less pork 
or beef would be wanted.’135  Not long after James’s submission reached the Sick and Hurt 
Board, Mr Douglas offered a slight variation on James’ proposal.  Douglas claimed he had 
a method to supply cabbages and onions which would keep in all types of climates.  His 
plea was accepted by the Board which allowed him to trial his preserved provisions at 
Haslar hospital under the watchful eye of Dr James Lind, who had recently been appointed 
its head surgeon.136  The results at Haslar were adequate enough to send Douglas to the 
Mediterranean with Vice Admiral Saunders to further trial his preservation techniques, 
which were eventually discounted. 
One of Lind’s contemporary’s on the subject of scurvy was David McBride.   McBride 
(sometimes written as MacBride) suggested malt wort as a suitable cure since fresh 
provisions, the optimal treatment, were not always available.  He believed the wort would 
affect the fermentation of food once it was consumed by the seamen which thereby 
reduced putrefaction, making them ‘perfectly similar to...fresh vegetable juices.’137  His cure 
was sent for trial on board the Dolphin, bound for the Pacific Ocean along with other 
treatments including portable soup, mustard, vinegar and pickled cabbage in order to 
ascertain the curative quality of each one.138  The trials of McBride’s wort proved 
inconclusive and the Sick and Hurt Board felt that there were not enough positive reports 
to carry out further surveys at that time.  The quest for a cure carried on. 
Confusion over the relief from scurvy continued to beleaguer both the Admiralty and Sick 
and Hurt Board.  When Captain Cook’s proposed first voyage to the Pacific was in the 
planning stage, the Admiralty saw their chance to put this issue to bed.  If they provided 
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Cook with a variety of treatments, he could carry out a trial on each of them, keep 
meticulous records of the outcome and eventually report back to the Admiralty.  Equipped 
with the same antiscorbutics as the Dolphin, Cook’s ship the Endeavour also carried sour 
krout and the rob of oranges and lemons.139  During his voyage, Cook maintained relatively 
healthy crews mainly due to his own initiative and the level of cleanliness he demanded.  
Scurvy rarely made an appearance during the voyage and the men suffering from illnesses 
were generally afflicted with fever and dysentery.  Upon Cook’s return from his second 
voyage, his report to the Admiralty testified to the efficacy of the malt of wort amongst the 
other cures.  He referred to the wort as ‘one of the best anti-scorbutic medicines yet 
discovered’ although he was ‘not altogether of opinion that it will cure [scurvy] at sea .’140  
The Admiralty thought so highly of his recommendation since his crews fared so well 
against the ravages of scurvy, that they threw their weight behind McBride’s antiscorbutic 
treatment. 
When it became apparent to the Sick and Hurt Board that McBride’s wort did not cure 
scurvy, they endeavoured to find a treatment that would.  Dr Hulme appeared to have the 
answer.  Writing to the Board in 1777, he suggested combining pure salt of tartar 
(potassium carbonate), water and spirit of vitriol which could be administered to patients 
until their scorbutic symptoms disappeared.141  The Board were pleased to trial Hulme’s 
medicine on ships sailing for the coast of Africa, North America and the West Indies in the 
dosage he recommended with surgeons reporting their observations.  No results from 
these trials exist, but it is obvious that his proposed treatment did not work as no further 
references to the medicine exist. 
While the Sick and Hurt Board were trialling prospective scurvy cures, Gilbert Blane was 
stationed in the West Indies where he was carrying out observations on the connection 
between scurvy and fresh provisions.  He noted that by May 1781 no fresh vegetables had 
been taken on board ships in the Leeward Islands since January of that same year.  
According to his detailed data-gathering, there had been 1077 cases of scurvy in the fleet 
during May.  He compared that to the 678 cases in April and 543 in June which was during 
a time that fresh provisions became available again. 142  Elsewhere, frustration had set in 
among captains and surgeons who were also coping with the immediate ramifications of 
scurvy on board their ships.  Entirely unsatisfied with medicines furnished by the Board, 
these men took it upon themselves to purchase their own provisions which they believed 
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promoted the health of sick men.  Captain Caldwell of the Hannibal was one of those men.  
Upon his arrival at Crookhaven, he had 120 men on board suffering from scurvy.  He was 
induced by the surgeon to purchase seventeen boxes of lemons and sweet oranges and 
once they had been distributed, the sick men recovered so fast ‘that many returned to their 
duty and only two died.’143  Captain Curtis of the Brilliant at Gibraltar transmitted a similar 
account from his ship’s surgeon and the surgeon from the Porcupine on the same station.  
According to those men, lemon juice proved to be the most effective antiscorbutic they 
had tried and both had virtually no men suffering from scurvy.144  Even surgeons from the 
East India Company urged the Board to use lemons to treat the disease.  Stephen 
Matthews, one of the East India Company’s surgeons proposed mixing the juice from 
lemons and limes with good French brandy, which he found to cure men on the verge of 
death.145 
It took the Sick and Hurt Board until 1794 to genuinely accept the effectiveness of lemon 
juice (not the ‘rob’ of lemons as proposed by Lind).  The voyage of Commodore Peter 
Rainier in 1794-1795 reinforced the belief in the treatment.  He used the lemon juice during 
a continuous voyage from England to Madras which took nineteen weeks with only a 
temporary appearance of scurvy.146  Sufficiently convinced of the lemon juice’s efficacy, the 
Board urged the introduction of it in 1795 and by June 1796, it was administered daily as a 
preventative on ships ordered on foreign stations although ships on the home stations were 
ordered only to use lemon juice as a cure.  Because the juice was considered a medicine, the 
Sick and Hurt Board were responsible for procuring lemons for production and in 1797 
they reportedly secured 30,000 gallons of lemon juice for 9s/9d per gallon.147  Despite 
procuring this considerable volume, the allowance to the Channel Fleet remained for 
curative purposes only and not surprisingly, scurvy broke out among men in that squadron.  
By 1799 the conditions had become so insufferable that Rear Admiral Berkeley wrote a 
‘public letter’ to the Sick and Hurt Board criticizing the situation and urging them to 
distribute lemon juice as a preventative and not just as a cure.   He claimed that he: 
never knew an instance of a ships being out nine weeks that the scurvy 
did not begin to shew itself, although kept under and certainly very much 
lessened by the lime [sic] juice which is medicinally allowed to all ships.  
But this lime juice is never made use of until a scorbutic patient 
discovers himself which is rarely or ever until the disease has gained a 
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considerable head, where as if it was mixed with his drink from the time 
the beer was expended and that he was allowed sour kraut with his beef 
or to eat as a salad it might keep him free from the scurvy, or at least 
operate upon him so as to keep the disorder from bursting forth in the 
violent manner which we always see instances of at the period I have 
mentioned.148 
Berkeley’s letter struck a nerve and when the navy had an adequate supply of lemon juice in 
stock, enough to provide a small dose for every man in naval service, the Board ordered its 
general distribution to all seamen as a preventative.  Finally the dreaded scurvy could be 
managed effectively through the daily use of lemon juice.  According to the Sick and Hurt 
Board’s records, between 1796 and 1805, a total of 289,562 gallons were issued to the fleet 
in order to combat the disease (no record exists for the peace of 1802-1803) which 
averaged 36,195 gallons per annum.149  Although it had taken the Admiralty and the Sick 
and Hurt Board some time to agree on the cure, it was not necessarily avoidable even if 
they had heeded the advice of James Lind half a century earlier.  It took time for the 
medical understanding of scurvy to evolve from the assumption it was caused by 
putrefaction from too much salted meats into a disease caused by a deficiency of fresh fruit 
and vegetables.  Vitamin C itself remained unknown for decades, but even without that 
specific knowledge, the navy still knew enough about the good effects of citrus fruits to 
prevent and cure the disease.  The conquering of scurvy was, and still is, one of the most 
popular achievements of the Royal Navy in the eighteenth century. 
Conclusion 
One of the major duties of the Sick and Hurt Board was to facilitate the organisation and 
distribution of medicines throughout the fleet.  Unfortunately for a long period of their 
history, the commissioners were not medically trained meaning they lacked sufficient 
knowledge necessary to make decisions about medicines required in surgeons’ chests.  It 
was not until 1793 that a medically trained commissioner was appointed to the Board and 
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until that time, they frequently relied on external organisations like the Royal College of 
Physicians or respected London physicians to provide opinions on treatments.  
During this period, medicine was undergoing a period of significant reform which led to a 
number of surgeons and physicians to question Hippocratic and Galenic teachings.  These 
surgeons preferred to rely on observation and experimentation in order to determine the 
best method of treatment for a number of diseases.  Naval life allowed these surgeons to 
carry out trials in a ‘controlled’ environment, much like hospitals did in Britain.  The Sick 
and Hurt Board also employed the policy of trialling remedies which appeared to hold 
merit.  At times, these trials proved useful, although on a number of occasions, the Board 
were more confused by the results.  The best they could do was assess the individual 
qualities of each proposal as well as the credentials of the submitter. 
Until such time as the Sick and Hurt Board was comprised of medically-trained men, 
medication and treatments ultimately responsible for the increased health of seamen during 
the majority of the century stemmed from the indefatigable efforts of surgeons at sea.  If it 
were not for surgeons and their captains taking a proactive stance for the issuance of 
Peruvian Bark or the juice from lemons, limes and oranges, the devastating effects of both 
malaria and scurvy would have undoubtedly carried on for a number of years.   Those men 
are the unsung heroes of naval medicine in the eighteenth century.  They deserve equal 
recognition for their shipboard trials, advancements in cleanliness, the conquering of 
scurvy and the subdual of other diseases along with the more notable figures of the day 
including James Lind, Gilbert Blane and Thomas Trotter.   Despite their efforts, they were 
not able to suppress all naval diseases.  Yellow fever, ulcers and ruptures continued to 
plague the navy for some time.  However, it was during this period in the last quarter of the 
eighteenth century that the groundwork was laid for the near-suppression of nearly all 
naval diseases in the nineteenth century. 
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Chapter 4 
Health of British Sailors Afloat in the West Indies 
Contemporary historians often refer to the eighteenth century West Indies as an unhealthy 
region where sailors regularly succumbed to their diseases, or weakened them enough to 
warrant a discharge from service.  Even one of the most referenced series of books on 
naval medicine mentions the injurious situation for seamen in that tropical zone.  In 
Medicine and the Navy, Lloyd and Coulter maintain that ‘to be sent out in a big line-of-battle 
ship to a tropical climate such as that of the West Indies [was],...under prevailing hygienic 
condition, to invite disease if not death.’1  Lloyd and Coulter are not alone in suggesting the 
islands of the West Indies were the most dangerous environment for an eighteenth century 
sailor.  Sir James Watt referred to Antigua as the ‘white man’s graveyard’ in his article about 
the naval surgeon-cum-abolitionist James Ramsay.2  These assessments are typically 
exaggerated with levels of disease and mortality largely misrepresented.  N.A.M. Rodger’s 
opinion more closely reflects the true situation, claiming that although ‘service in the West 
and East Indies was unpopular with many...heavy losses on several well -known expeditions 
should not lead us to exaggerate the real risks of ordinary service .’3  Most certainly 
Vernon’s attack on Cartagena in 1741 is a superb example of an expeditionary voyage in 
the West Indies region which experienced severe, but not typical, loss.4  And as it will be 
demonstrated later in this chapter, the Grey-Jervis expedition of 1794 was also an 
exception to the health rule predominantly due to seamen’s heightened onshore 
involvement with the British Army.  Aside from these particular extreme cases, seamen in 
the West Indies throughout the second half of the eighteenth century enjoyed relatively 
good health.5  During that time, sickness and mortality were largely under control and the 
majority of seamen ordered to the West Indies returned to England alive. 
Sampling Criteria 
To help quantify the levels of sickness and mortality in the West Indies during the period 
covered by this thesis (1770-1806), I have carried out a survey of all ships on both the 
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Jamaica and Leeward Islands stations tallying up the total number of men on the sick list as 
well as the number of men who died in relation to the total number borne.  The selected 
survey years are 1773, 1778, 1783, 1788, 1790, 1793, 1798 and 1803 meaning there was a 
sample taken every five years (the exception being 1790)6.  Opting for these dates ensured 
an equal number of samples were taken during both war and peace time to enable 
comparisons to be drawn between them.  Notable outbreaks of fevers from 1793-1798 
have been covered by two of the survey dates in order to compare these more sickly years 
against the ‘average’ years.  These dates exclude the two joint army-navy expeditions of 
1794 and 1796 which suffered high levels of sickness and mortality.  Both of the 
expeditions were atypical from a naval operations point of view.  During their joint 
assignments with the army, seamen and marines were obligated to partake in a number of 
operations on shore where a higher-than-usual percentage of them were exposed to the 
mosquito vector.  As a result of this greater exposure to diseases contracted on shore, a 
considerable number of men succumbed to illness or were so severely affected through 
exposure as to render them useless for all future military service.  In order to demonstrate 
just how exceptionally deadly these expeditions were for both army and navy men, a 
sample of sickness and mortality figures from 1794 are included in this thesis.7 
The sampling data was compiled using Admiralty muster books belonging to ships on both 
West Indies stations.8  Once muster books were identified for each ship, figures were 
recorded from the summary page of each bi-monthly muster submitted to the Admiralty 
including the number of men ‘Borne’, the number ‘Mustered’ and ‘Sick’.  Ships’ companies 
were typically mustered four times per calendar month meaning that each bi-monthly 
record had 8 sets of figures (Figure 4.1).  Within each bi-monthly muster record, each 
seaman’s name was recorded along with their status on board ship (discharged, dead or 
                                                                 
6 The year 1790 is the only date that breaks away from the five-year sampling method employed in this thesis.  
It was selected because it was a year of peace time meaning an equal number of peace and  war years were 
sampled.  Also, it is generally accepted that the 1770s and 1780s were relatively healthy and virtually free from 
fever outbreaks.  By selecting the year 1790, it circumvents those ‘healthier’ decades and therefore more 
accurately represents the overall morbidity and mortality percentages during the last quarter of the eighteenth 
century. 
7 The Jervis-Grey expedition was originally conceived and organised in 1793, however, due to a number of 
political and military factors, the number of troops was reduced and there was a delay in sailing.  When the 
expedition finally set sail in November 1793, it was eight weeks behind schedule and it was scarcely half of its 
originally-proposed strength.  For the purposes of this thesis, the Jervis-Grey expedition will be referred to as 
the ‘1794’ expedition because, although the men set sail in 1793, they did not arrive in the West Indies until 
January 1794.  This will limit the confusion in the sampling dates since both 1793 and 1794 are included in 
this thesis (1793 is included in the 5-year sampling while 1794 is included for reference purposes only.  The 
latter figures can be found on pp. 319-321).  For more details of the expedition’s organisation and operation, 
see Michael Duffy, Soldiers, Sugar, and Seapower: The British Expeditions to the West Indies and the War against 
Revolutionary France (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987). 
8 Ships belonging to both stations were extracted from the List Books at TNA, specifically ADM 8/49 
(1773), ADM 8/54 (1778), ADM 8/59 (1783), ADM 8/64 (1788), ADM 8/66 (1790), ADM 8/69 (1793), 
ADM 8/75 and ADM 8/76 (1798), ADM 8/85 and ADM 8/86 (1803). 
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run) as well as the ships’ location at the time the muster was taken.  When a seaman was 
recorded as having died during his service in the West Indies, the date and cause of death 
(if specifically noted in the muster book) were also recorded.9  Following the assemblage of 
all this data, it was then possible to calculate the percentage of men who suffered from 
disease or injury and the number of those who died.10 
 
Figure 4.1 - Muster Book from HMS Solitaire on the Leeward Islands Station, 1783
11 
There are a few exclusions to note, firstly that the survey was limited to active seamen in 
the Royal Navy and excludes marines and invalids put on board ships for carriage to 
England.  The second notable exclusion from the survey was men discharged and sent 
ashore to either sick quarters or hospital.12  If ships’ musters were incomplete in any way, 
either because the recorded numbers were not complete or if a ship was not actually 
located on either of the West Indies stations during the survey year, these musters have 
                                                                 
9 These figures include deaths from all diseases, shipboard accidents, battle casualties, drowning and  murders. 
10 Complete graphs for all survey years can be found in Appendix 6. 
11 TNA, ADM 36/9574, Solitaire Muster Book, April – May 1783. 
12 There are a number of reasons for men released to sick quarters and hospitals to be excluded from this 
survey.  The first one being that the men, once discharged into care ashore, no longer counted toward the 
ship’s borne men therefore distort the figures .  The second reason for their exclusion is once the men were 
put ashore, there is no easy way to track them without consulting a large number of volumes from the ships’ 
pay books series at TNA (ADM 33, ADM 34 and ADM 35).  Lastly, a comprehensive review o f all surviving 
hospital musters is included in Chapters 6 and 7 with similar sickness and mortality statistics given.  
Muster Date Borne Mustered Sick 
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been disregarded.13  Hospital muster books from facilities in the West Indies are not 
included in the sample, although they are consulted elsewhere.14  Despite these exclusions, 
the vast majority of ships serving in the West Indies have useable musters which therefore 
allows for an accurate depiction of health on board ships in that region during the last 
quarter of the eighteenth century.15 
Since two samples were taken during the documented fever epidemic from 1793 to 1798, 
comparisons can be made between those and the other sample years to quantify the 
heightened levels of sickness and mortality during the outbreaks as well as comparing those 
two sample years against 1794; a year that had both a fever outbreak and the joint 
expeditionary force sent from England.  As it will be shown, while the outbreak and 
expedition did increase mortality rates above the average percentage, sickness percentages 
remained largely unchanged.  There were, however, a small number of ships which 
experienced above-average levels of sickness and mortality during the time of the outbreak.  
If those particular ships were deemed as being representative of the entire station, it is not 
surprising that the West Indies were considered by seamen to be deadly.  Therefore it is 
essential to identify some of these individual ships to see just how severely some of them 
suffered.  Following the examination of the survey figures, there are a handful of case 
studies utilising naval surgeons’ journals which provide unique glimpses into the 
experiences of those men working in the West Indies and also contextualise how diseases 
affected seamen. 
Seamen in the West Indies 
The number of men stationed in the Caribbean during the survey period varied greatly and 
wholly depended on the political state of affairs back in Europe.  During times of peace, 
the combined average number of seamen on both West Indies stations was roughly 2,000 
while during times of war, that number grew as large as 11,000 men at any given time.16  
Table 4.1 outlines the average number of seamen on both stations for each of the survey 
                                                                 
13 The ADM 8 List Books record the name of naval ships at each station.  If, however, the individual ships’ 
muster books record them as being in another region of the world, they have not been included in the survey 
figures. 
14 Hospital muster books are only available from the 1790s onward and therefore are not consultable 
according to the criteria chosen for the thesis sample.  However, the hospital muster books have been 
employed in Chapters 6 and 7 where West Indies naval hospitals are explored in more depth.  
15 Due to the exclusions outlined above, the following statistics apply to active seamen who were on the 
muster books on board ships.  There are a number of seamen who were discharged to shore (hospital, sick 
quarters, etc) who are not included in the figures.   
16 The peacetime average was calculated from the number of men on both the Jamaica and Leeward Islands 
station from the 1773 survey while the wartime average was calculated from the 1783 survey.  
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years.17  With such a substantial fluctuation in the number of men, it was often difficult  for 
the navy to anticipate their medical needs well in advance.  The majority of medicines and 
necessaries were sent on board ships from England and typically took a number of months 
to arrive at their destination.  When supplies ran low, surgeons were required to procure 
them from local agents, although quantities were often limited and extremely costly.  One 
would expect that the enormous fluctuation in the number of seamen, coupled with the 
difficulty in delivering supplies would have resulted in sickness levels fluctuating 
considerably.  As it will soon be demonstrated, the levels of morbidity did not vary and in 
fact remained steady throughout the survey period. 
 
Table 4.1 – Average Number of Seamen in the West Indies, 1773-1803 
Sickness and Mortality in the West Indies 
Representations of sickness and mortality levels in the West Indies in a number of literary 
sources have generally been inflated and inadequately convey the reality which existed on 
board naval ships.18  In truth, sickness and mortality levels were relatively moderate.  Table 
4.2 provides an overview of the percentage of sick men on both stations throughout the 
                                                                 
17 The number of men reflected in the Table are taken from the m uster books used in the survey, therefore 
the numbers are here reflect the ships which have complete muster books.   To come to an annual average, a 
per-ship average of borne seamen was calculated.  Once complete, those per-ship averages were added 
together, thereby generating the most accurate number of men on station during the entire year.  Simply 
calculating the monthly borne number does not take into account the vessels which did not spend an entire 
year on station. 
18 See Lloyd and Coulter, Medicine and the Navy:  Sir James Watt, ‘James Ramsay. 
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survey period while Table 4.3 illustrates the mortality rate.19  It is evident from the figures 
in Table 4.2 that both stations scarcely surpassed a 3 per cent sickness rate during the end 
of the eighteenth century.  It is interesting to note that the Leeward Islands station was 
more sickly which can be attributed to a number of factors.  One of the principal reasons 
was that ships’ surgeons at Jamaica had a purpose-built hospital at Port Royal at their 
disposal which employed a full time surgeon: therefore a greater number of men found 
relief ashore rather than remaining on board their vessels’ sick list.20  More remarkable were 
the mortality figures from both stations.  From closer examination of these figures in Table 
4.3 it is evident that, by and large, only a small number of men ordered to the West Indies 
succumbed to disease, injuries and accidents for a majority of the sample years.  The most 
noticeable area in Table 4.3 is the increased mortality figures beginning in 1793 which 
continue to swell toward the end of the century.  This mortality upsurge is a direct result of 
the well-documented fever epidemic and escalation of naval operations in the region.  
Peculiarly, a similar spike in sickness did not occur in 1793, leading one to believe the strain 
of fevers themselves were so severe and fast-acting that many men failed to make it to the 
sick list or were there momentarily before succumbing to the disease. 
 
Table 4.2 – Percentage of Overall Sickness on Board Ships in the West Indies, 1773-1803 
                                                                 
19 These figures include deaths from all diseases, shipboard accidents, battle casualties, drowning and 
murders. 
20 Further details of Jamaica hospital, including musters, are to be found in Chapter 6. 
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Table 4.3 - Percentage of Overall Mortality in the West Indies, 1773-1803 
By citing Duncan Crewe’s figures from his book Yellow Jack and the Worm, we can put these 
percentages from the last quarter of the century into a wider context.  Crewe’s work, which 
focused on the Royal Navy in the West Indies between 1739 and 1748, includes similar 
mortality calculations from 1738, 1741 and 1747 for both stations.  Using the same 
sampling method as the one employed in this thesis, Crewe arrives at the following 
mortality percentages:21 
   Jamaica  Leeward Islands  Total 
1738   6.54%  6.08%   12.62% 
1741   17.66%  6.20%   23.86% 
1747   7.98%  7.95%   15.93% 
The mortality experienced during the 1730s and 1740s was, up until that time, somewhat 
expected.  Epidemics of disease, particularly yellow fever, were most common in the West 
Indies during the period 1690 to 1770.  Not coincidently, these dates corresponded with 
the period of the most rapid development in that region, meaning that the proportion of 
white, non-immune people was at its height.22  Few outbreaks of yellow fever were 
recorded in the two decades after 1770.  By that time, the influx of new residents had 
tapered, suggesting that the local population were more likely to have been previously 
exposed to the disease and were now immune.  The lack of non-immunes in the local 
                                                                 
21 Duncan Crewe, Yellow Jack and the Worm: British Naval Administration in the West Indies, 1739-1748 (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 1993), p. 96. 
22 David Geggus, ‘Yellow Fever in the 1790s: The British Army in Occupied Saint Domingue’ in Medical 
History, vol 23 (1979), p. 41. 
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population meant the spread of yellow fever by the infected aegypti was suppressed owing 
to the lack of fresh arrivals.23 
So if morbidity and mortality had decreased so significantly in such a short period of time, 
why did the West Indies continue to maintain such a deadly reputation?  Correspondence 
originating from men stationed in the West Indies during the eighteenth century is partly to 
blame for the over-inflation of disease and mortality perceptions in contemporary 
publications.  Additional writings also influenced the way the West Indies were viewed 
during this time; particularly those generated by anti-slavery campaigners.  It is worth 
addressing the latter writings in greater detail.  These abolit ionists were keen to exaggerate 
real losses in the West Indies for their own motives; chiefly their abhorrence for slavery 
and the slave trade. 
During the 1790s, as a result of mounting criticism from abolitionists, publications 
emerged such as Elliot Arthy’s work, The Seaman’s Medical Advocate: or, an attempt to show that 
five thousand seamen are, annually, during war, lost to the British nation,...through the yellow fever , in 
which it was claimed that a substantial number of seamen were lost to both the naval and 
merchant service in the West Indies.24  Arthy’s publication cites yellow fever cases he 
observed as well as the deaths resulting from that disease during a number of sailings on 
board West Indian merchantmen.  His mortality figures were partly based his own 
observations as well as on figures quoted in Mr Baillie’s speech to the House of Commons 
in 1792 on the abolition of the slave trade in which the latter calculated that upwards of 
20,000 seamen were annually conveyed to the West Indies.25  Applying Baillie’s annual 
conveyance figure, Arthy arrived at his 5,000 person mortality figure (from the title of his 
publication) based on his prior observations of a 25 per cent per-ship mortality rate while 
he served on board West Indian merchantmen.26  There are a couple of points that should 
be mentioned which influenced Arthy’s writing.  Most of the ships which routinely voyaged 
to the West Indies were merchantmen whose crew members customarily spent time on 
shore and were therefore more likely to contract yellow fever.  Moreover, the elevated 
mortality rates experienced on Arthy’s voyages were not common for every ship and it 
cannot, therefore, be assumed that 25 per cent of merchant seamen sailing to the West 
                                                                 
23 See the ‘Yellow Fever’ section of Chapter 2 for more information on the fluctuation of the disease in the 
West Indies during the eighteenth century. 
24 Roger Norman Buckley, The British Army in the West Indies: Society and the Military in the Revolutionary Age  
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1998), p. 4. 
25 Elliot Arthy, The Seaman’s Medical Advocate: or, An Attempt to Show that Five Thousand Seamen are annually, during  
War, lost to the British Nation, in the West India Merchants’ Service, and on board Ships of  War on the West India Station, 
through the Yellow Fever, and other Diseases and Means, f rom Causes which, it is conceived, are chief ly to be obviated, and 
unconnected with the Misfortunes of  War or Dangers of  the Seas (London, 1798), p. 25. 
26 Ibid., pp. 70-72. 
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Indies perished due to yellow fever.27  Finally, the period when Arthy was employed on 
slave ships, was during the fever epidemic of 1793-1798 when the mortality rates were at 
their highest.  By painting such a dire picture of the seamen’s probability of survival on 
board ships, particularly slavers, the author was attempting to sway his readers to the 
abolitionist movement. 
Arthy was not the only naval doctor who used West Indian mortality to push an 
abolitionist agenda.  Thomas Trotter, an extremely influential and well -respected naval 
physician, also used his experiences from both the West Indian merchant and Royal Navy 
services to promote the abolitionist movement.  Initially, Trotter was employed as a 
surgeon’s mate in the Royal Navy, followed by a single voyage in 1783 on the slave ship 
Brookes serving as its surgeon.  This last assignment left a lasting impression on Trotter.  
The slave ship voyage took him from England to the West Coast of Africa where it picked 
up its human cargo, then made for Antigua and finally arrived at Jamaica where the slaves 
were sold.  According to Brian Vale: 
Thomas Trotter was shocked and sickened by what he had seen on the 
Brookes during the middle passage: the packing of shackled slaves into the 
hold so tightly that it was impossible to walk between them; the brutality 
of their treatment; the moaning cries from the lower deck at night as the 
slaves began to realise their true fate; and the suffocating stench when 
the hatches were covered in bad weather – all left an indelible 
impression.28 
By the time the Brookes returned to Liverpool in August 1784, Trotter left the ship a 
dedicated abolitionist.  Six years later, he recounted various stories from the slave ship to a 
Parliamentary Committee investigating the slave trade.  Trotter painted a dire picture, 
particularly concerning the way slaves were confined and handled during the middle 
passage.  In his medical writings, he often suggested that the islands of the West Indies 
were exceedingly unhealthy and encouraged the termination of British services to that 
region in order to further his abolitionist opinion.  Despite the efforts of men like Arthy 
and Trotter to deter the slave trade through inflated sickness and mortality figures, it 
continued, meaning the presence of naval forces in the West Indies remained requisite. 
Strongly-worded correspondence from a number of admirals, captains, physicians and 
surgeons sent to the Sick and Hurt Board and Admiralty also perpetuated the notion that 
the West Indies were enormously unhealthy and deadly.  They described the detrimental 
                                                                 
27 See the subsequent section in this Chapter with regards to the variance in sickness levels from ship to ship.  
28 Brian Vale and Griffith Edwards, Physician to the Fleet: The Lif e and Times of  Thomas Trotter 1760-1832 
(Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2011), p. 57. 
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effects that fevers, ulcers and scurvy were having on ships’ crews.  Typically these letters 
only made reference to one particular ship and it cannot be assumed that all ships on 
station suffered equally during the same time period.  Not surprisingly, these letters were 
generally written during extreme periods of sickness, sometimes desperation, and are not 
representative of sickness levels on the whole.  For instance, writing in 1766, Thomas Pye, 
then Commander-in-Chief of the Leeward Islands station, reported the Chatham was in a 
‘sickly state’ while making no mention of any other vessels.29  He wholly attributed the 
sickness to the ‘drinking of their allowance of rum too new’ allowing the men to become 
susceptible to other diseases.  A little less than three years later, when Commodore Man 
assumed command at Antigua, he reported that there were few men sick with the 
exception of the recently-arrived Scarborough whose crew, he claimed, was suffering from 
disease.30  To put his idea of a relatively healthy squadron into context, Man included a 
report on the state and condition of the ships at English Harbour with his letter (Table 
4.4).  Of the 674 men ‘borne’ on the five ships, only thirty were sick, which worked out to 
less than .05 per cent sickness level.  However, fifteen of the thirty men belonged to the 
Scarborough, meaning that half of the sick came from only one ship. 
Ship Name Complement Borne Mustered Widows Men Sick on Board Sick on Shore 
Montagu 243 243 236 6 0 0 
Jason 140 141 132 4 0 5 
Squirrel 96 103 98 2 2 2 
Scarborough 96 104 99 2 15 3 
Vulture 66 83 76 2 0 3 
TOTALS 641 674 641 16 17 13 
Table 4.4 - State of His Majesty’s Ships at English Harbour Antigua, 24 August 176931 
Within three months, Man wrote to the Admiralty reporting the transformation in health 
amongst the men.  During that three-month period, the Montagu had been laid up at 
English Harbour for the hurricane season with her men put on shore in temporary 
accommodation.  Almost immediately, the ship’s master, surgeon, fourteen seamen, the 
lieutenant and eleven marines died.32  Aside from the dead, the Montagu had, according to 
Man, between sixty and seventy men in the hospital.  As her complement was 243 seamen, 
that meant roughly 25 per cent were in hospital.33  The other ships at Antigua appeared to 
have been healthier by comparison and collectively lost twelve seamen and two marines, 
although one of the dead was Captain Antrobus of the Jason who succumbed to a violent 
fever.  The explanation for the higher mortality rate on board the Montagu is two-fold.  Not 
                                                                 
29 TNA, ADM 1/308, Rear Admiral Pye to Admiralty, 9 November 1766. 
30 TNA, ADM 1/309, Commodore Man to Admiralty, 24 August 1769. 
31 Ibid. 
32 TNA, ADM 1/309, Commodore Man to Admiralty, 13 December 1769. 
33 That figure is assuming that there were sixty men in hospital. 
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only had the men been accommodated on shore and were therefore more susceptible to 
direct contact with fever-carrying mosquitoes, they had been put ashore during the ‘sickly 
season’ which occurred from October to January, those being the rainiest months of the 
year. 
Other commanders wrote letters referencing the heightened levels of sickness on both the 
Leeward Islands and the Jamaica stations during the ‘sickly season’.  In early 1770, 
Commodore Forrest wrote from Jamaica reporting the squadron had ‘been very sickly for 
some months past’ while in December 1772 Sir George Rodney claimed that his men had 
also been ‘extremely sickly for these three months past owing to the rainy season being 
more violent.’34  As the months of the ‘sickly season’ were the same for both stations in the 
West Indies, it is worth tracking the percentages of sickness and mortality through the 
calendar year for each of the sample dates.35  Table 4.5 illustrates the combined sickness 
percentage of men from both stations during each month.  It is evident the rainy season 
triggered a rise in the number of sick men for the majority of sample years; the most 
noticeable spike coinciding with the much-referenced fever epidemic from 1793-1798.  
Also discernible is the similarity between both peacetime and wartime years.  It appears 
that men did not suffer more during times of war due to the lack of supplies and 
provisions.  In fact, according to the muster books, during the War of American 
Independence in 1778 the men enjoyed a relatively healthy year just as they did in 1798 
during the French Revolution.36 
                                                                 
34 TNA, ADM 1/238, Commodore Forrest to Admiralty, 1 February 1770.  ADM 1/239, Sir George Rodney 
to Admiralty, 19 December 1772.  Rodney subsequently acknowledged the fair weather had set in again and 
the sickness was abating. 
35 As demonstrated in Chapter 2, the ‘sickly season’ in the West Indies coincided with the rainy season in the 
latter quarter of the year.  Some years the rainy months began a tad earlier, but generally ran from October to 
January. 
36 It is worthy of note that during the American War of Independence, there were no major yellow fever 
outbreaks, therefore sickness and mortality figures remained low. 
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Table 4.5 – Total Percentage of Sick Men from Leeward Islands and Jamaica, 1773-1803 
A similar trend emerged for the mortality rate through the calendar year with most men 
succumbing to their diseases during the ‘sickly months’.  Table 4.6 provides the combined 
mortality figures for both stations.  The mortality figures include all types of recorded 
deaths and are not exclusively due to disease.  A moderate number of seamen died as a 
result of shipboard accidents, naval battles, fighting amongst crew members, murder while 
on shore or even from acts of nature such as lightning strikes. 37  Immediately noticeable in 
the Table is the large peak in the latter months of 1793 which demonstrates that 15.92 per 
cent of men stationed in the West Indies died around the time of the yellow fever outbreak.  
Aside from this significant escalation, on average less than 3 per cent of men died per 
month while either serving at Jamaica or the Leeward Islands.38 
                                                                 
37 Ships’ muster books typically provide details of all non-disease related deaths which have been noted 
during the survey.  It was decided to omit the data from the chapter since there was enough information to 
produce an entire chapter analysing lightning strikes, armament accidents, drownings, battle casualties, 
shipboard skirmishes and the like. 
38 These figures include those men which were sent to hospital on shore for treatment and were not 
discharged from the ship’s muster book.  Those men who were discharged either into sick quarters or to 
hospital would appear in the hospital’s muster books which are investigated separately in Chapters 6 and 7.  
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Table 4.6 – Total Percentage of Dead Men from Leeward Islands and Jamaica, 1773-1803 
The years selected for the thesis survey are considered ‘routine’ in terms of the navy’s  
responsibilities in the region.  As it has been stated in a previous chapter, ships’ crews were 
typically kept far off shore to avoid exposure to ‘unhealthy airs’ or ‘noxious land breezes’ 
which many believed triggered yellow fever.39  Keeping the ships off shore produced the 
desired effect, but not for the reasons they supposed.  Putting a fair amount of distance 
between the ships and stagnant bodies of water, the favoured breeding ground of 
mosquitoes, seamen had virtually no chance of coming into direct contact with them unless 
they were ordered ashore.  Despite its best efforts, the navy was not always afforded the 
luxury of keeping their seamen off shore during their operations in the West Indies.  Joint 
expeditionary forces sent from England to that region in both 1793 and 1795 forced navy 
personnel to spend more time on land than had been customary.  By working so closely 
with the army, seamen were more exposed to deadly fevers.  Morbidity and mortality 
figures for the 1794 expedition are included in Table 4.7, which demonstrates just how 
much more deadly land operations were for naval personnel.40  It is clear that mortality, 
rates, particularly on the Jamaica station were much higher than had been the case prior to 
the expedition.  Where most sample years establish that monthly mortality percentages 
were generally below 2 per cent, the figures from the expeditionary year tell a slightly 
                                                                 
39 See Chapter 2, section on Yellow Fever regarding the ‘miasmatic’ theory of disease distribution from land 
to naval ships. 
40 These figures were compiled utilising the same method as the above samples.  Exact figures for 1794 are 
also located in Appendix 6. 
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different story.  In June 1794, expeditionary forces were sent from Martinique to Port au 
Prince with the intent to conquer that island.  Of the 518 that had left the former island, 
120 were landed at Jamaica as they were deemed too sick to carry on to Port au Prince.  
Even worse for the joint forces, only 290 were landed at their intended destination; the 
remainder died from yellow fever during the passage and were buried at sea.  That was 
merely the beginning of the force’s suffering.  Within two months, 40 officers and 600 men 
were dead.41  It is evident from the figures in Table 4.7 that the navy also suffered heavy 
losses during those same months, particularly among those assigned to the Jamaica station.   
When the naval surgeon Leonard Gillespie joined Jervis’s fleet off Guadeloupe in 
November, he observed the men to be fairly healthy, ‘though weak from the loss of men.’ 42  
He discovered that in the six months preceding his joining the fleet on board the Majestic, 
about a fifth of the crews died due to yellow fever.  While a 20 per cent average mortality 
rate per ship was shocking, Gillespie noted that transport ships experienced an even greater 
loss of life. 
 
Table 4.7 – Total Percentage of Sickness and Mortality from the Leeward Islands and Jamaica, 1794 
The deadly reputation of the Grey-Jervis expedition reached the British public, which was 
afraid that such substantial military losses would jeopardise their chances of success in the 
war.  British soldiers were also justifiably concerned over the deadly reputation of the West 
Indies at this particular time.  They wrote letters and kept journals which voiced their 
                                                                 
41 Duffy, Soldiers, Sugar & Seapower, p. 104. 
42 Leonard Gillespie, Observations on the diseases which prevailed on board a part of  His Majesty’s squadron, on the 
Leeward Island Station, between November 1794 and April 1796 (London, 1800), p. 8. 
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reluctance to be conveyed on that particular service as well as their observations while on 
station.  Prior to setting sail with the Abercromby expedition of 1796, Dr George Pinckard 
wrote: 
A degree of horror seems to have overspread the nation from the late 
destructive effects of yellow-fever, or, what the multitude denominates, 
the West India plague; insomuch that a sense of terror attaches to the 
very name of the West Indies – many, even, considering it synonymous 
with the grave; and, perhaps, it were not too much to say, that all, who 
have friends in the expedition [of 1795-96], apprehend more from 
disease than the sword.  Such discouraging sentiments I am sorry to find 
have not been concealed from the troops.  The fearful farewell of 
desponding friends is every day, and hour, either heedlessly, or artfully 
sounded in their ears.  People walking about the camp, attending at a 
review, or a parade, or merely upon seeing parties of soldiers in the 
streets, are heard to exclaim, - ‘Ah, poor fellows! you are going to your 
last home!  What pity such brave men should go to that West India 
grave! – to that hateful climate to be killed by the plague!  Poor fellows, 
good bye, farewell! we shall never see you back again!’  With such like 
accents are the ears of the soldiers incessantly saluted; and the hopeless 
predictions are loudly echoed, for the worst purposes, by the designing, 
whose turbulent spirits would feast in exciting discontentment among 
the troops.43 
At the time Pinckard was writing, morbidity and mortality among British soldiers in the 
West Indies had remained at the heightened level seen during the previous expedition.  The 
influx of non-immune Europeans in the West Indies continually facilitated the spread of 
fevers, particularly in army camps scattered among various islands.  According to Duffy, 
overall British army casualties in the West Indies during the wars against France, 1793-
1801, were exceedingly high.  Some 45,250 European military personnel died, which 
roughly translates to 51 per cent of white troops. 44  While the Royal Navy also suffered 
more during this period due to their participation in amphibious operations, their sickness 
and mortality figures were not as extensive as those of the army.45  The navy’s mortality 
percentages from the expeditions were exceptional and cannot be regarded as the standard, 
although they are worthy of note in order to demonstrate the potential loss of manpower 
during atypical operations. 
***** 
                                                                 
43 George Pinckard, Notes on the West Indies: Written during the Expedition under the Command of  the Late General Sir 
Ralph Abercromby, vol 1 (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees & Orme, 1806), pp. 15-6 in Buckley, Roger Norman, 
The British Army in the West Indies: Society and the Military in the Revolutionary Age  (Gainesville: University Press of 
Florida, 1998), p. 60. 
44 Figures quoted in Buckley, The British Army , pp. 87-88.  See also Richard Harding, Seapower and Naval 
Warfare: 1650-1830 (London: University College London, 1999), p. 266. 
45 See Appendix 6 for total numbers of sick and dead as well as percentages for all sample years as well as 
1794. 
149 
Much of the blame for sickness and mortality in the West Indies stemmed from the 
apparent lack of supplies (both of food and medicine) which was often quoted as the root 
of men falling gravely ill.  For example, Vice Admiral Byron, Commander-in-Chief at 
North America during the War of American Independence, notified the Admiralty of ‘the 
sickliness of the squadron’ brought on by ‘the shortness of...provisions.’46  According to 
Byron, there were numerous sick men but many were not dangerously ill, which made the 
ships so ‘weakly handed’, that he was forced to apply to General Grant for a detachment of 
troops to carry out duties on board.  A total of 574 troops, including some army officers, 
were loaned to Byron’s ships under the stipulation that they were not to be carried off 
station.  Since his seamen were not gravely ill, he surmised the damaging effects from 
reduced crews were not liable to persist once they procured fresh provisions.  Despite his 
optimistic outlook, Byron wrote to the Admiralty three months later reporting the 
continued sickness throughout his squadron while the naval hospitals struggled to handle 
the large volume of sick seamen.47  To compound the problem, Commodore Rowley, 
recently-arrived with a squadron from England, added to the delicate situation when a large 
number of his men instantly fell ill and were reportedly in a worse condition than Byron’s.  
Some senior men on the West Indies stations, rather than forward complaints to the 
Admiralty and wait for them to address the shortages, preferred to take action to avoid 
sickness among their squadrons.  Admiral Rodney, an officer who enjoyed a reputation for 
being generally unprincipled and selfish, was one of these proactive men.48  When it came 
to the health of his squadron, he displayed a genuine and resolute concern.  He habitually 
procured fresh provisions, medicines and necessaries from local suppliers without 
Admiralty approval at times when he considered it essential.  Even his Physician of the 
Fleet, Gilbert Blane, procured local goods for the benefit of the squadron.  When this pair 
assumed command of the Leeward Islands station in 1779, the overall health of the men 
belonging to the lower decks was in a period of stability with very few seamen falling ill.  
Both Rodney and Blane considered their indefatigable efforts as the reason for the unusual 
healthiness enjoyed by the fleet.  However, the pair was unaware that they were in charge 
during a period when fever outbreaks were relatively unknown in the West Indies.  Naive 
to the prevailing good health in that region, Blane forged ahead with his schemes for 
improving the seamen’s wellbeing. 
                                                                 
46 TNA, ADM 1/312, Vice Admiral Byron to Admiralty, 4 February 1779. 
47 TNA, ADM 1/312, Vice Admiral Byron to Admiralty, 13 May 1779. 
48 More on Admiral Rodney’s character is found in Chapter 5. 
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One of Blane’s biggest criticisms was the lack of gratuitous medicines furnished for naval 
surgeons.  When a convoy arrived under the command of Commodore Walsingham in 
1780, Blane was frustrated to find that no supply of medicines had been brought out by the 
latter and took a hard line concerning the exclusion with the Sick and Hurt Board.  In a 
letter to them, he maintained that naval surgeons ‘cannot be supposed able to afford the 
colony price of medicines which is exorbitant’ since surgeons were required to pay for their 
original medicine chests from their own pockets.  Blane called on the Board to use their 
‘superior judgement’ to ascertain whether or not it would be advantageous to ‘adopt some 
such plan...that would afford a regular and reasonable supply’ of medicines to the West 
Indies.49  When very few provisions were sent from England on the subsequent convoys, 
Blane, under Rodney’s direction, purchased fresh meat and vegetables to curtail the onset 
of scurvy, sufficient enough at least for the sick, although the pair preferred to purchase 
enough for the entire fleet.50  In addition to procuring fresh provisions, they also obtained 
medicines from local merchants no matter the cost when the navy failed to send adequate 
supplies from England. 
Once Rodney and Blane set a precedent in the West Indies for allowing surgeons to 
purchase medicines and fresh food from local suppliers, a number of subsequent 
commanders ordered their captains and surgeons to do the same.  Rear Admiral Rowley, 
who was appointed Commander-in-Chief at Jamaica in 1782, consented to the purchase of 
fresh beef which was supplied daily to the numerous sick and convalescing men under his 
command.51  Less than a month later, Vice Admiral Pigot, Commander-in-Chief of the 
Leeward Islands station (relieving Rodney) reported his seamen were enjoying ‘remarkable 
health.’  This was due, according to Pigot, to his supplying the seamen with additional 
rations of vegetables and milk at the rate of eight pence per man per day.  He claimed that 
he ‘not only saved a great many men but [also] a sum of money to government as each man 
at the hospital stands at near three shillings per day.’52 
When the War of American Independence drew to a close in September 1783, the number 
of men stationed in the West Indies was greatly reduced. 53  Correspondence from captains 
and surgeons concerning the health of the men during this peace time was infrequent; 
however, once the fever outbreak began in 1793, letters complaining of the heightened 
                                                                 
49 Ibid. 
50 TNA, PRO/30/20/9, Gilbert Blane to Sir George Rodney, 14 April 1781. 
51 TNA, ADM 1/242, Rear Admiral Rowley to Admiralty, 22 December 1782. 
52 TNA, ADM 1/313, Vice Admiral Pigot to Admiralty, 15 January 1783. 
53 Refer to Table 4.1 for the average number of men stationed at Jamaica and the Leeward Islands in 1788 
and 1790.  On average the combined number of men on both stations did not exceed 2,000. 
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levels of sickness and mortality arrived more regularly.  Writing from Martinique in 1795, 
Admiral Laforey described the severity of illnesses among the entire fleet, particularly on 
board the Majestic where a malignant fever was raging.  At the time of writing Laforey 
claimed that ship had lost 110 men with nearly an identical number on shore at Gros Islet 
hospital.54  He speculated that the ‘sultry weather with the stagnation of air [during] 
hurricane season has brought [the fever] forward with great violence.’  He was anxious 
about returning men to their ships once they had recovered on shore because he feared 
they might infect their healthy shipmates.  Laforey ensured that each ships’ ballast was 
changed, fumigated and washed with hot vinegar as that was, ‘where the seat of the 
infection [was] thought to lay.’  If those measures failed to eradicate the infection, Laforey 
believed the Majestic would be lost for that year’s service due to the lack of seamen to sail 
her.  As this was during a time of war with France, the loss of a 3 rd rate ship would have 
been a serious detriment to the service; however the infection was eventually eradicated 
and the Majestic remained in service. 
The health situation in Jamaica during the French Revolution was slightly better than that 
of the Leeward Islands with overall sickness remaining low, except in a handful of ships.55  
In February 1797, Admiral Sir Hyde Parker wrote to the Admiralty regarding the poor state 
of health on board the Hannibal.  He claimed the crew was suffering from so many cases of 
severe scurvy that the ship was unable to go to sea.56  By April, he reported that ‘through 
the means [he] adopted at purchasing port wine and vegetables the dreadful progress of the 
scurvy is almost subdued among the ships [sic] crews.’57  Parker’s efforts were so well 
respected that the Admiralty requested he divulge the quantities of fruit, vegetables, port 
wine and lime juice he distributed to cure sick seamen in such a short period of time.58  
Parker found, ‘from experience that no quantity could be fixed on as a remedy for the evils 
they were to correct, and that the procuring of these articles was equally difficult and 
uncertain.’  When he was able to procure these items, he instructed the captains and 
surgeons to distribute whatever quantities they found necessary.  Parker claimed that, ‘had 
it not been for such exertion on [his] part, and attention on the parts of the captains and 
surgeons, this squadron...would have been rendered unfit for any service.’  Although Parker 
was boastful of his methods, he was correct.  Had it not been for his authorisation to 
procure provisions, scurvy no doubt would have continued to wrack his squadron.  And 
                                                                 
54 TNA, ADM 1/317, Admiral Laforey to Admiralty, 1 October 1795. 
55 See Tables 4.2, 4.5 and 4.7 for sickness figures.  Sickness figures for Jamaica in Table 4.7 are rather high, 
although, as it has been discussed, the joint expeditionary operation exposed an atypical number of seamen to 
disease on shore. 
56 TNA, ADM 1/248, Admiral Sir Hyde Parker to Admiralty, 14 February 1797. 
57 TNA, ADM 1/248, Admiral Sir Hyde Parker to Admiralty, 27 April 1797. 
58 TNA, ADM 1/248, Admiral Sir Hyde Parker to Admiralty, 7 October 1797. 
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despite his authorisation being ‘a heavy expense to the public ,’ Parker felt it his 
‘indispensible duty to adopt [it]’ in order to preserve ‘such a valuable class of men as the 
seamen are.’ 
Health of Individual Ships 
Health on board most ships depended heavily on the vigilance of the captain, the surgeon 
and the men themselves.  Ships which were rigidly disciplined by their captains tended to 
enjoy a certain freedom from disease, even ships of a large size.  There were ships that 
suffered severely from a number of diseases, mainly fevers and ulcers, which were brought 
on by a diminished level of discipline on board.  When captains failed to direct seamen to 
launder themselves, their clothing and their bedding on a regular basis, they inadvertently 
allowed germs to propagate and infect other members of the ships’ company.  The focus in 
this section will be on a number of individual ships on the West Indies stations to 
demonstrate how important it was to keep a clean and tightly-run ship and to examine how 
poorly some ships fared in the West Indies. 
At this point it is worth briefly revisiting the survey figures to do a more in-depth study on 
selected ships which were known to suffer more severely.  In doing so, sickness and 
mortality levels on board these individual ships can be emphasised as well as recognising 
the impact these amplified levels had on a ship’s company.  Beginning with 1773, just prior 
to the outbreak of the American War of Independence, the number of seamen on the 
Leeward Islands station averaged around 900.  Statistics from the survey demonstrate an 
average sickness rate of 2.89 per cent and a 2.15 per cent mortality rate.59  As was the 
typical yearly trend of sickness, the lowest percentages occurred in the spring and summer, 
while the highest monthly figures tended to occur in early autumn through winter.  Figures 
at Jamaica follow the same pattern just prior to the war, although that station was more 
populated.  Despite the larger number of seamen, they experienced less sickness, though 
the figures are marginal. 
Somewhat surprising were the figures for 1778, the next sample year, calculated during a 
time when England was at war.  Although, on average, the number of men on each station 
was double that of the first survey in 1773, the number of men reported sick was nearly 1 
per cent less.  Even when war had been raging for a number of years, the sample from 
1783 tells a similar story.  In the Leeward Islands, where the number of men averaged 
5,500 and at Jamaica where the number averaged 4,900, sickness figures continued to be 
                                                                 
59 These figures are taken from Table 4.2 and Table 4.3. 
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relatively low with the former at 3.04 per cent and the latter showing 1.49 per cent.  
Mortality figures were similar with 1.34 per cent in the Leeward Islands and 1.92 per cent at 
Jamaica.  During these first three survey years, most ships suffered minimally with none 
exhibiting above-average figures. 
At the outbreak of fever in 1793, a number of ships were severely attacked and suffered a 
comparatively higher rate of mortality.  The outbreak did not begin until September: 
therefore Table 4.8 highlights from August until the end of the year and focuses on the 
four sickliest ships on both stations in order to demonstrate how seriously fevers affected 
individual ships. Ships from the Leeward Islands station were the Experiment, Nautilus, 
Solebay and Blanche, while the ships from Jamaica were the Flying Fish, Musquito, Hermione 
and Europa.  It is evident from the figures that the Leeward Island’s ships endured a much 
worse attack than their counterparts at Jamaica.  So severely hit were the Experiment, 
Nautilus and Solebay that nearly 35 per cent of their crews entered the sick list between 
September and November.  Ships from Jamaica fared better with none of the four worst-
hit suffering over 10 per cent. 
 
Table 4.8 – Highest Level of Sickness on board Ships at Leeward Island and Jamaica, 1793 
The mortality rate during the same months and among the same ships is shown in Table 
4.9.  Not only were seamen rapidly contracting yellow fever, they were also succumbing to 
the disease almost immediately.  Not surprisingly, the three ships with the highest sickness 
percentages were also the ships with highest mortality rates.  What is interesting to observe 
is that despite those three particular vessels having similar sickness percentages, their 
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mortality rates are noticeably different and it appears the Experiment and Nautilus were able 
to better manage the fever once it took hold and ultimately lost fewer crew members, 
although both suffered significant mortality rates.  The Solebay suffered considerably, losing 
over 50 per cent of its entire ship’s company during November alone! 
 
Table 4.9 - Highest Level of Mortality on board Ships at Leeward Island and Jamaica, 1793 
Towards the end of the fever epidemic which lasted until 1798, similar sickness and 
mortality patterns emerge.  Using the same criterion as above, the four ships with the 
highest percentage of sickness are shown in Table 4.10.  The Leeward Islands station is 
represented by the Vengeance, Requin, Concorde and Lapwing while the Jamaica station is 
represented by the Thunderer, Brunswick, Magicienne and Diligence.60  An obvious difference, 
aside from the overall sickness levels being far less than in 1793, is that the Thunderer 
suffered from an extremely high level of sickness in August which then tapered off at the 
same time that sickness on the other ships began to increase.  After the reduction of 
sickness, the ship resumed a higher percentage toward the close of the year.  The 
explanation is simple; since these figures were collected using the sick list, the sharp decline 
and rise indicate a large number of sick men were sent ashore to hospital (hence the 
decline) after which time the remaining healthy crew members contracted fevers (hence the 
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to Nassau, Bahamas in July and left for England in mid-September and has been excluded on the grounds 
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rise).  Mortality trends in 1798 were similar to 1793 although the maximum percentages 
were considerably less during the former.61 
 
Table 4.10- Highest Level of Sickness on board Ships at Leeward Island and Jamaica, 1798 
Before considering the next sample year, 1803, it is worth examining a number of letters 
received from the West Indies regarding the health of the seamen to ascertain how 
individual ship in the early nineteenth century coped with disease.  In December 1801 Dr 
Blair, physician to the Jamaica squadron, reported the total number of sick between the 5 th 
and the 10th of that month was 247.  The total number of seamen on station during 
December was roughly 8,000, meaning that less than 1 per cent were sick.  At the same 
time, Blair also submitted a breakdown of the illnesses on individual ships on that station 
(Table 4.11).  The most prevalent ailment by far was ulcers; it was more than double the 
number of scurvy patients, the second most frequent disease.  Ulcers affected nearly every 
ship in the squadron, while scurvy appeared to affect the Captain more than any other.  The 
number of fever complaints were insignificant which is unusual for that time of year when 
they typically raged. 
The respite from fevers did not last long as they were reportedly raging again in the 
Leeward Islands while it was under the command of Commodore Hood at the end of 
1802.  He wrote to the Admiralty describing the malignant fevers on board the Castor, 
Emerald and Drake as well as at the naval hospital at English Harbour.  The Castor sustained 
the loss of a lieutenant, her surgeon and upwards of thirty men while the Emerald lost two 
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lieutenants and upwards of sixty men, all of whom died after contracting fevers.62  While 
the Drake was disabled by sickness, it had not suffered such a high number of mortalities.  
All three ships appear in the survey for 1803 and are worth investigating in greater detail 
here.  In January there were nineteen ships belonging to the Leeward Islands squadron 
which were scattered amongst a number of islands including Antigua, Trinidad, Barbados 
and Aruba.  Of those nineteen, seven ships reported no one on the sick list in January; the 
Heureux, Osprey, Ulysses, Asp, Steady, Blenheim and Netley.  The remaining twelve suffered 
from some degree of sickness which is represented in Table 4.12.  As Hood indicated in his 
letter, the Drake was suffering considerably from a malignant fever, while the Castor and 
Emerald appear to have overcome the worst by January.  The Heureux was attacked by the 
same malignant fever after she sailed from Antigua, but its spread soon came under 
control.63 
Ship Ulcer Slight 
sores 
Venereal Scurvy Fever Yellow 
Fever 
Rheumatism Flux Catarrh Total 
Sick 
Sans Pareil 24  2     11 3 40 
Captain  20  30      50 
Goliath 4 11 2 13 3  4    
Carnatic 21  1    1 2  25 
Elephant 1  5    1 1  8 
Brunswick 12  4   1    17 
Ganges 20  3 2    4  29 
Abergavenny 7  1 1 2     11 
Thelampus 1  4 1   3   9 
Apollo 1       1  2 
Crescent 6  1       7 
Tartar  1 4       5 
Nereide 1  4 1      6 
Juno 4 1 3  1  1   10 
Circe 8        1 9 
Bourdelois 4         4 
Tisiphone 1  1  1     3 
Calypso   2       2 
Pelican   4     2  6 
Wilmington   1       1 
Mosquito    2   1   3 
State of 
Each 
Disease 
115 33 42 50 7 1 10 22 4 247 
Table 4.11 – Health of Jamaica Squadron inspected between the 5 and 10 December 180164 
                                                                 
62 TNA, ADM 1/324, Commodore Hood to Admiralty, 28 December 1802. 
63 Ibid. 
64 NMM, ADM/E/48, Dr Primrose Blair to Admiralty, 11 February 1801. 
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Table 4.12 – Percentage of Sick Seamen on board ships in the Leeward Islands, January 1803 
By February 1803, sickness on board the Drake reduced to 7.5 per cent and declined even 
further by March.  As the year progressed, sickness on board the Drake returned and 
reached nearly 12 per cent at it highest level (Table 4.13).  Other ships on the station during 
the survey year which also suffered terribly through the sickly season were the Centaur and 
Osprey.  The number of sick grew steadily on these three ships until the Centaur exceeded 10 
per cent and the Osprey reached nearly 7 per cent.  These ships were the worst-hit and it 
should not be assumed that the entire squadron was equally as sick.  Included in Table 4.13 
is the average number of men on the sick list in the Leeward Islands, which gives an 
indication of the overall health of the squadron in relation to the worst-hit ships.65  The 
average percentage remained extremely low, and it was only during the sickly season that it 
rose above 4 per cent.  That average translates to roughly 100 seamen on the sick list out of 
an approximate 2,300 seamen borne per month.  Put in those terms, the figures clearly 
indicate the men were reasonably healthy and capable of executing their jobs to keep the 
squadron mobile. 
                                                                 
65 The average number does not include the number of men ashore in hospital or in sick quarters.  Those 
figures are reported separately in Chapters 6 and 7. 
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Table 4.13 – Sickness Levels on board the Unhealthiest Ships in the Leeward Islands, 1803 
In June of the following year, Commodore Hood, writing from Martinique, described the 
yellow fever which was raging again at English Harbour.  Dr Cole, the surgeon at the 
Antigua naval hospital, described the fever as being more virulent then ever before, 
‘making it the greatest havoc’ on the squadron.66  Worst hit was the Carysfort who lost her 
purser, the surgeon, ‘some young gentlemen’ and several seamen and marines. 67  The 
Caryfort’s principal loss was Captain Fanshawe who also succumbed to this rash of yellow 
fever.  Hood reasoned that Fanshawe’s ‘zeal under the trying situation of his ship appears 
to have been unremitted and probably the cause of his demise.’68  Captain Nourse, the 
senior officer at English Harbour, endeavoured to control the fever outbreak by removing 
the invalids and healthier patients from the hospital and put them on board the De Ruyter in 
order to free up crucial space.  Nourse believed that most of the men fell mortally ill during 
their reception on shore at the capstan house which was used a ‘receiving house’ until the 
men could be moved to the hospital.  He considered it imperative to open up space at the 
hospital so the sickest men could circumvent the capstan house, as he believed that it was 
at that place where the Caryfort’s men were subjected to ‘a pretty smart attack’ from the 
yellow fever.69  Cole also urged Nourse’s opinion that no seaman be permitted to sleep in 
the house due to its unhealthy nature and it ought to be used for the reception of stores 
                                                                 
66 TNA, ADM 1/325, Dr John Cole to Commodore Hood, 6 June 1804. 
67 TNA, ADM 1/325, Commodore Hood to Admiralty, 15 June 1804. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
Drake
Centaur
Osprey
Average
159 
only.70  Once Nourse learned all the invalids and healthier men had been moved to the De 
Ruyter, he ordered the ship and the remainder of the squadron at English Harbour to 
remove themselves from the area to minimize the fever’s proliferation.  Due to his quick 
action, Nourse supposed he saved the majority of healthy seamen and marines from the 
severe rash of fevers.  Once most of the unaffected men left the vicinity of English 
Harbour, the only significant loss of life was owing to an accident: the sinking of a shipyard 
boat carrying twenty-five men which resulted in the drowning of four of them.  By 
September of 1804, Commodore Hood happily described the reversal of health at Antigua.  
According to Dr Cole’s report to Hood, the outbreak of fevers had subsided and ships’ 
companies were particularly healthy.71 
With the arrival of the sickly season in 1804, the situation at Antigua reversed yet again and 
Commodore Hood reported that the most heavily-distressed ship was the Amelia which 
had previously been ordered to the Surinam River for two months.  While she was there, a 
considerable number of the ship’s company fell ill with yellow fever.  By the time the ship 
returned to Antigua, the Amelia had lost her captain, Lord Proby, her first lieutenant, the 
master, the surgeon, some petty officers and seamen. 72  The surgeon’s journal still exists (a 
rarity for this time period) which details the fever outbreak on board and the number of 
men struck down. 
According to her surgeon’s journal, the Amelia originally arrived in the West Indies during 
the latter part of July 1804 in what he considered to be a very healthy state averaging nine 
men on the sick list mainly suffering from ulcers and slight colds.  The ship was ordered to 
cruise around the Leeward Islands for two months to avoid hurricanes after which time 
they were to proceed to Surinam in early October.  During the cruise, Dr Reeder, the ship’s 
replacement surgeon (her first surgeon died at Surinam), claimed that there was little 
alteration to the sick list with the number of men remaining consistently low.  In order to 
replenish their refreshments after arriving at Surinam, her Captain, Lord Proby, ordered a 
boat to meet the Berbice at Paramaribo to procure fresh beef, fruit and vegetables.  The 
Berbice, which had a high number of sick men on board, eventually met the Amelia to 
transfer provisions.  Despite the precautions taken on board the Amelia to limit the 
transmission of diseases, the first seaman exhibited symptoms of the fever only three days 
                                                                 
70 TNA, ADM 1/325, Captain Nourse to Commodore Hood, Dr John Cole to Commodore Hood, 6 June 
1804. 
71 TNA, ADM 1/325, Dr John Cole to Commodore Hood, 3 August 1804.  Dr John Cole to Commodore 
Hood, 14 August 1804. 
72 TNA, ADM 1/325, Commodore Hood to Admiralty, 10 November 1804. 
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later.73  Two days later, Mr Rowen, the ship’s original surgeon, the first lieutenant and the 
master were attacked in a similar fashion.  The surgeon entered the sick list on the 12 th 
October and was dead by the 14 th while the master lasted one additional day and died on 
the 15th.  Most noteworthy was the death of the commander, Lord Proby, who fell ill on 
the 14th and succumbed to his fever within two days.  Hood asserted that those senior 
members of the ship’s company fell victim to the disease because they showed unrelenting 
attention to their duty and were to be admired for their efforts. 
Nature of the Disease or 
Hurt 
Put on the Sick 
List 
Discharged to 
Duty 
Sent to Hospital Died on Board 
Yellow Fevers 170  144 26 
Fluxes 3 3   
Scurvy     
Ulcers     
Wounds & Accidents 1  1  
Rheumatism     
Pulmonic Inflammation 1 1   
Intermittent Fevers 1 1   
Other Complaints 20 20   
TOTAL 196 5 145 26 
Table 4.14 – Summary of the Sick List from Amelia from 14 October 1804 – 2 February 180574 
A further investigation into the surgeon’s journal reveals the magnitude of the attack.  The 
journal was compiled from 14 October 1804 to the 2 February 1805 and the extracted 
figures are shown in Table 4.14.  A total of 170 men contracted fevers and, in all, 196 men 
were put on the sick list in less than four months.  Amelia was a 5th rate ship with a 
complement of 274 seamen, which meant the greater part of her crew fell ill at some point 
during that four-month period.  The number of deceased appears in Table 4.14 and only 
includes the men who died on board.  Men sent to hospital at either Barbados or Antigua 
after the ship returned from Surinam could have died while on the hospital’s muster books 
and were not reflected in the surgeon’s journal.75 
Ships like the Nautilus, Solebay, Carysfort and Amelia paint a dire picture of ships in the West 
Indies and it is easy to forget that the squadrons as a whole were reasonably healthy.  Those 
few ships which suffered the most cannot be allowed to form the basis of a negative view 
of seamen’s health in the entire region.  Even during the worst outbreaks of fevers from 
1793-1798, the combined sickness figures on board ships in the West Indies for either of 
the sample years barely reached 6 per cent while the combined mortality rate touched 15 
                                                                 
73 The ship’s surgeon believed the Berbice’s men were suffering from a contagious fever which is why 
precautions were taken.  The Amelia’s men fell ill with yellow fever through contact with fever-carrying 
mosquitoes. 
74 TNA, ADM 101/85/1, Surgeon’s journal from the Amelia, 14 October 1804 to 2 February 1805. 
75 Ibid. 
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per cent during the epidemic.76  The majority of the sample year morbidity and mortality 
percentages should be considered relatively low and contradict modern views of naval life 
in the West Indies.  One only needs to recall the combined mortality figures quoted by 
Crewe which demonstrated an average rate of 12 to 23 per cent loss in that same region of 
the world. 
Surgeons’ Journals 
Aside from using ships’ muster books and correspondence to gather data regarding illness 
on board ships, surgeons’ journals prove to be an interesting, although rare, tool to 
enhance the raw data.  It is simply not enough to identify how many men on board a vessel 
were on the sick list.  To fully comprehend what seamen suffered from, how they were 
treated and what life on board a West Indies ship was like is enormously valuable.  These 
journals often include a great degree of detail such as the ailments which put seamen on the 
sick list, medicines and treatments utilised and the length of time men remained under each 
surgeon’s care.  Unfortunately these surgeons’ log books only survive beginning in 1793 
and are not available for every ship.  Despite the brief period the surgeons’ journals apply 
to this study, a number of interesting cases emerge that deserve individual attention. 
L’Aimable: A Case Study77 
The surgeon’s journal from the L’Aimable’s was kept from the 5 September 1797 to the 4 
September 1798 during which time the ship served in the West Indies and sailed back to 
England.  As there was no official procedure for completing journals at that time, surgeons 
reported incidents as they saw fit.  L’Aimable’s surgeon, Alexander Milne, focused his 
attention on the more atypical cases in detail.  John Stephenson, aged 28, entered the sick 
list on 9 January 1798 complaining of a pain in the head and back, gripings, tenesmus, 
chilliness succeeded by heat and burning at the anus.  The most dreadful symptom 
Stephenson suffered from was frequently voiding worms ‘of an enormous size .’  One of 
these worms which passed out of his mouth the day he was placed on the sick list , 
measured 22 inches and, according to the surgeon, looked similar to the common ground 
worm.  Milne treated him with an emetic in order to clear out the contents of his stomach 
and to regulate his digestive system.  After two weeks on the sick list there was little change 
in Stephenson’s prognosis and he continued to void worms.  He was finally able to return 
to duty on the 28 January, although his active service did not last long.  By the 2 February, 
                                                                 
76 The combined sickness figure for 1793 is 5.17 per cent, mortality is 6.56 per cent.  The combined sickness 
figure for 1798 is 4.1 per cent, mortality is 15.97 per cent. 
77 TNA, ADM 101/81/4, Surgeon’s journal from the L’Aimable, 5 September 1797 to 4 September 1798. 
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Stephenson once again entered the sick list citing the same complaints, though on this 
occasion his recovery time was less than a week.  He was admitted to the sick list for a 
third, fourth and fifth time at the beginning of March, in early April and once more in early 
May respectively.  Stephenson observed that his relapses occurred ‘always at or near the full 
of the moon.’  The surgeon tested that theory on the next full moon at the end of May, and 
sure enough the patient returned to the sick list, but his recovery time continued to 
decrease.  Milne anticipated the seaman would return to his care at the end of June, July 
and August (the next full moons) however Stephenson remained healthy during these 
months and did not require treatment.  The journal draws to a close at that time and it is 
not known whether or not Stephenson suffered from tapeworms again. 
Arab: A Case Study78 
Thomas Sappen, the Arab’s surgeon, compiled a journal from the 27 March 1799 to the 27 
March 1800, during which time the ship served entirely in the West Indies.  Like the 
L’Aimable, the surgeon treated typical complaints such as fevers, scurvy and ulcers and also 
like the L’Aimable, he treated a number of interesting cases.  The master’s mate, Mr Ody, 
required treatment for poisoning brought on by the consumption of the ‘mangereen’ apple 
which occasioned his severe vomiting and violent convulsions; he was able to return to 
duty in eight days.  Much worse was the poisoning of Jonathan Randall who was stung, 
according to the surgeon’s reckoning, by either a scorpion or a centipede which resulted in 
near-paralysis and a tumour in the affected area.  A third man, James Stevens, was also 
poisoned during the time the journal was kept, his caused by a tarantula bite on the leg.  
Stevens suffered from a sedated melancholy, nausea and a sensation of pain in the breast.  
In both the arachnid cases, the seamen were kept on the sick list for nearly a month before 
returning to duty. 
The most unique incident on board the Arab came on the 11 October 1799 when the ship 
was off the coast of Cape Canaveral, Florida.  Three men, Jonathan Legget, James Dumble 
and Jonathan Gray, were killed by lightning striking the ship, with the main mast acting as 
the conductor.  At the time of the incident, the surgeon reported that ‘every man on deck 
[was] knocked down, many of whom cried out their legs or arms were broke , from the 
violence of the shock.’  In the aftermath, there was a sulphurous stench accompanied by 
three sharp cracks.  The surgeon was most astonished that the man positioned in the main 
top gallant mast during the storm remained completely unaffected by the strike.  Jonathan 
Legget’s body was conspicuously wounded with the side of his body burnt and his skin 
                                                                 
78 TNA, ADM 101/85/4, Surgeon’s journal from the Arab, 27 March 1799 to 27 March 1800. 
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peeling off.  The two others, according to the surgeon, had only one contusion each just 
under their ears and around the forehead.  In order to ‘satisfy the credulity and superstition’ 
of the ship’s company, the three men’s bodies were kept on board until evening before 
being committed to the deep. 
As was the case with a number of the journals, the surgeon provided an abstract of illnesses 
belonging to men on the sick list which gives a comprehensive overview of the ship’s 
ailments.  Table 4.15 is the abstract from the Arab’s journal demonstrating that fevers were 
the most frequent cause of men’s placement on the sick list while wounds and accidents 
made up a reasonable portion as well. 
Nature of the Disease or 
Hurt 
Put on the Sick 
List 
Discharged to 
Duty 
Sent to 
Hospital 
Died on Board 
Yellow Fevers 42 16 3 23 
Continued Fever 1 1   
Intermittent Fever 1 1   
Fluxes 8 8   
Ulcers 6 5 1  
Wounds & Accidents 27 19 2 6 
Pulmonic Inflammation 3  3  
Scurvy 12 8 4  
Ischuria 1 1   
Incontinence of Urine 2 2   
Heamorrhoids 3 3   
Jaundice 2 2   
Poisonous Reptiles 3 3   
Cynanche Tonsillaris 2 2   
Syphilis 2 2   
Inflammation 7 7   
TOTAL 142 86 18 29 
Table 4.15 - Seamen on the Sick List on board Arab from 27 March 1799 – 27 March 1800 
Ambuscade: A Case Study79 
William Edwards, a seamen aged 28, was put on the Ambuscade’s sick list on the 24 
September 1801 after sustaining an injury when one of the main deck guns went off by 
accident while it was being loaded.  Another man lost his life in the accident, while 
Edwards had his right arm badly injured.  He was brought down to the cockpit for the 
surgeon, Thomas Hendry, to assess the damage to his arm.  Hendry found the limb 
completely shattered along nearly its entire length to within three inches of the shoulder 
joint, while his axilla (armpit), breast and face were noticeably burnt and he had lost part of 
his pectoral (chest) muscle.  Despite Edwards losing a considerable amount of blood from 
his arm, the surgeon opted to amputate reserving as much of the sound outer skin as 
possible leaving the patient with a stump measuring two inches from the shoulder joint.  
                                                                 
79 TNA, ADM 101/84/6, Surgeon’s journal from the Ambuscade, 27 August 1801 to 27 May 1802. 
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That night Edwards enjoyed a restful evening most likely due to the amount of blood lost  
and suffered slight oozing from the stump and the burnt areas of his face, neck and breast 
which emitted an offensive smell.  Three days after the accident, the patient was reported 
to be well-rested, without pain and of a cheerful demeanour.  When the dressing was 
removed by the surgeon on the fourth day he noted the stump and his axilla were covered 
in large maggots, despite this, his burns were healing nicely.  By the 2 October the surface 
of the stump was covered with what Hendry deemed ‘healthy granulations’ and just over a 
month later Edwards was discharged back to duty. 
Blenheim: A Case Study80 
The Blenheim was initially located at Spithead and then ordered out to the Leeward Islands 
where Jeremiah Smithers’s journal describes a number of dysenteric cases.  Beginning on 
the 26 May 1803, only a few months after the ship arrived on the Leeward Islands station, 
there was a serious outbreak of fluxes on board which affected a large portion of the ship’s 
company and lasted until the 4 July.  During that time, a total of 225 cases were reported by 
the surgeon (a small number of those were relapse cases).  Smithers claimed the ‘numbers 
increas[ed] so fast with all the same complaints, and both assistants ill, [he] could not make 
pills sufficient to supply’ the sick men.  The Blenheim’s muster book from that time reveals 
that men did not remain on the sick list for a long period of time and during the month of 
June, sickness on board averaged 2.22 per cent.81  A breakdown of the ship’s sick list was 
contained in the surgeon’s journal although those figures represented almost a two year 
period and included diseases suffered at Spithead before sailing for the Leeward Islands.  
(Table 4.16)  While suffering from an intense bout of fluxes, the ship was also troubled by 
fevers, ulcers, wounds and accidents making it one of the worst-affected ships according to 
the figures in the surgeon’s journal. 
  
                                                                 
80 TNA, ADM 101/91/2, Surgeon’s journal from the Blenheim, 20 May 1802 to 7 March 1804. 
81 TNA, ADM 36/15569 and ADM 36/15570, Blenheim muster books, 1803. 
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Nature of the Disease or 
Hurt 
Put on the Sick 
List 
Discharged to 
Duty 
Sent to the 
Hospital 
Died on board 
Continued Fevers 185 146 9 30 
Fluxes 284 278 3 3 
Scurvy 23 21  3 
Ulcers 95 61 14 3 
Wounds and Accidents 96 55 6 11 
Rheumatism 8 6 1  
Pulmonic Inflammation 15 7 2  
Intermittent Fevers 7 7   
Venereal Complaints 26 24 1  
Other complaints 48 46  1 
TOTAL 787 651 36 51 
Table 4.16 - Seamen on the Sick List on board Blenheim from 20 May 1802 – 7 March 180482 
Arethusa: A Case Study83 
Particularly difficult was the job of Arethusa’s surgeon.  Stationed in the West Indies for the 
majority of the journal, Thomas Simpson contended with a variety of complaints which 
included severe dysentery, a concussion and fractures.  Initially, the majority of cases were 
typical ailments until the 15 November 1805 when John Downie, a marine, was put on the 
sick list suffering from a headache, although Simpson suspected he was faking the illness to 
avoid punishment for drunkenness.  The surgeon described the marine as a ‘coltish 
drunken fellow of such a ghastly wretched appearance in general’ that it was difficult, ‘to 
ascertain at anytime whether he is in health or otherwise especially if it is convenient for 
him to affect indisposition.’  Downie apparently possessed a rare talent for imitating 
various animals including a pack of hounds, a cock crowing and the bellowing of a bull, 
cow or calf.  On account of this unusual ability, ‘he [was] often solicited by his shipmates to 
give a specimen of his talents and a glass of grog of course the reward,’ meaning he spent a 
good deal of time intoxicated. 
Upon entering the tropics for the first time, Thomas Toogood, a 22 year old seaman, was 
exposed to the custom of King Neptune holding court in a crossing-the-line ceremony.  
While the senior crew members were preparing the performance, Toogood stowed himself 
away in the hopes of evading the ceremony.  Once found, he was ‘severely ducked, shaved 
and afterwards rinsed.’  Ducking involved being tied to a wooden harness and dropped 
from the yardarm into the sea.84  Later in the evening, while searching for his hammock 
and his equilibrium not quite recovered, he fell down into the waist of the ship and hit the 
left side of his head.  He immediately vomited and continued to do so repeatedly which 
                                                                 
82 This table includes men who were sick at Portsmouth before the ship departed.  There were a large number 
of men sick with fevers during that time and returned to duty before sailing for the Leeward Islands.  The 
numbers do not add up in the Totals row as some men remained on the sick list at the end of the journal.  
83 TNA, ADM/101/86/1, Surgeon’s journal from the Arethusa, 14 May 1805 to 14 June 1806. 
84 Tim Clayton, Tars: The Men Who Made Britain Rule the Waves (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2007), p. 210. 
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was brought on by the concussion he sustained.  Toogood ultimately returned to duty in 
little less than a fortnight. 
Another accident came only days later when Robert Sampson fell when reefing the main 
topsail.  A block strap gave way, throwing him and several other men off the yard.  The 
men manoeuvred on to the top sustaining very few injuries with the exception of Sampson.  
He fell all the way down to the quarter deck near the skylight as there was no splinter 
netting, ‘which would have saved him.’  The fall resulted in fractures to both thighs and his 
left arm.  His left thigh was injured the worst injured as his femur bone propelled through 
the skin and ruptured the femoral artery.  Incredibly, Sampson initially survived the long 
fall and was treated by the surgeon with splints and bandages on his limbs.  The patient 
never uttered a word after he fell, but the surgeon claimed he was sensible, apparently 
alluding to the patient’s consciousness.  Sampson was put to bed, but, due to the large 
amount of blood lost by the rupturing of the major artery, he gradually sunk and died later 
that evening. 
While George Wright was working aloft he sustained an unusual puncture wound.  He was 
laying out on the fore topsail yard to reef the sail when a large sewing needle, which he had 
placed in the breast of his shirt, ran into his sternum.  When he attempted to remove it 
himself, he claimed the needle broke nearly in the middle meaning half of it remained in his 
chest.  He sought out the surgeon at once because he was in a great deal of pain and had 
‘large drops of sweat [falling] from his face in profusion.’  The surgeon immediately 
inspected the hole in the sternum where the needle entered, but could not see or feel any 
part of it.  Wright maintained that when the surgeon prodded around the hole, he could 
feel the end of the needle pricking him internally.   In order to locate the needle point, 
Simpson made incisions above and below the orifice, however no part of the object was 
found.  The patient claimed the pricking feeling persisted, but since the surgeon found no 
foreign objects during the examination, he joined the edges of the incisions and secured the 
entire area with adhesive straps.  A week after the accident, when the wound had 
suppurated, Wright claimed he still felt the prick in his left breast although an additional 
week remaining on the sick list proved long enough for the feeling to subside and for 
Wright to return to duty. 
The last remarkable case that Simpson treated on board the Arethusa was Jonathan Williams 
who was placed on the sick list on the 9 January 1806.  He suffered a fit (epileptic seizure) 
but this was not the first time the surgeon witnessed Williams in that condition.  The 
patient’s stature was substantial and during this particular attack it took a considerable 
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number of men to prevent him injuring himself during the convulsions.  Simpson 
previously enquired into William’s history of fits which the latter claimed began at the age 
of twelve in consequence of being frightened by his sister coming suddenly into a dark 
room dressed in a white sheet.  As for the attacks themselves, Williams maintained he had 
no forewarning, only a rattling noise in his ear that resembled falling water, followed by 
unconsciousness, his neck, breast and abdomen strongly convulsed, his eyes turned 
upwards and an agitation of his whole frame became excessive.  The surgeon knew that 
unless he was able to place an object in the mouth (customarily a spoon), William’s jaw was 
likely to lock up and at the height of the paroxysm he was liable to lacerate his tongue.  
Simpson was keen to document this case in exacting detail as there was a ‘genuine 
sympathy excited in the breasts of all who have ever witnessed his malady.’  The surgeon 
was uncertain how to treat the patient as nothing seemed to suppress the fits.  Eventually 
Williams agreed to a venesection (surgical cutting of a vein) to relieve the symptoms and 
was subsequently returned to duty. 
Atlas: A Case Study85 
A surgeon’s journal also exists from the Atlas which served for a time in the West Indies 
before making her way back to England.  During her time off Santo Domingo, she was 
involved in the naval battle led by Vice Admiral Sir John Thomas Duckworth on the 6 
February 1806.  The men on board Atlas were not badly wounded during the attack; in fact 
they suffered the least aside from Agamemnon who trailed so far behind during the battle 
that she was hardly engaged.  There were two men wounded sufficiently enough to be 
placed on the sick list, the first of them was a 33 year old seamen named Joshua Barton 
who received two deep lacerated wounds on his right arm and shoulder.  One of the 
lacerations, perceived to be caused by a broad sharp splinter, divided his bicep muscle, 
fractured the humerus and destroyed the integuments (protective outer layer) up to the 
highest point of the deltoid (shoulder) muscle.  The other laceration was caused by a 
canister shot which entered under the axilla (armpit) and narrowly missed injuring the 
humeral artery.  Due to a considerable haemorrhage, the surgeon, Jenkin Jones, declined 
performing an operation to amputate the arm.  Instead, Barton was kept on board the ship 
for a week until he was stable enough to be transferred to Port Royal hospital. 
The other seaman injured during the battle was 34 year old Michael Redman.  While he was 
positioned in one of the tops, a musket ball passed through the superior and external part 
of the left thigh and grazed the scrotum leaving him with an inflamed right testicle.  Once 
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he was shot, Redman came down from the top with very little assistance, demonstrating to 
the surgeon that the seaman sustained no injury to the bone, nor had there been a large 
haemorrhage because the bullet’s path missed the principal blood vessels.  The surgeon 
used a tourniquet to compress the artery at the groin in order to suppress any further blood 
loss and eventually sent the patient to Port Royal hospital along with Barton. 
Orpheus: A Case Study86 
For most of the journal, the Orpheus was employed in the North Sea but was then ordered 
to the West Indies in late 1806.  Her surgeon, William Millbank, was forced to treat two 
seamen who were struck by lightning soon after their arrival in the latter.  Both men were 
on deck at the time of the strike and both temporarily lost their vision.  One of the seamen, 
Samuel Gardiner, was unable to open his eyelids and complained of a burning pain.  It took 
him two days to regain the ability to open his eyes and he was returned to duty in five.  The 
other man, Michael Macklaughlin, was not as fortunate.  Aside from losing his sight, he was 
also struck deaf.  He regained vision in his right eye, but was unable to see out of his left 
eye nor did his hearing return.  The surgeon had no choice but to invalid Macklaughlin a 
week and a half later. 
Millbank also treated Henry Sherbic after the latter was bitten by a shark on his foot on the 
24 October 1806.  Sherbic lost a considerable amount of blood during the attack, but was 
fortunate enough to not lose his foot.  The surgeon applied plaster to the severe wound 
and allowed the patient to rest for the night.  He noted Sherbic had minimal pain and a 
healthy appetite the following day, but experienced terrible discomfort over the succeeding 
days.  The journal ended before the fate of Sherbic was established, but if the surgeon’s 
notes were accurate, he felt positive that the suppuration and discharge from the wound 
looked healthy and it was probable the patient returned to duty once the laceration was 
fully healed. 
Conclusion 
Quantitative investigations into the health of seamen on board ships demonstrate that for 
the latter part of the eighteenth century and into the nineteenth century, sickness in the 
West Indies has been largely overestimated in a number of contemporary sources. 87  By 
                                                                 
86 TNA, ADM 101/111/3, Surgeon’s journal from the Orpheus, 29 October 1805 to 29 October 1806. 
87 The use of ‘contemporary sources’ here refers to both publications dating from that time period as well as 
modern-day publications.  As was demonstrated at the beginning of the chapter, esteemed historians such as 
Lloyd and Coulter referred to the West Ind ies as a deadly region while Sir James Watt called it the ‘white 
man’s graveyard’.  Earlier publications, most notably Elliot Arthy’s work in which he aimed to prove some 
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using individual ships’ muster books, data can be extracted allowing for a comprehensive 
survey to be carried out.  Not only do the figures provide the number of men on the sick 
list four times per calendar month, they can also be used to track patterns of mortality.  
Manipulation of that data provides an overall representation of sickness and mortality 
during both war and peace times.  By and large, the average percentage of sick men was 
relatively low and manageable so long as supplies of medicines and fresh food were 
procured by vigilant naval officers.  These figures also demonstrate that, although the 
figures were low, there were some ships which were more susceptible to contracting 
diseases than others.  Ships had the potential to suffer quite severely and in some cases 
individual sickness levels reached 35 per cent while those same ships lost over 50 per cent 
of their crew within a month or two.  Even though a handful of individual ships’ figures are 
high, they are not representative of the overall state of health.  Realistically, most  men 
ordered to serve in the West Indies were not likely to succumb to disease or injury and 
more importantly to the navy they remained well enough to serve the fleet. 
Simply gathering raw sickness and mortality data is not adequate enough to understand the 
role of naval surgeons in the West Indies.  Surgeons’ journals, as sporadic as their existence 
is, put these figures into context.  They describe, sometimes in great detail, both the 
ailments which put seamen on the sick list, but also the treatments surgeons employed to 
return them to active duty.  While they document the typical diseases such as fevers, 
dysenteries and ulcers, they also highlight more unusual cases such as gunshot wounds, 
shark bites and epileptic fits.  These case studies demonstrate application of contemporary 
medical knowledge and the ingenuity of surgeons.  Through their efforts, the majority of 
seamen, even those who suffered incredible injuries or the amputation of limbs, were not 
lost to naval service indefinitely. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
5,000 British seamen perish in the West Indies in order to promote his anti-slavery message, are also guilty of 
overestimating the true impact of naval mortality. 
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Chapter 5 
Surgeons, Physicians and Naval Personnel in the West Indies 
The improved level of health enjoyed by seamen in the West Indies during the latter half of 
the eighteenth century was not solely the result of the levelling off of fever epidemics.1  
Some of the most beneficial improvements were the product of hard work and dedication 
by individuals stationed in the West Indies who ensured all possible strategies were 
employed in order to secure the highest level of health.  As has been discussed previously, 
the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century significantly altered the attitudes of a number 
of naval surgeons.  Many broke away from the Hippocratic and Galenic teachings, instead 
preferring to alter their practices to conform to their own observations and experiences.  
Tröhler is correct in his assertion that these progressive surgeons were ‘motivated by 
humanity and by love for observations of fact.’2  These men went beyond the boundaries 
of their job and were the principal catalysts for sweeping changes in health practices in that 
region.  Efforts to improve health in the West Indies included persistent letter writing to 
officials in London to demand supplies, the purchase of fresh provisions from local 
vendors as well as trialling various medicaments in order to ascertain which were the most 
effective in combating disease.  A great number of their findings were published and 
circulated through the population-at-large.  Some also demanded rigorous cleanliness 
regimes on board ships; the hygiene advances significantly reduced reports of typhus and 
other contagious diseases. 
Notable men who will be investigated in greater detail in this chapter include Dr James 
Lind, Admiral Robert Man, Admiral Sir George Rodney, Sir Gilbert Blane and Dr Leonard 
Gillespie and Dr Thomas Trotter.  So important were the contributions of certain men on 
station, that thirteen years after Blane left naval service he remarked ‘much praise is due 
to...the officers of the navy’ for their hard work in bringing about  crucial changes to the 
health of seamen.3  It is these men who deserve the majority of credit for altering the 
victualling and hygiene practices of seamen which resulted in a substantially healthier fleet 
in the West Indies. 
                                                                 
1 As previously mentioned, the 1770s and 1780s were relatively ‘healthy’ decades as far as yellow fever and 
malaria was concerned.  See Chapter 2 for particulars. 
2 Ulrich Tröhler, ‘Quantification in British Medicine and Surgery 1750-1830, with Special Reference to its 
Introduction into Therapeutics’ (PhD dissertation, University of London, 1978), p. 64.  
3 Gilbert Blane, On the Comparative Health of  the British Navy, f rom the year 1779 to the Year 1814, with Proposals for 
its farther Improvement  (London, 1815) in Christopher Lloyd (ed.), The Health of  Seamen: Selections f rom the Works of  
Dr James Lind, Gilbert Blane and Dr Thomas Trotter, vol 107 (London, 1965), p. 187. 
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Despite overwhelming efforts to create a healthy environment for seamen, not everyone 
who served in the West Indies considered it their duty.  A small number of dubious 
characters, primarily driven by financial motivations, compromised the health of sick 
seamen by cutting corners and failing to procure adequate provisions.  Typically these 
people were employed as agents or contractors who billed the navy for services they did 
not consistently provide.  Particularly during times of war when the Admiralty and 
merchant vessels were unable to ship a regular supply of medicines and necessaries, 
contractors were forced to purchase local provisions which were generally scarce and 
expensive.  Contractors, who were paid per man per day, were unable to afford the inflated 
local rates for necessaries so they simply failed to supply all they had agreed to.  The 
contractor at Antigua during Admiral Man’s command was guilty of operating in such a 
way.  Aside from not securing the goods he was contracted to provide, he also requested to 
relocate the sick seamen into a non-naval approved facility farther inshore despite the 
proposed location being deemed potentially injurious to the men.  Later in the century, 
William Smellie Forbes, who was appointed surgeon of Martinique naval hospital, 
demonstrated his ineptitude which cost a number of invalid seamen their lives.  Despite the 
appalling care of these men, the damage they inflicted was minor compared to the 
exceptional work carried out by their counterparts. 
James Lind 
Referred to as the ‘father of nautical medicine’ by Thomas Trotter, James Lind is the most 
recognized name in naval medicine.  There are a number of references to Lind in books, 
articles and television documentaries all of which deliver an opinion as to whether or not 
he was the pivotal figure in the suppression of scurvy in the navy.  The tendency seems to 
be that the older the source, the greater the admiration for Lind, while more contemporary 
sources strip away a certain amount of credit for his publications on scurvy.4  While older 
sources describe a man who worked diligently to find a cure for scurvy only to find 
unreasonable bureaucrats dismissing his ideas, the newer sources reduce Lind’s work to 
                                                                 
4 For references to Lind finding a cure for scurvy then largely ignored see Michael Duffy, ‘The Foundations 
of British Naval Power’ in The Military Revolution and the State 1500-1800, vol 1 (Exeter: University of Exeter, 
1980):  Louis H. Roddis, A Short History of  Nautical Medicine (New York: Paul B. Hoeber, 1941):  Christopher 
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Harrison, Medicine in an Age of  Commerce and Empire: Britain and its Tropical Colonies, 1660-1830 (Oxford: Oxford 
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trial-and-error (although mainly error).  In between those two extremes lie a number of 
alternative versions, most giving credit to Lind for performing his trial on board the 
Salisbury, however, due to a lack of confidence in his findings, was unable to convince the 
Sick and Hurt Board of his results.  Julian de Zulueta takes a impartial view claiming Lind 
‘had experimentally shown the extraordinary effects of lemons and oranges against scurvy 
as early at 1753 [but] it took nearly half a century before the regular issue of lemon juice 
became a general practice in the English Navy.’5  Zulueta’s remarks report the facts from 
Lind’s experiment as well as the period when the Admiralty approved the use of citrus fruit 
as a preventative for scurvy.  At no time does the author suggest Lind’s experiment 
influenced the Admiralty’s decision to distribute lemon juice in the 1790s.6  No matter what 
the researcher’s opinion on Lind’s understanding of lemon juice as a cure, it may be said 
that his contributions during his naval career, which spanned a half century, influenced the 
practices of the physicians and surgeons in His Majesty’s service. 
James Lind was born on the 4 October 1716 in Edinburgh and was the second child and 
first son of a well-to-do family of middle class merchants.  He was well-educated from a 
young age and his interest in medicine may have been sparked by his uncle who was a 
physician.  In 1731, at the age of fifteen, Lind went to study as an apprentice for George 
Bush Langlands, the latter being a Fellow of the Incorporation of Surgeons (the 
predecessor to the Royal College of Surgeons in Edinburgh).  It is not clear how long Lind 
remained in his apprenticeship, but at the beginning of the War of Jenkins’ Ear, Lind 
travelled to London, passed the exam at Surgeons’ Hall and entered naval service as a 
surgeon’s mate.  He was initially posted to the Mediterranean, then to Guinea and finally 
the West Indies.  After eight years of service as a surgeon’s mate, Lind took the exam to 
become a surgeon and following his successful examination, was promoted to surgeon of 
the Salisbury serving in the Channel Fleet.7 
It was on board this ship that he carried out his famous scurvy experiment.  The 
experiment consisted of selecting twelve crew members suffering from scurvy and divided 
them up into six pairs.  When selecting the men, Lind opted for those with conditions as 
similar to one another as possible.  According to him, all twelve had ‘general putrid gums, 
                                                                 
5 Julian de Zulueta, ‘Trafalgar – The Spanish View’ in Mariner’s Mirror, vol 66 (1980), p. 298. 
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7 See Louis H. Roddis, James Lind, Founder of  Nautical Medicine (London: Heinemann Medical Books, 1951):  
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the spots and lassitude, with weakness of their knees.’8  His idea was to treat each pair with 
different remedies and gauge the efficacy of each treatment.  As a standard, each pair was 
given a sweetened water-gruel for breakfast, mutton soup or a boiled biscuit with sugar for 
dinner and barley, rice or sago with currants and raisins for supper.  In addition, the first 
pair received a quart of cider to drink, the second pair received elixir of vitriol, the third 
were given two spoonfuls of vinegar three times a day, the fourth were made to drink 
seawater, the fifth dosed with an elixir of garlic, mustard seed, horseradish, balsam of Peru 
and myrrh and the final pair given oranges and lemons.  Lind found the final pair 
recovered quickest and were able to return to duty in the shortest time.  This experiment 
carried out by Lind on board the Salisbury is considered by many to be the ‘first classic 
therapeutic trial’ in history.9 
The War of Jenkins’ Ear was over, meaning there was a significant reduction in manning in 
the navy.  Lind left naval service following his trial on board the Salisbury.  His departure 
from shipboard service was voluntary and as was the case with other naval surgeons during 
peacetime, Lind was placed on half pay.  He chose to return to Edinburgh to study for his 
medical degree; and, perhaps unexpectedly, his thesis concentrated on the review of 
venereal lesions.  Once Lind completed his degree, he was elected a Fellow of the Royal 
College in 1750 and served as its Treasurer from 1756.  He also became a member of the 
Philosophical and Medical Society of Edinburgh (later the Royal Society of Edinburgh).   
Lind remained on half pay during this time, although the bulk of his income was earned in 
private practice.  Aside from that, he published his research on scurvy in his Treatise of the 
Scurvy which stressed the details of his trial and results from the Salisbury.10  During Lind’s 
lifetime, the book ran to three editions in English and was translated into French, German 
and Italian.  One of his inspirations for penning the treatise, aside from his own 
experiences, was the appalling mortality in the navy, particularly the high level suffered on 
Anson’s voyage round the world in the early 1740s.  Lind even dedicated his discourse to 
Anson.11  In Lind’s book, he recommended using a rob (a boiled concentrate) of lemons or 
oranges to prevent and treat scurvy.  Ventilation, he considered, was key to keeping scurvy 
at bay by dispelling noxious airs, one of the believed causes of the disease in the eighteenth 
century.  The other believed cause was the seamen’s diet .  Surgeons supposed that the large 
quantities of salted meat served daily to men over extended periods of time wore down 
                                                                 
8 J.B. Hattendorf, R.J.B. Knight, A.W.H. Pearsall, N.A.M. Rodger and Geoffrey Till (eds.), British Naval 
Documents 1204-1960, vol 131 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1993), p. 523. 
9 Roy Porter, Blood & Guts: A Short History of  Medicine (London: Penguin, 2003), p. 94. 
10 James Lind, Treatise of  the Scurvy (Edinburgh, 1753), unpaginated. 
11 Lord Anson was made First Lord of the Admiralty in June 1751 and Lind’s connection with Anson while 
the latter was in that position of authority would later pay off for the surgeon. 
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their constitutions.  To alleviate the bad effects from the salted provisions, Lind 
recommended supplying fresh green vegetables as often as they could be procured. 
All of Lind’s ideas, although competent suggestions for improving seamen’s immune 
systems, were incapable of suppressing scurvy in the fleet.  Despite the nourishing 
properties of the proposed citrus fruit, once the juice had been boiled down into a rob as 
Lind suggested, the proportion of vitamin C reduced substantially rendering it almost 
useless in combating scurvy.  His proposal for the supply of green vegetables could have 
worked, although regular procurement of these items in regions, especially those which 
suffered from hard winters like Scotland and Newfoundland, could prove difficult and 
extremely expensive to the service.  He also appears to have altered his opinion on the 
cause of scurvy from the first edition of his Treatise to the third.  Initially attributing the 
disease to moisture, differing beliefs emerged in later editions which ascribed it to several 
causes and found it to occur most predominantly among the ‘lazy and indolent’.12 
There is no record to suggest how Lind’s Treatise reached either the Admiralty or the Sick 
and Hurt Board for critical examination, but it is almost certain that Lind forwarded a copy 
directly to Lord Anson (then First Lord of the Admiralty).  At the time, members of the 
Admiralty and the Sick and Hurt Board were retired naval personnel and administrative 
men, neither of which would have been able to determine, to any degree of medical 
certainty, if Lind’s Treatise proposals would prove successful.  As was customary at the time, 
medical opinions were sought from outside institutions including the Royal College of 
Physicians and the Society of Apothecaries.  Lind’s Treatise was forwarded to external 
medical persons for review and comment.13  As none of the independent reviewers were 
able to come to some common opinion, coupled with the potential expenditure to supply 
naval seamen with fresh provisions or the rob of oranges and lemons, meant that Lind’s 
proposals in his Treatise were largely ignored at that time. 
Despite the snub to his Treatise by naval authority, there were those who acknowledged the 
gravitas of his work.  Lawrence suggests that Lind’s writings regarding scurvy were not 
influential for the treatments they proposed, he maintains when surgeons and physicians 
cited Lind when discussing the disease, they invoked ‘the undisputed authority, the best 
possible ally.’14  Lind ‘could be cited without any danger of political censure’, moreover his 
‘work was quoted by every eighteenth-century author on scurvy to justify his own 
                                                                 
12 Lawrence, ‘Disciplining Disease’, p. 84. 
13 Refer to Chapter 3 for full details of the comments made regarding Lind’s proposals.  
14 Lawrence, ‘Disciplining Disease’, p. 84. 
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viewpoint.’  The influence that Lind possessed over naval surgeons was great  with his 
works often quoted by Blane, Robertson, Trotter and Gillespie. 
Aside from his association with scurvy, Lind’s dedication to treating other disorders 
affecting seagoing men and his attention to hygiene and cleanliness are often overlooked.  
In 1757, he turned his focus away from scurvy and published his second book entitled An 
Essay on the Most Effectual Means of Preserving the Health of Seamen .  Three editions of this 
valuable and well-received book were published; the second in 1762 and the third in 1779.  
Lind tackled the problems for treating a variety of diseases and ailments in this particular 
publication.  Methods for treating scurvy were included, but he mainly concentrated on 
other shipboard dangers such as drowning, suffocation by noxious vapours from the bilge, 
lightning strikes and seamen working in wet clothes which were liable to result in ulcers.  
His progressive views on diseases in this particular book focused on preventative medicine, 
not curative.  However, the main principals Lind conveyed in this book centred round 
levels of cleanliness which he believed were necessary to suppress the majority of sea 
diseases on board.  He presented theories on the connection between the seamen’s 
environment and the occurrence of illnesses on board ships.  Lind maintained that 
‘filthiness [was] a chief source of infection and cleanliness an excellent preservative .’15  
According to Lind, new naval recruits, including imprest men, would benefit from passing 
through a reception ship where they would receive: 
...slops, shirts, bedding, and all the necessary articles of seamen’s apparel; 
with soap, tubs, and proper conveniences for bathing, and with a room 
upon deck for fumigating of clothes.  Every suspected person, whether 
imprest at sea, or on shore should be first put on board of her; their stay, 
however, should be short, as soon as they are stripped of their rags, well 
washed and cleaned, they should be supplied with new clothes and 
bedding, and be sent on board the receiving guardships.  Such of their 
apparel as appears tolerably good ought to be cleaned, or, if necessary, 
fumigated with brimstone and returned to them; but it will be absolutely 
necessary to destroy all filthy rags.16 
Lind’s opinion on the method for treating new recruits in this manner spilled over to his 
later work at Haslar hospital and the admittance of its patients. 
After publishing both his Treatise of the Scurvy and his Essay on the Most Effectual Means of 
Preserving the Health of Seamen Lind had earned the respect of both the Admiralty and the 
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Sick and Hurt Board.  On that basis was selected, at the instigation of Lord Anson, the first 
physician of the newly-built Haslar hospital in Gosport; an esteemed and influential 
position.  The hospital was the largest to date in England, and in fact was the largest in 
Europe.  For Lind to be given such a prestigious post, it is almost certain that his 
unremitting dedication to the prevention and cure of diseases had made an impression on 
members of the Admiralty.  Lind’s appointment to serve as physician commenced on the 
25 May 1758 at a pleasing salary of £200 per annum.17 
Lind’s theory that bad air was the trigger of most diseases influenced his management of 
Haslar where he imposed a strict hygiene regimen.  He required all incoming patients to 
remove their dirty clothing and bathe with warm water and soap.  Until their own clothes 
were laundered, the new patients were issued clean hospital dress.  Their bedding and 
clothing were not allowed into the hospital; there was an outhouse for the purpose of 
storing these items until such time as they could be laundered.18  The sick seamen were also 
quarantined in an area of the hospital to be sure they did not infect existing patients.  Lind’s 
approach for accepting patients was revolutionary and Haslar was one of the first hospitals, 
naval or otherwise, to employ such stringent regulations.   The procedure was time 
consuming and rigorous; however the end result was that Lind managed to keep recovery 
times short and, more importantly, men were able to return to active service. 19  In the third 
edition of his Treatise, he inserted the notes from his routine and meticulous observations 
among the sick of Haslar.  Lind kept records of all his patients; using these records he was 
able to compile accurate documentation of the scurvy cases he treated as well as a host of 
other complaints.20 
In addition to serving as Haslar’s physician, Lind published his last work in 1768 entitled 
Essay on Disease Incidental to Europeans in Hot Climates, with the Method of Preventing their fatal 
Consequences.  This book ran to six editions before its last printing in England in 1806, 
although it continued to be printed in America.  This was the first major British work on 
diseases of hot climates and, as with his other two publications, this volume contained 
indispensable advice for Europeans (including seamen) who anticipated travelling to the 
tropical colonies.  Lind evaluated different islands in the West Indies, noting that the 
healthiest island was Barbados, followed by St Kitts.21  Most damning were his opinions of 
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the airs of Antigua and Jamaica, the former was ‘bad’ while the latter was ‘reckoned still 
more unhealthy, though much less so than it formerly was’.  His narrative included telltale 
signs that the ‘sickly season’ was fast approaching and how Europeans who had not yet 
‘seasoned’ themselves to the environment could effectively preserve their health.  He noted 
ways to combat the bloody flux and the tertian remitting fever (malaria) by administering a 
quantity of Peruvian Bark which was ‘the only and most effectual remedy.’22  In fact, Lind 
was one of the first naval surgeons to recommend this successful treatment to the 
Admiralty and remarked that during the rainy season it worked with particular success.  He 
learned of the treatment while serving off the coast of Guinea where he witnessed the 
African Company sending quantities of the medicine to their settlements as a preventative.  
Lind considered bloody fluxes and all fevers to be caused by air vitiated with diseases; he 
recommended that linens, bedding and other articles belonging to sick men, which 
propagated infections, be cleaned on a regular basis.  If the precautions and cures Lind 
suggested in his book were heeded by persons travelling to tropical climates, they certainly 
would have experienced positive effects and reduced exposure to a number of maladies.  
The publication became one of the most fundamental works in the eighteenth century and 
stood as a standard work of reference for half a century.23 
Trotter was right to refer to Lind as the ‘father of the nautical medicine ,’ not because the 
latter was involved with stamping out scurvy in the navy, but because he set in motion a 
medical revolution that vastly improved the health of seamen in a span of fifty years.  Sir 
James Watt described Lind’s trio of publications as a ‘compendium of naval preventative 
medicine argued from sound principles’ which contained germane observations and 
suggestions.24  Aside from the points raised in his publications, during his lifetime Lind also 
advocated the distillation of sea water and even engineered his own purifying machine.  In 
addition he formulated an emergency ration of powdered meal and dehydrated soup and, 
to improve morale, he recommended seamen be issued with uniforms with a badge 
embroidered with the name of their ship.  Through his dedication and efforts, Lind 
effectively suppressed typhus, introduced better ventilation, regular bathing and clean 
clothing.  His progressive work eventually led to the establishment of depot ships used for 
quarantine and receiving ships for new recruits.   Most of these efforts carried over to his 
tenure as physician at Haslar which he held until 1783 when he retired at the age of sixty-
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22 NMM, ADM/E/13, James Lind to Admiralty, 28 February 1754. 
23 Harrison, Medicine in an Age of  Commerce, p. 72. 
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seven.  After retirement, Lind remained in Gosport, not too far from the hospital he so 
vigilantly superintended for twenty-five years, until his death in July 1794 at the age of 
seventy-seven. 
Rear Admiral Robert Man 
One of the more overlooked health advocates in the West Indies is Rear Admiral Robert 
Man.  He was ordered to the Leeward Islands in 1769 where he served for three years.  
Man’s contributions to the health of seamen principally involved his efforts in establishing 
a permanent naval hospital in Antigua.  When Man arrived at English Harbour he found 
the dockyard in a deplorable state with wharves falling down, shipwrecks in the harbour 
and the depth of the water reduced by the amount of silt that had been allowed to build 
up.25  Man was, at least, pleased with the state of the rented naval hospital which was 
located near to the dockyard.  Fortunately for the Rear Admiral, the seamen belonging to 
his squadron were healthy enough upon their arrival at Antigua so not many required 
medical attention in hospital.  Man submitted figures to the Admiralty in August 1769 to 
testify to the ships’ healthy dispositions as well as figures relating to the number of seamen 
and marines in hospital (Table 5.1). 
Ship Name Whole 
complement 
Complement Borne Mustered Widows 
Men 
Sick on 
Board 
Sick on 
Shore 
Montague 300 243 243 236 6 0 0 
Jason 180 140 141 132 4 0 5 
Squirrel 120 96 103 98 2 2 2 
Scarborough 120 96 104 99 2 15 3 
Vulture 90 66 83 76 2 0 3 
Total 810 641 674 641 16 17 13 
State of Ships English Harbour, Antigua 24 August 1769 
Ship Name Quality Number Ill Very Ill Recovering 
Jason 
Seamen 4 1 1 2 
Marines     
Squirrel 
Seamen 2 1 1  
Marines     
Vulture 
Seamen 3 2  1 
Marines 1   1 
Lynx 
Seamen 3 1 1 1 
Marines     
Kinsale Hulk 
Seamen 1 1   
Marines     
Total  14 6 3 5 
State and condition of His Majesty’s Hospital at Antigua 24 August 1769 
Table 5.1 – Rear Admirals Sickness Figures from English Harbour 24 August 196926 
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At the time of writing, there were seventeen men sick on board ships at English Harbour 
and thirteen in hospital out of a total of 674.27  That meant only 4 per cent of the men at 
that location were unavailable for active service.  The hospital had very few men, a third of 
which were listed as ‘recovering’ and presumably would return to their ships once their 
health was restored.  Man’s squadron did not remain free from illness for much longer; the 
‘sickly season’ was fast approaching and fever outbreaks were imminent.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the ‘sickly season’ in the West Indies ran roughly 
from August to December.  Well aware of the sickly season, the Admiralty preferred to 
send ships earlier in the year to ensure their arrival much in advance of the inevitable rainy 
months allowing men to acclimatise to their new environment.  It was generally supposed 
that only after a year or so of being in the tropics, Europeans could become ‘seasoned’ to 
the environment and had a better chance to remain healthy. 28  If the navy positioned their 
men in the West Indies well in advance of the sickly season, they believed a number of the 
seamen would become ‘seasoned’ and therefore less susceptible to fevers.  Due to contrary 
winds, Man’s flagship, the Montagu was delayed at Plymouth and the fleet did not reach 
Antigua until August of that year, meaning the freshly-arrived men were immediately 
exposed to the unhealthiest season in the West Indies.  Between the time of their arrival 
and December 1769, the master, surgeon, fourteen seamen, the lieutenant of marines and 
eleven marines died on board his flagship.  Man’s ship appeared to have endured the worst 
as the other ships that arrived with him suffered the death of only twelve seamen and two 
marines.  When Man wrote to the Admiralty in December, he claimed there were over 100 
men on shore at the hospital, although at one point there were 125 men requiring medical 
attention.29  Because Man’s ship suffered so severely and since he found the entire naval 
infrastructure at English Harbour deplorable, he made it his goal to improve all aspects of 
the base. 
So bad was the health on shore at Antigua that Man was obliged to write to the Admiralty 
in January 1770 to report the death of Andrew Manderstone, the surgeon at Antigua 
hospital.  Man selected William Coltart as his replacement based on the latter’s experience 
with ‘diseases incident to this country’ and because he was the oldest surgeon on the 
station.30  Once appointed, Coltart and Man enjoyed a good working relationship, often 
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exchanging letters on the state of men on shore.  Man respected Coltart’s abi lities and 
made it his priority to address grievances about the hospital arrangements noted by the 
surgeon.  The surgeon’s complaints were generally about the contractor, Mr Grant, who 
was hired to supply the sick men with a range of necessaries and victuals.31  Because of 
Grant’s incompetent handling of the hospital victualling contract, Man was forced to step 
in on more than one occasion to ensure the seamen’s health was not placed in jeopardy.  In 
Man’s first grievance to the Sick and Hurt Board about Grant’s management, he made his 
first of many appeals to purchase the hospital building which was currently rented for the 
purpose of housing the sick men.32  The contractor was determined to relocate the patients 
from Antigua hospital to an alternative facility some distance away from English Harbour 
dockyard because it was more cost effective for him.  The Rear Admiral was not pleased by 
this proposal and took up the lease of the existing hospital on behalf of the Crown rather 
than putting the men’s lives in danger by relocating them. 33  Within a two-month period, 
Man wrote three separate letters to the Sick and Hurt Board, an exceptionally high number 
considering the first letter was not likely to have reached the Board in that short time.  The 
Board did respond to Man, although they refrained from including any instruction on all 
matters pertaining to the state of the hospital.34 
Undeterred by the lack of concern demonstrated by the Board, Man continued to criticise 
the hospital’s contractor.  Having been forced to take up a temporary contract with the 
proprietor of the Antigua hospital on behalf of the Crown, Man expected to hear from 
London on how to proceed once that temporary contract expired.35  Despite not receiving 
instructions from either the Admiralty or the Sick and Hurt Board, Man continued to 
exhibit an extraordinary amount of concern for the naval hospital.  With no instructions at 
his disposal, Man took all necessary actions to ensure the health of the patients was not 
compromised in any way.  This involved extending the lease with the building’s proprietor 
on more than one occasion for the next two years on behalf of the Crown and securing any 
necessaries when required. 
Man realised the hospital situation could not carry on that way for much longer.  He 
believed that it was necessary to either purchase the rented building outright from the 
proprietor or the navy would have to erect their own facility.  Anticipating the Admiralty’s 
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instructions, Man personally investigated ‘what fit places may be had and upon what terms’ 
in order for the Crown to erect their own hospital in the vicinity of English Harbour.36  He 
carried out reconnaissance work on a number of locations and, to some extent, advised on 
the financial implications of purchasing certain tracts of land in and around English 
Harbour.  Once his survey was completed, Man reported his findings to the Sick and Hurt 
Board and indicated that whatever their decision concerning the possible erection of a 
hospital, they could be certain of him ‘giving it all the assistance that depends upon me .’37  
His willingness to inspect areas and to make himself available to the Board whenever a 
decision was handed down reveals Man’s enormous commitment to the health of seamen 
at Antigua. 
Had Rear Admiral Man not been ordered to the West Indies in 1769, it is uncertain what 
events would have transpired with regard to the Antigua naval hospital.  The proactive 
approach he took with both the Admiralty and the Sick and Hurt Board is something to be 
commended.  If the contractor was permitted to remove the hospital patients to an unsafe 
location a reasonable distance from English Harbour dockyard, it is unknown how those 
men would have fared and if the mortality rates would have increased.  Man did, of course, 
have the benefit of being commander-in-chief during a period of peace, meaning his 
routine duties were not as demanding as those placed on admirals during war time.  
Regardless of the reduced burdens, Man took his responsibility for ensuring the health of 
seamen in the Leeward Islands very seriously and undoubtedly saved many lives through 
his unremitting dedication. 
Admiral Sir George Rodney & Sir Gilbert Blane 
As with James Lind, much has been written about the careers of Admiral Sir George 
Rodney and Sir Gilbert Blane.  Although their lives were only briefly intertwined in naval 
service, their partnership in the West Indies resulted in sweeping changes to health and 
hygiene practices.  During their tropical service, the English were embroiled in a major war 
with both the rebellious American colonies and their French ally.  This meant the number 
of men stationed in the West Indies was extremely high with the potential for sickness to 
overwhelm the squadron and render it virtually useless.  The individual backgrounds of the 
two men will be discussed separately including how they came to naval service, followed by 
a summary of their time working together in the West Indies and finally their subsequent 
careers. 
                                                                 
36 TNA, ADM 97/86, Rear Admiral Man to Sick and Hurt, 20 December 1770. 
37 Ibid. 
182 
***** 
George Rodney entered naval service in July 1732 and was quickly promoted to the rank of 
midshipman.  In 1738, Rodney sailed for Newfoundland on fisheries protection duties 
which was the first time he was exposed to such a lengthy voyage and the effects of scurvy 
on the ship’s company.  After he returned to England, he was eventually promoted to 
captain and, in 1749, he was once again ordered to Newfoundland on fishery protection 
duty.  Since he was aware of the dire effects of the lengthy voyage as well as the 
inhospitable climate of that location during the winter months from his previous service, 
Rodney built a hospital and created a market garden to supply fresh vegetables to his 
men.38  His time spent in Newfoundland provides the first impression of how concerned 
Rodney was with the health of the seamen.  Following his service in Newfoundland, he was 
ordered to various regions during the Seven Years’ War and was promoted to Rear Admiral 
in 1759.  He was first sent out to the West Indies two years later when he was appointed 
Commander-in-Chief of the Leeward Islands station with orders to attack the lucrative 
French-held island of Martinique.  Although Rodney had already witnessed the ravages of 
some diseases such as scurvy and typhus, his service in the West Indies exposed him to a 
number of new illnesses including yellow fever and malaria.  The negative effects that these 
tropical illnesses had on the West Indies squadrons remained in Rodney’s mind and 
influenced his instructions on future stays in that region. 
Once the war was over and Rodney was back in England, he attempted to run in the 1768 
general election and, in doing so, exhausted a great deal of his earnings.  That, coupled with 
his growing gambling debts, placed Rodney in serious financial difficulty.  When the 
opportunity arose for him to remove himself from England and escape his debts, he gladly 
accepted the position of Commander-in-Chief of Jamaica in 1771 where he remained until 
1774.  Yet again he was exposed to the devastation of tropical diseases.  The debt problems 
Rodney left in England before sailing for Jamaica were waiting for him upon his return.  
Faced with these extensive financial problems, Rodney applied for a leave of absence from 
the navy and took his family to France where he remained until 1778.  When the effects of 
the American War of Independence reached France, he returned to England after a deal 
was struck between Rodney and the Navy Board to clear his debts.  He took up an 
appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Leeward Islands station in 1779 and it was at 
that point where Rodney was joined by Gilbert Blane. 
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***** 
Sir Gilbert Blane was born on the 29 August 1749 at Blanefield, Ayrshire.  His birth into a 
wealthy merchant family allowed Blane to attend Kirkoswald and Maybole schools, both 
prestigious institutions, before he enrolled at the University of Edinburgh, known for 
producing a number of esteemed medical men.  It was not Blane’s intention to enter the 
medical profession when he enrolled in university; his plan was to study for a career in the 
church.  It is unclear why, after five years of art and religious studies, Blane switched his 
course of study to medicine.  He received his MD from the University of Glasgow in 1778, 
where he was fortunate enough to study under William Cullen, who subsequently 
introduced him to William Hunter in London.39  Blane’s contact with Hunter eventually led 
to the recommendation of the young doctor to Admiral George Brydges Rodney.  On 
Hunter’s suggestion, Rodney agreed to employ Blane as his personal physician and took 
him out to the West Indies in 1779 on board the Sandwich as the former suffered severely 
from gout and was something of a hypochondriac.40  The physician proved to be a valuable 
member of the ship’s company and often went above and beyond his normal duties when 
required.  Rodney quickly recognised Blane’s efforts both as a member of the ship’s 
company and also his ability as a man of medicine.  Unlike most medical men serving in the 
navy, Blane was not content to serve below deck during battle; he made himself available 
on deck carrying with him a supply of tourniquets in order to quickly suppress bleeding 
and attended the wounded men in the place they fell as to reduce the amount of stress 
ordinarily experienced by moving them to the orlop deck.  To reward him for these 
positive attributes, Rodney appointed Blane Physician of the Fleet in April 1780.41  He 
accepted Rodney’s appointment but insisted he be placed on a similar rank as army 
physicians and to be allowed a suitable share of prize money. 
Serving in this capacity, Blane, with Rodney’s full support, was able to advance the health 
of the fleet in a short period of time by introducing a number of medical and hygiene 
reforms.  According to J.D. Spinney, the partnership was so successful that, ‘never before 
had any British fleet a better health record - thanks to Rodney and Doctor Blane.’42  The 
close relationship with Rodney afforded the physician a great deal of leverage when it came 
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time to compel captains and surgeons of the fleet to follow his new orders.  As 
commander-in-chief of a vital fleet during a crucial war, Rodney knew the benefits of 
keeping his men healthy and prepared for battle and he was all too aware of how tropical 
diseases had the potential to devastate a squadron. 
Upon his appointment as physician, Blane was allowed autonomy to treat the men as he 
saw fit and was ordered to report any necessary actions directly to Rodney, the Sick and 
Hurt Board and the Admiralty.43  So determined was Blane to monitor the well-being of 
every ship, that he demanded each ship’s surgeon submit a report on the state of health on 
a recurring basis.  His request was groundbreaking in that this was one of the first instances 
that regular reports were generated and forwarded to a medical man on station who was 
positioned solely to oversee health concerns.  Blane believed that by collecting the data he 
would ‘be able to form some judgement of the comparative state of sickness at different 
times, and of the success of the means to be employed in preserving health.’44  Once the 
reports were compiled, Blane determined they would provide the Admiralty with sufficient 
data to revise the instructions for naval surgeons ‘that [were] best adapted to the situation 
of the fleet.’45  Here again, Blane is remarkably progressive in terms of the navy’s standard 
medical practice.  His advice to compile data and then use that information to alter 
guidelines issued to naval surgeons demonstrated an uncommon attempt at preventative 
care. 
Reforms in the medicine were not solely instigated by Blane.  Rodney was especially 
distressed by the lack of cleanliness and hygiene throughout the navy.  He believed that 
captains would benefit from implementing stricter levels of discipline and keeping their 
ships as clean as possible.  He observed that if every: 
care is taken to keep the ship sweet and clean, particularly in the hold 
and orlop, where she is properly ventilated by wind sails, and keeping the 
ports open, where the seamen are kept clean and neat in their persons, 
their bedding clean and properly aired, their work, when possible, 
restricted within proper hours, the crew is [more] healthy. 46 
Knowing how important it was to be well-equipped with certain necessaries in the West 
Indies, Rodney wrote to the Admiralty requesting a quantity of portable soup and the 
essence of spruce, both crucial to the navy’s system of treating sick men, since both items 
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had been omitted from his cargo when he sailed from Portsmouth in 1780. 47  The other 
item Rodney demanded was fresh provisions for sick men.  He insisted that if he was 
unable to obtain orders from London to authorise the purchase of fresh provisions, he 
would procure them on his own and submit the bills to the Admiralty for reimbursement.  
In May 1782, he was forced to authorise the purchase of fresh beef and other refreshments 
for the use of the sick because the navy’s administration failed to agree to his demands.  
Rodney directed the Formidable’s purser to be in charge of procuring and overseeing the 
distribution because the victualling contractor in the Leeward Islands refused to do it 
because it went against general orders.48  Throughout his time on the station, Rodney 
continued to write to the Admiralty requesting medicines and necessaries to be sent from 
England rather than having to procure those items locally at a higher price.  He claimed, 
‘some of the most fatal diseases of that climate [arose] from the want of fruit and fresh 
diet’ which could be ‘prevented and cured by such an allowance of Peruvian Bark as is 
provided for HM’s ships serving on the Coast of Africa .’49 
Blane took an unorthodox approach when he too wrote directly to the Sick and Hurt 
Board because he considered the situation of the Leeward Island’s squadron warranted it.  
In his letter of July 1780, he indicated to the Board that he was accumulating monthly 
sickness returns from each ship of the squadron and intended to use these returns to ‘form 
some judgement of the comparative state of sickness at different times, and of the success 
of the means to be employed in preserving health.’50  He believed that the figures should be 
complied by the Sick and Hurt Board on a regular basis and used to better calculate the 
distribution of medicines and necessaries in advance.  Blane described the plight of 
surgeons and their inability to afford the inflated costs of medicines when the Board failed 
to send regular supplies.51  Even those surgeons who arranged for a repeated supply of 
medicines from home by a private commission rather than procuring them locally were 
gambling on account of the distance, risks and credit necessary to do so.  The most useful 
medication, the Peruvian Bark, never retailed for less than 30 shillings per pound in the 
West Indies, a great sum of money to surgeons whose wages were six shillings and eight 
pence per man per cure.52 
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Six months after Blane arrived in the West Indies he printed, at his own expense, A Short 
Account of the Most Effectual Means of Preserving the Health of Seamen .  He drew largely on his 
experiences in that region and specifically addressed issues of hygiene and victualling.  In it, 
he stressed that the prevention of disease was just as important as curing them.  Blane, 
echoing Rodney’s opinion, endeavoured to make captains and officers more culpable for 
the health of their men by suggesting that if discipline on each ship was enforced to a 
greater degree, it would ‘extirpate diseases from the navy.’53  The three most fatal diseases 
Blane witnessed firsthand in the West Indies, fevers, fluxes and scurvy, would be better 
managed if authority figures were prepared to implement these stronger regulations. 
Blane’s book was well-received and distributed to all captains and surgeons in the Leeward 
Island’s squadron.  He also continued to prove to Rodney he was competent in his role, so 
much so that Rodney recommended he be made a Commissioner of the Sick and Hurt 
Board who would be permanently stationed in the Leeward Islands.  Rodney observed that 
the Navy Board had a commissioner posted at Antigua dockyard, but ‘there [was] another 
department equally important in that unhealthy climate namely that of the Sick and 
Wounded’ and all his ‘time and attention being employed in the other arrangements also of 
so great a fleet, as well as the general objects of war, I had no leisure to manage and settle 
the particulars referred to me.’54  Rodney maintained the attention he provided to this 
branch of service during the war was not adequate enough to sustain his squadron.  His 
recommendation for Blane to take on the responsibility was based on the latter’s ‘past 
conduct in the medical part, and his knowledge and experience of the station’  which made 
him ‘fit...above any other person for conducting the whole branch.’  While the Sick and 
Hurt Board felt Rodney’s suggestion held merit, the Admiralty disagreed and the position 
was not established.55 
When Blane sailed home with Rodney for the recovery of the latter’s health in August 
1781, he reported the state of the Leeward Island’s squadron to the Admiralty as well as 
sending a formal proposal recommending changes to current health practices.56  To 
convince the Admiralty that changes were requisite, he presented mortality figures from the 
West Indies fleet from July 1780 to July 1781.  According to Blane’s data, a total of 715 
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seamen died on board ships, of which only fifty-nine died during battle or from wounds 
suffered in battle while a further 862 died in naval hospitals on shore during the same 
period of time.  Of the 12,109 men needed to man twenty ships of the line, 1,577 of them 
perished largely due to disease.  A further 350 were sent back to England as invalids during 
this period and most of them were never again fit for service. 57  Blane’s first formal 
proposal for changes to the system of medical care was to establish a clear-cut set of rules 
to create uniformity in cleanliness among seamen and to make ships sanitary and dry.58  To 
this point the Sick and Hurt Board, to whom the proposals had been referred by the 
Admiralty, felt the navy was currently performing that task much better than other 
countries and therefore no further regulations should be added.  Blane’s second request 
was for the navy to supply fruit and vegetables for the prevention and cure of scurvy, 
which the Board was appeared eager to enact.  Points three and four referred to the 
distribution of medicines and necessaries to surgeons; specifically he appealed for the 
supply of free medicines to be increased.  Blane insisted that additional quantities of 
Peruvian Bark in particular would enhance the care provided by surgeons in an area where 
‘medicines are exorbitantly dear, and often unsound.’59  The Board responded that 
medicines had already been ordered to the West Indies and were to be sold to the surgeons 
at the same price as they are sold in England, and they would not authorise the distribution 
of more free medicines.60 
Addressing the level of sickness and mortality on board ships-of-the-line, according to 
Rodney, was not the only solution for keeping them properly manned.  Desertion plagued 
the West Indies squadrons and at times proved more destructive than illness.  Sending 
parties ashore on wooding, watering and provisioning duties was always a risk.  Most 
commanders-in-chief expressed concern to the Admiralty at one point or another about 
the level of desertion experienced abroad.  To combat the problem, Rodney and Blane 
took additional precautions to ensure the men sent on shore were returned to their ships.  
At St Lucia, in particular, Rodney relocated the temporary sick quarters from the town of 
Gros Islet to permanent facilities on nearby Pigeon Island.61  Moving the men to the 
isolated location meant the local population was not exposed to diseases, the seamen were 
not tempted by the rum houses and convalescing seamen were not able to desert so easily. 
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Rodney and Blane’s hard work and dedication paid off.  In 1782, when the fleet consisted 
of forty ships-of-the-line with crews numbering nearly 24,000, Blane reported there were 
only 350 deaths from disease in six months and no more than 1,000 men were sent to 
hospital.62  If these figures seem high, one only has to compare them to the figures 
reported by Blane a year earlier when nearly 800 died in a fleet half the size! 
Some of the biggest tests that Rodney and Blane faced were the engagements with the 
French fleet, most famously the Battle of the Saintes.  Blane’s measures for reducing 
sickness and mortality had been so successful that of the thirty-six ships-of-the-line present 
at that battle on the 12 April 1782, ‘every ship, except two, might be said to be healthy .’63  
In his book, N.A.M. Rodger considered the men in attendance at the Battle of the Saintes 
to ‘have been the healthiest body of British subjects in the world.’64  That was an incredible 
feat given the medical knowledge of the day.  The British suffered significantly less than the 
French, with Blane reporting the total number of men killed at 234 and the number of 
wounded at 789.65  Although their dead and wounded numbers were never published, 
Blane estimated the Ville de Paris, de Grasse’s flagship, lost 300 men.  Considering there 
were 5,400 French troops on board in addition to the seamen of the fleet distributed 
among the vessels, the casualties would have been proportionally more numerous.66  Blane 
commented on the state of French prizes taken that day, observing that their decks were 
never washed, there was no proper ventilation and no scuppers were open on the lower 
decks to allow the water and filth to leave the ship.  Perhaps the most astonishing French 
practice was their habit of sending blood, mangled limbs and even entire dead bodies down 
to the orlop deck which lay there and putrefied for extended periods of time.  Blane 
ascertained the French had a ‘superstitious aversion to the throwing of bodies overboard 
immediately after they are killed, the friends of the deceased wishing to preserve their 
remains, in order to perform a religious ceremony over them when the hurry and danger of 
the day [was]...over.’67 
During their time together in the West Indies, Rodney’s faith in Blane’s abilities, in addition 
to the physician’s own medical prowess, made this duo the most successful in the West 
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Indies in the eighteenth century.  The changes implemented in the early part of their 
service together laid the groundwork for the squadron’s subsequent naval victories.  
Rodney’s insistence on strict discipline amongst both the officers and men, the focus on 
the reduction of desertion and the development of ship repair facilities scattered at various 
harbours in the Leeward Islands instead of relying solely on English Harbour resulted in 
the considerable advantage over the French fleet. 
When Rodney and Blane returned home separately in 1783, the two remained friends.68  
The former was created Baron Rodney of Rodney Stoke, Somerset and the House of 
Commons voted him a pension of £2,000 per annum.  Rodney retired in the country 
spending time with his family until his death at his home in Hanover Square, London in 
1792.  Blane returned to England, retired from naval service and was granted a pension of 
ten shillings a day, although this was certainly not the end of his contributions to naval 
medicine.69  His continuing friendship with Rodney proved advantageous and the former 
acquired an appointment at St Thomas’s hospital, London, largely through the influence of 
his former admiral.70  To further demonstrate the bond between the two men, Blane named 
one of his sons after Rodney: George Rodney Blane.71  Aside from his hospital 
employment, Blane established a substantial private practice for London’s upper classes.  
He also befriended the Duke of Clarence while serving in the navy, and on the latter’s 
recommendation, Blane was appointed Physician Extraordinary to the Prince of Wales in 
1785.  In that same year, he wrote his influential work on naval hygiene entitled Observations 
on the Diseases of Seamen.72  The work largely recapped his experiences in the West Indies 
with Rodney and provided a unique insight into the incidences of tropical disease.  During 
the three years of his service, there were no less than twenty ships-of-the-line on the station 
at any point in time, and there were occasions when that number exceeded forty.  Figures 
submitted to Blane by surgeons from these ships during his term as Physician of the Fleet 
were compiled and analysed in a precise way in order to: 
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acquaint the commander in chief, from time to time, of the state of 
sickness, or the predominance of particular diseases, in order to 
recommend such articles of diet, or other means, as might tend to cure 
them, or to check their progress.73 
These figures were included in Blane’s book, giving the Sick and Hurt Board their first 
comprehensive study of disease in that region. 
Blane spent a total of twelve years serving at St Thomas’s hospital until 1795 when he was 
once again given a chance to directly influence naval medicine.  He was offered the 
opportunity to serve as a Commissioner of the Sick and Hurt Board.  As Commissioner, 
Blane’s main goal was to continue the advancement of health in the navy and in Eunice 
Turner’s estimation, Blane ‘was equally outstanding as a commissioner’ as he was in his 
West Indies service.74  Using his position as a commissioner, Blane forged ahead with 
improvements in the seamen’s diet and hygiene as well as tackling the Board’s poor 
administration and excessive expenditures.  His tenure with the Sick and Hurt Board lasted 
seven years, during which time he helped to usher in the general issue of lemon juice to the 
fleet to combat scurvy and the free issue of additional medicines to surgeons (though not 
the surgical instruments). 
His departure from the Board was by no means his last interaction with the Royal Navy.  
Blane consulted on a number of government health campaigns, the Turkey Campaign and 
drew up much of the legislation which became the Quarantine Act of 1799.  He was 
knighted in 1812 partly for his achievements in coping with the aftermath of the disastrous 
Walcheren Expedition.75  He later became physician to George IV while he also had the 
honour to be consulted by the Emperor of Russia, the King of Prussia and the US 
President John Adams on medical queries.  Throughout these various services, Blane 
continued to publish works on naval and general health including Elements of Medical Logick 
in 1819 and a dissertation entitled On the Comparative Health of the Navy in 1779, 1814 first 
issued in 1815.  The latter publication demonstrated Blane’s continuing interest in the navy 
and its improving degree of health.  Also in the latter work, he cited the mortality figures 
for the navy from 1811 to 1813 and using these figures, he calculated: 
that if the navy had been equally sickly in 1813 as it was in 1779, and 
there had been no improvements in the treatment of the sick, the whole 
number of deaths from disease in the former year would have exceeded 
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the actual number by 6,674.  Under such an annual waste of life, the 
national stock of mariners must have been exhausted in the course of the 
prolonged warfare from which this country has just emerged. 76 
To further confirm his dedication to the navy, in 1829 Blane founded a prize medal (the 
Blane naval medical medal) for the best kept journal by surgeons of the Royal Navy.77  The 
notice given to naval medical officers signified the fund was set up in perpetuity for ‘ the 
purpose of providing the means of conferring a gold medal, once in every two years, on 
such two medical officers...as shall produce the most approved journals of their practice’  
and exhibited a dedication for improving health and hygiene in the service.78 
During Blane’s lifetime, a number of significant and advantageous changes were 
implemented in the navy, many derived from his own ideas and writings.  Levels of 
personal cleanliness had been greatly improved, particularly with the introduction of slop 
ships in 1781.  On the back of enhanced seamen’s hygiene, advancements in cleanliness, 
dryness and ventilation of ships were enacted through stricter shipboard discipline.  
Surgeons were given a gratis supply of their principal medicines in 1796 (while Blane was a 
commissioner), although they were obliged to purchase the remainder until 1804 when all 
medicines were provided free of charge.79  Even with all these sweeping changes, Blane was 
confident it was the issuance of lemon juice from 1795 that proved the greatest catalyst for 
reducing sickness.  Writing in 1830, Blane examined the improvements in the health of 
seamen during the late eighteenth century.  He said: 
It now remains to be mentioned, through what means these mighty 
results have been brought about.  Are we to thank for it a guardian angel, 
presiding and watching over the dearest and most valuable interests of 
our country?  Or is it more rationally imputable to some of those 
profound and exquisite discoveries in science, mathematical, chemical, 
mechanical or pharmaceutical, with which the present age abounds 
above all other?  No such thing.  The scurvy has been prevented, 
subdued and totally rooted out, by the general use of lemon juice, 
supplied for the first time at the public expense in the year 1795, and 
which operated so speedily that in less than two years afterwards, it 
became extinct, and has remained so.80 
Blane died in his home on Sackville Street, Piccadilly on the 27 June 1834 leaving an 
enduring legacy, one consisting of exceptional medical prowess, insistent and assertive 
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conduct during his naval career and an unrelenting desire to advance the health of 
England’s population at large. 
Leonard Gillespie 
The name Dr Leonard Gillespie is most often connected with Admiral Horatio Nelson.  
Gillespie was appointed Physician of the Fleet under Nelson’s command in the 
Mediterranean joining him on board Victory in January 1805.  Before he joined the Admiral 
in the Mediterranean, Gillespie already had a long and distinguished career as a naval 
surgeon.  He spent a number of years serving in the West Indies during the American War 
of Independence and then again during the French Revolutionary War.  His second spell in 
the Leeward Islands lasted for eight years and it was at this point that Gillespie familiarised 
himself with a number of tropical diseases and remedies and it this latter service that is the 
focus of this section. 
Leonard Gillespie was born in Armagh, Ireland on the 20 May 1758, the son of Leonard 
Gillespie and Elizabeth Blakely.  Both parents died when Gillespie was a child and he was 
subsequently raised by his two elder sisters until he entered an apprenticeship to a local 
doctor at the age of fourteen.  At the age of nineteen, Gillespie went to Dublin to study 
under various surgeons and in June 1777, he was successfully examined by the Company of 
Surgeons in London.  Upon passing his examination, Gillespie entered naval service and 
became the second assistant surgeon on board the Royal Oak.  The ship was stationed off 
the coast of West Africa with occasional voyages to the West Indies under orders to guard 
merchant ships.  This was Gillespie’s first exposure to tropical diseases endemic to both 
regions.  During one of his voyages from West Africa, Gillespie performed an experiment 
with Peruvian Bark claiming to follow the writings of James Lind.81  His experiment called 
for all seamen coming on watch to strip to the waist when it rained so they had dry clothes 
to put on when they came off watch.  They were also made to drink a dose of bark in wine 
at the beginning of their watch to ward off the bad effects from putrid air, rainy conditions 
and physical exertion.  Coming off watch, the men took a bath in seawater before putting 
on dry clothes and taking another dose of bark and wine.  Gillespie also insisted on total 
cleanliness and fresh air, therefore the ship was always well-ventilated and the decks 
frequently washed with vinegar.  A sick berth was also fashioned under the forecastle 
where the sick were kept separated from those in health. 82  Gillespie’s hard work and 
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meticulousness paid off and only one man out of 125 died on the normally dangerous 
passage.83  He was promoted to surgeon of the Royal Oak in 1781 and spent the majority of 
his time in the waters around St Lucia.  When the Treaty of Versailles was signed in 1783, 
Gillespie was discharged from the navy with a considerable sum of prize money to his 
name.  Peacetime and his own financial welfare afforded him the opportunity to study 
medicine further in Edinburgh, St Andrews and Paris before returning to Armagh.  It was 
during this hiatus from the navy that he published his well-received work in the London 
Medical Journal on the subject of the treatment of ulcers.  Rather than settle in Armagh 
and establish a private practice, Gillespie chose to return to London in 1786 and by 1787 
he went to sea on board the Racehorse where he remained until 1791, after which time he 
opted to take up residence in Paris.  His time in France was short-lived and when war was 
declared between England and France in 1793, he rejoined the navy assigned to the 
Majestic.  On board that ship, Gillespie was present at Lord Howe’s victory on the Glorious 
First of June in 1794, after which the ship made its way to the Leeward Islands. 
The British took the island of Martinique from the French in 1794 and it was here that the 
Majestic was ordered to cruise around until receiving further instructions.  Not long after 
the ship arrived, the commander-in-chief, Admiral Sir John Laforey, found it necessary to 
establish a naval hospital at Fort Royal of which Gillespie was appointed surgeon.  This 
appointment lasted for seven years and involved both the care of seamen belonging to the 
squadron and managing French prisoners-of-war.  His experience with tropical diseases 
during this period led him to publish two books on the subject: Advice to Commanders of HM 
Fleet serving in the West Indies (1798) and Observations on the Diseases which Prevailed in HM 
Squadron in the Leeward Island (1800).  In the former publication, Gillespie examined the 
needs of seamen in that tropical climate including special attention to their diet, the 
unwholesome airs, the sickly season, infection, ship overcrowding, exposure to the sun and 
excessive fatigue.  The latter work written while Gillespie was at Fort Royal was a more 
significant work which dissected a precise period of time (November 1794 to April 1796) 
from his service on board the Majestic following its arrival in the Leeward Islands.  He 
described the onset of fever almost immediately after the ship arrived in Barbados in 
December.  It recalls that at the time of Gillespie’s arrival, ships belonging to the Grey-
Jervis expedition had already been battered by the fever epidemic that began the previous 
year.  So by the time Gillespie met up with Jervis’s fleet off Guadeloupe, he found the 
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crews ‘pretty healthy, though weak from the loss of men.’ 84  Through speaking with 
members of Jervis’s fleet, Gillespie attempted to identify the cause(s) of the fever so as not 
to allow his men on the Majestic to fall victim to it.  The remainder of the publication was 
concerned with his experience at Fort Royal Hospital, including the facilities as well as a 
few of the treatments he utilised during his time there.   He also made observations on the 
Spanish ships who seemed to suffer worse than any other country’s fleet due to their 
surgeons only issuing tartar emetic and antimonials; remedies which were now out of 
favour with the English.  On the basis of these publications, Gillespie was granted a 
medical degree by proxy from St Andrews University.   
Aside from his publications, a great deal of information about his professional and personal 
life at Martinique is found in his diaries which still exist. 85  His observations and notes 
principally focus on the effects of yellow fever on seamen; however he pays particular 
attention to the welfare of negro slaves and how diseases affected them.  His investigation 
into the lives of slaves prompted Gillespie to be sympathetic to the abolitionist movement 
that was gaining strength in England.  His writings reveal that during the course of his time 
at Martinique, he had a relationship with a local mulatto woman named Caroline Heiliger, 
who was almost certainly his servant or housekeeper, by whom he had two children.   
Additional entries in his journals recount other aspects of sailors’ lives in the West Indies 
including an account of a duel between the surgeon and master of the Bittern. 
At the Peace of Amiens in 1802, Gillespie returned home for a brief period before 
rejoining the navy in 1804.  It was at this point that he was promoted to physician and 
inspector of naval hospitals in the Mediterranean under the command of Nelson, although 
he did not join Victory until January 1805.  As physician, Gillespie proved to be ‘an able 
professional man, and of an admirable and humane disposition.’86  In August of that year 
when the ship was anchored off Spithead, Gillespie resigned and was granted prolonged 
leave to visit London.  This signalled the end of Gillespie’s naval career and he retired on 
half pay in 1809.  When the Treaty of Paris was signed in 1815, he returned to Paris where 
he lived for the remainder of his life.  By this time he had amassed a significant fortune, 
partly through prize money and partly through having charge of prisoners-of-war at 
Martinique hospital.  Gillespie died in London in January 1842 at the age of 84, but was 
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buried in Paris.87  His contributions to understanding of tropical diseases which were 
included in his publications were based on astute observations and provided valuable 
insight for future naval operations in the West Indies. 
Thomas Trotter 
While Thomas Trotter only spent a brief period in the West Indies, his contributions to 
naval medicine require brief recognition.  He was born in Melrose, Roxburghshire, in 1760 
where he spent the majority of his early years after which he relocated to nearby Kelso.  
While in Kelso, he became skilled at arithmetic, French and geography; expertise he would 
utilise during his life in medicine.88  In 1777, Trotter left school in order to pursue the study 
of medicine in Edinburgh.  He remained there for one year, during which time he attended 
lectures in anatomy and surgery.  Following his study, he joined the Royal Navy as a 
surgeon’s mate and, in 1780, Trotter spent a brief time in the West Indies on board the 
Berwick serving in the same capacity.  His time in the West Indies was cut short when his 
ship was damaged in a hurricane and was forced to return to England.  In 1782, Trotter 
was promoted to surgeon and appointed to the Bustle and later to the William.  The latter 
ship ran aground at the mouth of the River Mersey (where she was stationed) and the ship 
was paid off.89  With the American War of Independence being over, Trotter was relieved 
of his duties in the Royal Navy and instead found work on board the slave ship Brookes, 
serving as its surgeon.  The ship was employed mainly off the coast of West Africa.  His 
displeasure with the slave trade meant he only served on the ship for a single voyage, after 
which he returned to England a fervent abolitionist.  
Upon his return, Trotter resumed his studies, paying particular attention to scurvy.  Using 
the observations he made during his time on the Berwick and the Brookes, he published his 
Observations on the scurvy in 1786.  While there were no statistics, Trotter set out to disprove 
the three substances the Sick and Hurt Board relied on for the prevention of scurvy.  
Firstly he commented on sour kraut and its preparation, secondly discussing the elixir of 
vitriol which he found not ‘capable of preventing or curing the scurvy’ and a ‘mere placebo’ 
and lastly extract of malt introduced by Dr MacBride.90  This publication, which ran into a 
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subsequent edition and translation into German, was the first of many for Trotter, who 
wrote about various diseases and treatments in the navy.  
In 1793, Trotter was appointed second physician to John Lind at Haslar hospital (James 
Lind’s son).  In the brief time he was there, Trotter observed the enough of the hospital’s 
operations that he was able to publish a pamphlet, Remarks on the Establishment of the Naval 
Hospitals and Sick Quarters with Hints for their Improvement in which he remarked on the 
requisite changes he felt were required for the improvement of those facilities.  A year later, 
Trotter was appointed to be the Physician of the Channel Fleet to Lord Howe.  During 
that time, Trotter was an immense supporter of the distribution of lemon juice in the 
prevention of scurvy, which was ushered in while he was serving with Howe.  His  
experience with the Admiral gave Trotter the opportunity to pen his impressive Medicina 
Nautica in 1797, which was followed by a second volume in 1799 and a third in 1803.  The 
volumes contained his comments on scurvy, contagion, typhus, yellow fever, catarrh, 
dysentery and smallpox.  Not long before the third volume was published, Trotter retired 
from the navy, but, like Blane had done, he remained active in naval medicine.  He 
published various medical works (not all naval related) while he served as a private 
physician in Newcastle-Upon-Tyne.  The most germane to the navy was A Practicable Plan 
for Manning the Royal Navy, and Preserving our Maritime Ascendancy, without Impressment which 
included Trotter’s thoughts on the reduction of the number of seamen in the nineteenth 
century and the preservation of seamen who were ordered to the West Indies. 91 
Trotter retired from his private practice in 1827 and went to live near his birthplace.  He 
remained there for three years before relocating to Edinburgh.  In 1832, he returned to 
Newcastle where he died that same year.  Throughout his life, Trotter devoted himself to 
the wellbeing and safeguarding of the navy’s personnel.  His contributions through his 
numerous publications and the avocation and insistence for the distribution of lemon juice 
in the navy can no doubt be regarded as one of the most vital contributions to naval 
medicine in the late eighteenth century. 
William Smellie Forbes 
There were a handful of surgeons serving in the latter half of the eighteenth century who 
proved ineffectual in their duties and therefore posed a hazard to sick seamen.  Through 
their inadequate and often reckless practices, a number of seamen were further injured or 
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forced to return to England as an invalid.  During war time, losing men to non-life 
threatening illnesses severely hampered England’s efforts abroad.  Dangerous behaviour 
like this was not tolerated and the small number of men who were reprimanded because of 
their dire practices were quickly removed from service.  One of the most serious culprits in 
the West Indies was Dr William Smellie Forbes who served for a number of years as 
surgeon of the Jamaica hospital. 
As early at 1794, Forbes was employed as the naval surgeon on board the Europa under the 
command of Rear Admiral John Ford.  While a portion of the Jamaica squadron was 
ordered to St Domingo (the present-day island of Haiti) from September 1793 until April 
of the following year, Ford required all sick men to be treated on board their respective 
ships.  At the beginning of April, the health on board ships at St Domingo worsened 
predominantly because they were experiencing a lack of Peruvian Bark and fresh 
provisions.  Ford ordered the ships round to Mole St Nicola (on the same island) and for a 
hospital to be established there.  William Smellie Forbes was ordered off the Europa and to 
commence service as the hospital’s surgeon.  Ford selected Forbes because he was ‘a very 
able man in his profession’ and put him on the same footing and salary as the surgeon at 
Jamaica hospital, that being fifteen shillings per day.92 
Not long after Forbes took up service at Mole St Nicola, the surgeon at Jamaica hospital, 
Robert Wood, who had been in residence since 1764, died in January 1795.   At this point it 
can be supposed that Ford regarded Forbes’s work very highly since he selected the latter 
to assume the role of the surgeon at Jamaica hospital despite pleadings from Wood’s 
assistant surgeon, John Fitzsimmons.  According to the assistant surgeon, who wanted his 
predecessor’s position, he had served at the hospital for thirteen years and had been 
engaged constantly in naval service since 1779 as both a surgeon’s mate and a surgeon. 93  
Even with Fitzsimmons’s naval career in the West Indies spanning over fifteen years, Ford 
opted for Forbes to move to Jamaica to fill Wood’s position. 
Initially Forbes appeared to take his job seriously and his attention towards the men in 
hospital was very apparent.  No sooner had he taken up residence at Jamaica hospital he 
began to complain about the condition of the buildings, specifically the damage to the 
pilings from the ravages of the sea worm.  The brick wall that relied on these pilings, he 
claimed, had given way significantly enough to produce a gap allowing the seamen in the 
hospital to communicate freely ‘with the worthless low class of people in this town, who 
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industriously supply the seamen with spirits and other things extremely prejudicial to their 
healths, and it also affords a ready outlet for desertion.’94  Men from the hospital were able 
to make their way down to the wharf at night where boats came to take them away so they 
could be put on board merchantmen ready to weigh anchor the next morning in order to 
escape naval service.  Forbes’s attention to detail and his initial operations at Jamaica 
hospital impressed his commander-in-chief, although within a few years his superiors 
found his conduct and methods a disappointment. 
The first complaint against Forbes’s conduct came from Samuel (sometimes William) 
Parker, late surgeon of the Ceres followed by another one filed five days later by James 
Tosh, late surgeon of the Valiant.95  Both surgeons had just returned to England from the 
West Indies on their respective ships and were under orders to carry back a number of 
invalids from the hospital at Jamaica.  According to Parker’s account, thirteen men 
perished during the voyage, while another two died almost immediately when they arrived 
at Deal hospital.  The deplorable state of the men when they embarked at Jamaica, he 
surmised, was the cause of such a high mortality rate.  He claimed that Forbes sent the men 
on board with most of them suffering from fluxes, large decaying ulcers and ‘extensive 
mortification of the worst nature’ and that he never saw ‘such wretched objects.’96  To 
understand Parker’s full annoyance and dissatisfaction with Forbes’s conduct, it is worth 
quoting the former’s letter at length: 
…I am truly sorry that such a task falls to my lot, but not being myself at 
all culpable in the business, and as much blame was attached to me by 
some of the invalids on the first outset of the voyage for allowing them 
to come on board in such a wretched state, it is necessary for my own 
satisfaction also to point out on whom the censure should really fall I 
say, most deservedly on Mr W S Forbes.  As I conceive there has been 
very great neglect on the part of the surgeon, I consider it an obligation 
strictly incumbent on me to write this narrative as it essentially alludes to 
the…comfort of afflicted seamen, as well as the honour and reputation 
of HM’s Service.  Tis very true the men complained most egregiously 
and I am grieved to say they had the greatest reasons to do so, their 
murmurings were continual and their grievances could not be redressed, 
they lingered and died a cruel and miserable death shocking to humanity, 
it is to me equally strange and surprising that Mr Forbes should have so 
far divested himself of humanity and not to have represented the state of 
those unhappy men to the commander-in-chief and suffered them to 
remain and die in the hospital, because the nature of their diseases made 
it morally impossible to render them any real service.  I never saw such 
wretched objects, it was cruel to send them in so unprovided a manner 
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on board of a ship where they were destitute of every convenience and 
comfort of life, how painful to see man in such a melancholy situation 
and not have it in ones power to afford them redress.  In order to show 
Mr Forbes’s illiberal and parsimonious conduct, I must point out that the 
only articles he sent me were about a pound of lint and a few yards of 
narrow linen, which being used sparingly lasted me ten days… 
…It is a painful and distressing circumstance for any surgeon to have 
such a number of deplorable objects thrown upon his hands, when let 
him do what he will he has the unpleasant prospect before him that 
finally he cannot be of any real service to them, this circumstance is so 
literally true that it need no exaggeration...To Mr Forbes alone I ascribe 
all their misery and I have to present him with their execrations, my heart 
positively almost sent in twain, to hear them exclaim and behold their 
misery, it would have been charitable to have tied shot to their feet and 
thrown them into the sea and thereby put an immediate end to their 
sufferings, some method should surely be taken to put a stop to such 
proceedings in future for it absolutely reflects disgrace on the country 
and human nature.  I conceive the circumstance only wants a 
representation to be remedied, and I hope you will excuse me for 
troubling you with this one as I trust it may be at least sufficient to pave 
the way for an investigation.97 
Receiving Parker’s letter, followed quickly by a much shorter complaint from Tosh, forced 
the Sick and Hurt Board to order a full investigation into the hospital proceedings at 
Jamaica by the commander-in-chief and surgeons on station.  Aside from the enquiry into 
Forbes’s actions, the Board recommended that a strict policy be disseminated to all hospital 
surgeons serving on foreign stations detailing how invalided men were to be returned to 
England.98  Suggestions for their new policy included the issue of bandages sufficient 
enough for the length of the voyage per person and a quantity of provisions available on 
station including sago, barley, onions, portable soup and wine.  
Once news of the investigation reached Forbes in Jamaica, he promptly defended his 
actions in a letter to the Sick and Hurt Board.99  In his letter, Forbes claimed that he never 
received guidelines for transferring invalid seamen from the hospital to ships for carriage to 
England.  As per the 17th Article of the surgeon’s general instructions which specified that 
surgeons needed approval from officers on station to invalid men, Forbes applied to 
Admiral Sir Hyde Parker, Commander-in-Chief at Jamaica, for a survey of the men to be 
carried out by three senior captains and their respective surgeons, before sending those 
invalids on board the Ceres and Valiant.  The result of the survey was that the seamen 
needed a change of climate and should be removed from the island as soon as possible.  
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On the day of the transfer to the Ceres, Forbes claimed he cleaned and dressed the men’s 
wounds, which was attested to by his first assistant surgeon.  Forbes also asserted that, 
‘every one of the invalids discharged into the two ships expressed the greatest joy and 
satisfaction on their being put on the list for embarkation’  and the weaker men left behind 
would have ‘cheerfully...risked the passage home, from their minds being impressed with 
the knowledge and belief of the unhealthiness of the climate.’  The hospital surgeon felt he 
followed all requisite instructions to ensure the safe transport of patients and any ensuing 
deaths were not as a result of his care.  Admiral Sir Hyde Parker’s reaction to the 
complaints made by the surgeons of the Ceres and the Valiant against Forbes’s conduct 
favoured the hospital surgeon and Parker accused the Ceres’ surgeon of acting improperly 
as he had ‘no foundation for such illiberal accusations.’100  It seems the Sick and Hurt 
Board believed the testimony of Forbes and Admiral Parker largely because of the lack of 
written instructions regarding transportation of invalids on board naval ships. 
Forbes continued in his role as the hospital surgeon for a further two years before another 
complaint reached the Sick and Hurt Board again regarding the condition of invalids 
leaving his care at the hospital.  This time the complaint originated from Mr McEvoy, 
Forbes’s own assistant surgeon at the hospital, and once again, the Forbes underwent 
scrutiny and was allowed to continue his service.101  For making the complaint, McEvoy 
was completely removed from the navy.  It was not long before Mr Lander, surgeon of the 
Juno, put forward a similar complaint regarding twelve invalids sent from the hospital into 
his care for carriage to England.102  The consistent complaints, by this time, set off a red 
flag to both the Admiralty and the Sick and Hurt Board.  Following Lander’s letter to his 
Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Duckworth, a plan was devised with a number of captains 
and surgeons which involved attending the hospital unannounced, thereby not allowing 
Forbes the time to disguise a potentially unpleasant situation.   Despite the unannounced 
visit, the captains and surgeons found the hospital to be in order and ‘perfectly clean and 
wholesome’ and ‘saw no ground for complaint.’103  In fact, Duckworth assigned blame to 
Dr Blair, the Physician of the squadron, whose job it was to visit the hospital most days of 
the week and to address any shortcomings. 
Despite a handful of complaints, Forbes continued in his job for the remainder of 1802, 
although his service was to be short lived.  Under orders from the Admiralty, Duckworth 
dismissed the surgeon from his role (he was also removed from the naval list of surgeons) 
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and replaced him with James Gregory, the surgeon from the Leviathan.104  The grounds for 
Forbes’s dismissal were abundant, but the main reason was the number of complaints 
received from various surgeons became too large to ignore.  In addition to the numerous 
allegations of ill treatment towards the patients, the Admiralty noticed Forbes’s excessive 
spending at Jamaica hospital, which, during his eight years of service, totalled £36,733 , a 
figure which made the Admiralty extremely uncomfortable.105  Costs appear to have 
spiralled due to Forbes’s inability to manage diseases properly, and indeed on one occasion, 
he invalided two seamen who were deemed fit by other surgeons who evaluated them. 106  
The poor care coupled with the blatant disregard to operate with financial prudence 
ultimately proved too much for the administration in London.  Certainly the behaviour of 
Forbes at Jamaica hospital is by no means indicative of the general calibre of surgeons and 
medical personnel stationed in the West Indies.  During his tenure there is no question an 
indeterminate number of seamen suffered largely due to his neglect and inability, but 
through the vigilance of other surgeons who spoke up against Forbes such as Samuel 
Parker of the Ceres, his inabilities were exposed and demonstrated that Forbes was indeed a 
‘disgrace on the country and human nature.’107 
Conclusion 
Advancing medical practices that were ushered in by the navy were particularly evident 
during the second half of the eighteenth century.  One of the main impetuses for 
improvement over time was most certainly the dedication and determination of naval 
officers and surgeons who had experience serving in the West Indies.108  Their first hand 
observations compelled them to change the health practices in that region, and when it 
proved manageable, medical care went from being curative to chiefly preventative.  A 
number of individuals serving in the West Indies at this time are particularly noteworthy 
for the work they carried out.  The earliest and most recognisable figure is James Lind who 
devoted the better part of his life to the navy, first at sea and the remainder of his career at 
Haslar naval hospital.  He performed what some believe to be the first ‘classic therapeutic 
trial’ in history and was one of the driving forces behind the eradication of scurvy in the 
navy.  Surgeons were not the only individuals concerned with improving the health of the 
seamen in the West Indies.  Admiral Robert Man was integral in establishing a better 
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system of care on shore at Antigua through his persistent correspondence with both the 
Admiralty and the Sick and Hurt Board.  When the care of seamen on shore was engaged 
by an unprincipled and greedy contractor, Man took the unprecedented step of interceding 
on the Admiralty’s behalf to keep the men in a more favourable situation.  His concern did 
not stop there.  Man advocated erecting a purpose-built hospital at English Harbour to 
establish an efficient and healthy place where men could recuperate quickly and return to 
duty.  Although the hospital was not erected during Man’s time in the West Indies, his 
letters certainly influenced the Sick and Hurt Board’s approach towards treating sick 
seamen at Antigua. 
A decade later, Admiral George Rodney and his personal physician Gilbert Blane arrived in 
the West Indies and found the situation concerning the health of seamen much the same as 
Man did.  The on shore facilities were inadequate and the supply of necessaries and fresh 
provisions were almost non-existent.  Through the stern discipline imposed on captains in 
Rodney’s squadron and the demands made upon their surgeons by Blane, the duo reduced 
sickness and mortality levels considerably.  So significant was this reduction in sickness, 
that of the thirty-six ships-of-the-line present at the Battle of the Saintes in 1782, only two 
were considered unhealthy.  Once back in England, Blane continued his pursuit of creating 
a healthier environment on board naval ships by becoming a Commissioner on the Sick 
and Hurt Board where he supported a number of crucial changes to the seamen’s diet, 
most significantly the issue of lemon juice to suppress scurvy.  Even when Blane left the 
Board seven years later, he continued his commitment to naval health and hygiene through 
his publications and the setting up of the Blane naval medical medal.  Lind and Blane no 
doubt influenced the way Leonard Gillespie managed the men on board his ships sailing 
off the coast of West Africa toward the close of the century.  Utilising alternative methods 
to what was recommended by the Sick and Hurt Board, Gillespie was able to keep men 
healthy in a region notorious for outbreaks of malaria.  The good effects from his 
assiduousness were carried over to his time spent as the surgeon of Martinique naval 
hospital and serving as Physician to Nelson’s squadron in the Mediterranean prior to 
Trafalgar. 
Even naval surgeons who did not spend a great deal of time in the West Indies had a 
considerable impact on the progression of medical practices.  Through observation and 
experimentation, surgeons like Thomas Trotter were able to gather enough evidence to 
publish practical guides focusing on specific diseases and their preferred treatments.  For 
Trotter in particular, he utilised his varied experience in the Royal Navy, on board a slave 
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ship, time spent at Haslar hospital and his private practice in Newcastle to disseminate his 
findings to others in the service.  His writings also influenced the navy issuing lemon juice 
to the fleet as a preventative; the resulting saving in manpower during the Napoleonic Wars 
was certainly advantageous. 
Not all members of the navy were out to improve the health of seamen.  Although they 
were few and far between, there were a number of dubious men who put their own greed 
before the wellbeing of the men.  Contractors such as Mr Grant during Admiral Man’s 
service at Antigua is a prime example of just such a person.  Grant’s own financial interests 
drove him to propose the removal of sick seamen to a location further away from the 
dockyard which was potentially injurious to patients.  Even a handful of the navy’s own 
surgeons put seamen at risk due to their questionable practices.  When enough complaints 
were submitted by surgeons on the Jamaica station about the way in which William Smellie 
Forbes handled the return of invalids to England, the Admiralty and the Sick and Hurt 
Board took appropriate measures to remove him from service. 
Naval men understood the importance of keeping the entire fleet healthy, especially during 
times of war.  By following rules set out for surgeons, most ships enjoyed an average state 
of health, although tropical illnesses in particular continued to wreak havoc on crews in the 
West Indies.  Through the vigilance and dedication of a small number of individuals with 
firsthand experience in the tropics, beneficial changes in health and hygiene practices were 
gradually rolled out in the Royal Navy thereby reducing the overall percentage of death and 
disability from disease and increasing the overall effectiveness of the fleet toward the end 
of the eighteenth century. 
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Chapter 6 
Development of Hospitals in the West Indies 
In the West Indies prior to the 1740s, there were no permanent medical facilities for use by 
the navy’s sick.  Until that time it was accepted practice for the navy to rely on the sick 
quarters system which involved engaging temporary rooms or buildings on an ‘as-needed’ 
basis.  This served the Admiralty well during the first half of the century for they were not 
required to lay down large amounts of capital to erect facilities and when there was no 
longer a need, they simply did not pay out money for local lodging.  However, there were 
numerous problems with this system with regard to the type of quarters that were available.  
It was common for rented rooms to belong to public houses with landlords who often 
encouraged the seamen to drink alcohol.1  An additional consequence of using this system 
was that it was difficult for a surgeon to attend to patients ashore under his supervision as 
they were typically spread out in town.  Lastly, the placement of diseased and contagious 
men within a semi-healthy population could and did have disastrous effects.  Diseases were 
prone to spread rapidly through towns and infect the general populace. 
By the 1750s, the sick quarters system began to fall out of favour with the Admiralty.  Too 
many seamen failed to recover sufficiently enough to return to active service.  Purpose -
built hospitals appealed to the Admiralty and the Sick and Hurt Board as hospitals gave 
them control over alcohol distribution and consumption, the role the surgeon played and 
the rate of desertion.  Hospitals in the eighteenth century are not to be confused with 
present-day facilities.  They were, in essence, buildings where people simply went to 
recover from their illness or a place where incurables were sent to live out the rest of their 
lives.  It was only when the ships’ surgeons were desperate that they would turn to the 
hospital or sick quarters for relief.  The navy built two successful permanent hospitals in 
England: Haslar hospital in Portsmouth and Stonehouse hospital in Plymouth.  A handful 
of hospitals were also established overseas for the Mediterranean fleet at Gibraltar and Port 
Mahon, with a temporary facility at Lisbon. 
Naval hospitals did not exist in the West Indies during the early eighteenth century.  The 
method for caring for sick seamen on the Jamaica and Leeward Islands stations evolved 
from the sick quarters system to a contractor-based system, which provided a marginally 
better service for the sick.  Contractors were appointed to supply a building or group of 
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buildings to lodge sick seamen during their recovery.  Additionally, they were contracted to 
provide victuals and other non-medical necessaries.  For their service, they were paid a set 
fee per man per day rather than a monthly salary. 
While the contractor system was an improvement over the sick quarters system, an 
overwhelming number of complaints were returned to the Admiralty especially with regard 
to the Jamaica station.  Accommodations on both stations proved inadequate and the 
decision was taken by the Admiralty to erect the first permanent naval hospital at Port 
Royal, Jamaica in the mid-1740s, followed by a permanent facility at English Harbour, 
Antigua in the 1790s.  Other West Indian islands had temporary hospital facilities at 
various times throughout the study period including Barbados, Martinique and St Lucia.  
This chapter will follow the hospital development at each island individually with the 
exception of Antigua which is dealt with as a case study in its own chapter because it is the 
only facility that was conceived, built and used within the time period of this thesis.  The 
remaining islands considered in this chapter illustrate the general problems of maintaining 
both the permanent buildings and temporary facilities scattered around the West Indies. 
It is worth mentioning the position of the Sick and Hurt Board with regards to the 
standard of hospital accommodations which they mandatorily demanded be available to 
sick men irrespective of the hospital’s location.  The Board attempted to maintain the 
health of seamen by insisting on stringent levels of cleanliness and routine inspection by 
surgeons.  Very specific instructions were distributed in 1785 outlining the specific 
guidelines for the seamen’s onshore accommodations: 
All hospitals should be chosen in [an] open, elevated and airy situation, 
with windows in every ward in opposite directions, and a large airing 
ground for the recovering patients to walk in.  The more space each man 
has to breath in the better, but as this space must have its limitation 
somewhere, we think that 600 cubic feet is the least which ought to be 
allowed; thus a ward 20 feet broad, 60 feet long and 10 high may have 20 
sick men placed in it, and not more; if the height is above 10 feet, of 
course it may with safety receive more men, always observing the rule, 
that each man shall have a space of 600 cubic feet...In time of war when 
small hospitals are hired, or built for temporary purposes, it would be 
incurring an enormous expense to allow every man so great a space, and 
it does not seem necessary...Commonly the heads of the cradles are 
placed against the walls, and it is ordered that there should be three feet 
between each cradle, but this is not a proper rule, for where the height of 
the ceiling is very great, the cradles may be placed so close, as just to give 
sufficient room to get round them...Particular attention should be had 
that hospitals should be so situated to command a plentiful supply of 
good water, and that the soil and filth should never stagnate, but be 
carried off easily and expeditiously... 
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...When a man comes to the hospital, if there is the least suspicion of an 
infectious disorder, or even if he is ragged and dirty, his clothes should 
be instantly taken off, before he is conducted into any of the wards, and 
his body well washed; the hospital dress should be put on and his own 
clothes and bedding well fumigated, with sulphur thrown upon burning 
charcoal, and when discharged from the hospital and his clothes 
returned to him, the hospital dress which he put off never to be used by 
any man, till it has undergone fumigation.  Whenever any ward is 
emptied of the sick the floor and cradles ought to be well washed, the 
room fumigated and the walls white washed, and then all the windows 
thrown open, that no particle of infection may remain.2 
Jamaica 
Jamaica, located in the eastern Caribbean Sea, was a vital territory in the British Empire and 
accounted for a substantial portion of imports to England (Figure 6.1).  As was outlined in 
Chapter 4, the number of men on the Jamaica station was typically larger than the number 
at the Leeward Islands station.  Subsequently, that meant the volume of sick men sent 
ashore was also greater.  In May 1738, the navy appointed John Hume surgeon and agent at 
Jamaica at a salary of £250 per annum.  Until that time, Hume had been the surgeon on 
board the Hampton Court but was assigned to caring for sick men onshore after his 
predecessor resigned due to ill health.3  Upon taking up his appointment Hume located a 
small building on the island to utilise as the naval hospital ; however it was not sufficient to 
house the considerable number of sick belonging to Admiral Vernon’s fleet which 
numbered upwards of forty-five ships and 15,149 men.4  The building Hume hired was 
only capable of housing sixty-two men and was instantly occupied.  When an additional 
eighty were put on shore in October 1739, Hume corresponded with Vernon requesting to 
hire a further house at a cost of £3 per month, to which the latter agreed.  The fleet was so 
sickly that by the following January, Hume was forced to rent an additional seven houses in 
Port Royal and requested three more to manage the sick ashore.5 
In order to rent houses, provide proper victuals as well as an adequate number of assistants 
to attend the sick, Hume was forced to spend an exorbitant amount of the government’s 
money.  A bill submitted in October 1742 which covered some of the above expenses 
totalled £420.  By the time the bill reached London, the Admiralty had already determined 
to do away with the current system and to erect a permanent hospital in an area named 
                                                                 
2 TNA, ADM 98/14, Sick and Hurt to Admiralty, 1 February 1785. 
3 Duncan Crewe, Yellow Jack and the Worm: British Naval Administration in the West Indies, 1739-1748 (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 1993), p. 12. 
4 Ibid., p. 12.  The building Hume located dated from 1729. 
5 Christopher Lloyd and Jack L.S. Coulter, Medicine and the Navy 1200-1900, vol 3 (Edinburgh: E&S 
Livingstone, 1961), p. 101. 
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New Greenwich (Figure 6.1).  The proposal to build a hospital at Jamaica first came from 
Admiral Hosier prior to Vernon taking command of the station and, when Vernon 
assumed control, he also wrote to the Admiralty requesting to build a hospital rather than 
continue to hire houses.  Crewe suggests that ‘Vernon’s motives for proposing the building 
of a hospital were mixed but his fundamental concern was to keep his ships sufficiently 
manned to ensure their operational efficiency.’ 6  His original proposal to the Admiralty 
made that intention extremely clear: 
...Another chargeable article I observe here is house rent for hospitals 
and a great inconvenience from their being in a town full of punch 
houses, where as soon as they can crawl they get thither and make 
themselves sick again before they are half well, for which I will beg leave 
to suggest to you a model for an hospital that if you would send over to 
us ready framed here, or order to be built here by timber as cheap as we 
could get it I apprehend would be a great [saving] to you in case of a 
long war, and be a means of preserving many men’s lives and securing 
many more from desertion.7 
The proposal from Vernon regarding the hospital design was simple.  He felt the building 
should be a large square shape with only one outside door and small outside windows to 
prevent desertion as well as limiting the number of temptations that could be brought in.  
He suggested an open area at the centre of the building and an outdoor covered area to 
allow the sick to go outside for fresh air.  Vernon also recommended the building be two-
stories high to accommodate a large number of sick men as well as comprising storerooms 
and apartments for the officers and surgeon.8  While the Navy Board appreciated Vernon’s 
suggestions, they did not agree on his specific design.  Instead they felt that the building 
should be kept to one storey because its intended fabrication was timber which made it 
more vulnerable during inclement weather.  With the dimensions laid out, the Navy Board 
concluded their design was capable of having thirteen separate wards and accommodate up 
to 632 men.9  Despite the Navy Board wanting to move ahead with their plans, the 
surveyor of the navy delayed construction as he felt a two-storey building made of stone 
would be the best option in that region since it was prone to hurricanes and earthquakes.10  
Notice was sent to Vernon authorising the hospital’s erection according to the naval 
surveyor’s plan and instructions were given later that year to begin construction. 
                                                                 
6 Crewe, Yellow Jack and the Worm, p. 31. 
7 TNA, ADM 1/232, Admiral Vernon to Navy Board, 31 January 1740. 
8 Ibid. 
9 TNA, ADM 106/2178, Navy Board to Admiralty, 25 April 1740. 
10 TNA, ADM 3/44, Admiralty Board Minutes, 10 May 1740. 
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Figure 6.1 – Map of Jamaica 
Vernon was succeeded on the Jamaica station by Admiral Sir Chaloner Ogle before the 
hospital was completed.  Ogle reported the progress of the construction in November 
1742: 
The four sides of the body of the roof of the hospital are entirely framed 
and ready to be placed upon the walls when they have bricks enough to 
carry them up. 
The whole front and one third of the easternmost side of the roof are 
raised on the walls and boarded, the cornice fixed all round and the 
shingling in hand.  The piazza to the front now raising and that of the 
easternmost end as far as they have columns turned to go on with, which 
will soon be completed.  The other timber and materials are preparing 
for the floors etc as fast as possible. 
The bricklayers work on the front walls both outside and inside are 
entirely completed, the easternmost walls are almost and the north and 
west walls outside and in are three quarters completed. 
There are bricks enough to finish the east walls and to begin the going 
on with the outhouses which will all be landed within a week.11 
By September 1743, the plastering and whitewashing were nearly complete and 150 cradles 
had been fabricated.  Small houses on the hospital grounds were also nearly completed.12  
Finally, New Greenwich hospital accepted its first patients in October 1743 at which time 
Hume was able to discontinue the use of the numerous rented facilities.  The hospital, built 
in roughly three years should have, in theory, relieved a great deal of stress from Hume as 
he was able to treat the sick in one facility rather than having to travel between each rented 
                                                                 
11 TNA, ADM 1/233, Admiral Ogle to Admiralty, 5 September 1742. 
12 Crewe, Yellow Jack and the Worm, p 41. 
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accommodation.  Unfortunately, the new hospital proved a more difficult situation than 
the Admiralty had imagined. 
As early as January 1744, Hume wrote to the Sick and Hurt Board describing a severe 
outbreak of malaria amongst the patients at the new hospital.  He calculated that ‘no one in 
a hundred who has lodged in or near the hospital for two or at most three weeks has 
escaped [the disease]...whereof the sick were sent ashore, they were sure to have it 
supervened or followed by an intermitting fever.’ 13  Once the patients at the hospital 
contracted the fever, Hume observed their sufferings could not be relieved by routine 
medications.  The patients’ stomachs were less able to ‘bear either medicine or 
nourishment, the paroxysms became long and irregular, the intermissions short and 
imperfect, then succeeded a diarrhoea, hydropic, and anasarcous swelling, and in this 
diseased’ state they lingered ‘without hope till their strength was wasted and then died 
miserably emaciated.’14  For the quarter ending December 1744, Hume estimated that he 
buried ‘no less than 128 in the whole quarter.’  As further proof of the devastation felt at 
the hospital at New Greenwich, Hume provided figures comparing that facility with the 
aggregate amount from the rented houses at Port Royal (Table 6.1).  He claimed that the 
figures for each hospital were calculated over a 12-month period during which time each 
had a similar proportion of men sent ashore.  Hume recognised that the men sent ashore to 
the Port Royal houses would have been tempted by the availability of alcohol and other 
debauches which would have affected the number of men who were invalided or deserted. 
The table highlights some very significant differences from the old hospital to the new one.  
At Port Royal hospital, the mortality rate for 1743 was 19.2 per cent and for the first year at 
the new facility at New Greenwich, that figure soared to 28.2 per cent.  Another notable 
increase was the number of men discharged as invalids which went from 6.9 per cent in 
1743 to 15.0 per cent in 1744.  Roughly the same percentage of men deserted from the 
hospitals in both years, therefore indicating there was a drop in the number of men who 
were cured and returned to their ships.  That figure was 64.0 per cent in 1743 which 
sharply declined to 46.8 per cent the following year. 
  
                                                                 
13 NMM, ADM/F/7, Sick and Hurt to Admiralty, 17 January 1746. 
14 Ibid. 
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Port Royal Hospital 174315 
Ships Name No. of Men 
put Ashore 
Discharged 
Cured 
Discharged 
Invalid 
Discharged 
Dead 
Deserted 
St Albans 39 30 6 3 0 
Falmouth 212 142 8 38 24 
Adventure 86 53 6 10 17 
Greenwich 35 27 5 3 0 
Assistance 222 128 16 60 18 
Total 594 380 41 114 59 
 
New Greenwich Hospital 1744 
Ships Name No. Of Men 
Put Ashore 
Discharged in 
favourable 
intermissions 
Discharged 
Invalid 
Discharged 
Dead 
Deserted 
Orford 103 43 20 33 7 
Prince of 
Orange 
199 73 31 60 35 
Assistance 50 22 12 12 4 
Biddiford 11 4 1 6 0 
Drake Sloop 15 6 6 2 1 
Plymouth 78 61 5 9 3 
Rippon 130 65 13 43 9 
Total 586 274 88 165 59 
Table 6.1 – Comparison of Sick Men Sent Ashore at Jamaica Hospitals in 1743 and 174416 
Hume had justifiable cause for concern over these numbers.  He considered the reason of 
the significant spike in deaths and the decreasing number of cured men sent back to work, 
and cited the ‘situation of the hospital’, but was careful not to offend the Crown who had 
just spent a considerable sum for its erection.17  Hume suggested that if sick men remained 
on board their ships rather than being sent ashore, the men had a better chance at survival.  
He said, ‘I imagined that if such men as had fair intermissions [from their illnesses] were 
kept on board their ships in the harbour, they might by an emetic and some [Peruvian] 
Bark, get rid of their fevers aboard, without the certain danger of relapsing.’18  Nearly a year 
later, he retracted his judgment on the location of the hospital for being too rash.  In 
November 1745 he wrote: 
...its situation being very delightful, on a rising ground at a quarter of a 
mile distant from the sea, from which to the hospital gates, the land rises 
by a gradual and easy ascent, the soil is dry and the declivity of the 
situation suffers no wet to lie upon it.  The fields round it are all open 
and clear and it is plentifully supplied with excellent water by a spring in 
its centre.19 
                                                                 
15 The use of the word ‘hospital’ is meant to represent the collection of houses used by the navy to house 
men onshore at Port Royal prior to the erection of the hospital at New Greenwich. 
16 NMM, ADM/F/7, Sick and Hurt to Admiralty, 17 January 1746. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
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Still unsure of the exact reason for the eruption in intermittent fevers, Hume thought it was 
possible that the hot and cold temperature fluctuations were the cause, although from his 
letter, he appeared hesitant to completely disregard the idea that the hospital’s location was 
to blame.  Again he wrote: 
...there is some noxious quality in the air of the place [the island], 
whatever be the occasion of it, which strongly and constantly favours the 
production and continuance of obstinate intermitting fevers in people of 
all ages and constitutions, is unquestionably evident from what has 
constantly happened to all the sick sent there as well as to the surgeons 
themselves, their mates, to the stewards and their wives, to the agent 
victuallers and storekeeper clerks and to the marine guards doing duty; 
few or none of all these who had lodged a fortnight in or near the 
hospital, escaping an intermitting fever, the consequences whereof often 
proved fatal.20 
Hume’s original suspicions were correct; it was the location of the hospital that triggered 
such high occurrences of intermittent fevers.  A number of morasses laid in close proximity 
to the hospital, although Hume concluded they were too far away to be emitting noxious 
vapours to cause the fevers.  These considerable bodies of stagnant water laid both to the 
east and west of the building.  Hume’s first mate, John Murray, disagreed and remarked 
about the ‘noisome and disagreeable smell’ the morasses emitted which were easily smelled 
at the hospital.21  Modern medicine has since proved that malaria is spread by the Anopheles 
mosquito which breeds in areas of high temperature and stagnated water.  As was discussed 
in Chapter 2, during the eighteenth century, malaria, as with most other diseases, was 
thought to be caused by foul air.  Even the name of the fever ‘mal aria’ literally translates 
from Italian into ‘bad air’.  Insects were never considered as the cause in the 
communication of intermittent fever until the late nineteenth century.  It was the nearby 
position of the morasses and the insects that thrived in their stagnant waters that triggered 
such a high mortality rate at the hospital.  At one point, Hume suggested the morasses be 
drained to rid the hospital of the smell and noxious airs but felt ‘the expense would be 
immense’ and was uncertain if the ‘matters would thereby be mended.’ 22 
In order to combat the raging malaria, Hume wrote to Ogle in December 1744 requesting 
that the ships’ surgeons not send men ashore whose only complaint was an intermittent 
fever.  At that time, the hospital, according to him, already had 300 men and could not 
cope with too many more.  Knowing that intermittent fevers were not contagious, Hume 
                                                                 
20 NMM, ADM/F/7, Sick and Hurt to Admiralty, 17 January 1746. 
21 NMM, ADM/F/7, John Murray to Sick and Hurt, 17 January 1746. 
22 NMM, ADM/F/7, Sick and Hurt to Admiralty, 17 January 1746. 
212 
felt that they would be better treated on board their ships.23  This also prevented sick men 
coming ashore and contracting any further diseases.  Ogle wrote to the surgeons of the ten 
ships on station as well as the surgeon of Port Royal dockyard requesting them to consider 
Hume’s proposals.24  Those surgeons quickly replied suggesting they not only disapproved 
of Hume’s proposal to keep sick men on board, but also attacked his management of the 
hospital and requested that Ogle make a strict enquiry into the practices there. 25  Ogle 
ordered the ships’ surgeons ashore to assess the management of the hospital .  They 
reported that, following an inspection of every ward and nearly every patient, they were 
unable to find a great deal of fault with the state of the hospital.  Their only significant 
observation was regarding the medicines which were kept on site for the patients.  They 
believed that: 
the medicines are good in their kind, and the prescriptions in general well 
adapted to the cases of the patients, but that the Bark given for the 
intermitting fevers at present the epidemic disease, is in too small 
quantities and not repeated as it ought to be, which in great measure is 
owing to the want of [surgeons] mates.26 
Hume explained that there was a shortage of mates because two of them had recently died: 
‘Mr Sterling the third mate [died] that very day [the inspection day]’ and Mr Savage, the 
second mate, since dead, was ill in his bed on the inspection day and unable to assist at the 
hospital in any capacity.27 
John Murray, the former first mate at the hospital was forced to resign his position after 
only 13 months in order to return to England for the recovery of his health.  In Murray’s 
report to the Sick and Hurt Board on the state of New Greenwich hospital , he painted a 
similar picture as Hume of the bad state of patients and the location of the building.  
According to him, he observed ‘that of about 700 men sent during my stay there, I do not 
know of above two or three that were not seized with the intermitting fever after having 
been three weeks in the place, and I am credibly informed that the same observations still 
holds good.’28  He cited the same reasons which Hume had assumed; the location of the 
hospital, the inconvenient structure of the building and the sudden changes and extreme 
ranges in temperature on the island. 
                                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 NMM, ADM/F/7, John Murray to Sick and Hurt, 17 January 1746. 
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At one point in January 1746, the Admiralty discussed whether or not to give an order to 
drain the morasses which they agreed was the likely cause of the rash of intermittent fevers.  
However, nearly ten months later, Captain Mitchell of the Stratford at Jamaica (who was 
temporarily in charge of the Jamaica station following Admiral Daver’s death from yellow 
fever) wrote to the Admiralty suggesting that draining the morasses would be expensive 
and would not prove any benefit to the hospital.29  The Sick and Hurt Board were not 
convinced that Mitchell was correct in his assumption and they immediately wrote to the 
Admiralty expressing their feelings on the undertaking.  The Board said they felt ‘it highly 
necessary [that] it should be drained, if possible to be done for a reasonable expense .’  If 
the Admiralty did not see fit to drain the morasses, the Board proposed, as an alternative, 
that there should be 
some other provision for accommodating His Majesty’s sick and 
wounded seamen set on shore at Jamaica ’ rather than ‘continue to send 
them to a place there is so much reason to be convinced would be the 
destruction of many who might otherwise be recovered of their diseases 
and hurts, and afterwards do good service to their King and their 
country.30 
The Admiralty neglected to respond to the Board regarding the entire matter. 
In May 1748, Rear Admiral Knowles, the new commander-in-chief at Jamaica, wrote to the 
Admiralty complaining about the state of patients at New Greenwich hospital.  In his letter 
Knowles boldly asserted that one-sixth of the money spent erecting and maintaining the 
hospital should have been spent on a facility at Port Royal which would have been ‘more 
commodious, more healthful and securer for the men.’31  The Sick and Hurt Board agreed 
with Knowles, but the Admiralty was not inclined to spend money to rectify the unhealthy 
situation. 
It appears that no further complaints were made to either the Admiralty or the Sick and 
Hurt Board until October 1755 when Commodore Coles sent a letter to the Sick and Hurt 
Board advising of the distress at the hospital.  His observations mirrored those of his 
predecessors; the unhealthy nature of the place was due to its proximity to stagnant water.  
He wrote: 
I perfectly agree...in opinion that many a good seamen has been lost, and 
more will be lost by being sent to that hospital, not for want of care or 
attendance, but purely from the unhealthiness of the situation; since I 
                                                                 
29 NMM, ADM/E/12, Captain Mitchell to Admiralty, 16 April 1747. 
30 NMM, ADM/F/9, Sick and Hurt to Admiralty, 17 April 1747. 
31 NMM, ADM/E/12, Rear Admiral Knowles to Admiralty, 6 July 1748. 
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have commanded here, I have discharged at least 12 strong healthy men 
for watchmen to the King’s stores at Greenwich, and not one of them 
have ever lived eight months, and although there is at the victualling 
office one of the best houses in the island, yet no agent or clerk can be 
prevailed on to live there, so bad an opinion prevails against the 
place...hiring quarters at Port Royal would certainly be of advantage to 
the men...It certainly is by much the healthiest spot on this island, a 
proof of that is, that the inhabitants of Kingston and Spanish Town all 
go there to recover after a fit of sickness and the people of the town are 
seldom sick.  The only disadvantage it lays under is being much exposed 
in case of a hurricane or earthquake; if a small convenient hospital had 
been originally built there, it would not only have saved many men’s 
lives, but a considerable sum to the government.32 
By the following month, Coles was forced to write again, this time to report the death of 
the surgeon, Mr Gascoigne, who was ‘the fifth surgeon who died there within a few 
months.’33  This report from Coles proved the breaking point for the Admiralty.  They 
instructed Rear Admiral Townshend, who was en route to take command of the Jamaica 
station, to consult with Coles to determine the best course of action for relocating the 
hospital to a more conducive location.34  Townshend and Coles wasted little time and by 
July 1756, they submitted a proposal to the Sick and Hurt Board for erecting a new hospital 
at Port Royal along with a plan for the facility.  The Board made minor alterations and 
resubmitted the plan to the Admiralty in August requesting that orders be given 
immediately to commence building (Figure 6.2).  Additionally, they suggested that since the 
hospital at New Greenwich was so sickly, three vessels should be purchased at Jamaica and 
stationed at Port Royal to be fitted out for the temporary use of the sick and wounded.  An 
order was subsequently given by the Admiralty to purchase the three ships as well as an 
order for the Navy Board to purchase land and build the hospital  at Port Royal.  The 
building at New Greenwich was ordered to be sold once it had been stripped of any 
materials that could be used at Port Royal.35 
                                                                 
32 NMM, ADM/F/12, Commodore Coles to Sick and Hurt, 22 December 1755. 
33 NMM, ADM/F/12, Commodore Coles to Sick and Hurt, 22 January 1756. 
34 NMM, ADM/E/15, Admiralty to Sick and Hurt, 28 January 1756. 
35 NMM, ADM/E/16, Admiralty to Sick and Hurt, 11 August 1756.  NMM, ADM/E/16, Admiralty to Sick 
and Hurt, 18 August 1756. 
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Figure 6.2 – Sick and Hurt Board Plan for Port Royal Hospital, August 175636 
After nearly fifteen years of complaining from surgeons and admirals on the Jamaica 
station, a second naval hospital at Port Royal was erected.  Records do not exist to attest to 
the exact number of men who were lost due to the disastrous location of the New 
Greenwich hospital, although it is safe to estimate that Hume’s figures from 1744 of a 
roughly 30 per cent death rate would have carried on for the remainder of the time the 
                                                                 
36 AL, Portfolio B40, Sick and Hurt plan for Port Royal Hospital, 6 August 1756. 
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hospital stayed operational and the number of men invalided would have likely averaged 
around 15 per cent. 
Incidents of mortality dropped with the hospitals relocation to Port Royal.  Once the care 
of men became more straightforward, the attention shifted to the practices of agents 
supplying the hospital with its necessaries.  Messieurs Meyler, Hall & Torry were the first 
agents appointed to the new hospital at Port Royal.  Within a very brief time period they 
angered Rear Admiral Holmes who wrote to the Admiralty to complain.  Holmes detested 
the agents, noting they had ‘most effectually rendered themselves completely unworthy of 
the least notice or regard from me’ and that he would not ‘have the least connection or 
intercourse with them.’37  In 1761, he requested that both the Sick and Hurt Board and the 
Victualling Board cancel their contracts with the agent and suitable replacements found 
right away.  Holmes’s chief complaint was that they refused to submit weekly abstracts 
which would provide a ‘cheque upon the agents and pursers’ in order for him to ‘remedy 
two evils that are of the greatest hurt to the seamen, that is bad bread and bad rum.’38 
Among Holmes’s numerous complaints was a suggestion that the victuals were 
substandard.  He said: 
the seamen have been obliged to live upon bad bread at sea, or the ships 
must have broke off their cruises long before the time appointed and 
long before the four months were expired for which that bread is 
warranted.  The bad bread being in this manner expended from 
necessity, no room was left for the survey on the return of the ship into 
port; or at most a very small part remained to be surveyed; and even that 
was saved by the Agents gladly taking it into store and giving good bread 
in his room.  By this means few surveys have gone home, and the ships 
have been thought to be always well supplied.  A suspicion that this 
might [not] be the case and a desire to remedy it induced me to order in 
weekly abstracts from whence I could see all the different augmentations 
of bread and flour that were brought into the stores, and the exact 
expense of the same, in the weekly supplies made to the squadron; from 
both which I could be able to judge, from the time the supplies of real 
good bread and flour were made by the importation of the same into this 
country by the contractors, to the time of warranty, when it might be 
expected not to be serviceable for the length of cruise.  And by this 
means, I should have been able to fix the badness of the bread upon the 
ill supplies of the contractors, or the ill management or foul play of the 
agents.39 
                                                                 
37 NMM, ADM/E/34, Rear Admiral Holmes to Admiralty, 27 October 1761. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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When it came to rum, Holmes had a similar distrust of the agents.  New rum was more 
potent and it was cheaper.  He believed the contractors were distributing it rather than rum 
which was much older and not as strong.  He claimed that distributing rum ‘less than three 
months old is the same as using poison and destroys the seamen with fluxes and other 
disorders.’  His solution was for the contractors ‘to buy such quantities of new rum as at 
least, may be able to supply the squadron for three months of the following year with old 
rum, whilst the new continues to be noxious.’  Holmes claimed that the agents had older 
rum in stock which should have been used for benefit of men in hospital, however he 
indicated they were selling off the older rum to the highest bidder and supplementing it 
with new rum which was given to seamen.  If the agents had been ordered to submit 
weekly abstracts, Holmes claimed he could: 
have seen the stock in hand, and by calculating the consumption of the 
squadron I should both have known, whether the stores were opened to 
any other purpose than that of serving His Majesty’s ships; and in case of 
a deficiency, I should have had the opportunity of giving the agents 
timely notice and directions to prepare a proper stock of the old, against 
the season of the new rum.  By this means I would have effectually 
prevented the squadron from being ever ill served in that article. 40 
In the Sick and Hurt Board’s opinion, they were not a fit body to pass judgement on the  
practices of the contractors and instead it was an issue for the Victualling Board.  
Moreover, the commissioners felt that Holmes had overstepped a line by requesting that 
the contractors become accountable to him, rather than to their Board or the Victualling 
Board who signed the original contract for the supplies. 41  Before the Admiralty had a 
chance to determine the best course of action with the agents, the Seven Years War came 
to an end and the decision was made to reduce the service at several foreign stations 
including Jamaica.  The total number of men proposed to be stationed at Jamaica during 
peacetime was estimated at 1,545 and therefore supplies required from contractors and 
agents reduced significantly.42  Seeing as there would be so few men at Jamaica, the 
Admiralty felt the current agents were sufficiently capable of handling the duties and 
allowed them to continue. 
A new surgeon, George Kinghorn, was appointed to the hospital during this time of 
reduced service and it was not long before he was investigated for his poor conduct.  In a 
report to the commissioners from Sir William Burnaby it was claimed that Kinghorn was 
failing in a number of areas which was severely affecting the health of the men ashore.  The 
                                                                 
40 NMM, ADM/E/34, Rear Admiral Holmes to Admiralty, 27 October 1761. 
41 NMM, ADM/F/22, Sick and Hurt to Admiralty, 3 November 1761. 
42 NMM, ADM/E/38, Admiralty to Sick and Hurt, 28 November 1763. 
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biggest complaints were that patients did not receive their dinner until 5 or 6 o’clock in the 
evening, the wine they were served was generally weak and unfit, several of the men had 
been kept on the hospital books after they had deserted or died and lastly that the sick had 
gone without necessary medicines for days through the lack of attention by Kinghorn and 
his assistants.43  These issues troubled both the Admiralty and the Sick and Hurt Board.  
Not only was Kinghorn failing to tend to the men properly, but he was also misreporting 
their status for his own financial gain.  Kinghorn was immediately dismissed and replaced 
by Robert Wood, a dedicated surgeon who remained at Jamaica hospital for the next thirty 
years.44 
Natural disaster was the next issue to affect Port Royal hospital.  In September 1771, a 
minor earthquake struck Jamaica and caused a great deal of damage to the building.  The 
island was no stranger to earthquakes which struck frequently, but according to Rear 
Admiral Sir George Rodney, this most recent one was the worst that had hit Jamaica since 
the great one in 1692.  Wood reported to Rodney that the hospital building suffered 
significant damage and described it in detail: 
...the chimneys of both cookrooms and washhouse are shook down, and 
the walls from top to bottom much shattered, the partition walls dividing 
the several wards are much rent, and the gavel end of the northernmost 
wing, and a southern wall next to the dispensary greatly damaged. 45 
Rodney was concerned about the state of the men who were inside the building during the 
earthquake.  He claimed those men were ‘so terrified that such as were able to crawl out 
could not be induced to go within the walls that night, nor was it without reason as their 
situation was dangerous.’46  Not wishing to wait a few months for his correspondence to 
reach the Admiralty, Rodney authorised the repair of the damages as cheaply as possible 
‘consistent with the good of the service and safety of the patients belonging to the 
hospital.’47 
During the American War of Independence, the correspondence to both the Admiralty and 
the Sick and Hurt Board appear to have been minimal and mainly concerned minor 
building repairs.  Following the conclusion of the war, hospital service was decreased due 
                                                                 
43 NMM, ADM/E/39, Admiralty to Sick and Hurt, 5 July 1764. 
44 The fact that Robert Wood was able to serve at Port Royal hospital for so long is testament to how 
improved health was at the relocated hospital.  The hospital at New Greenwich went through at least half 
dozen surgeons in a year, all of which were lost to disease.  Robert Wood was a dedicated surgeon who 
provided stability in an often dangerous tropical climate. 
45 TNA, ADM 97/86, Admiral Rodney to Sick and Hurt, 19 September 1771. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
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to the reduced number of men on the station.48  Rear Admiral Rowley, the commander-in-
chief on the Jamaica station, proposed that some major works be carried out on the 
hospital while there was a reduction in service and instructed the naval surveyor, Nathaniel 
Watts, to make a survey of the buildings in their present condition.  It had been nearly 
thirty years since the hospital at Port Royal had been built and during that period it had 
resisted at least three minor earthquakes and undergone only minimal maintenance.  In 
Watt’s report he outlined the necessary repairs which were necessary: 
The roof of the dispensary [is] so much decayed as to require the greatest 
part being new shingled.  The gutter between the dispensary and the 
wards adjoining is decayed and very leaky to the great damage of the 
walls, requires being new planked and laid with lead.  The steward’s 
room and many places in the wards...are in need of new plastering and 
every part throughout the whole, scraping and whitewashing...Many of 
the windows require new hanging and bottom stiles and the shutters new 
hinges...The piazzas and balconies on three sides of the wards and the 
galleries of communication are in many parts decayed and defective viz. 
the northmost gallery of communication next [to] the kitchen and the 
washhouse is very much inclined towards the court owing to the ground 
sills and lower part of the columns being decayed...49 
Watts estimated the total amount needed to carry out the works was £1,811-13s-8½d, 
which would ensure the hospital was sound enough for a number of years.  The Admiralty 
was not entirely prepared to spend such a large sum of money on a hospital servicing a 
squadron made up of less than 1,500 men.  For once, the delay in the Admiralty’s response 
to authorise repairs to the hospital proved a savings to the Crown.  While waiting for the 
Admiralty to approve the works, a devastating hurricane hit Jamaica on the 31 July 1784.  
So severe was the storm that most of the vessels in the harbour either lost their masts or 
were driven ashore with the loss of many lives.  Before the island was able to recover, it 
was once again devastated when another hurricane struck, this time on the 27 August 1785.  
This second hurricane was stronger than the previous one, it lasted longer and caused a 
greater degree of damage.  Following the second hurricane, the hospital was truly in 
desperate need of repairs.  The surgeon, Robert Wood, forwarded an estimate of the 
necessary repair work which amounted to £2,734-15s-7d.50  When the estimate arrived in 
London, the Admiralty authorised all proposed repairs as they appreciated the hospital had 
suffered a great deal of damage along with routine wear and tear. 
                                                                 
48 NMM, ADM/E/43, Admiralty to Sick and Hurt, 18 August 1783.  The number of men proposed to serve 
on the Jamaica station during peacetime was 1,480. 
49 NMM, ADM/E/43, Nathaniel Watts to Rear Admiral Rawley, 22 October 1783. 
50 NMM, ADM/E/44a, Admiralty to Sick and Hurt, 13 December 1785. 
220 
Improvement work at the hospital did not end there.  In January 1796 Rear Admiral 
Parker, the commander-in-chief, requested a wall be erected around the hospital to help 
prevent desertion.  In his letter he justified the building of the wall: 
It is a known fact from the very high wages given to seamen that 
whenever a man is tolerably recovered at the hospital even before the 
surgeon considers him in a state of convalescence if he is not taken on 
board his ship he certainly runs away, this occasions frequent relapses 
from which many never recover and the loss of more seamen by death 
than would otherwise be the case, but from this necessity.   As I am 
thoroughly sensible its out of the power of the surgeon and his assistants 
to prevent desertion under the present circumstances of the hospital but 
which is very possible to remedy by building a wall along the shore from 
the side walls of the hospital to completely enclose its territory, desertion 
may be altogether prevented.51 
To further validate his point, he continued to rationalise the need for the wall and how it 
would deter the men from running: 
At present a boat may land upon the shore of the hospital yard in open 
day and take men off as there are always many there under the plea of 
the necessary or other pretence.  The idea hitherto to prevent desertion 
has been the running the side wall into the sea so far as to prevent men 
wading round; [or] by running a wall along the shore from one side wall 
of the hospital to the other about five feet high with iron railing over 
that the circulation of air so essential to health in this country may not be 
prevented and which I am confident is the only means to prevent 
desertion.52 
Desertion was not the only evil Parker thought the wall would thwart.  He claimed that by 
building the wall around the perimeter, the surgeon would also be able to control the influx 
of rum.  It appeared to Parker that rum was frequently got into the wards due to low 
windows and the lack of guards to monitor the facility.  It only took three days for the 
Admiralty to approve the request and to order the commissioners to move ahead with the 
project without delay.53  Their willingness to approve the erection of the hospital wall was 
driven by the need to convalesce men and return them to service as the French Revolution 
was raging in Europe and it was imperative for England to defend her valuable West 
Indian colonies from the French forces.  They considered the hospital integral to the navy’s 
operations in the West Indies, and before the end of the century, upwards of 8,000 men 
were sent to the hospital at some point for treatment, the majority of whom were returned 
to service. 
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52 Ibid. 
53 NMM, ADM/E/45, Admiralty to Sick and Hurt, 7 January 1796. 
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Hospital muster books were returned to the Admiralty on a quarterly basis.  Unfortunately 
musters that cover the majority of the eighteenth century at Port Royal hospital have not 
been retained.  They do exist from the Ladyday quarter 1793 to 1806 (the end of the survey 
period) and beyond.  Using the muster books and the Admiralty list books it is possible to 
compare the number of men recorded as part of the ships’ complement on the Jamaica 
station for each year with the number sent to Port Royal hospital (Table 6.2).  Also from 
these musters it is possible to get an accurate representation of the diseases they suffered 
from and ascertain their ultimate fate.  A number of significant patterns and trends can be 
determined through the manipulation of the data.  Not surprisingly, the most frequent 
ailment suffered by seamen on that tropical station was fever (Table 6.3). 
 
Table 6.2 – Comparison of Average Number of Men Sent to Port Royal Hospital versus the Average 
Number of Men on Station, 1793-180654 
                                                                 
54 TNA, ADM 102/426, ADM 102/427, ADM 102/428, ADM 102/429, ADM 102/430, ADM 102/431, 
ADM 102/432, ADM 102/433 Jamaica Hospital Muster Books.  In 1793, the Muster books for the first two 
quarters of the year were submitted as routine; however the second half of the year was lumped into one large 
submission with 1794.  In 1800, only two quarters were submitted with descriptions and therefore only that 
information was used for the percentages.  In 1801, there was only one quarter which held detailed 
information and therefore that is what the percentages are based on. 
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Table 6.3 – Breakdown of Diseases Afflicting Men at Port Royal Hospital , 1793-180655 
The documented outbreak of fevers in the West Indies from 1793 to 1798 is clearly seen 
from the data extracted from the hospital musters which significantly reduced once the 
outbreak ended.  Regrettably the recordkeeping in the 1800 and 1801 muster books was 
not as meticulous and most entries were catalogued with an ‘unspecified’ disease.  Data 
concerning the fate of seamen sent to the hospital can also be extracted from the muster 
books.  When fevers were raging at Jamaica, a considerable percentage of men died from 
the disease, but when fevers abated, the majority of men were discharged back to service 
(Table 6.4).  A large percentage of men died during those key years, particularly in 1796 
when the mortality rate was 35.5 per cent.  In the healthier year of 1800, when only 15.7 
per cent of seamen were sent to the hospital suffering from fevers, the mortality rate was 
only 12.9 percent.  The number of invalids in 1802 is somewhat misleading.  While there 
was a break in fighting during that year, the surgeon at Jamaica took the opportunity to 
send a large number of invalids back to England, the majority of which had ‘remained’ in 
hospital from the previous year.  That high proportion of invalids distorts the figures for 
the year, when in fact the majority of seamen that were sent to the hospital that year were 
discharged back to service. 
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Table 6.4 – Percentage of Men Discharged, Invalided, Dead, Run & Remaining at Port Royal 
Hospital, 1793-180656 
Overall, the Admiralty’s attention to the erection of a naval hospital at Jamaica significantly 
contributed to the health of men stationed there.  Although many men lost their lives when 
the first hospital was erected at New Greenwich, it was an unforeseeable situation.  Since 
the medical understanding was not comprehensive enough to realise the implications of 
putting so many men within the vicinity of stagnant water and malaria-carrying mosquitoes.  
Reasons for the high level of illness were blamed on temperature fluctuations and the lack 
of proper ventilation.  Once the naval hospital was relocated to Port Royal, incidences of 
deadly fevers subsided and the surgeon was able to carry on the business of caring for men 
until they were well enough to return to service.  The hospital served the Jamaica fleet well 
into the French Revolution and beyond.  Hospital musters prove integral to understanding 
the types of diseases most affecting the squadron and from these musters it is possible to 
determine what happened to each man after he was admitted.  The majority of men 
returned to service while a smaller percentage died or were invalided.  There can be little 
doubt that the purpose-built hospital at Port Royal played a strategic role in making those 
statistics possible. 
Barbados 
The island of Barbados had been under the control of the English government since 1627 
(Figure 6.3).  It was considered part of the Leeward Islands station with naval ships sailing 
regularly between it and Antigua.  In terms of contracting for the care of seamen on that 
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island, it was frequently the case that the contractor for Antigua was also responsible for 
Barbados.  From as early as the 1740s, that contract was held by Henry Lascelles, a 
merchant of London.  According to his contract he was ordered to provide an able surgeon 
as well as providing: 
[sick] quarters, fresh beef, mutton broth or any other necessary 
provisions as shall be thought by the surgeon or doctor convenient for 
them, and that each man shall be allowed one pound of good wholesome 
bread, one pound of good and wholesome fresh meat, and one pint of 
good and sound Madeira wine, or in lieu thereof, one pint of punch, to 
those whom the doctor or surgeon shall judge proper, with butter 
according to the custom of the navy.  And those so weak as meat shall 
not be judged fit for, are to have rice, eggs, cheese or any other 
provision, in such proportion as shall be sufficient for their maintenance, 
as the doctor or surgeon shall prescribe.57 
Aside from victuals, Lascelles was also contracted to supply other necessaries which 
included fire, water, candles, platters, spoons and soap, and the expense of washing...also 
[a] proper person that can speak English as [a] nurse to attend them, during the time of 
their being in the hospital.’58  For his service, Lascelles was paid 13s-4d for the cure of each 
man, and 2s-2d per man per day for provisions and necessaries.  An extra allowance of 1s 
was offered for the first twenty days that a man entered his care suffering from small pox.  
Finally, Lascelles was offered 10s to cover funeral expenses for men that died in the 
hospital. 
At that time, using the contractor system at Barbados made the most sense to the 
Admiralty.  The total number of men ordered for service on that island was not nearly as 
high as Jamaica, so the outlay of money to build a permanent hospital was not practical.  By 
using this system, the Admiralty knew they were in a favourable situation.  The main 
burden fell on Lascelles, for he was the one who was required to make contracts with locals 
for all provisions and necessaries as well as arranging for staff to attend the sick.  Once the 
contract with Lascelles was signed, the Admiralty’s only duty was to verify his submitted 
invoices and pay for services rendered.  And since the price was agreed with the contractor, 
the Crown was not stuck with an exorbitant bill for unforeseen expenses; the extra costs, if 
there were any, were the responsibility of Lascelles. 
                                                                 
57 NMM, ADM/F/8, Sick and Hurt to Admiralty, 16 May 1746. 
58 A copy of a contract made between the Sick and Hurt Board and Henry Lascelles dated 1744 is located in 
Appendix 7. 
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Figure 6.3 – Map of Barbados 
Complaints about the level of service Lascelles’s provided were made to the Sick and Hurt 
Board by the commanding officers at Barbados.  They claimed he was not supplying a 
number of items which he was contracted to do which was adversely affecting the care of 
men on shore.  Lascelles had a set of complaints of his own.  The majority of his 
grievances were a result of the fluctuating costs of provisions and necessaries, especially 
during war time when prices escalated.  This fluctuation in price affected the quality and 
amount of provisions the sick at Barbados received, which, in turn, caused the complaints 
from the officers on station.  By September 1761, the commissioners had heard enough 
from both parties and concluded that changes to the contractor system were necessary.  
They wrote a letter to the Admiralty proposing that surgeons and dispensers be supplied by 
the navy rather than the contractor at both Barbados and Antigua.  By appointing their 
own surgeons and dispensers, the Sick and Hurt Board ensured an approved naval surgeon 
with knowledge of diseases regularly suffered by seamen took responsibility for the sick on 
shore.  The Board proposed that the navy-appointed surgeons and dispensers should be 
paid a fixed salary of £250 and £120 per annum respectively rather than per man per 
cure.59  The Board also requested that a permanent hospital be built at Barbados as they 
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realised the newly-opened one at Port Royal proved very effective.  The Admiralty’s reply 
authorised the sending out of a surgeon and dispenser to the island as proposed; however 
their letter contained no mention of erecting a hospital indicating they were not prepared 
to discuss such a vast financial undertaking.60 
In November 1761, Edward Clark was named as the first navy-appointed surgeon at 
Barbados and Robert Smith was appointed the dispenser.61  They were sent out to 
Barbados the following month and arrived in early 1762.62  It was not long after their 
arrival that the Seven Year’s War came to an end and the Sick and Hurt Board proposed a 
reduction in foreign hospital service.  The Board believed there was a need for an 
establishment in Barbados; however they realised the number of men on the station would 
drastically decrease.  On those grounds, they reduced the surgeon’s salary to £150, but 
maintained the dispenser’s salary at £120.63  Barbados was not the principal island on the 
Leeward Islands station: Antigua served that purpose since the navy had established a 
dockyard there some years past.  Antigua also had a hospital (although not a permanent 
one like Jamaica) and in 1773 it was determined that due to the small number of men 
serving in the Leeward Island squadron, they no longer required a hospital and surgeon in 
Barbados.64  A survey was made by the Board to calculate both the number of men ashore 
from the time the service was reduced in 1764 until 1773 (Table 6.5). 
Year Total Expense Number of Men received on Shore 
1764 £280/14s/3d 465 
1765 £279/13s/3d 96 
1766 £280/5s/4d 135 
1767 £280/5s/4d 123 
1768 £280/5s/4d 93 
1769 £280/5s/4d 116 
1770 £280/5s/4d 46 
1771 £280/5s/4d 52 
1772 £160/5s/4d 49 
1773 £160/5s/4d 14 
Table 6.5 – Number of Sick Men Sent Ashore at Barbados, 1764-177365 
Initially the hospital remained effective, treating nearly 500 patients the year service was 
reduced.  In 1770, the number of men sent ashore reduced by over half of what it had been 
in the preceding five years, a pattern which continued for the next two years.  Before the 
                                                                 
60 NMM, ADM/E/34, Admiralty to Sick and Hurt, 1 October 1761. 
61 NMM, ADM/E/34, Admiralty to Sick and Hurt, 27 November 1761. 
62 NMM, ADM/F/22, Sick and Hurt to Admiralty, 17 December 1761. 
63 NMM, ADM/F/24, Sick and Hurt to Admiralty, 25 May 1763. 
64 NMM, ADM/E/39, Admiralty to Sick and Hurt, 9 May 1764.  The total number of men proposed to be 
on the Leeward Islands station was 1,105. 
65 TNA, ADM 98/10, Sick and Hurt to Admiralty, 13 September 1774. 
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Admiralty spent any more money to maintain the hospital, the decision was made to close 
it in 1773.66 
It was not long before England was once again at war, this time with the rebellious 
American colonies.  When France entered the war on the American side, England’s strategy 
for victory shifted southward.  The English planned to attack the lucrative island of St 
Lucia in the southern West Indies to deliver a severe blow to the French forces.  Barbados 
was the most obvious choice to serve as a base and when Admiral Barrington arrived there 
in July 1778 to carry out his orders to attack St Lucia, he was annoyed to discover that the 
naval hospital there had been closed five years prior.67  He wrote to the Sick and Hurt 
Board to detail the troubles he met with upon his arrival.  The seamen from the Prince of 
Wales were very sickly and Barrington was forced to send them ashore and establish a 
hospital for their recovery.  The Board advised Barrington to only rent sick quarters as 
needed and not to contract with anyone to manage a hospital.68  Before he received the 
letter, Barrington had already contracted with merchants on the island for them to provide 
a hospital or sufficient sick quarters with bedding for 100 patients and to perform the 
victualling.  Additionally he had employed a surgeon, who was a resident of the island, to 
attend the sick and so the system continued until Barrington was recalled to England in 
1779.69 
Barrington was relieved on the Leeward Islands station by Admiral Sir George Rodney.  
Rodney was no stranger to the West Indies; he previously served as the commander-in-
chief of the Jamaica station from 1771 to 1774.  Accompanying him on this appointment 
was Gilbert Blane, a young man who attended Rodney as his personal physician.  Rodney 
quickly realised Blane was an extremely talented and diligent doctor and appointed him 
Physician of the Fleet.  Together, both men worked toward raising the level of health by 
examining the system of caring for men onshore.  Realising it was an enormous task, 
Rodney wrote to the Sick and Hurt Board requesting that a representative from their Board 
be permanently located in the Leeward Islands.  Rodney felt that: 
...the magnitude of the squadron in the West Indies above what it has 
been in former wars has necessarily rendered the business of the 
commander-in-chief more complex and the powers with which I have 
the honour to be vested throws upon me in a great measure the 
management of all the different departments: the business of the yards is 
                                                                 
66 Alan G. Jamieson, ‘War in the Leeward Islands: 1775-1783’ (PhD dissertation, University of Oxford, 1981), 
p. 75. 
67 TNA, ADM 1/310, Rear Admiral Barrington to Admiralty, 13 July 1778. 
68 TNA, ADM 98/12, Sick and Hurt to Admiralty, 20 March 1780. 
69 Ibid. 
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indeed managed by a commissioner and the subordinate officers, but 
there is another department equally important in that unhealthy climate 
namely that of the sick and wounded.  In this there are not suitable 
appointments made and my time and attention being employed in the 
other arrangements also of so great a fleet as well as the general objects 
of war, I had no leisure to manage and settle the particulars referred to 
me.  A want of order therefore unavoidably took place in the 
management and accommodation of the sick to which I cannot but 
ascribe in part the mortality that prevailed.  In order to remedy this, I beg 
you will request their Lordships that some person be appointed to this 
department with the powers of a commissioner.70 
His request for a commissioner to be appointed to the Leeward Island station was denied.  
Both he and Blane realised that they were going to have to work extremely hard to keep the 
squadron healthy without much support from the Board.  One of their first orders to 
maintain health was the distribution of additional rations of fresh fruit.  Despite not 
understanding the nutritional value of why fresh fruits proved beneficial, they understood 
enough of their good effects to know they kept seamen healthy.  Aside from providing 
additional rations of fresh food, the pair championed the use of Peruvian Bark, alkaline 
salt, lemons and oranges to provide relief for men suffering from ‘the fatal diseases of the 
climate of the West Indies.’71 
Rodney also sent a report to the Sick and Hurt Board attesting to the state of the facilities 
at various locations on the Leeward Island station.  In the letter he highlighted the lack of 
attention shown by the Board to the medical services in that region and once again 
requested a permanent commissioner to be placed there to regulate and stabilise the 
service.72  At Barbados, specifically, Rodney recounted the troubles Barrington faced upon 
his arrival at the island with no established hospital combined with a large number of sick 
seamen.  According to Rodney, Barrington’s hospital contract which established a hospital 
for 100 men was not adequate enough and cited the number of sick men on shore at 
Barbados at particular times was between 500 and 600 men.  Following his complaint to 
the Sick and Hurt Board about the state of facilities, Rodney was forced to write once again 
to the Board advising of damage to the hospital at Barbados caused by the Great Hurricane 
of 1780.73  He claimed the hospital had been destroyed and it was not ‘possible to 
                                                                 
70 NMM, ADM/E/43, Admiralty to Sick and Hurt, 4 December 1781. 
71 NMM, ADM/E/43, Admiralty to Sick and Hurt, 10 December 1781. 
72 TNA, ADM 98/14, Sick and Hurt to Admiralty, 10 December 1781. 
73 The Great Hurricane of 1780 ravaged the islands of Barbados, St Lucia, and Martinique in the early part of 
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of 200 miles per hour.  The French fared no better, losing an estimated 40 ships and 4,000 soldiers.  
Martinique and Barbados had the highest casualty rates:  The best estimation is that upwards of 9,000 people 
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accommodate on shore one half of the sick in the fleet.’  He therefore, ‘ordered milk and 
vegetables to be supplied for the sick on board and...it had produced a good effect .’74  The 
surgeon was eventually able to secure the use of a house capable of accommodating 400 
sick men and there was no immediate need for the navy to erect a permanent structure.75 
It appears that the house rented for use as sick quarters fully answered the needs of the sick 
as well as providing housing for the officers.  Sir Samuel Hood, the commander-in-chief at 
Barbados in 1782 (in Rodney’s absence) submitted a request to erect a wall around the 
hospital with a guardhouse at the entrance.  Additionally he requested a hospital ship to be 
stationed in the bay.  The surgeon of Barbados hospital, Mr Crawford, was on leave in 
England and was asked to attend the Sick and Hurt Board to discuss Hood’s proposals.  
Crawford believed that the total cost to erect a wall around the hospital required an outlay 
of £1,200 local currency, but he indicated that the contract with the supplier of the hospital 
was coming up for renewal and he felt that half the expense to erect the wall could be 
made a condition of the new contract.76  The commissioners were happy to agree for the 
wall to become the partial responsibility of the contractor, feeling that any savings to 
government were welcomed.  They did have a concern over the placement of a hospital 
ship at Barbados in addition to the hospital.  Instead of a hospital ship, the Board 
suggested that a convalescent ship be anchored in Carlisle Bay.  A convalescent ship would 
be more advantageous because it was akin to a ‘ward in the hospital...as the seamen can 
more easily be prevented from drunkenness and debauchery of all sorts; and they will enjoy 
a cooler and more refreshing air than on shore. ’77  They instructed that ‘recovering patients 
from the hospital only are to be sent on board the convalescent ships as soon as they can 
with safety lay in a hammock, and no men are to be immediately sent thither from the 
King’s ships.’ 
By 1787 the wall had been erected around the hired hospital, however the surgeon felt the 
situation was still inadequate.  He requested the Admiralty to purchase the hired quarters so 
the facility could become a permanent naval fixture.  The Admiralty considered the request 
and ordered the Sick and Hurt Board to investigate the merit of the idea in greater detail.78  
The commissioners were not keen on the surgeon and suggested he was ‘not an officer in 
whom we ever had much confidence and he has always endeavoured to introduce expenses 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
perished in Martinique from a huge storm surge and in Barbados some 4,000 people died.  
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history.do?action=Article&id=51598. [last accessed 25 January 2009]. 
74 TNA, ADM 98/14, Sick and Hurt to Admiralty, 10 December 1781. 
75 Ibid. 
76 TNA, ADM 98/14, Sick and Hurt to Admiralty, 18 January 1782. 
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not really necessary.’  They also believed he had misrepresented the state of the sick on 
shore at Barbados and that his proposal to purchase this hospital would somehow benefit 
him financially.  As a result of this distrust, the Board wrote to Commodore Parker on the 
Leeward Islands station ordering him to supersede the surgeon and to find a suitable 
replacement who did not believe it was necessary for the Admiralty to spend money 
unnecessarily to purchase the rented hospital.79 
Not having a replacement to hand, Parker was forced to advertise.  Since it was peace time, 
the Admiralty was not prepared to pay a set salary for a surgeon; instead they offered the 
rate of 13s-4d per man per cure.  According to the previous quarter’s return, only two men 
were sent on shore and if things carried on that way, any surgeon taking up the post would 
earn next to nothing.  Parker advertised the position for three weeks and had no 
response.80  Realising that no interest would come from further advertisement, he advised 
that unless some salary be provided in peacetime, the hospital was pointless because: 
men capable of moving about if inclined to liquor had better be on 
board their ships than [ashore]; therefore with so small a peace 
establishment under these circumstances I think it may drop altogether, 
as I am aware it will be great saving to government...the [hospital] at 
present occupied [is] in a state of tumbling down, beside being open to 
every species of vice and drunkenness, [resulting in] the loss of the men 
to the service and their country instead of being restored to health. 81 
The Admiralty refused to provide a salary for a surgeon at Barbados and in lieu of locating 
an appropriate person, Parker was forced to use the ships’ surgeons to attend men ashore 
at the hospital.82  While the hospital remained open during peacetime, it operated on a 
much-reduced service.  Within a few years, the island once again became vital with the 
outbreak of the French Revolution.  Although the West Indies did not feature too 
prominently during the war, England sent out a large number of men to protect her 
colonial interests and trade.  In 1802, with a break in the fighting, the Admiralty made the 
decision to close the hospital at Barbados and all excess stores were sent to the hospital at 
Antigua. 
War was never out of sight and only one year later, a surgeon had to be appointed at 
Barbados to handle the number of sick sent ashore.  Until someone could be found for 
that role, John Lucie Smith, the man in charge of caring for sick prisoners of war at that 
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island, hired a house for the sick men and procured necessaries such as beds, bedding, 
flannel clothing and hospital utensils.  In addition he hired a dispenser, a clerk and nurses 
to attend the sick.83  By the end of 1803, George Vance, surgeon of the Theseus, was 
appointed the surgeon at a salary of £300 per annum.84 
For the remainder of the study period the hospital at Barbados remained busy, housing 
anywhere between 100 and 300 sick men per quarter (see Table 6.6).  Fully aware of the 
benefits of having permanent naval hospitals established both at home and abroad, the Sick 
and Hurt Board wrote to Commodore Hood in order for him to determine the cost of 
building a hospital at that island to accommodate 200 men.85 
Year 
Ladyday 
Quarter 
Midsummer 
Quarter 
Michaelmas 
Quarter 
Christmas 
Quarter 
TOTAL 
1795 22 36 43 77 178 
1796 260 343 92 43 738 
1797 95 56 17 28 196 
1798 31 62 42 72 207 
1803 N/A N/A 34 156 190 
1804 178 32 75 235 520 
1805 134 135 272 181 722 
1806 172 162 N/A N/A 334 
Table 6.6 – Total Number of Men Sent Ashore at Barbados, 1795-180686 
In August 1804, Commodore Hood returned a detailed estimate for the erection of a 
hospital at Barbados.87  Hood investigated two pieces of land which were in close proximity 
to one another and roughly costing £3,000 local currency each.  He suggested that the navy 
purchase both plots of land and to ‘take as much as [they] wanted and have out the other, 
not to be built on, which would prevent any nuisances from small liquor mobs etc , and 
would join the army land, which would completely prevent any people living between.’88  
Hood’s estimate to construct a wooden building 100 feet in length, 25 feet in width and 24 
feet in height with galleries around the main building was £3,710-6s-7d sterling.89 
The thesis survey period elapses prior to the Admiralty deciding what to do about a naval 
hospital in Barbados and therefore is not dealt with in greater detail here.  It is worth 
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noting that within a few years of Hood submitting his estimate, the navy erected a purpose-
built hospital for the reception of sick men near Carlisle Bay. 
***** 
Hospital musters were submitted quarterly for Barbados and are available from 1795 to 
1806 and beyond, save for four years when the hospital was closed and during the early 
period of its reinstatement.  For most years, fevers were the most frequently occurring 
illnesses, but they affected less than half the men sent to Barbados hospital (Table 6.7).  
Fevers occurred the most in 1796 which coincides with the outbreak in the West Indies 
from 1793 to 1798.  In that specific year, 64 per cent of seamen sent to the hospital were 
suffering from that particular disease compared to 1806 when only 15 per cent of men 
were sent ashore with the same complaint. 
 
Table 6.7 – Breakdown of Diseases Afflicting Men at Barbados Hospital , 1795-180690 
Figures from the muster books also denote whether each seaman was either discharged 
from the service, if they died or if they deserted.  The majority of seamen were discharged 
back to service while only a small number died in the hospital.  When Hood submitted an 
estimate for erecting a hospital, the number of men sent onshore was extremely high 
(Figure 6.8).  In 1805, that figure nearly reaches 600 men while only two years prior less 
than 200 were sent to the hospital. 
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Table 6.8 – Percentage of Men Discharged, Invalided, Dead, Run & Remaining at Barbados 
Hospital, 1795-180691 
St Lucia, Martinique and Cuba 
These three locations deserve a survey, albeit a much more abbreviated one.  No 
permanent facility was ever erected at any one of these islands nor was it ever a 
consideration.  The islands were used mainly during times of war; convenient locations 
where officers felt the men could be housed in order to regain their health and return to 
service. 
St Lucia was in French hands at the outbreak of the Seven Years War, but by 1762 the 
island had been captured by the British.  During the fighting to capture the island, the 
surgeon appointed to treat men onshore was handed his first assignment.  Eleven men 
belonging to the bomb vessel Basilisk were badly burned over their entire bodies while 
destroying a French magazine on the island.92  The surgeon, George Vaughan, had neither 
a facility on the island to attend them nor did he have an agent to supply him with 
necessaries like linens and other dressings.  Without key suppliers lined up, Vaughan was 
forced to spend his own money to procure material to treat the men’s severe burns.  As 
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there were no arrangements on shore, the Sick and Hurt Board honoured his request to be 
reimbursed his considerable expenditure amounting to £10.93 
The island once again passed back to French control, but that did not last long.  Vice 
Admiral John Byron captured the island again in late 1778 while D’Estaing and his 
squadron were 56 kilometres away at Martinique.94  St Lucia was, as Admiral Rodney had 
predicted, the base from which the English could watch the movements of the French due 
to its proximity to Martinique where the French fleet was based.95  Following the capture of 
the island, Byron’s fleet was wracked by typhus and scurvy and it was necessary for him to 
land the sick men at St Lucia for the recovery of their health.  Unfortunately for Byron, 
there was a lack of facilities to support the fleet on the island; it had no dockyard and no 
naval hospital.  The men were landed at Gros Islet Bay where he was forced to lodge them 
in huts and tents with the surgeons of the fleet going ashore each day to attend them. 96 
 
Figure 6.4 – Map of St Lucia 
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In July 1780, Rodney, who had assumed control of the Leeward Islands squadron, wrote to 
the Sick and Hurt Board to disclose the good effects of moving the temporary hospital 
arrangements from Gros Islet Bay just offshore to Pigeon Island (Figure 6.4).  According 
to him, the men were able to recover faster at the latter location as it provided a fresher 
breeze and was isolated so the men were not tempted to desert nor did they have access to 
alcohol.  He ordered small temporary hospitals, similar to sheds, to be built for the sick 
men ‘till such time as it might be determined whether the island might remain a part of the 
British Empire in which case it undoubtedly ought to be the place a general hospital should 
be fixed at.’97  Those hospitals were destroyed by a hurricane in December 1780 and once 
again the men were forced to be housed in temporary huts and tents.  Rodney purchased a 
French-constructed building which had been intended for use as a church at St Lucia  to use 
as the naval hospital.  He had the building removed to Pigeon Island where he felt that the 
‘insular situation would be very advantageous by precluding the men both from straggling 
and drunkenness’ although ultimately he preferred ‘keeping all such as could possibly be 
treated on board their ships under the care of their respective surgeons on board.’98  
Rodney was further convinced that while the war continued, the principal naval hospital 
serving the Leeward Islands squadron must be located at St Lucia since it was the healthiest 
location throughout the West Indies.  He was so adamant that that particular island was the 
principal location in the Leeward Islands that he spared little expense in tending to the 
construction of a new hospital for that purpose.  By July 1781, Rodney had submitted 
nearly £5,000 in invoices for work carried out there. 99  When Rodney was relieved on that 
station, the focus on St Lucia was lessened and once again Antigua became the 
predominant location on the Leeward Islands station.  The navy did not continue to use 
the building at Pigeon Island as a hospital because other islands on the station were better 
suited to care for the fleet. 
***** 
Rodney played a significant role elsewhere in the West Indies, namely at Martinique.  He 
captured the island from the French in 1762 and immediately realised its strategic 
importance.  He quickly sent word to the Sick and Hurt Board reporting his intention to 
use the harbour at Fort Royal as a ‘general rendezvous’ for the ships of his squadron.100  As 
Martinique was going to serve as Rodney’s base of operation on the Leeward Islands 
station, he proposed building a hospital at Fort Royal without delay (Figure 6.5).  The 
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commissioners were not convinced that a permanent facility should be built and instead 
they proposed Rodney follow the usual practice of hiring quarters and contracting with 
someone local for victualling, necessaries and medicines.101  Rodney, who was convinced 
that Fort Royal was an advantageous location, instructed the surgeon at Barbados hospital 
to remove stores from that place and relocate the entire hospital to Martinique.102  But 
before the surgeon and hospital stores could be removed to Fort Royal, the preliminaries 
towards a peace were signed and the Admiralty anticipated a reduction in service in the 
West Indies.103  When the Treaty of Paris was signed at the end of the Seven Years War, 
the French considered the lucrative sugar trade of Martinique so important that they ceded 
all of Canada to the British in order to regain control of the island and the neighbouring 
island of Guadeloupe. 
 
Figure 6.5 – Map of Martinique 
French occupation on the island lasted for over thirty years, however the British managed 
to capture the island once again in 1794.  Admiral Harvey wasted no time in establishing a 
hospital on a tiny island in Fort Royal bay that served both the navy and the army.  
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Leonard Gillespie, who was discussed in Chapter 5, was put in charge of the hospital where 
he served for the next four years.104  Supplies on the island were scarce and Gillespie had a 
difficult task supplying the hospital with necessaries.  Rather than procuring them at an 
inflated rate, the Sick and Hurt Board agreed to send out 400 bed cases, 400 pillows, 666 
pairs of sheets, 666 pillow cases, caps, shirts and 6,000 pounds of curled hair to fill the 
mattresses.105  In order to put the men in a healthier location, Rear Admiral Harvey 
removed the sick from their housing on the island into the Hospital de la Charite near the 
town of Fort Royal.  According to Lloyd and Coulter, this particular building was originally 
a monastery which had been renovated in order to care for the French navy since 1777.106  
The Board maintained that ‘men recover faster afloat from the greater coolness and purity 
of the air and are not subject to intemperance or desertions as they are on shore .’107  
Gillespie was instructed to keep hospital costs down and to satisfy the Board’s request, he 
was only allowed 8d per man per day for those sent onshore.  For that modest amount of 
money, he recognised sick men were indeed better off on their ships rather than on shore 
and the number of seamen sent to Martinique hospital was kept relatively low.108  The navy 
continued with the hospital at Fort Royal until the Treaty of Amiens in 1802 which 
returned the island to France. 
During his time at Martinique, Gillespie had a chance to observe a number of diseases, so 
many in fact that he was able to write two books instructing future captains and surgeons 
on how to treat diseases in tropical climates.  His first work, Advice to Commanders of His 
Majesty’s Fleet serving in the West Indies was published in 1798 while his second work entitled, 
Observations on the Diseases which prevailed in His Majesty’s Squadron in the Leeward Islands was 
published in 1800.  His experience in the West Indies compelled him to recommend that 
Martinique be made the main hospital in the Leeward Islands and he urged the closing of 
Antigua hospital because it had the worst reputation in the West Indies aside from Jamaica 
hospital.109  His recommendation was never a possibility as the French regained control of 
the island briefly after Gillespie was no longer the surgeon and recovered it permanently in 
1814. 
***** 
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When Spain entered the Seven Years’ War early in 1762, they had already taken the 
precaution of bolstering their defences at a number of key ports in the West Indies.  One 
of their most valuable and useful ports was Havana, Cuba, and the Spanish authorities 
dispatched forces to buttress the city’s fortifications.  In June, English forces commenced 
an amphibious attack on the city and by mid-August the Spanish surrendered.  The death 
toll from the 64-day siege for the English was 305 killed in action and 255 who died as a 
result of their wounds.  Once the siege was over the real suffering began.  Victims of 
yellow fever, ‘piled up after the end of human hostilities.’ 110  In October, General 
Albemarle reported that the army had ‘buried upwards of 3,000 men since the 
capitulation.’111  Albemarle lost more soldiers from disease in the two months of peace at 
Havana than the British Army had lost in all of North America during the entire Seven 
Years’ War.112  According to Syrett, by the 18th October the total number of army men who 
died from disease, mainly yellow fever, was 4,708.113  The Royal Navy fared only slightly 
better.  Admiral Pocock reported that from June to October they lost ‘about 800 seamen 
and 500 marines, and eighty-six were killed during the siege but from the number at 
present sick, as their Lordships will observe by the weekly account to be 2,673 and 601 
marines, we have reason to apprehend several of them will die.’114 
During the winter months, the outbreak of yellow fever at Havana subsided to some 
extent.  In January 1763, Pocock authorised the expenditure of £1,500 on Peruvian Bark to 
further lessen the yellow fever amongst his squadron.115  Pocock was not the only one who 
exhausted large sums of money on medicines and necessaries for seamen. 116  As the disease 
occurrences on shore were abundant, the idea of keeping men there for longer than 
necessary was not considered.  Therefore, no naval hospital was ever established at that 
place.  Surgeons were required to attend the sick men on board their ships or in temporary 
quarters in Havana.  Supplies of medicines and necessaries were non-existent on the island 
as most where exhausted by the Spanish before the siege.   The surgeon of the Namur, 
Samuel Ball Sherston, was the first to complain about the on shore medical establishment.  
In a letter to Pocock, the surgeon claimed that he attended a number of sick at Havana in 
addition to his regular duties and desired to be compensated.117  Sherston treated 593 
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seamen in total and provided them with medicines at his own expense which he estimated 
to be $290 local currency and had not received reimbursement.118  Within two weeks, the 
Admiralty agreed to arrange for a payment to be made to Sherston, although they 
acknowledged that normally ‘no allowance should be made to the navy surgeons for 
attending the people of their own ships when sick on shore.’119 
Once the other surgeons at Havana learned of the allowance given to Sherston, they 
forwarded a memorial to the Admiralty requesting to receive the same benefit as their 
colleague.  According to the surgeons, ‘the sick were put onshore into houses or tents, 
where they duly attended them, and furnished medicines, which they purchased from 
diverse parts at a very extravagant price’ and when the medicines ran out they ‘also supplied 
them with their own private stock of provisions and procured them many necessaries 
which their deplorable state stood in need of.’120  According to Mr Jones, the surgeon of 
the Hampton Court present at the siege of Havana, the agent victualler for the fleet did not 
procure a supply of fresh provisions regularly.  In the six weeks he was on shore, Jones 
alleged the victualler furnished fresh food once or twice every seven or eight days.  He 
calculated his own expenses at $238 local currency which he submitted to the Admiralty for 
reimbursement.121  Benjamin Lyon, surgeon of the Pembroke had a similar story.  His ship 
had spent nearly a year and a half in the West Indies before she was ordered to the attack 
on Havana.  By the time his ship sailed, Lyon claimed that the majority of his medicines 
were already expended and he was forced to replenish it at Jamaica before the siege began, 
costing him nearly £60.  Once he arrived at Havana, Lyon was forced to pay over $100 
local currency for Peruvian Bark, opium and other medicines to treat fevers.122 
Once the Sick and Hurt Board read the testimony from all the surgeons involved in taking 
care of men following the siege, they presented their opinion to the Admiralty.  Taking into 
consideration: 
there was not a general hospital, or any hospital ships attendant on the 
fleet, and the memorialists appear to have exerted themselves, and to 
have shown a very commendable zeal for the good of His Majesty’s 
service, and the greatest humanity and tenderness for the sick people, by 
providing for their necessities, even in particulars which it was not a part 
of their duty as surgeons to furnish, and must unavoidably have 
undergone great fatigue, we are humbly of opinion that they have not 
only a right to be repaid the amount of the medicines administered 
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during the time, when according to general practice an hospital on shore 
would have been established, if circumstances would have admitted of it, 
and for necessaries and provisions which they supplied at their own cost, 
but we also think them very deserving of their Lordships’ consideration 
for a reward adequate to their trouble during the said period.123 
The Board agreed that ‘it might be best to repay the surgeons the amount of the medicines 
they expended, together with the sums they actually disbursed for prov isions and 
necessaries, and to make them an allowance in addition thereto for their trouble.’  It was 
agreed that the Board would reimburse each surgeons’ expenditure and ‘as the service at 
the Havana was only temporary we have thought it reasonable to make some advance 
thereon in the proposed allowance to the memorialists, and therefore mentioned £1/5s a 
day.’124  Aside from providing an expensive operation, the siege at Havana proved to both 
the Admiralty and the Sick and Hurt Board that there were definite advantages in 
establishing hospitals for the use of sick men on distant shores.125 
Conclusion 
Early ideas for taking care of sick seamen on shore generally involved renting rooms from 
locals where the men could, theoretically, receive medicines and necessaries until they were 
well enough to return to service.  This sick quarters system was unreliable and it was often 
the case that sick men found themselves lodged in public houses where alcohol was readily 
available.  Alcohol negatively affected the men’s treatment and it was not unusual for 
seamen to either desert the service or hinder their cure to the point that they required 
invaliding from the service.  Both the Admiralty and Sick and Hurt Board knew the sick 
quarters system was not ideal; however there were a number of advantages for using it.  By 
the mid-eighteenth century the sick quarters system had fallen out of favour with the navy.  
They preferred recruiting contractors to handle the day-to-day running of onshore facilities 
dedicated to assisting sick men.  At some foreign locations like St Lucia and Martinique, the 
need to erect a purpose-built facility was not crucial.  The contractor system suited the 
navy’s needs in those places while also keeping costs to a minimum.  At other islands like 
Jamaica and Barbados the navy’s needs were different.  Jamaica was the principal island 
serving the station of the same name, and the main portion of the squadron remained at 
that island.  Therefore in 1740 the decision was made to do away with the contractor 
system and erect a purpose-built naval hospital at New Greenwich.  Despite the setbacks 
and high mortality rate, the hospital remained open for over a decade.  Finally, the 
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Admiralty agreed to build another hospital at Port Royal, which ultimately proved healthier 
and better placed to serve the fleet.  The Admiralty was not keen to repeat the mistakes of 
Jamaica on a different island.  When proposals were submitted to erect hospitals at 
Barbados and St Lucia, they were extremely reluctant to outlay capital for a building that 
might do more harm than good.  Eventually they agreed to erect hospitals at Antigua and 
Barbados as they saw financial benefits from not continually paying rent for buildings they 
had little control over. 
In all, both the Sick and Hurt Board and the Admiralty did a proficient job in securing the 
health of seamen in the West Indies.  Once they appreciated that a few purpose-built 
hospitals in strategic locations ensured the best level of care abroad, the navy wasted little 
time in erecting them.  The level of care the men received also depended largely on the 
surgeons and victualling contractors appointed to each location.  Commanders on each 
station were vigilant when it came to ensuring those men performed their roles at an 
acceptable level.  When a hospital had benefit of both a surgeon and victualling agent 
completing their roles adequately, as was the case at Jamaica with Robert Wood, those 
facilities provided unrivalled settings for seamen to regain their health and return to service. 
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Chapter 7 
Antigua Naval Hospital: A Case Study 
Although the island of Antigua first had contact with Europeans in 1493 during 
Christopher Columbus’s second voyage, European settlement did not occur for over a 
century largely because of Antigua's scarcity of fresh water and its local uprisings.  In 1632, 
a group of Englishmen from St. Kitts established a successful settlement at Antigua, and in 
1674, with Sir Christopher Codrington's arrival, the island entered the sugar trade as many 
of the surrounding islands in the West Indies had already done.  Codrington was an 
enterprising man who had come to Antigua to discover whether or not the island would 
support the sort of large-scale sugar cultivation that already flourished elsewhere in the 
West Indies. His initial efforts proved successful, and over the next fifty years sugar 
cultivation on Antigua exploded.  By the middle of the eighteenth century the is land was 
dotted with more than 150 cane-processing windmills and her exports to Europe and 
North America were extremely profitable.1 
Following the economic boom on the island, Antigua continued to grow in importance to 
the British Government.  The island’s geographical position in the West Indies made it a 
principal location on the main sailing routes to and from Europe for ships laden with 
commodities.  It was at English Harbour, on the southern side of the island, and to a lesser 
extent St Johns located on the northwest side, that the navy established themselves with 
bases for the squadron serving the Leeward Islands.  English Harbour had the only 
careening wharf on the station and after 1744 the dockyard underwent significant 
modifications including the lengthening of the careening wharf and the building of new 
storehouses.2  By carrying out these necessary and expensive works, the navy demonstrated 
their reliance on Antigua as the base of operations on the Leeward Islands station.  No 
other English-held island had facilities equal to that in the West Indies with the exception 
of Jamaica. 
Despite England’s reliance on Antigua both for financial and logistical reasons, the navy 
failed to establish a hospital until much later than Jamaica.  It was not until the 1770s that 
the navy began debating whether or not to erect a purpose-built hospital on the island.  It 
took them over twenty years to go from the development stage to it being operational, 
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2 Duncan Crewe, Yellow Jack and the Worm: British Naval Administration in the West Indies, 1739-1748 (Liverpool: 
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meaning the entire process falls within the survey period of the thesis.  Therefore it is ideal 
for this thesis to examine the whole process of building it as a case study.  This chapter 
thus begins by understanding the system of health care on the island before the 1770s; it 
then reviews the deliberations between the Admiralty and Sick and Hurt Board regarding 
the construction of a hospital; finally it analyses the hospital muster books to ascertain the 
effectiveness of the hospital once it was opened in the 1790s. 
 
Figure 7.1 – Map of Antigua 
Since Antigua was central to the navy’s operations in the West Indies, the Admiralty and 
Sick and Hurt Board decided to manage the sick seamen on shore using the contractor 
system.  Hospital facilities in the mid-eighteenth century were provided and subsisted by 
Henry Lascelles, a London merchant, with strong familial ties in the West Indies.  His 
contract commenced in May 1744 and stipulated that he was responsible for supplying ‘an 
able surgeon’ for ‘the care and cure of such sick and wounded men set on shore on those 
islands, from any of His Majesty’s ships.’3  The remuneration for this service was 13s-4d 
per man per cure.  This fee also covered the cost of Lascelles furnishing sick quarters, fresh 
meat and any other necessary provisions requested by the surgeon.  The men were entitled 
to one pint of good and sound Madeira wine, or a punch containing sugar in lieu when the 
                                                 
3 NMM, ADM/F/8, Sick and Hurt to Admiralty, 16 May 1746.  A copy of the contract entered into between 
the Sick and Hurt Board and Henry Lascelles is included in the letter to the Admiralty.  
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wine was not available.  If men were not fit to be prescribed a diet of fresh meat, Lascelles 
was contracted to provide those men with ‘rice, eggs, cheese or any other provision, in 
such proportion as shall be sufficient for their maintenance.’4 
Lascelles appeared to provide an adequate service under the terms of the contract.  When 
he was no longer employed in that capacity (he died in 1753 which may be the cause of the 
contract termination), the subsequent contractors were assigned the same duties for the 
same pay.  In the early 1750s the contactor employed to care for the men rented a facility in 
an area known as Cobb’s Cross (Figure 7.1).  When Rear Admiral Frankland arrived to take 
over the command of the Leeward Islands station, he found the on shore medical 
arrangements unacceptable.  Firstly, Frankland disapproved of the hospital being at Cobb’s 
Cross, which was located roughly one to two miles away from English Harbour.  Although 
the distance does not seem too great, the lack of passable roads (especially during the rainy 
season) made the trek very difficult and fatal for a number of sick men.  Frankland heavily 
criticised the hospital at Antigua: 
if it may be termed one’ but conveyed that it was ‘on much better 
footing than it was when I arrived, as they now dress their victuals for 
them, keep them clean and under some decorum and order, whereas 
before they had a pound of meat served raw to them which they 
generally sold for rum; and indeed the whole method of putting people 
as sick on shore, and other abuses with regard to sick quarters, were so 
great that the bare mentioning of them is irksome to me.5 
He protested to the contractor’s local agent, Dr Maxwell, for permitting rum to fall into the 
hands of the seamen.  Frankland claimed that the negroes employed at the hospital were to 
blame; however he also realised that rum was brought in by the men’s shipmates.  It was 
not only the rum that Frankland protested against, he found the supply of rice and eggs to 
those men who were not fit to consume fresh meat had not been arranged.  There was also 
a delay in supplying water, sheets, pillow cases, bedding, washing and nurses, and the 
quality of the house used as the temporary hospital was in a ruinous state.  All this was in 
breach of the contract.6 
Frankland sent the captains of the Augusta and Edinburgh, three captains of marines and the 
surgeons of the Anson, Edinburgh and Augusta on shore to investigate the full extent of the 
problem.  Their findings are worth noting at length to fully appreciate the conditions the 
sick were subjected to: 
                                                 
4 NMM, ADM/F/8, Sick and Hurt to Admiralty, 16 May 1746. 
5 NMM, ADM/E/17, Admiralty to Sick and Hurt, 8 December 1756. 
6 Ibid. 
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A surgeon attends once a day, seldom or never twice, as he lives four 
miles distant from it.  No surgeons mate.  The quarters in general very 
bad, particularly the upper wards; and so greatly crowded, that they lay 
even closer than seamen are usually stowed aboard a ship, and several of 
them in hammocks, which obstructs the passage of air in such manner as 
to endanger the infections becoming general.  No Madeira wine has been 
provided in lieu of which punch and small French red wine has been 
issued, but none of the later produced to for us to taste.   Fire and 
candles supplied, water for drinking good, that for making their rice, 
milk, broth and boiling their provisions very muddy, foul and bad, and in 
general complained of, and the surgeons are of opinion very hurtful to 
the men.  No spoons and platters but what the men bring with them.  
None appeared as nurses but three negro women, two of which said they 
were employed as cooks, the third ingenuously acknowledged she had 
been sent for in the morning and never was at the hospital before, 
notwithstanding sick men are now maintained in the hospital: nor are 
there any other conveniences for their making water or easing 
themselves [than] tubs without the doors, which obliges them to get out 
of their cradles for that purpose, or foul their beds.  All the bedsteads are 
badly boarded or cross bottomed, and must be very uneasy for sick men 
to lay on.  No bedding has been provided nor sheets, except in the petty 
officers ward, and seventeen for other wards, most of which were new 
cloth, and put on the morning of our visitation, nor is there a single 
pillow case in the hospital...No linen has been washed for the sick, but to 
the contrary they are obliged to sell their bread to pay at the rate of a bit 
for washing two shirts. 
Therefore we are of opinion (which is demonstrated by our enquiry) that 
several abuses have been made, and are daily practiced...and are farther 
of opinion that it will be necessary towards causing a reformation of the 
same, to have the several punch houses thereabouts put down, 
particularly as the steward of the hospital keeps one at a very small 
distance from it, which greatly contributes to the irregularity of the 
seamen, and in a great measure retards their cure.7 
Frankland forwarded his opinion and the survey to the Admiralty for review.  The  
Admiralty, in turn, referred it to the Sick and Hurt Board to ascertain why such an inferior 
contractor remained employed if the allegations made by Frankland were true.  The Board 
asserted their ignorance on the matter and indicated that this was the first they heard of the 
problems at Antigua.  They sent for the contractor immediately, who also claimed he was 
unaware of any complaints and requested time to communicate with his agent on the island 
to rectify any shortcomings.  The Board was not eager to allow the contractor time to 
correspond with his agent as the conditions at Antigua could not be allowed to continue.  
His contract was terminated that day and the Sick and Hurt Board set out to find a new 
contractor.8 
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In succession to Frankland, Commodore Moore was the first commander to suggest that 
the navy erect its own facility at Antigua rather than continuing to depend on contractors 
to locate suitable lodging.  In his letter to the Admiralty he proposed that if the navy 
erected its own hospital, it should be erected at English Harbour rather than Cobb’s Cross, 
and an additional one at St Johns.9  The Sick and Hurt Board had already written to him on 
the matter to acquaint the commodore that they had entered into a contract with Mr 
Patterson, ‘a gentleman of estate on the island, and in the neighbourhood of English 
Harbour and who, in addition to the obligations of his contract, proposed, and seemed 
very willing, to erect a building, or convert one to an hospital for the reception of the sick 
near to Falmouth’, a village about a mile distant from English Harbour.10  In response, 
Commodore Moore wrote to the Admiralty expressing his dissatisfaction with the 
arrangements at Antigua which, he claimed, had caused the number of men in the ships’ 
companies to be reduced into a very low state.  Moore blamed the inadequacies of the 
contractor in providing proper arrangements and care for the sick men.  He claimed the 
houses rented by Patterson for use as sick quarters had been full for some time and that 
Patterson was making no arrangements to either locate additional housing or erect his own 
building as he had proposed.  Those men who were in sick quarters were not receiving 
proper care and were without nourishment to aid in their recovery.11  Seeing as Patterson 
had only recently taken up the contract, the Sick and Hurt Board was inclined to allow the 
contractor more time to resolve his failings. 
Moore was not pleased and immediately forwarded another complaint to the Admiralty 
protesting the lack of bedding supplied by Patterson.  He claimed the sick were forced to 
carry their own bedding from their ships to the rented houses and those with infectious 
distempers were forced to lie in the beds which they made use of during their illness.  
Although Patterson was in direct violation of his contract, the Sick and Hurt Board made 
arrangements for 500 complete sets of hospital bedding to immediately be sent out to 
alleviate the suffering of the sick.12  Despite the extra time afforded to him, Patterson was 
still not fulfilling the terms of his contract.  Prices for the necessaries that he was expected 
to supply the hospital were considerably higher than he had assumed and he was operating 
at a loss.  He claimed the Madeira wine had doubled in price in only two years and rum 
increased by four times in the same amount of time.  As the prices for many other victuals 
had also mushroomed, Patterson gave notice to terminate his contract at midsummer of 
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1760 unless the Board agreed to augment his payment by 4d per man per day.  According 
to his calculations, no one else would be able to undertake the contract at his price (2s-6d) 
without operating at a loss.  Not only did Patterson feel he had done the best possible job 
considering the increase in prices for most items, but he had also converted some of his 
own cargo buildings, which he customarily used to make sugar and rum, into facilities for 
the reception of the navy’s sick men.13  Before the Board made a decision on whether or 
not to increase the contract price, Commodore Moore wrote a letter advising of Patterson’s 
death. 
In order to alleviate some of the inconveniences Moore referred to in his correspondence, 
the Admiralty authorised the Sick and Hurt Board to enter into an agreement with an 
appropriate person at Antigua to erect a hospital at his own expense which the Crown 
would rent on a contractual basis.14  This proposal appeared to solve a number of 
problems.  The navy would have use of a new purpose-built facility without having to 
release a large amount of capital for its erection.  A contractor would still be required to 
manage the daily victualling which had the potential to be done unsatisfactorily although 
there was some assurance in knowing the sick seamen were housed altogether in a secure 
location.  The Sick and Hurt Board advertised for over a year without success.  They wrote 
to the Admiralty signifying the trouble they experienced in finding a person at Antigua who 
would erect a hospital at their own expense and they suggested the Crown undertake the 
project themselves.15  With their letter, the commissioners enclosed an estimate for the 
proposed hospital providing the general layout and building materials for a facility that 
could house 300 sick men.  They anticipated that if the work was done to a reasonable 
specification, the total cost of erecting the wards, cisterns and officers ’ apartments would 
be £13,409.16 
The Admiralty did not respond to the Sick and Hurt Board’s proposal, although the former 
agreed to alter the system of contracting slightly.  As they had done at Jamaica, the 
Admiralty felt that sick men would be better served by a naval-appointed surgeon, rather 
than relying on the contractor to supply one.  They agreed to dispatch a surgeon from 
England who was paid a fixed salary of £250 per annum as well as a dispenser who was 
paid £120 per annum.17  Charles Este was confirmed as the surgeon at Antigua in March 
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16 Ibid. 
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1762, but with the coming of peace in 1763, the navy reduced the number of men serving 
on both West Indies stations.  Este’s salary was reduced to £200 per annum and he now 
acted as the hospital’s agent, for which service he received an additional 13s-4d per cure.18  
Despite adjusting the method of care on shore at Antigua to include naval-trained 
surgeons, the commander-in-chief, Rear Admiral Tyrrell, was dissatisfied.  He claimed the 
seamen still had the ability to obtain hard liquor easily which encouraged the men to 
behave in despicable ways and to also desert the service.  In Tyrrell’s opinion, a hospital 
ship or hulk which could lie in the Bay of Antigua (English Harbour) was better suited for 
medical purposes instead of the current situation.  He felt that the use of a hospital ship 
‘would contribute much more to their speedy recovery, and likewise more effectually 
prevent desertion than the sending them on shore.’19  The Sick and Hurt Board concurred 
with Tyrrell’s proposal especially since the Admiralty had not allowed the erection of the 
permanent naval hospital they proposed two years earlier.  The Admiralty referred the plan 
to the Navy Board for further consideration and to ascertain the availability of a ship to 
satisfy the job.20  The plan was never executed because local men contacted the Sick and 
Hurt Board replying to their advertisement to erect a naval hospital at Antigua which the 
navy would rent. 
At this point, the Seven Years’ War ended.  Nevertheless built at some point between 1766 
and 1768 a hospital was erected at English Harbour by Mr Whitehead and his partner 
Gilbert Francklyn.  The total cost to the men, which included the purchase of the land, 
amounted to £6,368.  Also incorporated into the cost was the erection of houses for the 
surgeon and the dispenser as well as a cistern to supply the hospital with fresh water.21  
Once the hospital was completed, Whitehead took up the role of contractor at the usual 
rate of 13s-4d per man per cure as well as an additional fee of £500 per annum for rent.22  
He did not serve long as the hospital’s contractor because in 1769 Robert Grant submitted 
a tender to victual the sick men for 2s-1¼d per man per day.  Grant’s considerably reduced 
rate enticed the navy to supersede Whitehead, although since the hospital belonged to the 
latter, the former was instructed to pay the £500 rent directly to the proprietors as well as 
additional charges for use of the cisterns, storehouses and a powder magazine which 
brought the total to roughly £1,058 per annum.23 
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Within a short period of taking up his contract, Grant became an enemy of Commodore 
Man, who was charged with the control of the Leeward Islands station in 1770.  The 
contractor was unhappy with the rental arrangements for the hospital at English Harbour 
and gave notice to both Man and Francklyn (Whitehead was now deceased) of his intention 
to remove the sick men from that facility and relocate them to Cobb’s Cross, a site that had 
previously been used by the navy to temporarily house sick men prior to the erection of 
Francklyn’s building.  Grant felt that £500 was too much to pay for the use of Francklyn’s 
facility and was causing the contractor to operate at a hefty loss.  If he removed the men to 
Cobb’s Cross, he believed he could find a comparable building for a reduced fee.  Man 
denied the request to remove the sick on the grounds that Cobb’s Cross was over a mile 
away and as previously mentioned the lack of passable roads made the journey very 
dangerous or even deadly for men in a sickly state.  In his report to the Sick and Hurt 
Board in April 1770, Man voiced his dissatisfaction with Grant’s intention to move the 
men farther away from the navy’s base of operation.  He suggested that, rather than 
allowing Grant to terminate the rental agreement, the Admiralty could purchase 
Francklyn’s land and hospital.  Man stressed the importance and benefit of purchasing the 
hospital and putting it ‘on the same footing with other Royal hospitals in these parts; for, 
until something of that kind is done, we shall always be in some degree (as in the present 
case) subject to the caprice of the contractors.’24 
The Sick and Hurt Board did not reply to Commodore Man forcing the latter to write to 
them again in May and June to reiterate his annoyance with Grant’s behaviour.  Man also 
indicated that the contractor had made considerable progress on repairs to a building at 
Cobb’s Cross which he intended for use as the new hospital.25  The more Man considered 
the present facility at English Harbour, the more he deemed it appropriate because ‘it 
stands upon a hill and enjoys a free current of air; the wards are convenient, the dispensary, 
surgeons house, out houses etc all contiguous thereto, and there is also a tank or cistern to 
supply them with water.’26  He was dissatisfied with the house at Cobb’s Cross since it did 
‘not stand so well, nor so airy, the cistern is in ruins, the old house not near so convenient 
and with all the proposed additions cannot be made equal to the other.’  Furthermore, Man 
stated that the house at Cobb’s Cross was ‘at least three-quarters of a mile from the head of 
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26 Ibid. 
250 
English Harbour partly over rugged road, which, when that house was before used as an 
hospital [it was] fatal to many a man who...died in the carriage thither.’27 
In July the Board wrote to Man; however they did not respond to his request to purchase 
Francklyn’s land and buildings.  They thanked him for his attention and dedication to that 
branch of service as well as approving his appointment of William Coltart as the new 
surgeon at Antigua.28  As the Board made no mention of how to proceed with the 
contractor, Man was forced to make his own determination about the situation.  In his next 
report to the Sick and Hurt Board, he indicated that rather than allowing Grant to remove 
the patients to Cobb’s Cross, he agreed to take up the contract with Francklyn, effectively 
becoming his tenant on behalf of the navy for a period of three months.  As the victualling 
contract was still held by Grant, he remained responsible for providing all food and 
necessaries.  By becoming Francklyn’s tenant, Man only afforded the navy a temporary fix.  
He again urged the Board to purchase the existing hospital and establish a permanent 
system for care at Antigua.29  He emphasised the importance of setting up a permanent 
naval hospital by showing ‘how liable the service is to be distressed by the avarice of a 
contractor for the sick and hurt…which would cease was the hospital a Royal building 
belonging to the Crown.’30  While the Board agreed that they would never permit the sick 
men to be moved to a location not approved of by the commander-in-chief, they were not 
certain that purchasing the buildings at English Harbour was appropriate for the navy. 31 
By September, the three month contract Man took out with Francklyn was practically  
expired and he still had not received any advice on how to proceed.  He was forced to 
extend the contract until the end of 1770 and hoped he would hear from the Sick and Hurt 
Board during that time with instructions on how they wanted to move forward.32  The 
Board wrote to him in early September requesting he liaise with Francklyn to ascertain 
what terms the proprietor would agree to in selling his land and hospital.  The letter also 
requested Man to identify alternative locations for a hospital should the Board not come to 
agreeable terms with Francklyn.  Some of the Board’s hesitation in purchasing the existing 
hospital stemmed from its unhealthy position some 200 paces to windward of a brackish 
swamp which resulted from a branch of English Harbour ebbing and flowing ‘regularly 
through the mangroves that surround[ed] part of the Harbour [and the hospital]…[and] 
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also in the rainy season the waters from the adjoining hills run into the sea through a gut or 
channel called Tobacco Gut.’33  The surgeon, William Coltart expressed concern over the 
‘offensive smell’ rising from the swamp during the rainy season, although the waters ran off 
during the dry season leaving the gut dried up.  Being aware of the former situation at New 
Greenwich hospital in Jamaica and the unhealthiness of that place having been built in 
close proximity to a morass thirty years prior, the Board was justifiably apprehensive about 
purchasing Francklyn’s property.  Following a survey of different areas in the vicinity of 
English Harbour, Man felt, that despite the morass, the current building was the best 
solution, although he conceded that if the Admiralty was concerned about that particular 
aspect, an alternative was to erect a new building on the Crown’s land between Falmouth 
and English Harbours.34 
Gilbert Francklyn left Antigua in 1771 in order to return to England to attend his other 
business interests.  He wrote to the Admiralty upon his arrival relating the troubles he 
experienced with Grant, the contractor for food to his hospital, as well as his willingness to 
either continue with his contract with the navy for providing his building on rental terms or 
for the Crown to purchase it from him.  In order to alleviate the frequent complaints from 
commanders on the station, Francklyn proposed leasing the entire 41 acres he owned for 
an extended period of 21 years although he was flexible with the time which could have 
been altered according to the needs of the navy.35  The Admiralty referred the matter to the 
Sick and Hurt Board and asked them to weigh all the options with regards to Francklyn’s 
land as well as considering erecting a new building on Crown land.  According to the 
Board’s response, they were not keen on agreeing a long-term lease with Francklyn.  They 
expressed concern over the: 
great inconvenience in carrying on our service in that island, owing to 
the hospital not being the property of the Crown, we have for some time 
past corresponded with Admiral Man, with a view to our getting all the 
information necessary respecting the situation and value of Mr 
Francklyn’s premises, or of any other convenient lands or places which 
were fit and might be had for our purpose.36 
Despite Francklyn’s hospital already in use for the sick at Antigua, the Board felt that 
erecting buildings on Crown-owned land was the better option.  They suggested a new 
hospital be built: 
upon the spot which Admiral Man and other naval officers have pointed 
out as the most convenient [and] we are humbly of opinion that, if it is 
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made capable of containing 300 patients, it will fully answer [the navy’s 
needs]...We are also of opinion that provision should be made for our 
surgeon and dispenser, and for two assistant surgeons and as the hospital 
at Jamaica which was built by the Navy Board at the beginning of the 
late war has been found to answer the purpose extremely well, we beg 
leave to offer it to their Lordships consideration, whether on account of 
the similarity of the climate of Antigua, it may not be very proper to 
adopt the same king of plan, regard being had to the number of people 
to be accommodated.37 
The Sick and Hurt Board followed up with a letter to the Admiralty and the Navy Board 
concerning the erection of a naval hospital at Antigua between Falmouth and English 
Harbours rather than purchasing Gilbert Francklyn’s buildings and land.38  On the 16th 
January 1772 the Admiralty granted permission to the commissioners to erect a hospital on 
the Crown’s land with enough room to house 300 patients as well as buildings to house the 
dispensary and a surgeon’s and officer’s house.39  Francklyn learned of the navy’s plan to 
build on their own land rather than leasing or buying his and he wrote to the Navy Board 
in February requesting they reconsider.40  In his letter, Francklyn signified his displeasure at 
the way he and his partner were lead to believe that when they erected their hospital, the 
navy would continue to lease it from them for an indefinite period ensuring the partners 
recuperated the money they spent.  He also requested that the Admiralty reconsider their 
order to build a new hospital.  If they insisted on going ahead with the plan, Francklyn 
hoped the navy would compensate him financially for his large expenditure made only five 
years earlier.  If the navy no longer had a need for his buildings, he argued they would be 
totally useless to him.41  Francklyn’s pleas for reconsideration did not fall on deaf ears.  The 
Admiralty called a meeting with the Sick and Hurt Board and the Navy Board to discuss 
what could be done with regards to the existing hospital.42  The commissioners suggested 
suspending the Admiralty order of the 16 th January for erecting the new hospital until an 
appraisal of Francklyn’s land and buildings could be carried out by the naval surveyor on 
the island.43 
Throughout the deliberations in London, no one wrote to Admiral Man to keep him 
abreast of the situation.  The tone of his letter sent in April 1772 clearly exhibited his 
frustration not only with the lack of communication, but with the conduct of the 
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contractor as well.44  While the administrators in London were contemplating the future of 
the hospital, Grant remained in charge of victualling the men at English Harbour.  During 
the previous year, the hospital surgeon, William Coltart,  criticised the lack of supplies 
reaching the hospital.  In May 1771 he wrote to Man, then at Barbados, maintaining there 
were not enough tubs and candles to carry out his duties and Grant’s steward refused to 
provide the requested materials.  He also claimed the steward showed disrespect toward 
him when he ‘came into the surgery ward and grossly insulted me, and called me all the 
rascals and scoundrels and challenged me to fight him; and at the same time hove his head 
in my face and clinched his fists and told me he had no more business to find tubs than to 
find me instruments.’45  Coltart also wrote to Captain Cauldwell of the Squirrel who was at 
English Harbour during Man’s absence complaining the hospital had not been supplied 
with cans, platters, spoons, table linen, towels, chamber pots, blankets, coverlids, feather 
pillows, and pillow cases.  Additionally he claimed: 
...very few of the patients have sacking bottomed cradles, the mattresses 
and bolsters should be filled with hair instead of which they are filled 
with plantain leaves which are very disagreeable to the patients and soon 
become unfit to lie on.  There is a great deficiency and want of sheets; 
not a third of the number specified by contract being supplied, there is 
also a want of tubs for different uses of the sick and I have been under 
the necessity of purchasing them myself; the people’s body linen is not 
properly washed and made clean, nor so often as is necessary, they often 
are sent back as dirty as they went.  The agent for the contractor refuses 
giving soap for washing the bandages, and for these two quarters past I 
have been obliged to supply it, to avoid disputes which I have always 
endeavoured but to no purpose.  The patients are often served rum 
almost new, and wine that is not sound; bread not well baked, sometimes 
neither roots nor greens and there is not any of the cooling drinks or 
phtisans as mentioned in the contract to be got when ordered.  The 
nurses are not properly supplied when wanted, some of them are new 
negroes, others of them are old and past their labour and consequently 
unfit for attending the sick and doing the duty of the hospital.  The 
stewards of the hospital have often served rum unmixed with water, as 
also pork in room of beef and mutton to the no small detriment of the 
patients, who have been told by the stewards of the said hospital that 
they must find firewood and dress their own victuals themselves, which 
was attended with many ill consequences, such as the recovery patients 
pulling down of people’s houses near the hospital; particularly some of 
the captains house, and even a part of the hospital itself – very often 
there is not a sufficiency of water or rice gruel boiled for breakfast – In 
short the contract has never been complied with since I came to the 
hospital by Mr Robert Grant’s agents, who have and do daily flatly refuse 
almost everything that is demanded agreeable to the contract. 46 
                                                 
44 TNA, ADM 97/86, Admiral Man to Sick and Hurt, 21 April 1772. 
45 TNA, ADM 97/86, Admiral Man to Sick and Hurt, 24 June 1771. 
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254 
Cauldwell immediately wrote to Admiral Man firstly to apprise him of the clash between 
Coltart and Grant’s steward and secondly that he and his lieutenant and surgeon paid a visit 
to the hospital to investigate Coltart’s allegations.  According to their survey, they found 
the claims made by the surgeon to be true and required immediate redress.47  In spite of the 
surgeon’s complaints and the captain’s survey of the conditions found at the naval hospital 
being forwarded to both the Admiralty and the Sick and Hurt Board, Grant was allowed to 
continue with his contract. 
While Man remained at Barbados, Coltart continued to voice his opinion about the 
contractor’s dreadful performance and in January 1772 wrote to Captain Peter Clark, the 
senior officer at Antigua, outlining the items the contractor undersupplied.48  Clark ordered 
a group of lieutenants and surgeons on shore to take stock of necessaries at the hospital to 
verify Coltart’s claims.  Table 7.1 is the list of the items inspected and the number of each 
item found which was compiled by the reconnaissance party. 
Sacking Bottom Cradles Forty-seven unserviceable and no more remaining 
Coverlids None 
Blankets Eight-four, none of which were given until this day 
Sheets in pairs One hundred, some unserviceable and new ones as per sample enclosed  
Pillows Ninety-two of which none were supplied until this day 
Pillow cases None 
Bolsters None 
Table linen None 
Towels None 
Mattresses Seven fit for use 
Beds Twelve fit for use 
Chamber pots None 
Washing tubs None 
Necessary tubs Two only, six more wanting 
Brushes None 
Mops None 
Brooms None 
Soap None 
Cans None 
Platters Not 1/3 of the number required 
Spoons Not 1/3 of the number required 
Table 7.1 – Inventory of supplies and necessaries at Antigua hospital, January 1772
49
 
The above survey further emphasised the appalling conditions which the surgeon and the 
sick were forced to labour under.  Grant was allowed time to put things right before 
another survey was made two months later.50  This time the party was led by Captain 
Charles Douglas who brought with him a number of lieutenants and surgeons.  During 
                                                 
47 Ibid. 
48 TNA, ADM 97/86, Admiral Man to Sick and Hurt, 21 April 1772. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
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their survey, they concluded that Grant had done little to rectify any shortcomings.  They 
reportedly found: 
...everything there (to the exception of seven or eight hair bolsters) much 
in the same defective condition as has been represented to you by the 
report of a survey...by order of Captain Clarke of the Kennington.  All the 
complaints made by Mr Coltart the surgeon and agent, I found to have 
been perfectly well grounded, and then totally unredressed. ..I found that 
money had at dry times been given to patients in lieu of meat, and 
sometimes pork, sometimes goat’s flesh, instead of beef or mutton.  
These two last-mentioned species in general having been very bad – It 
had moreover been much the practice to serve out raw meat to patients 
– The consequence of which has frequently been, the selling thereof 
(when saleable) for rum – None of the things whereof to make cooling 
drinks viz. barley, currants or raisins, tamarind &c &c I find in the 
hospital.51 
Since taking up the contract, Grant had the fortune of only having to procure provisions 
and necessaries during peacetime.  If a war had been raging, the Admiralty and the senior 
men on station may have been more tolerant of a number of shortcomings due to the lack 
of available items or the effects of rapid inflation.  Not being able to supply fresh food or 
bedding when trade markets were unimpeded by war damaged Grant’s reputation with the 
navy.  After two years of complaints from Admiral Man, the surgeon at Antigua as well as 
other senior officers on the station, Robert Grant were brought in for a meeting with the 
Sick and Hurt Board at their office in June 1772.  During the meeting, he was read the 
letters forwarded to the Board from Antigua and was told that the complaints were too 
severe in nature to ignore.  The Board not only dissolved his contract with them but 
advised that a mulct would be levied against him proportional to his failures at Antigua 
hospital.52 
Once Grant was dismissed, the navy had to speed up the process of determining what to 
do about the hospital at Antigua.  Before the Admiralty or the Sick and Hurt Board 
received a report from the naval surveyor regarding Francklyn’s buildings, disaster struck.  
On the 31st August 1772, a powerful hurricane devastated the Leeward Islands.  By the 
time it hit, Admiral Man had been relieved on the station by Rear Admiral William Parry.  
Parry wrote to the Sick and Hurt Board describing the degree of devastation felt across the 
island, including the damage to Gilbert Francklyn’s hospital.  His observations are lengthy 
but worth quoting in full: 
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52 TNA, ADM 99/47, Sick and Hurt Minutes, 30 June 1772. 
256 
The naval hospital is entirely destroyed together with the cabins for the 
officers, those opposite for the contractor’s steward, servants and stores, 
the surgeon’s house and in short every building or out-house belonging 
to it, except a small stone cook-room, part of the oven and a part of the 
dispensary house, but in so bad a state as not to be by any means 
habitable.  As the dispensary was not totally blown away I have had it 
surveyed, and in consequence of which directed the surgeon to give it up 
and take another…The medicines, instruments etc were all damaged and 
mostly lost…Two seamen, one white woman and four negroes were 
killed on the spot and buried amongst the ruins, and many more of the 
patients and contractor’s servants are now laying in a deplorable situation 
from the cuts and bruises they received, several being received by the 
wind along with the ruins of the house to a considerable distance, for in 
a great measure the building may absolutely be said to have been blown 
away; there is not a stick standing.  The surgeons and contractor have 
lost almost everything they had at the hospital, the dispenser escaped 
better at his house though greatly damaged was not totally blown 
down.53 
In order to restore a degree of care for the sick on shore at Antigua, Parry: 
...directed a house that is generally used for the accommodation of the 
captains while their ships are heaving down to be repaired for their 
reception and the worst patients were immediately put into it, and the 
contractor hired a very large airy house in Falmouth, a small town about 
a mile and a half distant from hence, in which the remainder are, both 
were hardly sufficient to contain them, but at that time of distress no 
other houses were to be hired...As the greatest attention is ever due to 
the maimed and sick, the contractor, by my permission, has erected and 
is erecting buildings to hold the whole number on the [land between 
English and Falmouth Harbours] for it is extremely inconvenient both to 
the surgeons and the ships for them to be dispersed in different places, 
and indeed the hospital surgeons could not give them proper attendance, 
were they to have been continued in that state. 
Parry realised this was only a temporary solution.  A new naval hospital would have to be 
erected on shore as soon as possible to cater for the large number of sick men.  Knowing 
the Admiralty would request a survey of potential sites, Parry: 
...carefully examined the adjacent grounds and have weighted all the 
advantages and disadvantages which may attend the different spots, and 
after consulting with others and fully considering the whole, I am of 
opinion that the place in which the captain’s house is erected is the most 
proper on account of the easy access to it and the airiness of the 
situation.  The longest side opens to English Harbour and fronts that 
way which the trade wind constantly blows, and the opposite side fronts 
Falmouth Harbour and Bay, which is a considerable body of water; and 
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there is a sufficient quantity of land for all the purposes of a naval 
hospital.54 
The surgeon at Antigua also felt the effects of the hurricane and applied to the Admiralty 
for redress.55  Coltart claimed that he lost all of his household furniture, wearing apparel 
and all his books and papers.  He also maintained that his house was swept away and 
dashed down the rocks into the sea and since the storm, he had been forced to live 
outdoors, being exposed to the night air and the rains.  In all, he calculated his losses at 
£600 local currency.56  The Sick and Hurt Board were directed to determine what to do 
about Coltart’s claim.  The Board was suspicious about the extent of Coltart’s claim and 
believed he misrepresented his hardships for financial gain.  To verify their suspicions, the 
Board decided to review Coltart’s spending at Antigua against his predecessor, Mr 
Manderstone, and the current surgeon at Jamaica, Robert Wood, in order to determine 
whether or not Coltart had been financially abusing the hospital. 57  The Board concluded 
that Manderstone had been paid £236-7s-3d for the cure of 633 men between 1768 and 
1769.  Wood had been paid a total of £332-12s-10½d for the cure of 1,155 men.  
Meanwhile, Coltart had been paid £618-13s-5¾d for the cure of 682 men between 1770 
and 1771 (Table 7.2). 
Hospital Surgeon Date Number of Men 
Treated 
Cost of Cure 
Antigua Manderstone 1768-1769 634 £236/7s/3d 
Antigua Coltart 1770-1771 682 £618/13s/5¾d 
Jamaica Wood 1770-1771 1,155 £332/12s/10½d 
Table 7.2 – Comparison of Hospital Surgeon’s Expenditures at Antigua and Jamaica, 1768-177158 
It is clear from the figures that Coltart received the greatest sum of money in proportion to 
the number of men he treated.  In those particular years of service, Robert Grant was the 
victualler to the hospital so it is not unreasonable to assume from the complaints logged by 
Coltart, Rear Admiral Man and other senior captains on the station that the surgeon was 
required to purchase the deficient items himself on the island at an inflated rate.  The 
Board acknowledged that Coltart was forced to purchase medicines at Antigua, however 
the prices he paid and the amount consumed differed greatly from that of his predecessor 
Manderstone.  Table 7.3 illustrates this variation in the consumption of Peruvian Bark, lint 
and tow alongside the number of patients each surgeon treated while Table 7.4 shows the 
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cost for these articles generated by the three surgeons. 59  Hospital returns from Antigua for 
that period do not exist and it is therefore difficult to ascertain whether or not Coltart 
treated a large number of fever patients which would have necessitated that volume of 
Peruvian Bark.  The Board was likewise unsure if Coltart’s expenditure for bark was overly 
excessive.  They wrote: 
In the article of Bark it is no easy matter to determine how much has 
been extravagantly demanded or bought, but we by no means think that 
so large a quantity could have been fairly administered, and are clearly of 
opinion that the greatest part of the amount of lint...[which] was 
purchased at Antigua was an unnecessary expense, for tow...Mr Coltart 
was supplied in a greater proportion than either of other gentlemen with 
whom his practice has been compared: indeed the whole of his issues of 
lint and tow cannot in our opinion by any wise reconciled to an 
economical or rational practice.60 
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Surgeon 
Time 
(between) 
Peruvian Bark 
Lint Tow 
Number of Patients 
Gross Pulverized Tincture 
Discharged 
Invalids or 
Unstable 
Discharged Cured Dead Run Remaining 
Mr Coltart 
19 Jan 1770 
– 30 Jun 
1772 
150lbs 140lbs 12lbs 
176lbs 
5 oz 
814 
lbs 12 
oz 
193 628 50 5 11 
Mr Wood 
1 Jan 1770 – 
30 Jun 1772 
20lbs 15lbs 8oz 10lbs 224lbs 111 1281 146 50 99 
Mr Manderstone 
1 Jan 1768 – 
31 Dec 1769 
40lbs 58lbs 7lbs 14lbs 403lbs 30 538 56 5 23 
Table 7.3 – Consumption of Peruvian Bark, Lint and Tow at Antigua Hospital, January 1768 – June 177261 
 
 
Surgeon Price of Bark Price of Lint Price of Tow Total 
Mr Coltart £181/18s/3½d £113/1s/7½d £30/5s/9½s £325/5s/8½d 
Mr Wood £12/19s/- £3/-/-* £5/12s/- £21/11s/- 
Mr Manderstone £39/15s/- £4/4s/- £10/1s/6d £54/0s/6d 
Table 7.4 – Expenditure for Peruvian Bark, Lint and Tow at Antigua Hospital, January 1768 – June 177262 
 
 
                                                 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid.  *The price of lint purchased at Jamaica is lower due to the Negroes scraping the Lint from old sheets. 
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With Coltart’s excessive spending and his claim for losses sustained in the hurricane, the 
Admiralty recommended he be removed from the position and superseded him with the 
surgeon from the Somerset.63 
Although the Sick and Hurt Board made a determination about the surgeon at Antigua, 
they had made little progress with deciding what to do about the hospital.  The situation 
remained much the same since the hurricane destroyed Gilbert Francklyn’s buildings  in 
1772.  Sick men continued to be housed in temporarily erected facilities at two separate 
locations on the island.64  Parry was not pleased with the new contractor, Mr Brymer, who 
had taken over when Grant’s contract was terminated.  It was Brymer’s responsibility to 
victual the seamen at both locations; one close to Falmouth Harbour and the other in the 
ruins of the captain’s house at English Harbour.  At Falmouth, Parry claimed the 
contractor failed to supply his agreed items.  In his report to the Sick and Hurt Board, he 
claimed: 
...the sick have not any water to drink but what they fetch themselves, or 
hire negroes with a part of their allowance to bring it for them from a 
pond that is brackish and some distance from the hospital, their clothes 
washed but once since the first of the month, which was the time of 
their going to those quarters...They have been obliged to make their own 
beds, not having a nurse to do it or clean their wards...[The sick] have 
been served rum unmixed for want of water, owing to which they have 
been frequently drunk, and in all probability their cures greatly retarded, 
as many have relapsed when almost well, imagined by the surgeon to be 
occasioned by that irregularity...One of the sick has been forced to serve 
the provisions, there not being any steward.  They also complain it is 
frequently three or four o’clock in the afternoon before they get their 
dinner...they had not any meat on Thursday or rum on Monday 
last...they are obliged to go in the heat of the sun to the pasture to drive 
the cattle in for slaughter...65 
The situation was not any better at the captain’s house at English Harbour and indeed 
could have been perceived as worse.  Parry reported: 
...they likewise complain of the badness of the meat at times, once in 
particular it was boiled overnight and served the next day when it stunk 
to that degree, neither it nor the broth were eatable.  When it rains they 
are up to their ankles in water, and their beds so wet they cannot lay in 
them; from appearance the house is in danger of falling every fiery 
breeze or hard squall being greatly damaged by the late hurricane.  In 
two of the lower wards there is a window to leeward, in the other not 
any...the sick who are put there must suffer much for want of air, and 
both here and at Falmouth the cradles are greatly crowded...there are two 
black nurses (one only at present effective) there was a white woman but 
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the contractor gave her orders not to attend the sick...It appears that 
there was one old experienced nurse that the contractor turned away, 
although the surgeon assured him she was the only person in that station 
to be depended upon, and kept one that he had desired to be discharged 
as being unfit to perform the duty...The rum which by contract ought to 
be old is new, and very unfit for the sick...they are not allowed sugar to 
their gruels, rice, etc, although the surgeon has excused punch (which the 
contractor ought to furnish when he serves rum) to enable him to 
provide sugar for that purpose...66 
In July 1773, it seemed the Sick and Hurt Board and the Admiralty had experienced 
enough difficulty housing and victualling the sick and hurt seamen at Antigua because they 
agreed to accept a proposal and estimate for building a new hospital submitted by 
Nathaniel Watts, the Navy Board’s surveyor.  In his proposal, Watts suggested that the 
buildings be sufficient enough to house at least 100 men and designed in a similar fashion 
to that of Stonehouse hospital at Plymouth.67  The erection of separate buildings rather 
than one large one, he believed, would provide a fresher flow of air throughout and would 
be capable of containing contagious diseases in independent wards.  His original plan for 
the hospital layout with various outbuildings as well as the plan outlining the proposed 
locations (one location on Crown-owned land and one on Francklyn’s land) were included 
in Watts’ correspondence.  Figure 7.2 shows the recommended layout of the hospital 
regardless of where it would eventually be built.  The plan depicts four hospital wards 
capable of containing forty-eight sick men each, a guard building, surgeon’s house, 
dispenser’s house, platforms for cisterns and cook houses.  In Figure 7.3, enlarged 
drawings of the proposed ward and the surgeon’s and dispenser’s houses are seen.  Watts 
carefully surveyed the land belonging both to the Crown and to Francklyn and he was of 
the opinion that the best place to erect the new hospital was on the Crown’s land where the 
hurricane-damaged captain’s house stood.  He opted for that location: 
on account of the easy access to it, and to the airiness of the situation, 
the longest side opens to English Harbour, and fronts that way which 
the trade wind constantly blows and the opposite side fronts Falmouth 
Harbour and Bay, which is a considerable body of water, that there is a 
sufficient quantity of land for all the purposes of a naval hospital .68 
Moreover, that location [had] ‘flat ground sufficient for erecting all the necessary  buildings, 
and from its situation and form, may easily be enclosed, and that it has one advantage, 
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67 NMM, ADM/FP/16, Sick and Hurt to Admiralty, 23 July 1773.  Stonehouse hospital was built during the 
Seven Years War on a 24 acre site on Stonehouse Creek. It was built around large quadrangles which were 
surrounded by detached ward blocks planned to prevent the spread of infection in the hospital. 
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which Mr [Francklyn’s] has not, viz easiness of access .’  Francklyn’s land was farther up 
along the hillside away from the naval dockyard.  Watts felt that: 
his land is of so long rugged and steep an ascent on every side, that no 
good road can possibly be made up it, and if there could the first shower 
of rain which falls very heavy there, would, from the very make of the 
hill, entirely destroy it, that sick men have been frequently fatigued and 
exposed for a long time, to the excessive heat of the sun in going up. 69 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2 – Proposed layout of Antigua Hospital, 177370 
Erecting a hospital on an island prone to destructive hurricanes meant that Watts 
recommended constructing each ward of brick ‘46 feet in length and 40 feet in breadth 
divided on each floor by a row of pitch pine pillars to support the floor above’ for a total 
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KEY 
A. Gateway and two Lodges for a Porter and Guard 
B. Cook room and Wash house 
C. Bake house 
D. Necessaries 
E. Platform and Cistern to contain 153 Tons 
F. Platform and Cistern to contain 153 Tons 
G. Rooms for nurses 
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cost of £2,886-17s-6d local currency, equal to £1,737-10s sterling.71  The wards were 
designed to contain twenty-four cradles for the use of the sick on both floors allowing for 
three feet of space in between them, giving sufficient room to afford the men the best 
chance for rehabilitation. 
 
Figure 7.3 – Proposed Ward, Surgeon’s House and Dispenser’s House, 177372 
Dwellings for both the surgeon and dispenser were included in Watts’ estimate.  The 
former’s house was proposed to be one storey only, 45 feet in length and 30 feet in 
breadth.  The layout included a ‘parlour, a passage and two chambers’ while in the case of 
the latter’s dwelling, Watts proposed for it to adjoin the steward’s storeroom totalling 60 
feet in length and 27 feet in breadth.  The plans included a cook room, a wash house, a 
bake house, two lodges for a porter and a guard, a fence around the yard and two platforms 
and cisterns which were of vital importance.73  There was no source of fresh water at 
Antigua, and if the Crown was prepared to spend a large sum of money to construct a 
permanent hospital, then the erection of cisterns to supply the hospital with water was an 
absolute necessity.  Watts recommended building rather large tanks and estimated the 
amount of rainwater that could be collected annually assuming the island received fifteen 
inches during that time (Table 7.5).74 
Location Amount of Water (in tons) 
Area of the platform on the right hand at the 
entrance 
334 Tons 
Area of the platform on the left hand at the 
entrance 
421 Tons 
Roof of all four of the hospital wards 516 Tons (129 Tons each ward) 
Roof of the surgeon’s house 86 Tons 
Roof of the dispenser’s house 88 Tons 
Roofs of the two lodges 17 Tons 
Total 1,462 Tons per annum 
Table 7.5 – Amount of Rainwater Proposed to be Collected at Antigua Hospital 75 
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For all of the abovementioned buildings, fences and water collection structures the total 
expense to the Crown to erect a new hospital at Antigua was estimated at £14,681-13s-1d 
sterling.76  A breakdown of the estimation is shown in Table 7.6. 
Once they reviewed the plans and estimates, the Sick and Hurt Board forwarded them to 
the Admiralty in July 1773.  They heard no response and after five months, the Board 
resubmitted their request to build the hospital.  Finally in January 1774 the Sick and Hurt 
Board received an answer and the Admiralty’s response was not altogether surprising.  The 
estimate for building the hospital on Crown-owned land was considerable and although 
there was a definite need for it, the Admiralty thought it best to examine all potential sites 
and determine if the work could be done cheaper.  They directed the Board to confer with 
Francklyn to establish the cost of purchasing ten acres of his land for the erection of the 
hospital.77 
Building or Structure Sterling 
One of the Four hospitals £1,737/10s/- 
One other Ditto £1,737/10s/- 
One other Ditto £1,737/10s/- 
One other Ditto £1,737/10s/- 
Dwelling House and Offices for the surgeon £1,207/1s/- 
Dwelling House and Offices for the Dispenser & Store Room  £1,056/14s/9d 
Cook room and Washhouse for the hospital £363/12s/9d 
Bake house £218/3s/7d 
Two Necessaries £197/11s/6d 
The Fences £1,133/6s/8d 
The Two Lodges and the Gate at the Entrance £219/7s/10d 
The Platform, breastwork and Cisterns on the right £1,615/15s/- 
The Platform and breastwork on the left side only £584/17s/- 
The Cistern to Ditto only £1,135/3s/- 
Total £14,681/13s/1d 
Table 7.6 – Estimate of the Erection of a naval hospital at Antigua, 1772 
Watts submitted a second proposal for erecting wards and the necessary out-buildings 
using some of the ruinous structures standing on Francklyn’s land while also erecting new 
ones.  A chart of the two proposed areas was forwarded to the Sick and Hurt Board and is 
shown in Figure 7.4.  Watts’ estimate for building the hospital on Francklyn’s land totalled 
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£9,959-0s-9½d, a difference of over £4,700 from the previous estimate.78  However, the 
second estimate did not include the cost of purchasing ten acres of land from Francklyn.  
To establish the cost of acquiring the land, the Sick and Hurt Board called on the 
proprietor to attend their office for a meeting to discuss the terms under which he would 
agree to a sale.  He was receptive to the suggestion that the Admiralty might purchase his 
land, but he was not able to provide definitive price at the meeting.79  He wrote to the Sick 
and Hurt Board a week later after he determined ‘that he could not abate of £750 sterling 
for the purchase of so much of the land as [the Board] wanted, together with the tank and 
all the erections on the proposed lot.’80 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4 – Two Proposed Locations for the Naval Hospital at Antigua, 177281 
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KEY 
 References to King’s Land    References to Mr Francklyn’s Land 
A. Captain’s house, now a hospital   F.   Platform and cistern 
B. Cook room     G.  A building lately the dispensary 
C. Mast house     H.  Cook room to late hospital 
E. Navy platform, Cistern & Tanks   I.    Powder magazine 
      K.  Watch house 
      L.   Store houses and cistern 
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The Board had to consider both proposals; go ahead with the erection of the hospital on 
Crown-owned land or purchase ten acres and the dilapidated buildings from Francklyn in 
order to redevelop the hospital on its most recent site.  Both options had positive and 
negative elements.  Building on the Crown’s land meant the men were in an airier and more 
convenient location due to its close proximity to the dockyard.  The downside was the 
extremely costly estimate of having to build a hospital from scratch.  If the navy opted for 
Francklyn’s land, the cost was considerably cheaper and included a number of pre-existing 
structures.  Despite being more economical, there were drawbacks to building on his 
property.  There were no passable roads from the dockyard which meant sick men would 
experience an arduous journey up the hill to the hospital.  And since the navy would not 
own the surrounding acreage, there was a possibility that Francklyn could sell his remaining 
land to dubious individuals who could potentially erect punch houses in the immediate 
proximity.  Following their deliberations, the Board recommended that they should go 
ahead with the purchase of Francklyn’s land in order to erect the hospital. 82  They also 
suggested that the hospital be made up of five individual wards instead of four wards which 
was previously suggested by Watts because of the greater availability of space. 
Two and a half years after their initial order to begin building a naval hospital at English 
Harbour, the Admiralty once again gave an order for it to be built, only this time they 
ordered it to be built on Francklyn’s land.83  Their instruction was for: 
the 5 hospital buildings with the necessary erections, and two additional 
buildings or more if necessary, together with airing ground, burial 
ground and a road from the harbour...[and] also for the purchase of the 
tank and the out buildings which remain standing upon the spot; and to 
pay him his demand of £750.84 
The Sick and Hurt Board signed the contract with Francklyn and his solicitor in July 
1774.85  Francklyn (who was then returning to Antigua) was instructed to liaise with Watts 
and an independent surveyor at Antigua to select the most appropriate tract of land on 
which to build the hospital and to lay out a road with ‘the most easy and gentle ascent’ 
from English Harbour.86 
Hostilities with the American colonies began to escalate from the time the contract was 
signed with Francklyn and the government turned their focus to North America.  Since 
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Francklyn’s arrival back at Antigua, no progress was made in relation to selecting ten acres 
of his land nor had the naval surveyor laid out a road from English Harbour.  As Watts had 
not completed the latter duty, this meant that the navy did not have use of the remaining 
buildings on his land.  For the time being, the sick men remained housed in the dilapidated 
hurricane-damaged captain’s house and in temporary tents erected in the general vicinity of 
English Harbour, a situation that had been practiced since August 1772.  It was no surprise 
that Vice Admiral Young, who was now in charge of the Leeward Islands station, wrote to 
the Sick and Hurt Board in October 1775 requesting that better provisions be made for the 
accommodation of the sick seamen at Antigua.87 
The hospital situation became more pertinent when in July 1776, Vice Admiral Howe, who 
had recently been appointed commander of the North American squadron, wrote to 
Young to apprise him of an expected increase in the number of men in the Leeward 
Islands.88  Howe anticipated sending a large number of sick men to the West Indies to 
recuperate.  Preparations were necessary at Antigua to ensure that any number of sick and 
hurt seamen could be properly tended to.  Young turned to Francklyn for assistance.  The 
latter was able to offer the Vice Admiral a storehouse he owned which was capable of 
accommodating thirty-six patients at a rate of £190 sterling per annum.89  Although renting 
Francklyn’s storehouse did alleviate some pressure, it was not enough to cope with the 
number of men put on shore.  Young was forced to write to the Sick and Hurt Board 
regarding: 
...the ruinous state of the present temporary buildings made use of as 
hospitals for the reception of His Majesty’s sick and hurt seamen; and of 
their insufficiency to contain the number of sick likely to be put on 
shore; this has been very fatally experienced in the course of the present 
year, when at times there has been upwards of 200 sick people on shore 
from the different King’s ships at English Harbour, either belonging to 
the American squadron; or that employed under my command, and no 
possibility of procuring proper accommodations for more than half the 
number, so that many were obliged to be kept in tents in the fields, 
which has occasioned a very great mortality among them; 
notwithstanding, I believe everything in the power of the surgeon and 
his assistants were done for their relief; and indeed I think it very 
[probable] the like calamity may happen another year; unless you 
forthwith set about building the new naval hospital intended for the 
accommodation of the King’s sick and hurt seamen at this place; which 
after this representation; I flatter myself you will immediately order to be 
done.90 
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Nothing was done with regard to erecting the new hospital until after the French joined the 
war on the American side in early 1778.  Once the French were involved, the conflict 
expanded from the small arena of North America to an international affair.  It was 
paramount for the navy to ensure that operations at each station were capable of handling 
an influx of ships and seamen.  The Admiralty wrote to the Sick and Hurt Board 
acknowledging that they had ‘resumed the consideration of the expediency of building an 
hospital at Antigua for the reception of sick and hurt seamen and marines...which...hath 
been purchased by you of Mr Gilbert Francklyn.’91  The Admiralty amended their original 
order as they felt only three of the five wards were required at present .  Despite being at 
war, they expected, within all reasonableness, to be able to procure materials for erecting 
the hospital to the outlined specifications for roughly the same cost estimated four years 
prior.92  Realising there was a lapse in time since the estimate was drawn up and that a war 
was underway, the Board suggested the cost would be much higher.  They said: 
[That] the general alteration of circumstances since the date of our said 
[estimate] which must greatly affect the prices of many of the materials 
proposed to be used in erecting the said buildings, and which may render 
it now impracticable to procure some of them on the island at least in 
such quantities as may be wanted.93 
To ascertain the difference in cost and the availability of materials, the Board requested 
Watts make a list of necessary alterations to the original hospital design and a note on ‘what 
materials it will now be most eligible to substitute in lieu of others which cannot be had.’  94  
Due to circumstances caused by the American War, the Admiralty was informed that the 
hospital was unable to be built at the same price as the estimate supplied by the surveyor in 
1772.95 
By the time the Board’s request to recalculate the works at Antigua reached Watts, Admiral 
Sir George Rodney had taken command of the Leeward Islands squadron.  Rodney was 
not new to the West Indies.  He had served as commander-in-chief of the Leeward Islands 
station from 1761 to 1763 and in the same capacity at Jamaica from 1771 to 1774.  When 
he arrived in the Leeward Islands in 1779, he was frustrated with the organisation of the 
service at Antigua.  He believed that Antigua was not ideal to serve as the principal island 
and general rendezvous point for the squadron.  In Rodney’s view, islands such as 
Barbados and St Lucia had become more strategically important due to their geographic 
locations and therefore Antigua’s dockyard and services became, to his mind, less 
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necessary.  He was driven by the idea that both Barbados and St Lucia deserved hospital 
facilities rather than Antigua and as far as the hospital at Antigua was concerned, Rodney 
persuaded the Board to delay its construction.  Commissioner Laforey, who was the Navy 
Board’s representative at Antigua, was not pleased by Rodney’s suggestion to postpone the 
construction of the hospital at English Harbour.  Writing to Charles Middleton in 1780, 
Laforey said: 
I am not yet, thank God, sufficiently divested of humanity to see with 
indifference numbers of men lost for want of common accommodation, 
and the skill and attention of a most able surgeon frustrated through 
want of even covering from the inclemency of the weather to his 
patients.  What can induce Sir George Rodney to set his face against the 
erecting an hospital here, which is already framed and prepared at home 
by the sick-and-hurt board, and only waits his order to contract here for 
the raising of, can only be accounted for by his unaccountable partiality 
to St Lucia, which, if he ever reflects, the effects of the hurricane in the 
port, and of its climate among the troops and ships must entirely destroy 
his predilection for.  But what is very extraordinary, at the time he is 
declaring this place improper for the reception of the sick of his fleet, he 
has been constantly sending them all here.  I cannot quit this subject 
until I have recommended to your notice and protection, if ever he 
comes within your department, Mr James Young, the surgeon of our 
nominal hospital, or more properly, of our sick tents...I ground my 
report of him upon his great ability, his indefatigable attention to his 
business...96 
The commissioners agreed with Rodney and felt that the lack of procurable materials and 
the reduced service at that island (due to Rodney’s orders) were reason enough to postpone 
the hospital’s construction, although they left open the possibility of building it in the 
future should Antigua once again regain its strategic significance. 97 
At the conclusion of the American War of Independence, discussions on the utility of a 
hospital at Antigua were once again initiated.  The hospital’s surgeon, James Young, was 
instructed to make a publication for the submission of tenders from individuals on the 
island who were able to erect buildings to the required plan and specifications. 98  The 
surgeon was labouring under harsh conditions and was feeling the negative effects of 
working at the dilapidated hospital.  He was aware that the ten acres of land purchased 
from Gilbert Francklyn had recently been plotted out and the final design of the hospital 
had been approved by the Admiralty.  He followed the commissioners’ order to receive 
quotations to undertake the building, although a substantial amount of time passed without 
the navy accepting one.  Young felt that he ought to create a more convenient situation for 
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himself because, until that point, he had been residing in one of the buildings destroyed by 
the hurricane over a decade earlier.  Following that particular storm, the surveyor and the 
master builder condemned the building he now occupied and Young complained that it 
had now ‘become so decayed and ruinous that it is totally uninhabitable and even 
pernicious to health.’  The building was also ‘liable to be thrown down’ meaning he was 
‘obliged to desert it upon every appearance of bad weather and as there is no house nearer 
than Falmouth to hire for a dwelling house it will be utterly out of my power to undergo 
the fatigue of carrying on the duty of the hospital at that distance.’99  Since his living 
situation had become so unbearable, he coordinated the erection of a surgeon’s house 
according to the agreed specifications laid out by the naval surveyor in 1772  on the ten 
acres of land Francklyn sold to the navy.  When he erected the house, Young took care to 
utilise the same dimensions and building materials and built it using his own funds.100  After 
the house was completed, Young requested to be reimbursed the money that the 
government expected to spend for the same purpose.101  The Board and the Admiralty 
agreed that a survey of the work should be made and if Young’s expenditure did not total 
more than the estimate, then he was entitled to a reimbursement.102 
With the surgeon now properly accommodated in a purpose-built house on the land, it was 
time for the Crown to focus on the accommodation for the sick.  At that point, the former 
captain’s house was still used to hold twenty-seven cradles for the sick but was not advised 
for further use following an inspection by the naval surveyor.   As for the remainder of the 
buildings in use, they were in no better state: 
The building called the ‘new ward’ [was] capable of containing fourteen 
cradles, a slight building, the piazzas much decayed and dropping, the 
posts that support them being decayed in the ground; also the doors and 
windows, being much shattered and broken, the whole will require a 
thorough repair.  The building called the ‘small ward’, capable of 
containing twelve cradles, require repair in the floor.  The doors and 
windows also being much decayed and shattered require a thorough 
repair or to be entirely new.  The building called the ‘cabins’, capable of 
containing twenty cradles, require repair in the floor, it being decayed 
and sunk in several places, the doors and windows also being much 
decayed and shattered, will require a thorough repair.   The necessaries, 
cook room and other offices being much decayed and broken, 
particularly the necessaries, will all require great repair. 103 
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Watts forwarded a map of the northern end of English Harbour to the Admiralty 
demarcating the ten acres sold to the navy (Figure 7.5).  It also contains the road created to 
connect the naval dockyard with the future hospital.  Buildings which were currently used 
as the hospital including the dilapidated captain’s house are shown to the southwest of the 
ten acres.  Despite the land and road being ready for development, a  further three years 
passed before the Admiralty finally agreed to erect two of the five wards at English 
Harbour.  The War of American Independence was now over and the feeling was that five 
hospital wards were unnecessary.  With a reduced number of ships on the station, the 
original plan was no longer crucial to the service.  Another way the Crown planned to save 
money was to not erect the entire wall surrounding the buildings.  As per a suggestion from 
Commodore Parker, the wall was replaced by a ditch filled with prickly pear bushes which 
he felt provided the same protection against desertion.104  The commissioners were not 
familiar with prickly pear bushes, however they were happy to approve their use as long as 
it answered the purpose and ‘if it will save expense there can be no objection to it .’105  It 
seemed that the Admiralty finally identified an opportune time to erect the naval hospital at 
Antigua and they wrote to the Navy Board in 1788 instructing them to carry out the 
necessary works.  Work began on the hospital right away and was completed by March 
1790.106 
It seemed the opening of the new hospital could not have come at a better time for the 
navy.  Once again the country was at war with France and the West Indies were a major 
theatre of war.  During the war, English forces wasted no time in invading Hispaniola in 
1793, they took Martinique in February 1794, followed by the taking of St Lucia and 
Guadeloupe in April of that year.  Antigua proved advantageous during these campaigns 
because of its strategic location in the West Indies.  Ships in the Leeward Islands squadron 
frequented the island for repairs and to utilise other facilities including the hospital.  
Significant numbers of men went ashore to convalesce before returning to service.  
Without the newly-built hospital available at English Harbour, it is highly probable that a 
greater number of seamen would have died or been invalided. 
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Figure 7.5 – Ten Acres Allocated for the New Hospital at English Harbour107 
***** 
Records of the exact numbers of sick men accepted at the previous hospital provided by 
Gilbert Francklyn in the 1760s and 1770s do not survive.  From the 1790s, the hospital 
muster books from Antigua provide insight into the types of sickness crippling the seamen 
as well as identifying how many of them died from their illness.  However, the muster 
books between 1790 and 1794 do not specify illnesses, only the number of men admitted 
to hospital every month and the number who were discharged, those that died and those 
that deserted.  Table 7.7 illustrates the number of men admitted to Antigua hospital 
between those dates.  It is interesting to note the sharp rise in the number of men put 
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ashore in 1793 which coincided with a well-documented outbreak of fevers in the West 
Indies.108 
 
Table 7.7 – Number of Sick Men at Antigua Hospital, 1791-1793109 
 
Table 7.8 – Number of Seamen Discharged, Dead or Deserted from Antigua Hospital, 1791-1794110 
Although specific diseases were not recorded in the hospital muster book from 1791 to 
1793, the fate of the seamen is registered.  The majority of men sent to Antigua hospital 
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were discharged, however the muster does not indicate whether or not the seaman was 
discharged back to service or discharged invalided (Table 7.8).  With the exception of the 
fever outbreak in 1793, the mortality rate is relatively low.  In fact, in 1791 out of a total of 
204 men sent to the hospital, only nine died and four deserted.   The figures for 1792 are 
not dissimilar.  Of the 242 men sent to the hospital, only twenty-four died and one 
deserted.  Once the fever outbreak spread to the ships on the Leeward Island station, there 
was a sharp increase in both the number of men admitted to hospital and the mortality 
rate.  A total of 585 men were treated at Antigua hospital in 1793, of which 200 died, 
mainly from the symptoms of yellow fever. 
 
Table 7.9 – Breakdown of Diseases Afflicting Men at Antigua Hospital, 1794-1806111 
Figures from 1794, 1804 and 1806 (and beyond) were submitted via quarterly hospital 
muster books.  They contain the name of each man brought ashore for care at the hospital 
along with their ship’s name, their age and the date they came ashore.  More importantly, 
listed with each man is a description of their illness.  Using the information about their 
diseases, an analysis can be carried out in order to identify which diseases were most 
prevalent in the Leeward Islands during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  
It is clear from Table 7.9 that in 1794, the outbreak of fevers in the West Indies hampered 
the health of seamen in that region, although the percentage of fever patients in the 
hospital in 1804 is slightly higher.  Once the outbreak subsided, fever occurrences reduced 
slightly and as had been the case at Barbados, ulcers became more prevalent and in 1806, 
the number of fever patients and ulcer patients were almost equal.  
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Hospital muster books also contain data concerning the fate of each seaman.   An entry 
after each name indicated whether a man was discharged (either back to service or 
invalided), deserted from the hospital or if he died while receiving treatment.  Sick men 
who were sent to Antigua hospital had a reasonable chance of survival, even after the turn 
of the century when war was raging.  According to the figures in Table 7.10, the mortality 
rate remained fairly low and averaged roughly 10 per cent of the men sent to hospital.  The 
overwhelming majority of the deaths continued to be fever-related and only a handful of 
men died from a different disease or injury. 
 
Table 7.10 – Number of Seamen Discharged, Dead or Deserted from Antigua Hospital, 1794-1806112 
Conclusion 
The development of Antigua naval hospital was a lengthy process, spanning the better part 
of twenty years.  During the delay, officers and surgeons serving on the Leeward Islands 
station continually complained about either the appalling service provided by contractors 
or the ruinous state of the various buildings used for the reception of sick men.  That is not 
to suggest that the complaints fell on deaf ears, for, on a number of occasions, both the 
Sick and Hurt Board and the Admiralty deliberated the erection of a hospital and even 
went as far as ordering its construction at one point.  Financial and military motivations 
prevented it from moving forward, and the alternative situation remaining in operation at 
Antigua did nothing to encourage the recuperation of sick men.  Prior to the outbreak of 
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the French Revolution, the navy managed to complete construction and sick seamen were 
finally able to be housed in a purpose-built facility which was properly suited to their 
requirements.  The case study into the development of the Antigua naval hospital 
demonstrates the Admiralty’s escalating preference for handling the care of their own 
sailors rather than trusting it to either public houses dispensing quantities of liquor or 
dubious contractors who were at time incapable of procuring provisions and necessaries.  
By evolving in this way, it is a clear indication that the navy recognised that healthy seamen, 
especially those serving in the West Indies, were indispensable. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis has examined the provision of medical care for seamen in the West Indies 
between 1770 and 1806.  Disease in the eighteenth century killed more seamen then naval 
battles and job-related injuries combined.  Numerous historical sources suggest that the 
West Indies, in particular, was the unhealthiest environment of any of the British colonies 
and that sending sailors there was often a death sentence.  While disease did affect a 
number of seamen in that region, it certainly did not disrupt service to the extent suggested 
in modern sources.  The exaggeration of sickness and mortality figures are largely the result 
of two factors.  The first was the assumption that a handful of voyages which experienced 
high mortality rates are indicative of the broader picture of health in the West Indies.  
These voyages were generally ill-equipped and required seamen to spend more time on 
shore resulting in severe losses.  Mortality figures from Vernon’s campaign at Cartagena 
were extremely high, while figures from the Grey-Jervis joint expeditionary force also 
demonstrated atypical losses.  These figures are extraordinarily high and are exceptional 
cases and in no way denote the true state of men in the West Indies during that period.  
The second was the assumption that letters generated by naval officers concerning the 
unhealthy state of particular ships represented squadrons as a whole. 
A large number of seamen were required to serve in the West Indies so as to provide 
essential protection for England’s lucrative trade market.  In order to manage this 
protection, the navy enhanced their logistical support network in that region which 
included constructing dockyards at both Jamaica and Antigua and to a lesser extent they 
established on shore facilities at Barbados and other West Indian islands.  The two most 
vital possessions from the navy’s point of view were Jamaica and Antigua.  Jama ica proved 
a strategic location for launching operations against the Spanish colonies while Antigua was 
better suited for molesting French trade due to its proximity to Guadeloupe and 
Martinique.  With these bases so far removed from London, the Admiralty was obliged to 
develop a system for delivering stores and provisions to the squadrons in the West Indies.  
Amongst the transported stores were medicines and necessaries intended for use by 
surgeons who required them in order to combat a variety of diseases. 
As well as shipping medicines and necessaries from London to the West Indies, the 
Admiralty endeavoured to control disease in the fleet by establishing a dedicated medical 
branch to oversee day-to-day operations.  The Sick and Hurt Board was originally formed 
in 1664 during the Second Anglo-Dutch War in order to manage the health of naval 
seamen.  Once war ceased, the Board was dismantled and their duties taken up by the Navy 
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Board.  When war broke out again five years later, the Sick and Hurt Board was 
reassembled to perform the same duties as before.  And so the cycle continued with 
regards to the Board’s existence; reformed during times of war and disbanded during 
peacetime.  The War of Jenkins’ Ear brought about a change to the way the Board was 
organised.  From 1740, it was established on a permanent basis and was allowed to 
continue serving the fleet once war was over.  Although the commissioners had the 
opportunity and continuity in service to potentially develop medical systems, the men 
charged with the duty were essentially bureaucrats with no medical training.  They were 
unable to make educated decisions regarding medicines and treatments and relied on 
independent bodies for advice.  Institutions such as the Royal College of Physicians and the 
Company of Surgeons provided guidance on matters regarding treatment while the latter 
also performed the official examination of would-be naval surgeons because the Board was 
incapable of executing that function.  The Board also depended on the Society of 
Apothecaries for advice on medicines required in the surgeons’ chests as well as opinions 
on remedies proposed by members of the general public. 
Once surgeons were successfully examined at the Company of Surgeons, they went to the 
Navy Board to obtain an appointment to a ship.  They then became the responsibility of 
the Sick and Hurt Board and were issued with printed regulations instructing them how 
they were required to conduct medical services on board.  Surgeons were expected to be 
relatively self-sufficient once they arrived at their ships as the Board was not medically 
trained and provided little practical advice.  That all changed from the mid-1790s when the 
Admiralty recognised that the Board’s reliance on independent  authorities was impeding 
the latter’s ability to perform their duties.  At that point, the Admiralty began appointing 
naval surgeons as commissioners and anticipated they would be virtually self-sufficient.  
Among the new commissioners appointed was Gilbert Blane, former physician to Admiral 
Sir George Rodney, who had previously served in the West Indies.  A number of 
significant changes to the way the Board was managed were enacted under his guidance, 
the most noteworthy being the discontinuance of surgeons’ examinations formerly held at 
the Company of Surgeons.  Blane and the remaining members of the Board felt that with 
their medical training and naval experience, they were better suited to judge the aptitude of 
candidates.  This thesis demonstrates how having medically-trained commissioners meant 
that the way naval diseases were controlled was revolutionised.  It shows the Board 
modified its opinion on treatment and found it necessary for the navy’s surgeons to 
practice preventative medicine rather than solely focusing on treatments for already-sick 
men.  If there were methods available for thwarting diseases prior to them taking hold of a 
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squadron, then it was the Board’s duty to ensure these measures were taken.  For instance, 
this thesis demonstrates that it was this new Board which oversaw the general issue of 
lemon juice in order to prevent scurvy erupting while also recommending that ships serving 
in tropical regions like West Africa and the West Indies to issue Peruvian Bark to men 
working on shore to prevent fevers.  Despite the beneficial practices rolled out by the 
Board during the last decade of the eighteenth century, its financial reconciliation was in 
arrears and because of that, the Admiralty determined it was appropriate to transfer away 
the duties of that office to the Transport Board in 1806 and for the Sick and Hurt Board to 
be dissolved. 
Even though the Board was able to combat a number of diseases during its existence, there 
were still a number of them which continued to impede the seamen’s duties.  In the West 
Indies in particular, illnesses were marginally more prevalent than on other naval stations 
and to make matters worse for naval commanders in that region, there was no reserve of 
seamen to replace those that died or invalided.  Therefore it was vital to ensure the care 
men received in the West Indies, both on board their ships and on shore in hospital, was 
reasonable.  During the course of this thesis, it was shown that the most common diseases 
affecting seamen in the tropics were fevers.  Outbreaks of both malaria and yellow fever 
were reported throughout the eighteenth century with physicians and surgeons believing 
the cause for both ailments was bad air.  Those airs came in a variety of manifestations; the 
putrid fumes rising from a foul bilge, the odours emanating from swamps and morasses 
and the land-sea breezes which carried in the moist cool air from the sea in daytime to be 
heated and largely expelled at night.  According to figures in this thesis, it has been proven 
that of the two diseases, yellow fever did more damage to a West Indies squadron.  Once 
there was a small outbreak among a handful of sailors, it quickly spread though the ships’ 
companies and had the potential to wipe out a large number of men in a short time. 
During the well-documented yellow fever outbreak from 1793 to 1798, an elevated number 
of seamen succumbed to the disease although mortality figures included in Chapter 4 
confirm those numbers remained relatively minor.  Malaria, to a lesser extent, concerned 
surgeons in the West Indies.  It was not as deadly as yellow fever, although it still had the 
potential to kill seamen.  The vital difference between it and yellow fever was that the 
former was preventable and treatable through the administering of quinine-based 
medicaments.  Typhus fever also distressed seamen; however this type of fever was not 
centred round tropical locations nor was its’ distribution based on mosquito vectors.  The 
spread of typhus derived from the circulation of the body louse and was therefore generally 
associated with filthy, cramped living conditions on board ships. 
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Aside from fevers, surgeons were required to attend additional ailments.  The most 
common of these discussed in this thesis were digestive and bowel complaints.  Food 
storage and preservation in the eighteenth century was rudimentary meaning provisions 
were normally susceptible to heat and vermin infestation.  Water was stored in a similar 
fashion and spoilt just as easily.  These issues, coupled with the limited availability of fresh 
food, meant the seamen’s digestive systems were vulnerable and they frequently went on 
the sick list complaining of diarrhoea, flux and dysentery.  Of these diseases, diarrhoea was 
the most common and uncomplicated disease to manage, but if it remained untreated, it 
had the potential to evolve into flux or dysentery. 
Although most contemporary naval medicine publications focus their attention on how 
scurvy negatively impacted the service, its reputation as the chief killer of seamen is grossly 
exaggerated.  While it did debilitate ships’ crews when fresh provisions were not available, 
it essentially weakened the men’s immune systems sufficiently enough for them to become 
susceptible to other diseases.  It was the subsequent diseases that brought death to those 
whose original complaint was scurvy.  Seamen also suffered from ulcers, which were 
associated with scurvy and other dietary deficiencies, which hindered them from 
performing their duties.  Aside from those prevalent diseases, seamen were prone to 
suffering from less common illnesses such as consumption (tuberculosis), dropsy 
(oedema), gravel, rheumatism, ruptures, asthma, debility, scrofula, pleurisy and apoplexy. 
While some surgeons and physicians remained loyal to the teachings of Hippocrates and 
Galen, many began to subscribe to the medical Enlightenment: a period which saw a 
considerable shift in the way diseases were observed, diagnosed and treated.  The former 
group opted to treat the sick according to the theory of the four humours and the 
medicines and remedies utilised by these men were based on that theory, meaning that 
most were inadequate.  The latter group rejected the four humours theory, instead relying 
on their own observations and experimentation in order to treat diseases.   As explored in 
Chapter 3, it was through trial and error that this latter group of surgeons were able to 
identify several effective treatments, although many times they were uncertain of the 
precise reasons why they were successful.  For instance, it was determined that issuing 
Peruvian Bark to men suffering from all types of fevers relieved symptoms in a number of 
cases, which was particularly the case for Robert Robertson.  Modern medicine has 
confirmed that Bark is a preventative as well as a cure for malaria; however it is ineffective 
in the cure of yellow fever or typhus.  By the mid-1790s it was also realised that fresh 
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lemons, limes and oranges were vital to the suppression of scurvy, although the nutritional 
properties of ascorbic acid was not identified for over a century.  
Another treatment that was advocated by the Sick and Hurt Board and reviewed in this 
thesis was portable soup.  It was produced by boiling bones and the offal of oxen to make 
a broth to which vegetables were added.  The broth was reduced and dried into small 
tablets which were easily transported on board ships.  When men were put on the sick list 
with fevers, scurvy and digestive complaints the tablets were reconstituted in hot water and 
served as a soup.  The tablets were so highly regarded that even after the general issue of 
lemon juice to treat scurvy was approved in the 1790s, portable soup was still distributed to 
ships in order to treat sick seamen.  To a lesser extent other medicines were also sanctioned 
for the cure of diseases including elixir of vitriol which was initially thought to be effective 
against scurvy.  But by the 1780s most surgeons agreed that although it was a useful 
remedy for other diseases, it certainly did nothing to relieve scurvy.  Another medicine 
advocated by the Sick and Hurt Board which was widely popular was Dr James’s Fever 
Powder.  As its name implied, it was distributed to surgeons as a cure for all types of 
fevers.  Its creator publicised that it was also useful in curing gout, rheumatism and even 
scurvy; however, its composition was such that it was rendered useless against the majority 
of illnesses. 
As beneficial as a number of treatments the navy employed were, there were other factors 
contributing to the advanced state of seamen’s health during the time period covered by 
this thesis.  The disease ecology in the West Indies altered over the course of the eighteenth 
century leading surgeons and physicians to overestimate their successes when combatting 
the principal illnesses affecting naval operations.  Between 1690 and 1770, yellow fever 
epidemics repeatedly appeared in the West Indies at a time when the majority of the local 
population had no immunity to the disease.  However, by the 1770s, the influx of non-
immune Europeans levelled off over the next two decades, indicating that a larger portion 
of the population residing in the islands for extended periods of time were more likely to 
have acquired immunity yellow fever.  As a result, fever epidemics during the 1770s and 
1780s were less frequent and less severe, meaning a general healthiness reigned among 
West Indian residents and visitors.  During this intermission in fever outbreaks, the Sick 
and Hurt Board and the navy’s medical personnel worked vigorously to improve medical 
practices so that when the joint expeditionary forces were ordered to sail to the West Indies 
in the 1790s, the navy was much better prepared to manage disease and therefore suffered 
considerably less than the army who had failed to make similar advancements.  The navy’s 
preparations included the distribution of portable soup, Peruvian Bark and the 
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administration of lemon juice as well as the erection of purpose-built hospital facilities on a 
number of West Indian islands.  These, and a number of other factors, gave the navy a 
distinct advantage over the army during the deployment of the expeditionary forces in the 
1790s, meaning the loss of naval men through disease and debility was somewhat 
mitigated. 
In order to establish the exact percentages of sickness and mortality for this thesis, a survey 
was carried out on all the ships stationed in the West Indies during 1773, 1778, 1783, 1788, 
1790, 1793, 1798 and 1803 meaning a sample was taken every five years (with the exception 
of 1790).  Those dates ensure an equal number of samples were taken during both war and 
peace years as to be able to draw comparisons between them.  From these figures, it was 
possible to ascertain sickness and mortality rates for both the Jamaica and Leeward Islands 
stations.  According to figures contained in Chapter 4, neither station experienced over a 4 
per cent annual sickness rate, even during years when there was a documented outbreak of 
yellow fever.  And in fact, there were a number of sample years during which time sickness 
figures for men on board their ships was less than 2 per cent.   The most violent year for 
sickness was 1793 (during the yellow fever epidemic) in the Leeward Islands where an 
average of only 3.57 per cent of men were ill at any one time. 
Mortality figures were similarly as low on both stations.  Astonishingly, during the survey 
years, less than 7 per cent of men succumbed to their disease or wound, the only exception 
being 1793.  There were a handful of years where both stations experienced less than 2 per 
cent annual mortality rate on board their ships.  Again, the most deadly year was 1793 in 
the Leeward Islands which experienced a 6.47 per cent annual mortality rate inclusive of 
the yellow fever outbreak while the Jamaica stationed suffered 9.50 per cent mortality.  
That is not to suggest that all ships enjoyed such a marginal state of sickness and mortality.  
A small number of ships suffered more than others at the outbreak of yellow fever; the 
Experiment, Nautilus and Solebay all sustained a roughly 35 per cent sickness level on board.  
The mortality rate also swelled on board those ships with the Experiment and Nautilus 
experiencing an approximately 26 per cent rate while the Solebay fared much worse losing 
almost 54 per cent of the ship’s company.  Typically, ships that were subjected to stringent 
levels of discipline and cleanliness fared much better in the West Indies than those that 
lacked discipline and who laundered their clothing and bedding less frequently.  It was also 
regularly the case for newly-arrived ships to experience an attack of fevers which produced 
higher sickness levels than those ships that had been on the station for some time. 
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Aside from the sampling method, another way to gauge health and illnesses on board ships 
in the West Indies was through the surgeons’ journals.  Although they were not 
mandatorily or systematically kept, surgeons recorded their observations and treatments for 
their future reference.  A number of the journals documented every man put on the sick 
list with a brief description of symptoms while other journals focused on the most 
extraordinary cases they treated in precise detail.  The journals which contain the more 
unusual cases include incidents of seamen voiding enormous worms, poisoned by insect 
bites, struck by lightning and one case in which a large sewing needle penetrated a man’s 
sternum. 
As the eighteenth century progressed, health improved significantly.  It advanced to such a 
degree during the thirty-six year period covered in this thesis, that, according to Gilbert 
Blane’s calculations, ‘it appears clear...that if the mortality during the twenty years of the 
[French] Revolutionary War had been equal to what it was in 1779, the whole stock of 
seamen would have been exhausted.’  If his calculations were correct, he approximated that 
‘men would not have been procurable by any bounties however exorbitant...that if the 
mortality of 1813 had been equal to that of 1779, there would have died annually six 
thousand, six hundred and seventy-four men more than have actually died; which in twenty 
years would have amounted to 135,480, a number very nearly equal to the whole number 
of seamen and marines employed in the last years of the late war.’ 1 
Vast improvements in health had a great deal to do with changes to the way seamen were 
cared for on shore.  Both Chapters 6 and 7 demonstrate how earlier in the eighteenth 
century, the Admiralty and the Sick and Hurt Board relied on the ‘sick quarters’ system as a 
way to manage the ailing men.  Although there were financial benefits for the Admiralty to 
utilise that system, there were sufficient objections on foreign stations particularly with 
regard to rooms rented in public houses.  The system of care evolved from the utilisation 
of sick quarters to the ‘contractor system’, which was designed to maintain men in one 
location and far-removed from town debauches.  Contractors were hired by the Admiralty 
and instructed to secure a house large enough to contain a considerable number of seamen 
as well as requiring them to provide all provisions and necessaries.  Once more the 
financial advantages belonged to the Admiralty.  Contractors were either paid per man per 
cure or per man per day with the principal monetary burden resting with them.  
Fluctuations in prices for provisions and necessaries meant that they were often unable to 
                                                                 
1 Gilbert Blane,  On the Comparative  Health of  the British Navy, f rom the year 1779 to the Year 1814, with Proposals for 
its farther Improvement  (London, 1815) in Christopher Lloyd (ed.), The Health of  Seamen: Selections f rom the Works of 
Dr James Line, Gilbert Blane and Dr Thomas Trotter, vol 107 (London: Navy Records Society, 1965), p.188. 
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supply the hospitals and frequently operated at a financial loss.  With this sporadic 
availability of medicines and necessaries at the hospitals, seamen suffered and often they 
did not return to service promptly. 
By the mid-eighteenth century, the Admiralty and the Sick and Hurt Board grew tired of 
the complaints about sick quarters and contractors.  They determined that replacing those 
systems with purpose-built naval hospitals would alleviate some grief.  Two successful 
hospitals were established by the navy in England; Haslar at Portsmouth and Stonehouse at 
Plymouth.  The good effects felt from having those large buildings available for sick men 
encouraged the navy to establish similar, though nevertheless smaller, hospitals abroad.  
There were already a handful in the Mediterranean, however the buildings were pre-existing 
structures rented by the navy and not constructed to their specifications which typically 
consisted of individual wards to separate sick men. 
In the West Indies, the Admiralty considered erecting a hospital at Jamaica as early as 1740.  
The current arrangements on that island meant that sick men were scattered between nine 
different houses while a single surgeon attempted to attend them all in the same day.  Both 
the surgeon and commander on the station thought it would be more appropriate for the 
men to be looked after in a single location where there would be a consistent availability of 
medicines.  The Admiralty considered erecting the hospital at Jamaica before any other 
island in the West Indies because the squadron based there was more heavily-manned than 
its counterpart in the Leeward Islands.  By 1744, a naval hospital was constructed adhering 
to a design drawn up by Admiral Vernon and the Navy Board in an area known as New 
Greenwich.  As soon as it began accepting patients, the instances of men dying from 
malaria increased significantly.  Unbeknown to the Admiralty and the Sick and Hurt Board, 
the morasses surrounding the hospital contained disease-carrying mosquitoes which 
attacked men in hospital who were already suffering from weakened immune systems.  
Even men who were sent to New Greenwich hospital with non-fever related complaints 
soon succumbed to malaria, so much so that the hospital’s surgeon requested that men not 
suffering from fever remain on their ships for treatment.  The hospital’s location also 
wiped out a number of surgeons and at one point five died within a few months.  A decade 
passed before the Admiralty ordered the construction of a replacement hospital at Port 
Royal and once the hospital was relocated, the overall health of patients improved. 
Port Royal hospital proved so successful in convalescing men that other islands were 
earmarked for construction.  Ongoing problems with sick quarters and contractors at 
Antigua forced the Admiralty to consider building a permanent hospital at English 
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Harbour.  Aware of the problems and expenditure at Jamaica fifteen years earlier, they were 
not eager to repeat their mistakes.  Instead they managed to find local Antigua men to erect 
a hospital at their own expense which was subsequently managed by contractors.  Problems 
with natural disasters and incompetent suppliers of hospital necessaries meant the on shore 
care of seamen at Antigua was substandard and forced commanders to order the sick men 
into temporary tents and a hurricane-damaged house.  They continued in that situation for 
eighteen years until the Admiralty was finally prepared to lay out funds for the erection of a 
naval hospital at English Harbour which was completed in 1790.  Having that facility 
operational before the outbreak of the French Revolutionary War meant the hospital was 
poised to accept large numbers of sick seamen who recuperated in an organised and 
favourable environment. 
***** 
In the eighteenth century, disease plagued a large portion of the European population 
which was generally anticipated and accepted.  Likewise, the navy too had a reasonable 
expectation that a portion of their fleet would be sickly at any given time.  In conjunction 
with this expectation, logistical issues and lack of fresh provisions caused an even higher 
level of dietary and nutritional complaints in the navy while the ordering of men to the 
West Indies added another concern about tropical diseases.  Some larger expeditions to 
tropical regions suffered severely from yellow fever and malaria but, on the whole, sickness 
was not that detrimental to the navy’s manpower.  By the 1770s, the navy had a grasp on 
successfully caring for men in that climate and knowledge of minimising the risks of 
exposure by anchoring ships offshore and administering Peruvian Bark to those destined 
for shore duty.  This resulted in overall sickness levels averaging around 3 per cent while 
mortality rates were generally less than 3 per cent.  These figures are a far cry from what 
researchers and historians have supposed and no longer should the West Indies be referred 
to as the ‘seamen’s graveyard’. 
This thesis thus provides a major corrective to recent opinion about the health of naval 
seamen in the West Indies.  It has concentrated on the care for them provided by the navy 
between 1770 and 1806.  By examining papers belonging to the Sick and Hurt Board, 
surgeons, physicians and the Admiralty’s records, the thesis has covered a variety of themes 
including disease, medicine, hospital development and key personnel.  The methodology of 
employing ships’ muster books in order to systematically carry out the survey of health is 
an original approach which can be replicated in future to determine sickness and mortality 
levels in different regions and at different time periods.  Likewise, the systematic approach 
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taken with the hospital muster books establishes an innovative way to gather sickness and 
mortality figures which can be replicated on other stations.  Surgeons’ journals have been 
generally overlooked in most naval medicine studies; something which this thesis rectifies.  
This thesis benefits from examining the surgeons’ first-hand experiences to contextualise 
how diseases took hold of a ship, what medicines were employed, which were found useful 
and a number of their more unusual cases that typically are not included in most naval or 
medical histories. 
Naval medicine has been experiencing a resurgence of late after it was largely ignored 
following the four volume series of Medicine and the Navy which was essentially a work on 
naval administration.  Recent publications have drifted away from the conventional focus 
on administration and moved towards a more interdisciplinary approach.  Works on 
particular diseases and on the role of surgeons in the navy demonstrates this shift well, 
although investigations into the levels of sickness in various regions and time periods have 
been largely ignored.  While this thesis has attempted to remedy the oversight to some 
extent, it is certainly not the definitive work on the subject.  It demonstrates that 
quantitative surveys can be carried out in order to establish sickness and mortality levels 
with reasonable certainty and more specifically it addresses the long-standing belief that 
ordering seamen to the West Indies in the eighteenth century was as good as signing their 
death certificates.  While naval medicine occupies only a small branch of the service as a 
whole, it played such a crucial role in securing and protecting the colonies that more studies 
of this nature need to be carried out in order to fully appreciate the working environment 
of an eighteenth century British seamen. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Islands of the West Indies 
 
Cuba 
Jamaica 
British Virgin 
Islands 
Antigua 
Martinique 
Barbados 
Trinidad and Tobago 
St Lucia 
Hispaniola 
Puerto Rico 
Atlantic Ocean 
Caribbean Sea 
Bahamas 
288 
APPENDIX 2 
New Edition of the Instructions for Navy Surgeons, 1 February 18001 
1st 
When you are appointed to serve on board of any of HM ships or vessels you are to provide yourself 
agreeably to the rules of the navy with instrument and a chest of medicines, which are to be viewed and 
examined by us, in order that we may satisfy ourselves and certify that they are of the quality and in the 
quantity required, you are also to demand the several gratuitous articles enumerated in form No.4, 
either from us or from our agents in Foreign Parts. 
2nd 
You are every twelve months, or oftener if necessary, when in port, to write to your Captain, requesting 
his application to the Commander in Chief to direct a survey on your medicine chest, which is to be 
taken by two or more surgeons of the fleet who are to certify and report the quantity and condition of 
the medicines and instruments on board, which report you are to transmit to this office in order to our 
directing the apothecaries company to send the necessary supply. 
3rd 
You are to be provided at all times with a competent number of smart tickets, which will be delivered 
to you upon application at this office or by our agents at the out ports. 
4th 
You are to examine the necessaries sent on board, and if they are deficient in quantity, or bad in quality, 
you are to acquaint your captain, that he may represent the same to us. 
5th 
You are to take care that the medicines and necessaries with which you are supplied, are faithfully 
administered for the relief of the sick and wounded and that no part of them be either wasted or 
embezzled. 
6th 
When draughts of men are brought on board, you are to apply to the captain or commanding officer 
for permission to inspect and examine them, and you are to endeavour to discover from whence they 
came, whether they have any infections, or whether there be reason to suspect infection, in 
consequence of their being received from jails, tenders, receiving ships, or ships in which infectious 
disorders have prevailed and you are to represent the same to the captain, that he many take proper 
steps either to remove them from the ship, or to have them properly cleansed and purified by bathing 
their persons, or by fumigating or destroying their cloths, before they mix with the ships company; 
together with such other methods as you may suggest for preventing the introduction of sickness. 
7th 
As it has frequently happened that men raised at the different rendezvous, impressed on shore, on from 
merchant ships or entered as volunteers, have been found on their coming on board His Majesty’s 
                                                                
1 NMM, ADM/F/30, 1 February 1800. 
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ships to be unfit for service, you are by the permission of your captain to examine such men, on their 
first appearance on board, in the most minute manner; and if you find any of them labouring under 
disease, or such bodily infirmity, as in your judgement renders them unfit for His Majesty’s service, you 
are immediately to inform your captain of their names, diseases or hurts, that he may take such steps, as 
he may think proper. 
8th 
On your return into port, from a cruise or voyage, you are to make out a list to be signed by yourself, of 
all such seamen and marines as have received wounds or hurts during the said voyage or cruise, which 
may entitle them to relief from the Chest at Chatham, but smart money or pension, noting who have 
had certificates and who have not, in form No.1 observing not to grant them for trifling hurts, whereby 
many persons are brought from a great distance for relief, when the sum that can be allowed them for 
their hurts may not be sufficient to defray the expenses of their journey, but you are not to refuse them 
to any men who are materially injured; and in the certificate you give, you are to be particularly attentive 
to the note which is at foot of the blanks, delivered from this office. 
As inconveniences have arisen from the said lists not being delivered into the navy office, till the ship is 
paid, you are to be careful to send your list of such men, with the captain’s muster books every two 
months, or as often as the captain shall have an opportunity to send his muster books, directing the 
same under cover sealed up to this office in order that we may transmit the same to the comptroller’s 
office, for payment of seamen’s wages, and further you are to deliver a list of the whole, to the clerk to 
the Comptroller of the Navy, at the payment of the ship, without which you are not to be paid your 
wages. 
9th 
When from bad weather the lower deck parts of the ships of the line cannot be opened and the leakage 
from these parts, and the breath and perspiration of the men sleeping below, render the space between 
decks replete with moisture and noxious effluvia, tending to produce disease and generate infection, 
you are in the most respectful but earnest manner to represent to your captain the absolute necessity 
there is to keep the ship as dry and sweet as circumstances will admit for which purpose you will 
recommend that iron pots, or hanging stoves, with burning cinders be carried between decks, into the 
well, manger, cockpit, cable tier, the hold and other parts of the ship, where the air is stagnant and 
offensive, from defect of ventilation, you are also when there is any infection, or cause to suspect 
infection, and when you can obtain your commanders permission to fumigate every part of the ship 
when the men are below, by diffusing the vapour of the nitrous acid, with the materials for performing 
which you will be supplied, directions for conducting this are annex No.2.  During this fumigation the 
bedding and clothes of the men are to be opened, spread loose, and detached so that they may be 
completely surrounded by the vapour.  In similar circumstances, and when the situation of the service 
will permit, all the men to be on deck, you are with your captain’s permission, to fumigate with burning 
charcoal and brimstone as often as may be necessary, according to the method hereunto annexed No.3.  
When men are taken ill of fevers, which you suspect to be infectious, they are to be stripped on their 
entry into the sick berth, and if practicable washed with soap and warm water, and to have clean shirts 
and night caps, on their going to bed, their clothes and bedding which they have laid aside, are to be 
carefully fumigated, and washed, before they are returned to the men’s chests. 
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10th 
As the frequent washing between decks, particularly in climates and season in which they cannot be 
completely dried before the men return to their berths, has ever been productive of sickness, you will 
therefore in respectful terms represent to your captain’s consideration, how much it will conduce to the 
health of the ships company that their apartments, as well as their clothing, should be kept as dry as 
circumstances will admit. 
11th 
As hair mattresses, sheets, linen, caps and pillow cases for the use of patients confined to bed, are 
allowed with soap for washing them when dirty, and for the more readily cleansing the persons of the 
sick, you will give particular directions to the assistants acting under you, that your patients be kept in 
that perfect state of cleanliness, which is necessary for their recovery. 
12th 
In an engagement you are to keep yourself in the cockpit, or such other place as the captain shall 
appoint, where a platform is to be prepared for the reception of the wounded men, and yourself, mates 
and assistants are to be ready and have everything at hand for stopping their blood, and dressing their 
wounds.  You are to instruct such of the assistants, as the captain may have directed to be quartered 
with you in the time of action, in the method of applying tourniquets, in case you are your mates should 
not have time to attend to that service. 
You will also represent to the captain, that as it sometimes happens in time of action, that men bleed to 
death for want of speedy assistance particularly in parts distant from the cockpit, such as the quarter 
deck, poop, forecastle, and tops, it would be expedient that a certain number of petty officers or others 
quartered at these stations should be instructed by you in the method of applying tourniquets, with 
which they should be provided on such occasions. 
13th 
You are to visit the men under your care at least twice a day, and oftener if their circumstances require 
it, and you are at other times to distribute your mates and assistants among them in order that none 
may at any time want due attendance and relief. 
14th 
As it is of the utmost importance, that proper means of cure should be employed at as early a stage as 
possible, of the several diseases to which the men are subject, and as seamen are naturally careless of 
their own welfare and averse to complain, you are as often as your perceive any of the ships company 
who by their appearance give indications of illness; to examine them and put them on the sick list, if 
necessary; that not time may be lost in stopping the further progress of disease; and in order to make an 
early discovery of illness, you will take frequent opportunities of viewing the ships company, and for 
the same purpose yourself on your mate, will take care to be present at all musters. 
And upon long cruises, or voyages, when there is not a sufficiency of lemon juice for the whole number 
of men on board, you are with the captain’s leave, to take a view of the ships company from time to 
time, and examine whether any of them have obscure symptoms of sea scurvy, too slight to make it 
necessary for them to withdraw from duty and be put on the sick list, and you will also enquire what 
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men have been longest on salt provisions, and making out a list of such men, you will present it to the 
captain, in order that may give directions for their being supplied with the usual allowance of lemon 
juice and sugar, put in the purser’s custody for that purpose. 
15th 
You will take care to regulate the diet of the sick according to their several symptoms and disorders.  
This is to consist of a certain proportion of their sea victualling, restricting them in regard to salt 
provisions, and such other articles as you may judge improper for their complaints, and employing their 
oatmeal in making gruel and sowins, their flour, in making soft bread or puddings, these together with 
their molasses, and raisins, the necessaries in your own charge, and portable soup, will constitute a 
wholesome diet for the sick.  For such cases as in your opinion require wine, at a time when beer or 
spirits are served, you will demand from the purser in lieu of these such a quantity of wine as you judge 
necessary, not exceeding one pint for each man daily. 
16th 
You are to request the captain to permit the sick berth, to be in the most airy part of the ship, provide 
it is sheltered from the weather, and the patients are to be removed thither when you judge it necessary, 
you are also to request your commander to allow such a number of the ships company as my be 
requisite, to attend the sick as nurses, night and day you are also to request him to cause you to be 
furnished with a sufficient number of buckets with covers for necessary occasions. 
17th 
You will take particular care that medicines and drink be provided every evening in sufficient quantities 
to last till morning, and as drink to the sick, particularly in fevers, it essential to their comfort and 
recovery you are to give the most positive directions, that the nurses and attendants offer, and gently 
press it upon the patients, every hour or oftener according to circumstances; although the patients may 
not crave or ask for it. 
You are to have a stove with clean burning cinders, in the berth as often as possible, not only for the 
comfortable warmth of the patients, should the climate and season require it, but to prevent dampness 
and for the purification of the air. 
18th 
In case any of the articles supplied by the purser, should be deficient in quantity or improper in quality 
you will take care to represent the same to the captain, in order to obtain redress. 
19th 
When any of the ships company are employed by the captain, in fishing, you are to point out to him 
those patients for whom fish may be proper. 
20th 
As it must be attended with danger to permit the sick, under perspiration, or in a state of extreme 
debility, to be moved from their bed on necessary occasions, you will be provided with bed pans and 
urinal for patients under those circumstances, and for those labouring under catarrhal and pulmonic 
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complaints, where expectoration is considerable, spitting pots will be furnished to prevent their 
becoming a nuisance to the other patients. 
21st 
As the recovery and comfort of the sick will much depend on the person employed as nurses, you are 
to see that they do their duty with the utmost care and attention by night, and by day, and you will 
enquire from the patients themselves every morning and at other times when you visit them, whether 
they have been treated with humanity and tenderness, have been plentifully supplies with drink, 
medicines, diet and every necessary accommodation and if you find that these important duties have 
been omitted, or have been performed in a careless and negligent manner, you will report the same to 
your captain. 
22nd 
In all cases that are difficult; if there be a physician in the squadron, you are to resort to him for advice 
and follow his prescriptions. 
23rd 
You are to keep a journal of your proactive, noting the disease and symptoms, with the medicines 
prescribed day by day, according to the form, delivered to you on your appointment, which is to be 
sent in original to this office with the other papers, necessary for passing your account; you are also to 
give an general history of the prevailing complaints in the ship during the said time, and if any 
malignant or infectious diseases have taken place, to trace them to their source, and account for their 
introduction, with the means used to destroy such infection and the steps taken to prevent their 
reappearance.  If the crew have been healthy, you are to state what was the general æconomy of the 
ship. 
24th 
Whilst your ship is in any port of Great Britain, you are to transmit a weekly account of the state of the 
sick signed by yourself, with remarks and observations, according to the form with which you will be 
furnished to be sent so as to reach this office on a Monday. 
25th 
When your ship is abroad, one general return is to be transmitted when the captain sends home his 
monthly books, stating in your remarks, the effect of the weather and of climate, on the health of the 
men; when you are on a long cruise, one general return is to be made on your arrival in any port of 
Great Britain.  In every return the name sand qualities of your mate are to be inserted. 
26th 
It has frequently occurred, that the crews of ships on their passages to England, after having been long 
in a warm climate have been destitute of clothes, except such as were adapted to the former station, 
and that on their arriving in the northern latitude particularly in winter, great numbers have been seized 
with rheumatic and pulmonic complaints, as well as other dangerous diseases, evidently arising from a 
deficiency of warm clothing, you will therefore previous to your sailing, submit this matter to your 
captains consideration, that he may take such steps as he may judge expedient for the procuring an 
adequate and suitable stock of clothing. 
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27th 
You are every morning after visiting your patients, to make out and deliver to your captain, a list of 
their names, with their diseases and submit to him your opinion on the proper steps to be taken for 
their comfort and accommodation, more especially should any of their distempers be infectious, in 
order that those labouring under them may be sent out of the ship, or it that cannot be down, that they 
may be separated from the rest of the sick, and means taken for preventing the progress of the 
sickness. 
28th 
When you arrive in port, from any voyage or cruise, and have men on board who from consumptive 
habits or other complaints, or in consequence of having received any hurts are in your opinion unfit for 
the service, you are to give in a list of their names and diseases to the captain, who will represent the 
same to the commander-in-chief, in order to their being immediately surveyed you are however to 
guard with the utmost circumspection, against the imposition of men assuming and persevering in 
deigned complaint with a view to elude the service. 
29th 
The principal course of sickness and mortality among seamen in tropical stations having been observed 
to consist in the duties they are obliged to perform on sore and Peruvian Bark with wine, having been 
found to be a preventive in such cases, you shall when your ship is upon these stations request from the 
captain a list of such men as are to be sent on shore duty, and administer yourself previous to their 
leaving the ship in the morning a drachm of Bark, in half a gill of sound wine to each man, and you will 
also give to each man the like quantity of wine after he shall have taken the bark, and the like quantity 
of Bark and wine proportioned in the same manner is to be given them in the evenings of the same 
days, on their return to the ship, particularly observing that the Bark administered for this purpose, is 
always to be given in substance, and not in tincture; and as wine is allowed to the ships companies on 
these voyages, it is recommended to you to make application to the captain for some of the best wine 
supplied for the ships use, to be reserved for this purpose, which is to be issued under his directions.  If 
it should happen that any men remain on shore duty all night, the officer commanding them is to be 
furnished with a sufficient quantity of Bark and wine, for such exigencies. 
You are to observe attentively the subsequent state of health of men to whom the bark may have been 
thus administered, and report fully to us, your opinion of its effects. 
30th 
No patients are to be sent from the ship to an hospital or sick quarters more especially in tropical 
climates, when they can conveniently be cured on board, unless where infection exists, but they may 
according to circumstances and with the captains approbation be supplied with diet on board by the 
contractor for the hospital your demands approved by the captain and your receipts are to be the 
contractors vouchers for what he may supply, and you are to take care that the same be faithfully 
administered. 
31st 
When any sick men are ordered on shore to the hospital or on board hospital ships, you are to send 
along with them to the physician and surgeon an account in writing sealed up, of the time and manner 
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of their being taken ill, and the methods used for their recovery, with your opinion whether they have 
appeared to you as impostors, who have feigned complaints to get clear of the service or whether on 
the other hand, their ailments are real, you are likewise to not their general character as far as comes 
within your knowledge. 
32nd 
In case there should be diseases of an infectious nature on board at the time of the ships arrival in port, 
you are to have in readiness a written statement of the nature and symptoms of such diseases, and the 
number you intend sending on shore, which you are to request your captain to send to the physicians 
and surgeons of the hospital or sick quarters, previous to landing the sick, in order that separate and 
proper apartments may be provided for their reception.  After the sick are landed, you will represent to 
your captain the necessity of the ships undergoing a thorough cleansing and repeated fumigations, and 
also the advantage of fires in the different parts of the ship, and likewise a proper admission and 
perflation of the external air with a view to eradicate the seeds of infection.  In case of your having any 
infectious disease on board when at sea, you are to endeavour to counteract such infection by the most 
strict attention to cleanliness, by ventilation, in so far as may be consistent with a proper degree of 
warmth, by drying and sweetening the air by means of portable fires, by the nitrous fumigation, and by 
an early separation of the sick from those in health. 
33rd 
When the medicines, bedding and other articles which government allows you are expended or nearly 
so, your demands for a supply are to be made to this Board when your ship is on the home stations or 
to our agents when abroad, transmitting at the same time a survey stating the remains and you are to 
take care, not to repeat your demands within the year, unless your ship should be ordered on foreign 
service, or in extraordinary exigencies, in which case you are to state your reasons, to be submitted to 
our decision. 
34th 
On passing your accounts, which are to be kept in form No.4 one general affidavit in form No.5 is to 
be made, stating that the different articles under your charge were expended for the use of the sick 
only. 
35th 
You are to propose from time to time for our consideration, all such matter as experience may have 
pointed out to you to be likely to prove beneficial to the service, to conduce to the comfort of the sick, 
under your care, and to tend to their speedy recovery. 
Note 
The preceding Instructions may serve as a guide for the common occurrences in general service, but 
much must ever be left to your own judgement and discretion.  As you have the charge of the lives of 
the most useful subjects of this Kingdom, uncleanly in their habits often much crowded in their 
accommodations from these circumstances and the nature of their diet, and the varieties of weather 
and climate, liable to infectious fevers, as well as scurvy and other chronic complaints, also accidents 
from wounds, hurts &c incidents to their mode of life, the guarding against and counteracting those 
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evils, must depend on your own resources and promptitude in applying the most speedy remedies, 
according to circumstances. 
As sickness in the most favourable situation on shore, in some degree depresses the spirits, much more 
must it affect your patients on board ships of war, labouring under so many inconveniences which 
cannot be remedied.  Under these circumstances it will readily occur to you that it must tend to their 
recovery, to sooth and cheer their minds, by the most humane attention, to hear with patience all their 
complaints, and to redress whatever they may think grievances, by every expression of consolatory 
kindness, which will naturally inspire them with confidence, exhilarate their spirits, and add to their 
hope of recovery to which it cannot fail to contribute. 
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APPENDIX 3 
Daily Allowance of Provisions for each man in the Navy1 
 
 
 
 Biscuit lbs Beer gallons Beef lbs Pork lbs Pease pint Oatmeal pint Butter ozs Cheese ozs 
Sunday 1 1  1 ½    
Monday 1 1    1 2 4 
Tuesday 1 1 2      
Wednesday 1 1   ½ 1 2 4 
Thursday 1 1  1 ½    
Friday 1 1   ½ 1 2 4 
Saturday 1 1 2      
 
                                                                
1 Gilbert Blane, Observations on the Disease of Seamen (London, 1789) in Christopher Lloyd (ed.), The Health of Seamen: Selections from the works of Dr James Lind, Sir Gilbert Blane and 
Dr Thomas Trotter, vol 107 (London: Navy Records Society, 1965), p. 164. 
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APPENDIX 4 
Instructions for Issuing Portable Soup on board His Majesty’s Ships, 3 February 17581 
 
Whereas it has been judged proper to provide Portable Broth for His Majesty’s Sick seamen and 
Marines on Board the Ships of War, the following rules are calculated for the issuing thereof viz. 
1st The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having been pleased to direct that the said broth 
shall be put under the charge of the purser, to be issued to the sick by demands in form No.1 to be 
made from time to time by the surgeon as he shall judge proper, verified by the captain; the purser is to 
account with this office for the expense thereof in the Form No.2 to produce the demands as vouchers 
thereto and to make affidavit in Form No.3 that he only issued the broth as demanded in that manner. 
2nd It has been found upon trial that one ounce of such broth will be sufficient to make one quart 
of liquid broth, so strong that it will jelly when cold; and as it contains the nourishing juices of about 
three quarters of a pound of flesh meat, that quantity will be sufficient for, and is to be issued to each 
recovering patient in a day; it must be dissolved in a quart of boiling water and given to the patients in 
such proportions as the surgeon of the ship may judge proper. 
3rd It has likewise been found that ¾ of an ounce will make one quart of light nourishing and 
diluting broth for those that are sick or weak, and will be very proper in scorbutic cases: that quantity 
will be sufficient for such patients for one day, and is to be issued accordingly. 
4th The surgeon is to cause to be added to the broth, if found necessary, rice, oatmeal, pearl barley 
or pease: an ounce of the first and two ounces of the three others will be sufficient for a quart of broth, 
being first softened in boiling water; which is to be poured off and then the remaining thick part to be 
mixed with the broth. 
5th The surgeon is to keep in a book for that purpose in form No.4 a journal of the sick, showing 
the number of days each man is upon the stronger or weaker broth diet, by which the expenditure of 
the broth will be checked and the effects it had on the several patients may likewise by that means be 
judged of; at the end of this journal an abstract is to be made in the form No.5 and both to be 
transmitted to this office; and as no portable broth is to be issued, but in the manner prescribed in the 
1st article, the surgeon is to make affidavit in form No.6 that he never demanded any but for the use of 
the sick; and that, to the best of his knowledge and belief, the same was faithfully served to them, and 
not expended for any other uses. 
6th The pursers and surgeons are both to take notice that till the accounts prescribed for each, are 
delivered and adjusted, the accounts of the one with the Victualling Office will not be passed, nor the 
wages of the surgeon paid: and that any remains which there may be of the portable broth, is to be 
delivered to the agent for sick and wounded seamen at the port where the ship may happen to be. 
Given under our Hands at our office on Tower Hill this 3rd Day of February 1758. 
                                                                
1 NMM, ADM/F/17, 3 February 1758. 
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APPENDIX 5 
Number of Seamen and Marines Voted by Parliament with the Number sent Sick on Shore and to 
Hospital Ships on the Home Stations, 1778 - 18061 
 
Year Voted by Parliament Sent Sick 
1778 60,000 15,978 
1779 70,000 24,226 
1780 85,000 32,121 
1781 90,000 23,812 
1782 100,000 22,909 
1783 110,000 13,577 
1793 45,000 17,280 
1794 85,000 19,248 
1795 100,000 20,579 
1796 110,000 16,860 
1797 120,000 20,544 
1798 120,000 15,713 
1799 120,000 14,608 
1800 111,538 17,747 
1801 131,538 15,082 
1804 100,000 7,650 
1805 120,000 8,083 
1806 120,000 7,662 
 
                                                                
1 Gilbert Blane, Select Dissertations: On the Comparative Health of the British Navy, from the year 1779 to the year 1814, with proposals for 
its farther improvement in Christopher Lloyd (ed.), The Health of Seamen: Selections from the works of Dr James Lind, Sir Gilbert Blane 
and Dr Thomas Trotter, vol 107 (London: Navy Records Society, 1965), p. 200. 
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APPENDIX 6 
Sickness & Mortality Figures on board ships on the Leeward Islands and Jamaica stations 
1773, 1778, 1783, 1788, 1790, 1793, 1794, 1798 and 1803 
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Appendix 6.1 – Leeward Islands & Jamaica 17731 
  
                                                                
1 Primary sources for the data are individually listed on the following pages. 
0.0% 
1.0% 
2.0% 
3.0% 
4.0% 
5.0% 
6.0% 
Leeward Islands Sickness 
Jamaica Sickness 
Leeward Islands Mortality 
Jamaica Mortality 
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 January February March April May June July August September October November December 
Yearly 
Average2 
Jamaica - Number of 
Borne Seamen 
1310.5 1357.25 1023.0 1022.0 1196.25 1182.5 1069.5 767.25 772.5 776.25 631.5 633.75 1824.2 
Jamaica - Average 
Number of Men on 
Sick List 
33.75 11.5 17.75 16.75 14.25 9.5 16.75 13.75 15.5 17.75 30.0 26.25  
Jamaica - Total 
Number of Men Dead 
3 3 0 1 3 2 6 0 1 4 2 5  
Leeward - Number of 
Borne Seamen 
1105.5 1104.75 1113.5 1001.75 1008.0 929.25 798.75 797.5 766.5 766.75 749.0 735.75 1209.9 
Leeward - Average 
Number of Men on 
Sick List 
46.0 41.0 42.75 32.5 11.0 16.5 14.25 12.75 14.5 19.0 19.75 37.75  
Leeward - Total 
Number of Men Dead 
3 2 0 4 1 1 0 1 2 2 4 6  
                                                                
2 The Yearly Per-Ship Average is not derived simply by averaging together the ‘Borne’ Seamen figure from each month.  A more complex system has been employed in order 
to calculate this figure.  Due to the constant influx of ships on each station, an average ‘Borne’ number was calculated for each ship that spent time in the West Indies.  For 
example, in the Leeward Islands, for the twelve months that Chatham was on station, an average of ‘Borne’ men was calculated and added to other individual ships’ averages, 
thereby arriving at the figure 1209.9 as the yearly-average rather than 906.4 which would be the case if I took an average of the monthly ‘Borne’ figures. 
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Leeward Islands station 1773 
Chatham ADM 36/8454, ADM 36/8455 
Crescent ADM 36/7573, ADM 36/7574 
Active ADM 36/7545 
Seahorse ADM 36/7517 
Kennington ADM 36/7760 
Spy ADM 36/7492 
Falcon ADM 36/7501 
Favourite ADM 36/7372 
Lynx ADM 36/7629 
Deal Castle ADM 36/7592 
 
Jamaica station 1773 
Princess Amelia ADM 36/7275, ADM 36/7276 
Achilles ADM 36/7293 
Diana ADM 36/7495 
Lowestoffe ADM 36/7634 
Carysfort ADM 36/7340 
Garland ADM 36/7391, ADM 36/7392 
Zephyr ADM 36/7541 
Diligence ADM 36/7585 
Ferret ADM 36/7378, ADM 36/7379 
Portland ADM 36/8047 
Seaford ADM 36/7679 
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Appendix 6.2– Leeward Islands & Jamaica 17783 
  
                                                                
3 Primary sources for the data are individually listed on the following pages. 
0.0% 
0.5% 
1.0% 
1.5% 
2.0% 
2.5% 
3.0% 
3.5% 
4.0% 
Leeward Islands Sickness 
Jamaica Sickness 
Leeward Islands Mortality 
Jamaica Mortality 
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 January February March April May June July August September October November December 
Yearly 
Average 
Jamaica - Number of 
Borne Seamen 
2396.75 2534.5 2931.0 2552.75 2349.75 2024.0 2097.25 1970.0 1729.5 1745.75 2184.5 2177.25 3786.3 
Jamaica - Average 
Number of Men on 
Sick List 
31.5 30.75 37.25 50.0 31.25 40.0 32.75 19.75 23.5 25.5 40.75 27.75  
Jamaica - Total 
Number of Men Dead 
18 8 16 8 10 11 18 9 7 13 31 19  
Leeward - Number of 
Borne Seamen 
2144.25 2148.25 2315.5 2299.25 2098.5 2036.0 1902.0 1384.5 1812.75 1653.5 1647.5 1594.5 3468.7 
Leeward - Average 
Number of Men on 
Sick List 
36.75 61.5 71.5 59.5 27.75 15.25 11.75 44.75 31.25 29.25 34.5 30.75  
Leeward - Total 
Number of Men Dead 
2 5 15 4 4 6 4 5 4 1 3 7  
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Leeward Islands station 1778 
Endeavour ADM 36/8126 
Portland ADM 36/8592, ADM 36/8593 
Yarmouth ADM 36/8072 
Aurora ADM 36/8728, ADM 36/8729 
Ariadne ADM 36/9081, ADM 36/9082 
Deal Castle ADM 36/8257 
Seaford ADM 36/8912 
Ceres ADM 36/7828 
Cygnet ADM 36/9597, ADM 36/9598 
Shark ADM 36/7720 
Favourite ADM 36/7976, ADM 36/7977 
Fly ADM 36/8763, ADM 36/8764 
Grasshopper ADM 36/7733 
Snake ADM 36/9775 
Beaver ADM 36/10158, ADM 36/10159 
Boreas ADM 36/9061 
Prince of Wales ADM 36/7900, ADM 36/7901 
Boyne ADM 36/8010 
Pelican ADM 36/8521, ADM 36/8522 
Comet ADM 36/7726 
Antigua ADM 36/7827 
 
Jamaica station 1778 
Antelope ADM 36/7555 
Southampton ADM 36/8528 
Aeolus ADM 36/8832, ADM 36/8833 
Niger ADM 36/8450, ADM 36/8451 
Hind ADM 36/8382 
Glasgow ADM 36/7906, ADM 36/7907 
Atalanta ADM 36/9045 
Porpoise ADM 36/7740 
Lowestoffe ADM 36/10048, ADM 36/10049 
Chameleon ADM 36/9610 
Lynx ADM 36/10029 
Hornet ADM 36/9897, ADM 36/9898 
Hound ADM 36/9903, ADM 36/9904 
Sylph ADM 36/7842, ADM 36/7843 
Porcupine ADM 36/10531 
Stork ADM 36/10144 
Racehorse ADM 36/7888 
West Florida ADM 36/9895 
Camel ADM 36/8462, ADM 36/8463 
Cupid ADM 36/7969 
Druid ADM 36/7853 
Ostrich ADM 36/9096 
Lowestoffe’s Prize ADM 36/8254 
Ruby ADM 36/8987 
Bristol ADM 36/8117, ADM 36/8118 
Winchelsea ADM 36/7881 
Diligence ADM 36/7586 
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Appendix 6.3– Leeward Islands & Jamaica 17834 
  
                                                                
4 Primary sources for the data are individually listed on the following pages. 
0.0% 
0.5% 
1.0% 
1.5% 
2.0% 
2.5% 
3.0% 
3.5% 
4.0% 
4.5% 
5.0% 
Leeward Islands Sickness 
Jamaica Sickness 
Leeward Islands Mortality 
Jamaica Mortality 
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 January February March April May June July August September October November December 
Yearly 
Average 
Jamaica - Number of 
Borne Seamen 
8079.5 11177.75 11832.0 11726.5 6575.75 2851.0 1288.5 1117.25 1176.25 1025.75 950.25 738.0 12984.5 
Jamaica - Average 
Number of Men on 
Sick List 
148.5 225.5 229.25 169.25 49.75 42.5 29.0 15.25 11.75 12.25 10.5 10.75  
Jamaica - Total 
Number of Men Dead 
50 45 33 40 36 14 11 5 6 4 3 2  
Leeward - Number of 
Borne Seamen 
11511.0 12779.0 12593.0 12850.0 4885.75 3132.75 1869.0 1686.5 1304.75 1297.75 1314.75 1138.5 13695.0 
Leeward - Average 
Number of Men on 
Sick List 
258.0 370.75 399.5 320.5 94.5 84.75 67.5 58.25 58.5 44.25 44.5 30.5  
Leeward - Total 
Number of Men Dead 
33 19 36 35 22 11 2 2 9 4 6 5  
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Leeward Islands station 1783 
Pegasus ADM 36/9793 
Fury ADM 36/10085, ADM 36/10086 
Zebra ADM 36/10229, ADM 36/10230 
Formidable ADM 36/9120 
Namur ADM 36/8984 
Duke ADM 36/9127 
Union ADM 36/9377 
Princess Amelia ADM 36/9988 
Fame ADM 36/8848 
Berwick ADM 36/8904 
Raisonable ADM 36/10067, ADM 36/10068 
Bellona ADM 36/8896 
Suffolk ADM 36/9396 
Conquerer ADM 36/8976 
Hercules ADM 36/9213 
Royal Oak ADM 36/9526 
Invincible ADM 36/9002 
Warrior ADM 36/8908 
Magnificent ADM 36/9470 
Princessa ADM 36/8944 
St Albans ADM 36/9146 
Ruby ADM 36/8992 
Prudent ADM 36/9369, ADM 36/9370 
Nonsuch ADM 36/9756 
Yarmouth ADM 36/8935 
Agamemnon ADM 36/9149 
Polyphemus ADM 36/10368 
Anson ADM 36/8927 
Leander ADM 36/9571, ADM 36/9572, ADM 36/9573 
Dolphin ADM 36/9244, ADM 36/9245 
La Nymphe ADM 36/9720 
Alcmene ADM 36/9945, ADM 36/9946 
Champion ADM 36/9748, ADM 36/9749 
St Eustatius ADM 36/9768 
Experiment ADM 36/10070, ADM 36/10071 
Reynard ADM 36/10217 
Alecto ADM 36/8946 
Sally ADM 36/9942 
Solitaire ADM 36/9574 
Mohawk ADM 36/9970 
Stormont ADM 36/10219 
St Lucia ADM 36/8890 
St Vincent ADM 36/9420 
Barbados ADM 36/10148 
Germaine ADM 36/9917 
Star ADM 36/10090 
Lizard ADM 36/10401 
Gros Islet ADM 36/9918 
Berbice ADM 36/9200 
Achilles ADM 36/9660 
Boreas ADM 36/10524 
 
Jamaica station 1783 
London ADM 36/9137 
Preston ADM 36/9461, ADM 36/9462 
Ulysses ADM 36/10378 
Resistance ADM 36/9730, ADM 36/9731 
Actaeon ADM 36/9679 
Diamond ADM 36/9212, ADM 36/9216 
Alarm ADM 36/9642 
Success ADM 36/9737 
Tartar ADM 36/9880 
Proserpine ADM 36/9221 
Fox ADM 36/9648, ADM 36/9649 
Ajax ADM 36/9009 
Nestor ADM 36/9786 
Du Guay Trouin ADM 36/10134 
Childers ADM 36/9590 
Duc d’Esisac ADM 36/9891 
Tobago ADM 36/10225 
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Jamaica ADM 36/10153 
Endeavour ADM 36/10258 
Prosperity ADM 36/9935 
Post Boy ADM 36/9933 
Badger ADM 36/9885 
Racehorse ADM 36/10111 
Shrewsbury ADM 36/10246 
Torbay ADM 36/9176, ADM 36/9177 
Licorne ADM 36/10241 
Barfleur ADM 36/9191 
Bedford ADM 36/9382 
Valiant ADM 36/8938, ADM 36/8939 
Arrogant ADM 36/9398 
Port Royal ADM 36/10149 
Arrow ADM 36/10035 
Salamander ADM 36/9400 
Admiral Barrington ADM 36/9041 
Nemesis ADM 36/10164 
Alfred ADM 36/9854 
Alcide ADM 36/8920, ADM 36/8921 
Prince William ADM 36/9198 
Belliqueux ADM 36/9141 
America ADM 36/9092 
Repulse ADM 36/9521 
Prothee ADM 36/10372 
Marlborough ADM 36/8964 
Magicienne ADM 36/9718 
Santa Margarita ADM 36/10055 
Whitby ADM 36/10388 
Spanish Pacquet ADM 36/8889 
Camilla ADM 36/10633 
Ariel ADM 36/10361 
Endymion ADM 36/9224, ADM 36/9225 
La Fortunee ADM 36/9957 
L’Aimables ADM 36/9687 
Blast ADM 36/9800 
Prince George ADM 36/9167 
London ADM 36/9137 
Porcupine ADM 36/10534 
Pegasus ADM 36/9793 
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Appendix 6.4– Leeward Islands & Jamaica 17885 
  
                                                                
5 Primary sources for the data are individually listed on the following pages. 
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Leeward Islands Mortality 
Jamaica Mortality 
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 January February March April May June July August September October November December 
Yearly 
Average 
Jamaica - Number of 
Borne Seamen 
919.5 1004.5 1092.75 1238.5 1239.5 1238.5 1189.25 1245.25 1236.5 1231.25 1228.75 1235.75 1236.5 
Jamaica - Average 
Number of Men on Sick 
List 
21.25 12.5 9.25 11.25 17.75 20.0 21.5 30.5 30.0 36.75 37.75 38.5  
Jamaica - Total Number 
of Men Dead 
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 3 1 0 4 1  
Leeward - Number of 
Borne Seamen 
833.5 832.75 832.75 826.25 931.0 929.75 909.75 894.75 896.75 897.75 904.25 905.0 910.9 
Leeward - Average 
Number of Men on Sick 
List 
25.0 27.75 27.75 42.75 33.5 30.0 25.25 24.25 28.5 27.5 30.0 11.75  
Leeward - Total 
Number of Men Dead 
0 0 2 4 0 2 1 5 1 4 1 1  
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Leeward Islands station 1788 
Jupiter ADM 36/10734, ADM 36/10735 
Solebay ADM 36/10650 
Maidstone ADM 36/10738, ADM 36/10739 
Sybil ADM 36/10975 
Bonetta ADM 36/11127 
Scorpion ADM 36/10741 
 
Jamaica station 1788 
Europa ADM 36/10659, ADM 36/16660 
Expedition ADM 36/10672, ADM 36/10673 
Amphion ADM 36/10725 
Astraea ADM 36/10729, ADM 36/10730 
Cygnet ADM 36/10885 
Calypso ADM 36/10889, ADM 36/10890 
Aurora ADM 36/10727 
Alert ADM 36/10792 
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Appendix 6.5– Leeward Islands & Jamaica 17906 
  
                                                                
6 Primary sources for the data are individually listed on the following pages. 
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 January February March April May June July August September October November December 
Yearly 
Average 
Jamaica - Number of Borne 
Seamen 
860.25 936.75 935.5 683.0 949.25 958.0 769.0 949.75 965.25 975.5 1158.5 1075.25 1699.0 
Jamaica - Average Number 
of Men on Sick List 
8.5 15.75 8.5 8.0 23.25 22.25 33.75 26.75 29.75 29.75 18.75 14.75  
Jamaica - Total Number of 
Men Dead 
1 1 1 0 6 2 1 5 0 2 1 2  
Leeward - Number of 
Borne Seamen 
937.25 939.25 933.0 940.25 1396.0 915.5 935.5 684.75 690.75 692.5 696.25 665.75 1611.8 
Leeward - Average Number 
of Men on Sick List 
32.25 38.0 35.0 13.75 8.0 18.0 36.0 14.25 20.8 30.25 29.0 7.25  
Leeward - Total Number of 
Men Dead 
0 1 3 1 3 0 1 1 0 1 0 1  
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Leeward Islands station 1790 
Jupiter ADM 36/10737 
Blanche ADM 36/11009 
Maidstone ADM 36/10976 
Sybil ADM 36/10976 
Bonetta ADM 36/11128 
Scorpion ADM 36/10742 
Trusty ADM 36/11214 
Solebay ADM 36/10982 
Proserpine ADM 36/11057 
 
Jamaica station 1790 
Amphion ADM 36/10726 
Calypso ADM 36/10890 
Aurora ADM 36/10728 
Alert ADM 36/10793 
Centurion ADM 36/11116, ADM 36/11117 
Astraea ADM 36/10731 
Liberty ADM 36/12034 
Advice ADM 36/11173 
Diana ADM 36/11130 
Brune ADM 36/11125 
Juno ADM 36/11034 
Serpent ADM 36/11355 
 
316 
 
Appendix 6.6– Leeward Islands & Jamaica 17937 
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 January February March April May June July August September October November December 
Yearly 
Average 
Jamaica - Number of 
Borne Seamen 
1208.25 1214.75 1022.5 1099.5 1082.0 1125.5 1445.75 947.0 946.75 934.75 1337.5 1509.0 2781.8 
Jamaica - Average 
Number of Men on Sick 
List 
21.0 14.0 15.5 14.75 11.75 12.25 33.25 19.0 11.0 17.75 32.5 22.25  
Jamaica - Total Number 
of Men Dead 
1 0 1 2 1 3 2 6 8 10 13 18  
Leeward - Number of 
Borne Seamen 
666.0 542.5 539.0 1763.0 1763.0 4203.0 3173.75 1247.25 1065.0 1036.0 595.25 534.5 5358.4 
Leeward - Average 
Number of Men on Sick 
List 
33.75 33.0 24.0 15.0 9.25 21.75 18.5 7.75 11.75 52.0 77.25 26.75  
Leeward - Total Number 
of Men Dead 
0 4 0 3 4 10 8 9 19 62 89 18  
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Leeward Islands station 1793 
Trusty ADM 36/11216 
Blanche ADM 36/12176, ADM 36/12177 
Perseus ADM 36/11318 
Fairy ADM 36/11924 
Centurion ADM 36/13833 
Experiment ADM 36/12147 
Woolwich ADM 36/11983 
Nautilus ADM 36/13488 
Vengeance ADM 36/11232 
Ulysses ADM/11268 
Alligator ADM 36/11244 
Hannibal ADM 36/11165 
Duke ADM 36/11168 
Hector ADM 36/11188, ADM 36/11189 
Monarch ADM 36/11747 
Orion ADM 36/11335 
Iphigenia ADM 36/11520 
Rattlesnake ADM 36/11483 
Solebay ADM 36/11324 
Winchelsea ADM 36/11225 
 
Jamaica station 1793 
Europa ADM 36/11272 
Penelope ADM 36/11981 
Proserpine ADM 36/11433 
Hyaena ADM 36/11151 
Hound ADM 36/11338, ADM 36/11339 
Serpent ADM 36/11356 
Fly ADM 36/12291 
Falcon ADM 36/11492 
Helena ADM 36/11498 
Advice ADM 36/11173 
Hermione ADM 36/12009 
La Magicienne ADM 36/13102 
Success ADM 36/13190 
Goelan ADM 36/11259 
Mosquito ADM 36/12001 
Flying Fish ADM 36/12012 
Triton ADM 36/11284 
Alligator ADM 36/11244 
Hannibal ADM 36/11165 
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 January February March April May June July August September October November December 
Yearly 
Average 
Jamaica - Number of 
Borne Seamen 
2186.25 2177.25 2694.25 3102.5 3325 3762.75 3504.25 3296.0 2576.75 2492.5 2270.0 1974.5 2780.2 
Jamaica - Average 
Number of Men on 
Sick List 
14.75 10 60.75 74.25 141.5 112.25 304.75 339.75 226 154.75 114.5 65.5  
Jamaica - Total 
Number of Men Dead 
14 18 21 29 75 208 285 140 86 38 41 12  
Leeward - Number of 
Borne Seamen 
2959.75 3919.75 3897.25 4158.5 3837.75 3149.5 1787.25 1718.25 2298.5 2769.25 3013.5 3017.5 6331.5 
Leeward - Average 
Number of Men on 
Sick List 
15.25 8.25 23.25 38.75 84.75 46.25 20.25 36.0 27.0 37.75 34.0 40.5  
Leeward - Total 
Number of Men Dead 
10 20 54 76 185 62 38 26 49 31 34 40  
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Leeward Islands station 1794 
Bulldog ADM 36/11495, ADM 36/11496 
Seaflower ADM 36/11191 
Resource ADM 36/11528 
Assurance ADM 36/11247 
Vanguard ADM 36/11652 
Berbice ADM 36/11559 
Vesuvius 36/12698 
Roebuck ADM 36/11847, ADM 36/11848 
Dromedary ADM 36/12332 
Zebra ADM 36/11502 
Inspector 36/13466, ADM 36/13467 
Rattlesnake ADM 36/11483 
Irresistible ADM 36/11350, ADM 36/11351 
Asia ADM 36/15474, ADM 36/15475 
Beaulieu ADM 36/11918, ADM 36/11919 
Santa Margarita ADM 36/13156 
Blanche ADM 36/12177 
Boyne ADM 36/11250 
Vengeance ADM 36/11232, ADM 36/11233 
Alarm ADM 36/12367 
Terpsichore ADM 36/12152 
Blonde ADM 36/11389 
Ceres ADM 36/13076 
Winchelsea ADM 36/11225, ADM 36/11226 
Solebay ADM 36/11324, ADM 36/11325 
Rose ADM 36/11317 
Ulysses ADM 36/11268 
Nautilus ADM 36/13488, ADM 36/13489 
Woolwich ADM 36/11984 
Quebec ADM 36/11594 
Experiment ADM 36/12148, ADM 36/12149 
 
Jamaica station 1794 
Irresistible ADM 36/11350, ADM 36/11351 
Iphigenia ADM 36/11520, ADM 36/11521 
Rose ADM 36/11317 
Alligator ADM 36/11244, ADM 36/11245 
Chichester ADM 36/12527 
Marie Antoinette ADM 36/12008 
Serin ADM 36/11992 
Intrepid ADM 36/11377, ADM 36/11378 
Sceptre ADM 36/12272 
Europa ADM 36/11273 
Penelope ADM 36/11981, ADM 36/11982 
Hermione ADM 36/12009, ADM 36/12010 
Magicienne ADM 36/13102, ADM 36/13103 
Success ADM 36/13190, ADM 36/13191 
Hound ADM 36/11339 
Fly ADM 36/12291 
Goelan ADM 36/11259 
Mosquito ADM 36/12001 
Flying Fish ADM 36/12012 
Powerful ADM 36/11212 
Belliqueux ADM 36/11270 
Swan ADM 36/11628 
St Albans ADM 36/12498, ADM 36/12499 
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 January February March April May June July August September October November December 
Yearly 
Average 
Jamaica - Number of 
Borne Seamen 
5599.0 5802.25 6353.0 6277.0 6101.75 6204.0 6890.75 6257.25 5399.5 5839.5 6317.5 5903.0 8211.1 
Jamaica - Average 
Number of Men on 
Sick List 
59.0 39.25 86.75 106.25 99.75 95.0 145.75 151.0 104.5 98.75 77.0 192.25  
Jamaica - Total 
Number of Men 
Dead 
36 24 14 28 25 65 214 115 59 48 46 98  
Leeward - Number of 
Borne Seamen 
3630.75 3875.75 4417.75 4711.75 4483.25 3961.25 3524.5 3266.25 3742.75 3728.5 3443.5 3457.5 5298.9 
Leeward - Average 
Number of Men on 
Sick List 
81.0 75.5 99.0 114.0 89.0 83.75 60.0 49.25 72.0 114.5 150.5 107.25  
Leeward - Total 
Number of Men 
Dead 
13 7 11 17 24 26 20 15 36 74 64 36  
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Leeward Islands station 1798 
Roebuck ADM 36/11851 
Alfred ADM 36/12249 
Tamer ADM 36/14396 
Amphitrite ADM 36/13340 
Prince of Wales ADM 36/12789, ADM 36/12790, ADM 36/12791 
Vengeance ADM 36/12135, ADM 36/12136, ADM 36/12137 
Invincible ADM 36/12412, ADM 36/12733 
Madras ADM 36/13036 
Concorde ADM 36/13908, ADM 36/13909 
L’Aimable ADM 36/11876 
Eurus ADM/14769 
Solebay ADM 36/13333, ADM 36/13334 
Lapwing ADM 36/13725, ADM 36/13726 
La Babet ADM 36/13131, ADM 36/13132 
Matilda ADM 36/12022 
La Per Drix ADM 36/12548 
Victorieuse ADM 36/14721 
Favourite ADM 36/12301, ADM 36/12302 
Bittern ADM 36/13427 
Cyane ADM 36/13439, ADM 36/15058 
Scourge ADM 36/13521, ADM 36/13522 
Beaver ADM 36/13429 
Zephyr ADM 36/13682, ADM 36/13683 
Etrusco ADM 36/14759 
Terror ADM 36/12666 
Requin ADM 36/12783 
Hawke ADM 36/13824, ADM 36/13825 
Santa Margarita ADM 36/15183 
Syren ADM 36/13331, ADM 36/13332 
Pearl ADM 36/13225 
Frederick ADM 36/14261 
 
Jamaica station 1798 
Queen ADM 36/13351, ADM 36/13352 
Brunswick ADM 36/12868, ADM 36/12902 
Valiant ADM 36/12144, ADM 36/12145 
Carnatic ADM 36/13785, ADM 36/13786 
Hannibal ADM 36/13671, ADM 36/13672, ADM 36/13673 
Thunderer ADM 36/13029, ADM 36/13030 
Serpent ADM 36/15019 
Thorn ADM 36/12374 
Pelican ADM 36/15023 
Abergavenny ADM 36/13705, ADM 36/13706 
Severn ADM 36/13002 
Jamaica ADM 36/12685, ADM 36/12686 
Regulus ADM 36/12285, ADM 36/12286 
Renommee ADM 36/13348, ADM 36/13349 
Adventure ADM 36/13623 
Magicienne ADM 36/13106, ADM 36/13107 
Ambuscade ADM 36/14901 
Aquilon ADM 36/15173 
Proselyte ADM 36/13346 
Thames ADM 36/13184, ADM 36/13185 
Drake ADM 36/14999, ADM 36/15000 
Ceres ADM 36/13080, ADM 36/13081 
Tourterelle ADM 36/12026 
Prompte ADM 36/13329 
Stork ADM 36/15134 
Rattler ADM 36/14501 
Diligence ADM 36/13455, ADM 36/14927 
Albacore ADM 36/14987 
Merlin ADM 36/14462 
Grampus ADM 36/15112 
Recovery ADM 36/13681 
Mosquito ADM 36/12001 
Acasta ADM 36/14474 
Dromedary ADM 36/15151, ADM 36/15152 
Sparrow ADM 36/14268 
Greyhound ADM 36/15084, ADM 36/15085 
Alarm ADM 36/14729 
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La Legere ADM 36/14585 
Maidstone ADM 36/13201, ADM 36/13202 
York ADM 36/13790 
Sheerness ADM 36/12990 
Trent ADM 36/15226 
Amaranthe ADM 36/14983 
Lark ADM 36/14565, ADM 36/14566 
Roebuck ADM 36/11851 
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 January February March April May June July August September October November December 
Yearly 
Average 
Jamaica - Number of 
Borne Seamen 
4552.75 4511.5 4531.0 4530.5 3892.25 3522.25 3551.5 3652.5 3440.0 3649.0 3556.75 3733.25 5585.2 
Jamaica - Average 
Number of Men on Sick 
List 
58.5 54.5 46.25 35.5 33.75 25.5 37.25 58 33.5 34.5 41.75 35.5  
Jamaica - Total Number 
of Men Dead 
18 21 9 5 11 7 59 101 55 32 44 32  
Leeward - Number of 
Borne Seamen 
2517.25 2541.75 2288.5 1894.5 1935.75 2101.25 2270.0 2488.5 2294.5 2239.5 2243.75 2329.0 3149.7 
Leeward - Average 
Number of Men on Sick 
List 
22.5 34.25 25.5 27.75 31.25 38.25 39.5 66.25 70.25 81.5 102.0 104.0  
Leeward - Total 
Number of Men Dead 
6 5 15 7 13 8 20 12 23 20 37 25  
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Leeward Islands station 1803 
Chichester ADM 36/16690, ADM 36/16691 
Centaur ADM 36/15686, ADM 36/15685 
Excellent ADM 36/15238 
Emerald ADM 36/15558 
Venus ADM 36/15659, ADM 36/15660 
Castor ADM 36/15030 
Heureux ADM 36/16223, ADM 36/16224 
Hornet ADM 36/15649 
Cyane ADM 36/15843, ADM 36/15844 
Surinam ADM 36/15561 
Osprey ADM 36/16400 
Drake ADM 36/15525, ADM 36/15526 
Guachupin ADM 36/16395 
Ulysses ADM 36/15646, ADM 36/15647 
L’Eclair ADM 36/15518 
Asp ADM 36/15482 
Steady ADM 36/14204 
Blenheim ADM 36/15569, ADM 36/15570 
Fairy ADM 36/17087 
Busy ADM 36/15607 
St Lucia ADM 36/17118 
Serapis ADM 36/15661 
Netley ADM 36/15521, ADM 36/16588 
 
Jamaica station 1803 
Leviathan ADM 36/14757 
Bellerophon ADM 36/15590 
Theseus ADM 36/15987, ADM 36/15988 
Vanguard ADM 36/16031, ADM 36/16032 
Goliath ADM 36/14820, ADM 36/15826 
Ganges ADM 36/15395 
Elephant ADM 36/15551 
Hunter ADM 36/17100 
Racoon ADM 36/16193, ADM 36/16194 
Pique ADM 36/16825 
Cumberland ADM 36/15492, ADM 36/15493, ADM 36/15494 
Trent ADM 36/15230 
Desiree ADM 36/15593, ADM 36/15594 
Tartar ADM 36/16390 
Aeolus ADM 36/15596, ADM 36/15597 
Garland ADM 36/14870 
Shark ADM 36/17186 
Calypso ADM 36/15004 
Echo ADM 36/17073 
Pelican ADM 36/16047, ADM 36/16048 
Snake ADM 36/15048, ADM 36/16386 
Stork ADM 36/17193, ADM 36/17194 
Revolutionaire ADM 36/16839 
Santa Margarita ADM 36/15187 
Hercule ADM 36/15643 
Port Mahon ADM 36/17135, ADM 36/17136 
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APPENDIX 7 
Copy of the Contract between the Sick and Hurt Board and Henry Lascelles for Antigua and Barbados, 
4 May 17441 
 
Contracted and agreed this 4th day of May 1744, with the Commissioners for taking Care of Sick and 
Wounded Seamen and for exchanging Prisoners or War, for and on the behalf of His Majesty on the 
one Part, and Mr Henry Lascelles of London Merchant, on the other part; That the said Henry 
Lascelles doth promise and oblige himself, to provide on the Island of Antigua and also on the Island 
of Barbados, an able Surgeon to take upon him, the care and cure of such Sick and Wounded Men, as 
shall be set on Shore on the those Islands, from any of His Majesty’s Ships; for which he is to be 
allowed thirteen shillings and four pence Sterling Money for each man, during the Time of their being 
on Shore; and the said Henry Lascelles doth likewise contract and agree, that every Man so set Sick on 
Shore, shall be supplied with Quarters, Fresh Beef, Mutton Broth or any other necessary Provisions, as 
shall be thought by the Surgeon or Doctor convenient for them, and that each Man shall be allowed 
one Pound of good wholesome bread, one pound of good and wholesome Fresh Meat, and one pint of 
good and sound Madeira Wine, or in lieu thereof, one Pint of Punch, to those whom the Doctor or 
Surgeon shall judge proper, with Butter according to the Custom of the Navy.  And those so weak as 
meat shall not be judged fit for, are to have Rice, Eggs, Cheese or any other Provision, in such 
proportion as shall be sufficient for their maintenance, as the Doctor or Surgeon shall prescribe, and 
the said Henry Lascelles doth likewise contract and agree to find Fire, Water, Candles, Platters, Spoons 
and Soap, and the expense of washing, as also proper person that can speak English, as Nurses to 
attend them, during the Time of their being in the Hospital, so that His Majesty shall not be at any 
other charge whatsoever than thirteen shillings and four pence beforementioned for the Care and Cure 
of each Man, and two shillings and to pence sterling per man a day for the provisions and necessarys 
and one shilling extra for the first twenty days for those men that shall happen to have the small Pox 
and ten shillings for the funeral of each man that shall die in the Hospital.  For which the 
commissioners for taking care of Sick and Wounded and for Exchanging Prisoners of War, for and on 
the behalf of His Majesty, do covenant and agree to pay unto the said Henry Lascelles the several 
process before mentioned, for supplying the said Sick and Wounded Men so sent on Shore as aforesaid 
and that the said Henry Lascelles at the end of each Quarter, send home his Accounts and Vouchers 
and drawn Bills of Exchange for the amount of them, upon the Commissioners for taking Care of Sick 
and Wounded Seamen and for exchanging the Prisoners of War, which Bills are to be attested by the 
Commander in Chief of His Majesty’s Ships at the aforesaid Islands for the time being.  This Contract 
to subsist for twelve months certain from the Twenty ninth day of September next ensuing the date 
hereof, and until six months warning shall be given on either side.  But as by this contract, the said 
Henry Lascelles is to have Six Pence per man per day, more than he had by the last, merely in 
Consideration of the great advance on the Prices of Provisions in the said Islands, by Reason of the 
present War with France and Spain.  It is therefore expressly agreed by and between the Partys hereto, 
that whenever those Exorbitant Prices of Provisions do abate, of which abatement the said Henry 
                                                                
1 NMM, ADM/F/8, 16 May 1746. 
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Lascelles promises and engages himself to acquaint the said Commissioners, so soon as the same shall 
come to his knowledge, the above rate of two shillings and two pence per man per day, shall be 
reduced according to such abatements, any thing herein to the Contrary notwithstanding to which, each 
party has interchangeably set their Hands and Seals the day and Year before written. 
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APPENDIX 8 
Estimate for erecting a hospital at Barbados submitted by Commodore Hood in 18041 
 
57,500 Superficial feet of pitch pine lumber in the sills, plates, cirders, tie beams, 
braces, principal rafters, small rafters, principal post, small post, flooring joint 
and boards @ £20 per no. 
£1150/-/- 
36,500 Superficial feet white pine plank and boards in boarding the sides, end roof 
door and window shutters 
£450/-/- 
11,500 Cypress shingles for shingling sides etc £431/5/- 
10,000 Of 20dy flooring boards £18/15/- 
25,000 10” Nails £27..5..7½  
250,000 6” Nails for shingling £109..7..6 
300 Lbs Spikes £15..0..0 
18 Pairs large hinges for  £16..17..6 
100 Pairs small hinges for windows £50..0..0 
100 Pairs of hooks & staples for windows £6..5..0 
50 Pair stay bars for windows £7..16..3 
2 Door locks £1..5..0 
115 Square of workmanship on sides, ends and roof £460..0..0 
115 Square of shingling £57..10..0 
25 Square bottom flooring £100..0..0 
25 Square top floor, grooved and tongued £125..0..0 
625 Days labour attending carpenters while framing £78..5..0 
270 Days ditto attending ditto shingling £33..15..00 
56 Cubical yards masonry in the foundation £175..0..0 
 Carriage of 93,500 feet lumber from Bridge Town to the place the building is 
intended to be erected 
£116..17..6 
22,750 Superficial feet of pitch pine lumber in sills, plates, girders, floor joints & 
boards 
£455..0..0 
8,500 Feet of white pine plank boards for the roof £106..5..0 
27,000 Cypress shingles £105..0..0 
5,000 Of 20” Nails £4..13..9 
10,000 Of 10” Nails £6..17..6 
54,000 Of 6” Nails £23..12..6 
55 Square of workmanship panning £82..10..0 
25 Square workmanship grooved and tongued £125..0..0 
30 Square roofing £45..0..0 
30 Square shingling £15..0..0 
3,000 Of 12” square tiles for bottom floor £187..10..0 
50 Days for a man laying tiles £12..10..0 
250 Days labourers attending £31..5..0 
 Carriage 31,250 feet of lumber £39..1..3 
 TOTAL BARBADOS CURRENCY £4669..9..4½  
 AS STERLING @ 132 ½ PER CENT £3524..2..6 
 ADD FOR PAINTING & CONTINGENCIES NOT SUBJECT TO EXACT 
COMPUTATION 5 PER CENT 
£186..4..1 
 TOTAL STERLING £3710..6..7 
 
                                                                
1 NMM, ADM/F/36, Commodore Hood to Admiralty, 5 November 1804 
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